A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design by Marek Pycia

Join us for this week's event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Summer Term 2021

Professor Marek Pycia from the Department of Economics, University of Zurich., will present their research on A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design.

Abstract 

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current perspective. Agents may update their so-called strategic plan as the game progresses, and, at any point, for the called-for action to be simply dominant, it must lead to unambiguously better outcomes, no matter what occurs at non-simple histories. We use our approach to simplicity to provide characterizations of simple mechanisms in general social choice environments both with and without trans[1]fers, including canonical mechanisms such as ascending auctions, posted prices, and serial dictatorship-style mechanisms. As a final application, we explain the widespread popularity of the well-known Random Priority mechanism by characterizing it as the unique mechanism that is efficient, fair, and simple to play.

This seminar will be held via Zoom on Monday 10th May at 4pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public. To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.