Optimal Feedback in Contests by George Georgiadis

Join us for this week's event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Summer Term 2021

Dr George Georgiadis from Kellogg School of Management, will present their research on Optimal Feedback in Constests.

Abstract 

We derive optimal contests for environments where output takes the form of breakthroughs and the principal has an informational advantage over the contestants. Whether or not the principal is able to provide real-time feedback to contestants, the optimal prize allocation is egalitarian: all agents who have succeeded in a pre-specified time interval share the prize equally. When providing feedback is feasible, the optimal contest takes a stark cyclical form: contestants are fully apprised of their own success, and at the end of each fixed-length cycle, they are informed about peer success as well.

This seminar will be held via Zoom on Wednesday 5th May at 4pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public. To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.