Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals by Vincent Anesi

Join us for the another event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Spring Term 2022

Vincent Anesi, from the Department of Economics and Management at the University of Luxembourg, will present research on Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals. 

Abstract 

A group of principals collectively and sequentially screen an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous values from the relationship that may evolve over time. At each date, the principals use a collective decision rule to propose a contract to the agent. We unearth circumstances in which every non-dictatorial decision rule yields inefficiency in the form of excessive learning: relative to a single-principal benchmark, collective principals screen the agent too aggressively. They do so in order to reduce uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, and alleviate dynamic conflicts of interest between the principals that exist regardless of their static alignment. 

This seminar will be held at 4pm on Zoom. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public. To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.