Monitoring Teams by Marina Halac

Join us for the next event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Summer Term 2021.

Professor Marina Halac from the Department of Economics, at Yale University will present their paper on Monitoring Teams.

Abstract

A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, each delivering a signal of joint performance. We show that unlike under partial implementation, the principal always exhausts her monitoring capacity to optimally implement work as a unique outcome. Optimal monitoring teams are homogeneous between them: equally sized and with agents allocated in an anti-assortative fashion. Higher-effort-cost agents receive lower rents, and they tend to be monitored more closely than lower-effort-cost agents when the principal’s allocation is constrained. 

This seminar will be held via Zoom at 4pm on Monday 14th June. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public. To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers. This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.