Dr Carmine Ventre

Kwang-Hua, CR., Li, H-C., Polukarov, M., Ventre, C. and Li, Z-H., (2022). Note on electron energy can oscillate near a crystal dislocation. Physica B: Condensed Matter. 632, 413766-413766

Fang, F., Ventre, C., Basios, M., Kanthan, L., Martinez-Rego, D., Wu, F. and Li, L., (2022). Cryptocurrency trading: a comprehensive survey. Financial Innovation. 8 (1)

Black, E., Brandão, M., Cocarascu, O., De Keijzer, B., Du, Y., Long, D., Luck, M., McBurney, P., Meroño-Peñuela, A., Miles, S., Modgil, S., Moreau, L., Polukarov, M., Rodrigues, O. and Ventre, C., (2022). Reasoning and interaction for social artificial intelligence. AI Communications. 35 (4), 309-325

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2021). Approximation Guarantee of OSP Mechanisms: The Case of Machine Scheduling and Facility Location. Algorithmica. 83 (2), 695-725

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2019). Metastability of the Logit Dynamics for Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games. ACM Transactions on Algorithms. 15 (2), 1-42

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2019). Social pressure in opinion dynamics. Theoretical Computer Science. 795, 345-361

Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2018). The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design. The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 62, 459-488

Gatti, N., Rocco, M., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2018). Towards Better Models of Externalities in Sponsored Search Auctions. Theoretical Computer Science. 745, 150-162

Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2017). Combinatorial Auctions Without Money. Algorithmica. 77 (3), 756-785

Ferraioli, D., Goldberg, PW. and Ventre, C., (2016). Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games. Theoretical Computer Science. 648, 96-115

Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2016). Heterogeneous facility location without money. Theoretical Computer Science. 636, 27-46

Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable. Theoretical Computer Science. 571 (C), 21-35

Krysta, P., Telelis, O. and Ventre, C., (2015). Mechanisms for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 53, 721-744

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. Games and Economic Behavior. 86, 491-509

Grandoni, F., Krysta, P., Leonardi, S. and Ventre, C., (2014). Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multiobjective Optimization. SIAM Journal on Computing. 43 (4), 1263-1290

Ventre, C., (2014). Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification. Theoretical Computer Science. 518, 64-79

Goldberg, PW., Savani, R., Sørensen, TB. and Ventre, C., (2013). On the approximation performance of fictitious play in finite games. International Journal of Game Theory. 42 (4), 1059-1083

Goldberg, LA., Goldberg, PW., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2013). Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies. Theoretical Computer Science. 476, 24-37

Briest, P., Gualà, L., Hoefer, M. and Ventre, C., (2012). On stackelberg pricing with computationally bounded customers. Networks. 60 (1), 31-44

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2012). Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions. ACM Transactions on Computation Theory. 4 (2), 1-17

Auletta, V., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2011). Alternatives to truthfulness are hard to recognize. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 22 (1), 200-216

Auletta, V., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2011). A response to “Mechanism Design with Partial Verification and Revelation Principle”. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 22 (1), 224-224

Ferrante, A., Parlato, G., Sorrentino, F. and Ventre, C., (2009). Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification. Theoretical Computer Science. 410 (8-10), 886-899

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2004). Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions in Wireless Networks. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). 3104, 255-266

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2023). On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality

Thorburn, L., Polukarov, M. and Ventre, C., (2023). Error in the Euclidean Preference Model

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2023). Explicit Payments for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms

Archbold, T., de Keijzer, B. and Ventre, C., (2023). Non-Obviously Manipulable Mechanism Design for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral Trade

Archbold, T., de Keijzer, B. and Ventre, C., (2023). Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents

Thorburn, L., Polukarov, M. and Ventre, C., (2023). Error in the Euclidean Preference Model

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2023). Mechanism Design: (Ir)Rationality and Obvious Strategyproofness

Zhao, L., Polukarov, M. and Ventre, C., (2023). Liquidity and Solvency Risks in Financial Networks

Li, H., Polukarov, M. and Ventre, C., (2023). Detecting Financial Market Manipulation with Statistical Physics Tools

WANG, Z., Ventre, C. and Polukarov, M., (2023). Robust Market Making: To Quote, or not To Quote

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2022). Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation

Ferraioli, D., Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2022). Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality

Ioannidis, SD., de Keijzer, B. and Ventre, C., (2022). Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Derivatives

Liu, B., Polukarov, M., Ventre, C., Li, L., Kanthan, L., Wu, F. and Basios, M., (2022). The Spoofing Resistance of Frequent Call Markets

Zhu, Y. and Ventre, C., (2022). Irrational Behaviour and Globalisation

Alden, A., Ventre, C., Horvath, B. and Lee, G., (2022). Model-Agnostic Pricing of Exotic Derivatives Using Signatures

Qi, J. and Ventre, C., (2022). Incentivising Market Making in Financial Markets

Ma, Y., Ventre, C. and Polukarov, M., (2022). Denoised Labels for Financial Time Series Data via Self-Supervised Learning

Liu, C., Ventre, C. and Polukarov, M., (2022). Synthetic Data Augmentation for Deep Reinforcement Learning in Financial Trading

Ioannidis, SD., de Keijzer, B. and Ventre, C., (2022). Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Priorities

Liu, B., Polukarov, M., Ventre, C., Li, L. and Kanthan, L., (2021). Call markets with adaptive clearing intervals

Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2021). Efficient Truthful Scheduling and Resource Allocation through Monitoring

Gong, Z., Ventre, C. and O'Hara, J., (2021). The efficient hedging frontier with deep neural networks

Liu, B., Polukarov, M., Ventre, C., Li, L. and Kanthan, L., (2021). Agent-based markets

Serafino, P., Ventre, C. and Vidali, A., (2020). Truthfulness on a Budget: Trading Money for Approximation through Monitoring

De Keijzer, B., Kyropoulou, M. and Ventre, C., (2020). Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions

Ferraioli, D., Meier, A., Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2020). Novel paradigm for the design of obviously strategyproof mechanisms

Gong, Z., Ventre, C. and O'Hara, J., (2020). Classifying high-frequency FX rate movements with technical indicators and inception model

Kyropoulou, M. and Ventre, C., (2019). Obviously strategyproof mechanisms without money for scheduling

Culley, C., Qi, J. and Ventre, C., (2019). How to get the most from goods donated to charities

Kyropoulou, M., Ventre, C. and Zhang, X., (2019). Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location

Serafino, P., Ventre, C., Tran-Thanh, L., Zhang, J., An, B. and Jennings, N., (2019). Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2019). Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation

Ferraioli, D., Meier, A., Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2019). Automated Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Set Systems

Serafino, P., Ventre, C. and Vidali, A., (2019). Truthfulness on a budget: Trading money for approximation through monitoring

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms (Extended abstract)

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic verification for obviously strategyproof mechanisms

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic verification for Obviously strategyproof mechanisms

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2017). Social Pressure in Opinion Games

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2017). Obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2017). Obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations (extended abstract)

Gatti, N., Rocco, M., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2016). Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions

Ferraioli, D., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2016). What to Verify for Optimal Truthful Mechanisms without Money

Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). Truthful mechanisms without money for non-utilitarian heterogeneous facility location

Ferraioli, D., Ventre, C. and Aranyi, G., (2015). A mechanism design approach to measure awareness

Kovács, A., Meyer, U. and Ventre, C., (2015). Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation

Krysta, P., Telelis, O. and Ventre, C., (2015). Near-optimal approximation mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions

Gatti, N., Rocco, M., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). Cascade model with contextual externalities and bounded user memory for sponsored search auctions

Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). The power of verification for greedy mechanism design

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2015). Metastability of Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games

Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Heterogeneous facility location without money on the line

Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Truthful mechanisms for the location of different facilities

Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Combinatorial Auctions without money

Goldberg, PW. and Ventre, C., (2013). Using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue

Krysta, P., Telelis, O. and Ventre, C., (2013). Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods

Ferraioli, D., Goldberg, PW. and Ventre, C., (2012). Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games

Goldberg, PW., Savani, R., Sørensen, TB. and Ventre, C., (2011). On the Approximation Performance of Fictitious Play in Finite Games

Grandoni, F., Krysta, P., Leonardi, S. and Ventre, C., (2010). Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multi-Objective Optimization

Goldberg, LA., Goldberg, PW., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2010). Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies

Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2010). Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractable

Briest, P., Hoefer, M., Gualà, L. and Ventre, C., (2009). On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers

Ventre, C. and Visconti, I., (2009). Co-sound Zero-Knowledge with Public Keys

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2009). Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification

Ventre, C. and Visconti, I., (2008). Completely Non-malleable Encryption Revisited

Auletta, V., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2008). Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2008). Collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification yielding optimal solutions

Auletta, V., De Prisco, R., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2006). New Constructions of Mechanisms with Verification

Ventre, C., (2006). Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2006). The Algorithmic Structure of Group Strategyproof Budget-Balanced Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

Ferrante, A., Parlato, G., Sorrentino, F. and Ventre, C., (2006). Improvements for Truthful Mechanisms with Verifiable One-Parameter Selfish Agents

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2005). Free-Riders in Steiner Tree Cost-Sharing Games

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2005). More Powerful and Simpler Cost-Sharing Methods

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2004). Energy-efficient broadcasting in ad-hoc networks: Combining MSTs with shortest-path trees

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2004). Energy-efficient broadcasting in ad-hoc networks