Signalling with Private Monitoring

Join us for the next event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Summer Term 2021.

Aaron Kolb from the Kelley School of Business, at Indiana University will present their paper on Signalling with Private Monitoring.

Abstract

We study dynamic signalling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A long-run player signals her type continuously over time to a myopic second player who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the myopic player transmits his private inferences back through an imperfect public signal of his actions. Preferences are linear-quadratic and the information structure is Gaussian.

We construct linear Markov equilibria using belief states up to the long-run player's second-order belief. Because of the private monitoring, this state is an explicit function of the long-run player's past play. A novel separation effect then emerges through this second-order belief channel, altering the traditional signalling that arises when beliefs are public. Applications to models of leadership, reputation, and trading are examined. 

This seminar will be held via webinar. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public. To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.