How do individuals behave strategically in two-sided matching markets?

In recent research Ahrash Dianat, who joined the Department of Economics this term, uses experimental economics to investigate strategic behaviour and equilibrium selection in games and market settings.

  • Date

    Thu 23 Nov 17

Ahrash Dianat

Ahrash received his PhD in Economics from George Mason University in 2015. Prior to joining the University of Essex, he was a Postdoctoral Scholar in Economics at the California Institute of Technology.

This year, he will teach the modules, Behavioural Economics I and Topics in Economic Theory at postgraduate level.

In his research, Ahrash investigates strategic behaviour in matching markets, such as a typical dating market. He shows that individuals in such markets have incentives to reject offers from less-preferred dating partners in anticipation of receiving future offers from more-preferred dating partners. While rejection of offers may help by improving an individual’s final match, it may also hurt by leaving the individual unmatched.

Ahrash goes on to explore the balance of risks associated with this behaviour: in particular, how do individuals in these markets respond to the downside versus the upside risks of this kind of misrepresentation? The work has applicability to how we design such markets in order to get the best matches possible.

Read Ahrash’s paper (.pdf)