Event

Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals by Vincent Anesi

Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Spring Term 2022

  • Mon 14 Mar 22

    16:00 - 17:30

  • Online

    Zoom

  • Event speaker

    Vincent Anesi

  • Event type

    Lectures, talks and seminars
    Microeconomics Research Seminar Series

  • Event organiser

    Economics, Department of

Join Vincent Anesi as they present research on Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals

Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals by Vincent Anesi

Join us for the another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Spring Term 2022

Vincent Anesi, from the Department of Economics and Management at the University of Luxembourg, will present research on Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals. 

Abstract 

A group of principals collectively and sequentially screen an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous values from the relationship that may evolve over time. At each date, the principals use a collective decision rule to propose a contract to the agent. We unearth circumstances in which every non-dictatorial decision rule yields inefficiency in the form of excessive learning: relative to a single-principal benchmark, collective principals screen the agent too aggressively. They do so in order to reduce uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, and alleviate dynamic conflicts of interest between the principals that exist regardless of their static alignment. 

This seminar will be held at 4pm on Zoom. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public. To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.

 

A lady handling money
Contact the seminar organisers
Dr Ahrash Dianat Department of Economics
University of Essex
Dr Aditya Kuvalekar Department of Economics
University of Essex

Related events