Event

At-Risk or Responsive? Targeting in Unemployment Policy by Johannes Spinnewijn

Join us for this joint event, which is part of both the Macroeconomics and Applied Economics Research Seminar Series, Summer Term 2026

  • Tue 12 May 26

    13:30 - 15:00

  • Colchester Campus

    5B.307

  • Event speaker

    Johannes Spinnewijn

  • Event type

    Lectures, talks and seminars
    Macroeconomics and Applied Economics Research Seminar Series

  • Event organiser

    Economics, Department of

At-Risk or Responsive? Targeting in Unemployment Policy by Johannes Spinnewijn

Join us for this week's Joint Macroeconomics and Applied Economics Research Seminar, Summer Term 2026.

Johannes Spinnewijn, from the London School of Economics and Political Science, will present this week's joint seminar on At-Risk or Responsive? Targeting in Unemployment Policy.

Abstract

This paper evaluates the use of algorithmic risk profiling to direct job search support toward individuals most at risk of long-term unemployment. Using three regression discontinuity designs and rich administrative data from the Flemish Public Employment Service (VDAB) in Belgium, we address two key dimensions: who and when to target. First, job search counselling raises employment on average, but treatment effects decline sharply with predicted risk. This reveals a fundamental trade-off between targeting those most at risk and those most responsive to intervention. Second, we find no evidence of depreciation in treatment effects at the individual level, but strong dynamic selection: as spells lengthen, surviving job seekers have both higher baseline risk and lower treatment responsiveness, generating a trade-off between the timing of treatment and the composition of the remaining pool. We develop and calibrate a conceptual framework for optimal targeting whose key sufficient statistic is the ratio of predicted treatment effects to predicted job-finding probabilities. Targeting rules combining both objects substantially outperform the status quo, yielding welfare gains nearly three times larger than random assignment, while targeting on risk scores alone performs worse than random targeting

This seminar will be held on campus in 5B.307 at 1.30pm on Tuesday, 12 May 2026. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public. To register your place, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Macroeconomics Research Seminar Series.