People

Dr Carmine Ventre

Reader
School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering (CSEE)
Dr Carmine Ventre
  • Email

  • Telephone

    +44 (0) 1206 873851

  • Location

    1NW.3.17, Colchester Campus

  • Academic support hours

    Thu 10-12 or by appointment

Profile

Biography

Carmine Ventre is a reader in CSEE. After gaining a summa cum laude Laurea in Computer Science degree (BSc plus MSc equivalent) he began PhD research in 2003 and was awarded his PhD in 2007, defending a thesis on theoretical advances in the design of incentive-compatible mechanisms. Subsequently, he took post-doctoral research positions in Italy at first and later at the University of Liverpool working on proposals funded by EU, DFG and EPSRC. He has been a lecturer first and a reader then at Teesside University between 2012 and 2016. He joined Essex in December 2016. Carmine is author of more than 50 refereed articles in Algorithmic Game Theory (AGT) and Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD), having published in world leading conferences and journals of Theoretical Computer Science (TCS), Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Economics. He has received the best paper prize award at the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013) for his work on mechanism design for combinatorial auctions. He is very active in the international research community, has sat on the program committees of several conferences and for the past few years has been involved with the organization of AGT@IJCAI, an annual AGT workshop held at one of the top AI venues.

Qualifications

  • PhD in Computer Science Università degli Studi di Salerno

  • Laurea (MSc equiv) Università degli Studi di Salerno

Appointments

University of Essex

  • Director of CCFEA, University of Essex ( 1/12/2016 - present )

  • Ethics officer, CSEE University of Essex ( 1/8/2017 - present )

  • Reader, CSEE University of Essex ( 1/12/2016 - present )

Other academic

  • Reader, Teesside University ( 1/1/2012 - 30/11/2016 )

  • Research associate, University of Liverpool ( 1/12/2007 - 31/12/2011 )

  • Assegnista di ricerca, Università degli Studi di Salerno ( 1/9/2006 - 30/11/2007 )

Research and professional activities

Research interests

Algorithmic Game Theory; Algorithms and Complexity; Cryptography and security; AI for finance and trading

Teaching and supervision

  • Industry Expert Lectures in Finance (BE653)

  • Quantitative Methods in Finance and Trading (CF962)

  • Industry Expert Lectures in Finance (CF968)

  • CCFEA MSc Dissertation (CF981)

Publications

Journal articles (19)

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., Metastability of the Logit Dynamics for Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games. ACM Transactions on Algorithms

Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2018). The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design. The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 62, 459-488

Gatti, N., Rocco, M., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2018). Towards Better Models of Externalities in Sponsored Search Auctions. Theoretical Computer Science. 745, 150-162

Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2017). Combinatorial Auctions Without Money. Algorithmica. 77 (3), 756-785

Ferraioli, D., Goldberg, PW. and Ventre, C., (2016). Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games. Theoretical Computer Science. 648, 96-115

Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2016). Heterogeneous facility location without money. Theoretical Computer Science. 636, 27-46

Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable. Theoretical Computer Science. 571 (C), 21-35

Krysta, P., Telelis, O. and Ventre, C., (2015). Mechanisms for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 53, 721-744

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. Games and Economic Behavior. 86, 491-509

Grandoni, F., Krysta, P., Leonardi, S. and Ventre, C., (2014). Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multiobjective Optimization. SIAM Journal on Computing. 43 (4), 1263-1290

Ventre, C., (2014). Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification. Theoretical Computer Science. 518, 64-79

Goldberg, PW., Savani, R., Sørensen, TB. and Ventre, C., (2013). On the approximation performance of fictitious play in finite games. International Journal of Game Theory. 42 (4), 1059-1083

Goldberg, LA., Goldberg, PW., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2013). Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies. Theoretical Computer Science. 476, 24-37

Briest, P., Gualà, L., Hoefer, M. and Ventre, C., (2012). On stackelberg pricing with computationally bounded customers. Networks. 60 (1), 31-44

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2012). Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions. ACM Transactions on Computation Theory. 4 (2), 1-17

Auletta, V., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2011). Alternatives to truthfulness are hard to recognize. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 22 (1), 200-216

Auletta, V., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2011). A response to “Mechanism Design with Partial Verification and Revelation Principle”. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 22 (1), 224-224

Ferrante, A., Parlato, G., Sorrentino, F. and Ventre, C., (2009). Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification. Theoretical Computer Science. 410 (8-10), 886-899

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2004). Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions in Wireless Networks. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). 3104, 255-266

Conferences (38)

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms (Extended abstract)

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2018). Probabilistic verification for obviously strategyproof mechanisms

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2017). Social Pressure in Opinion Games

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2017). Obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2017). Obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations (extended abstract)

Ferraioli, D., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2016). What to Verify for Optimal Truthful Mechanisms without Money

Gatti, N., Rocco, M., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2016). Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions

Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). Truthful mechanisms without money for non-utilitarian heterogeneous facility location

Ferraioli, D., Ventre, C. and Aranyi, G., (2015). A mechanism design approach to measure awareness

Kovács, A., Meyer, U. and Ventre, C., (2015). Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation

Krysta, P., Telelis, O. and Ventre, C., (2015). Near-optimal approximation mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions

Gatti, N., Rocco, M., Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). Cascade model with contextual externalities and bounded user memory for sponsored search auctions

Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2015). The power of verification for greedy mechanism design

Ferraioli, D. and Ventre, C., (2015). Metastability of Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games

Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Heterogeneous facility location without money on the line

Serafino, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Truthful mechanisms for the location of different facilities

Fotakis, D., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2014). Combinatorial Auctions without money

Goldberg, PW. and Ventre, C., (2013). Using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue

Krysta, P., Telelis, O. and Ventre, C., (2013). Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods

Ferraioli, D., Goldberg, PW. and Ventre, C., (2012). Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games

Goldberg, PW., Savani, R., Sørensen, TB. and Ventre, C., (2011). On the Approximation Performance of Fictitious Play in Finite Games

Grandoni, F., Krysta, P., Leonardi, S. and Ventre, C., (2010). Utilitarian mechanism design for multi-objective optimization

Goldberg, LA., Goldberg, PW., Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2010). Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies

Krysta, P. and Ventre, C., (2010). Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractable

Briest, P., Hoefer, M., Gualà, L. and Ventre, C., (2009). On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers

Ventre, C. and Visconti, I., (2009). Co-sound Zero-Knowledge with Public Keys

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2009). Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification

Ventre, C. and Visconti, I., (2008). Completely Non-malleable Encryption Revisited

Auletta, V., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2008). Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2008). Collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification yielding optimal solutions

Auletta, V., De Prisco, R., Penna, P., Persiano, G. and Ventre, C., (2006). New Constructions of Mechanisms with Verification

Ventre, C., (2006). Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2006). The Algorithmic Structure of Group Strategyproof Budget-Balanced Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

Ferrante, A., Parlato, G., Sorrentino, F. and Ventre, C., (2006). Improvements for Truthful Mechanisms with Verifiable One-Parameter Selfish Agents

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2005). Free-Riders in Steiner Tree Cost-Sharing Games

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2005). More Powerful and Simpler Cost-Sharing Methods

Penna, P. and Ventre, C., (2004). Energy-efficient broadcasting in ad-hoc networks: Combining MSTs with shortest-path trees

Grants and funding

2017

Incentives without monetary transfers

Engineering & Physical Sciences Res.Council

The project investigates the use of algorithms (genetic + reinforcement) to provide accurate forecasts of asset prices.

Innovate UK (formerly Technology Stategy Board)

Contact

c.ventre@essex.ac.uk
+44 (0) 1206 873851

Location:

1NW.3.17, Colchester Campus

Academic support hours:

Thu 10-12 or by appointment

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