Competing for Attention: Quality Provision in Digital Markets by Ricardo Alonso

Join us for another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Summer Term 2026.

Ricardo Alonso, from the London School of Economics and Political Science will present this week's Microeconomics Seminar on Competing for Attention: Quality Provision in Digital Markets.

Abstract

We consider creators who produce vertically-differentiated digital goods—interpreted here as videos—and compete for scarce consumer attention. To reach consumers, creators can distribute independently—keeping all ad revenue—or join a monopolistic platform that retains a share. Because the endogenous quality is an experience good, a key service the platform provides is ranking these goods and streaming them as a function of their rank. Ranking and streaming creates a tournament: raising quality moves a creator earlier in the feed, possibly increasing views. Creators and consumers take these incentives into consideration when making their choices, in particular, whether to join the platform. We solve for the platform’s optimal streaming algorithm and show how the platform’s payment to creators and the streaming algorithm affect quality competition, the platform’s profit, and consumer and creator surplus.

This seminar will be held in the Economics Common Room on Thursday 14 May at 11.00am. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public.

To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.