Dr Carmine Ventre
-
Email
c.ventre@essex.ac.uk -
Telephone
+44 (0) 1206 873851
-
Location
1NW.3.17, Colchester Campus
-
Academic support hours
Thu 10-12 or by appointment
Profile
Biography
Carmine Ventre is a reader in CSEE. After gaining a summa cum laude Laurea in Computer Science degree (BSc plus MSc equivalent) he began PhD research in 2003 and was awarded his PhD in 2007, defending a thesis on theoretical advances in the design of incentive-compatible mechanisms. Subsequently, he took post-doctoral research positions in Italy at first and later at the University of Liverpool working on proposals funded by EU, DFG and EPSRC. He has been a lecturer first and a reader then at Teesside University between 2012 and 2016. He joined Essex in December 2016. Carmine is author of more than 50 refereed articles in Algorithmic Game Theory (AGT) and Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD), having published in world leading conferences and journals of Theoretical Computer Science (TCS), Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Economics. He has received the best paper prize award at the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013) for his work on mechanism design for combinatorial auctions. He is very active in the international research community, has sat on the program committees of several conferences and for the past few years has been involved with the organization of AGT@IJCAI, an annual AGT workshop held at one of the top AI venues.
Qualifications
-
PhD in Computer Science Università degli Studi di Salerno,
-
Laurea (MSc equiv) Università degli Studi di Salerno,
Appointments
University of Essex
-
Director of CCFEA, University of Essex (1/12/2016 - present)
-
Ethics officer, CSEE, University of Essex (1/8/2017 - present)
-
Reader, CSEE, University of Essex (1/12/2016 - present)
Other academic
-
Reader, Teesside University (1/1/2012 - 30/11/2016)
-
Research associate, University of Liverpool (1/12/2007 - 31/12/2011)
-
Assegnista di ricerca, Università degli Studi di Salerno (1/9/2006 - 30/11/2007)
Research and professional activities
Research interests
Algorithmic Game Theory; Algorithms and Complexity; Cryptography and security; AI for finance and trading
Teaching and supervision
Current supervision
Previous supervision
Degree subject: Computational Finance
Degree type: Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded date: 6/12/2018
Degree subject: Computational Finance
Degree type: Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded date: 5/11/2018
Degree subject: Computational Finance
Degree type: Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded date: 24/8/2018
Degree subject: Computational Finance
Degree type: Master of Science (by Dissertation)
Awarded date: 23/1/2018
Publications
Journal articles (20)
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2019). Metastability of the Logit Dynamics for Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games. ACM Transactions on Algorithms. 15 (2), 1-42
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2019). Social pressure in opinion dynamics. Theoretical Computer Science
Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2018). The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design. The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 62, 459-488
Gatti, N., Rocco, M., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2018). Towards Better Models of Externalities in Sponsored Search Auctions. Theoretical Computer Science. 745, 150-162
Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2017). Combinatorial Auctions Without Money. Algorithmica. 77 (3), 756-785
Ferraioli, D., Goldberg, PW. and Ventre, C., (2016). Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games. Theoretical Computer Science. 648, 96-115
Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2016). Heterogeneous facility location without money. Theoretical Computer Science. 636, 27-46
Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable. Theoretical Computer Science. 571 (C), 21-35
Krysta, P., Telelis, O. and Ventre, C., (2015). Mechanisms for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 53, 721-744
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. Games and Economic Behavior. 86, 491-509
Grandoni, F., Krysta, P., Leonardi, S. and Ventre, C., (2014). Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multiobjective Optimization. SIAM Journal on Computing. 43 (4), 1263-1290
Ventre, C., (2014). Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification. Theoretical Computer Science. 518, 64-79
Goldberg, PW., Savani, R., Sørensen, TB. and Ventre, C., (2013). On the approximation performance of fictitious play in finite games. International Journal of Game Theory. 42 (4), 1059-1083
Goldberg, LA., Goldberg, PW., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2013). Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies. Theoretical Computer Science. 476, 24-37
Briest, P., Gualà, L., Hoefer, M. and Ventre, C., (2012). On stackelberg pricing with computationally bounded customers. Networks. 60 (1), 31-44
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2012). Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions. ACM Transactions on Computation Theory. 4 (2), 1-17
Auletta, V., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2011). Alternatives to truthfulness are hard to recognize. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 22 (1), 200-216
Auletta, V., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2011). A response to “Mechanism Design with Partial Verification and Revelation Principle”. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 22 (1), 224-224
Ferrante, A., Parlato, G., Sorrentino, F. and Ventre, C., (2009). Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification. Theoretical Computer Science. 410 (8-10), 886-899
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2004). Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions in Wireless Networks. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). 3104, 255-266
Conferences (44)
Culley, C., Qi, J. and Ventre, C., How to get the most from goods donated to charities (Extended abstract)
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation (Extended abstract)
Kyropoulou, M. and Ventre, C., (2019). Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms without Money for Scheduling
Serafino, P., Ventre, C. and Vidali, A., (2019). Truthfulness on a Budget: Trading Money for Approximation through Monitoring
Ferraioli, D., Ventre, C. and Machinery, AC., (2019). Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation
Culley, C., Qi, J., Ventre, C. and Machinery, AC., (2019). How to Get the Most from Goods Donated to Charities
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms (Extended abstract)
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic verification for obviously strategyproof mechanisms
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2017). Social Pressure in Opinion Games
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2017). Obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2017). Obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations (extended abstract)
Gatti, N., Rocco, M., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2016). Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions
Ferraioli, D., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2016). What to Verify for Optimal Truthful Mechanisms without Money
Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). Truthful mechanisms without money for non-utilitarian heterogeneous facility location
Ferraioli, D., Ventre, C. and Aranyi, G., (2015). A mechanism design approach to measure awareness
Kovács, A., Meyer, U. and Ventre, C., (2015). Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation
Krysta, P., Telelis, O. and Ventre, C., (2015). Near-optimal approximation mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions
Gatti, N., Rocco, M., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). Cascade model with contextual externalities and bounded user memory for sponsored search auctions
Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). The power of verification for greedy mechanism design
Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2015). Metastability of Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games
Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Heterogeneous facility location without money on the line
Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Truthful mechanisms for the location of different facilities
Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Combinatorial Auctions without money
Goldberg, PW. and Ventre, C., (2013). Using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue
Krysta, P., Telelis, O. and Ventre, C., (2013). Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods
Ferraioli, D., Goldberg, PW. and Ventre, C., (2012). Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games
Goldberg, PW., Savani, R., Sørensen, TB. and Ventre, C., (2011). On the Approximation Performance of Fictitious Play in Finite Games
Grandoni, F., Krysta, P., Leonardi, S. and Ventre, C., (2010). Utilitarian mechanism design for multi-objective optimization
Goldberg, LA., Goldberg, PW., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2010). Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies
Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2010). Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractable
Briest, P., Hoefer, M., Gualà, L. and Ventre, C., (2009). On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers
Ventre, C. and Visconti, I., (2009). Co-sound Zero-Knowledge with Public Keys
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2009). Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Ventre, C. and Visconti, I., (2008). Completely Non-malleable Encryption Revisited
Auletta, V., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2008). Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2008). Collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification yielding optimal solutions
Auletta, V., De Prisco, R., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2006). New Constructions of Mechanisms with Verification
Ventre, C., (2006). Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2006). The Algorithmic Structure of Group Strategyproof Budget-Balanced Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
Ferrante, A., Parlato, G., Sorrentino, F. and Ventre, C., (2006). Improvements for Truthful Mechanisms with Verifiable One-Parameter Selfish Agents
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2005). Free-Riders in Steiner Tree Cost-Sharing Games
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2005). More Powerful and Simpler Cost-Sharing Methods
Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2004). Energy-efficient broadcasting in ad-hoc networks: Combining MSTs with shortest-path trees
Grants and funding
2019
Intra-document analysis that lead to profit and performance optimisation
Stephenson Harwood
2017
Incentives without monetary transfers
Engineering & Physical Sciences Res.Council
The project investigates the use of algorithms (genetic + reinforcement) to provide accurate forecasts of asset prices.
Innovate UK (formerly Technology Strategy Board)
Contact
Academic support hours:
Thu 10-12 or by appointment