Join us for this week's event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Spring Term 2021
Dr Rustamdjan Hakimov from the Department of Economics at the University of Lausanne will present their research on Transparency in Centralised Allocation: Theory and Experiment.
Abstract
Many algorithmic allocation mechanisms suffer from a verifiability problem: participants cannot check if their assignments are correct. This problem is compounded if there are suspicions that the designer has deviated from the true allocation. We formalise these concerns and propose solutions in an information-based framework. A participant's assignment is 'verifiable' by her if any other assignment contradicts her information. A stronger requirement is 'transparency', where the designer cannot deviate from the true allocation without being detected. We show how the communication of 'terminal-cutoffs' and the use of `predictable' multi-stage mechanisms each provide information to participants that verifies their assignments. Even though the information from predictable mechanisms and terminal-cutoffs can each be manipulated by a dishonest designer without detection, in our main result we show that they nevertheless achieve transparency if used together. We suggest transparent environments for use in school admissions, single-object auctions and house allocation. We support the effectiveness of our solutions via a school admissions laboratory experiment.
This seminar will be held via Zoom on Monday 26th April at 4pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public. To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.
This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.