New research on Police and Crime Commissioners finds postcode lottery in accountability

Some PCCs "ill-equipped", leaving accountability "hinging on luck", research finds

  • Date

    Wed 28 Apr 21

In the run-up to May's elections, new research has found stark differences in the calibre of Police and Crime Commissioners, with some "ill equipped", leaving police accountability "hinging on luck".

New research, based on exclusive interviews with high-ranking figures from across UK policing, suggests a postcode lottery in police accountability. The calibre of individual Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) is seen as the key factor in ensuring adequate oversight, with stark differences exposed between forces.

Dr Simon Cooper, from our School of Law, gained unprecedented access to key figures from all sides, on condition of their anonymity. He interviewed PCCs, Chief Constables and members of Police and Crime Panels [PCPs] in five police forces, as well as one of the persons directly involved with introducing the current system and one of the most senior figures in policing at a national level.

While Dr Cooper’s findings, published in Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, support the argument that the current system can work, he identifies a “significant anomaly”, with accountability dependent on the relative strengths of PCCs and Chief Constables and the relationship between the two. Success, in this respect, can be seen to “hinge on luck”.

Dr Cooper said: “These findings suggest a significant variation in how police accountability is administered around the country. While one Chief Constable described being regularly ‘grilled’ by their PCC, some Commissioners are seen as ill-equipped, ill-prepared and potentially ego-driven. The importance placed by the system on these single individuals suggests there is a real possibility that some Chief Constables are being held to account more effectively than others.”

One Chief Constable, identified as Chief Constable D, outlined the issues that exist when dealing with their elected PCC, contrasting it with the previous ‘tripartite’ structure, where Chief Constables would report to the Home Secretary and their local Police Authority: “…there is a significant risk that the relationship (between PCC and CC) either becomes excessively hostile, excessively friendly or… there isn’t the balance, additional questioning or informing of the debate that a wider group would give. (…) Because of poor safeguards and governance arrangements it too quickly descends into personalities and subjectivity in which accountability becomes likeability, becomes re-electability. Accountability becomes all of those things it shouldn’t.”

Another Chief Constable, Chief Constable C, underlined the importance of the PCC-CC relationship, noting the impact of individual experience and characters: “I have seen evidence of PCCs who are ill equipped and ill prepared and actually don’t have the skills to understand big organisations making sweeping statements and making assumptions about individuals without any basis what so ever. I have also seen Chief Constables that do not want to adapt to a new way of working and will be very obstructive towards PCCs.”

Summarising the impact on oversight, Police and Crime Commissioner D asked: “The question is can a PCC be played by a Chief Constable? They clearly could be and some I suspect are. I am quite sure that there are some Chief Constables who just play lip service to their PCC.”

The current system was seen by some as placing an impractical burden on one individual. The lack of a ‘pool of different views’ limits opportunities for the PCC to moderate their thoughts and has the potential to leave the PCC either exposed or guided by advice from others, with no formal oversight role. PCC A commented: “Presumably if it’s something they (the PCC) didn’t know a lot about they talk to a lot of people about it but you don’t see any of those conversations played out.”

In reality, one senior figure, Person Z, was left questioning the original design of the PCC system: “For one person, even though they are elected, to replace the wisdom and contribution of 19 [Police Authority members] is a tall ask. There’s only one person [the PCC] providing scrutiny [of Chief Constables] and that’s a heavy responsibility, so in terms of scrutiny of course it’s a lot less. Palpably has it worked? No… I suspect PCCs might, in hindsight, be regarded as a blunder.”

Dr Cooper says his findings suggest a need for the Home Secretary to review the Policing Protocol and for an Accountability Code of Practice to be issued.

Dr Cooper said: “This research encourages the Home Secretary to exercise their power and urgently review The Policing Protocol Order. In its current form, the PPO is overly broad, presumption-based, loosely-worded and generic, with a resulting impact on accountability.”

Dr Cooper’s research is published at a time of continuing debate on police accountability. The Police Foundation recently launched a Strategic Review, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services recommended “profound and far reaching police reform” and there have been calls for a Royal Commission.

Dr Cooper’s research also found that in some instances the PCC model is viewed favourably when contrasted with its forerunner, with the previous bureaucracy and resulting backlog replaced by a “single point of decision-making” and a greater “visibility” of the decision-making process at a local level.

Other interviewees, however, suggested such appearances could be deceptive. PCC E commented: “We have gained in terms of visibility but lost in terms of detailed scrutiny that the Police Authority was capable of.”