Equitable Voting Rules by Omer Tamuz

Join us for this week's event in the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series, Spring Term 2021

Professor Omer Tamuz from the Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences at Caltech will present their research on Equitable Voting Rules.

Abstract 

May’s Theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May’s crucial assumption of symmetry often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a weakening of May’s symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally. We show that such rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population, but not less than the square root of the population size. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from group theory and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions.

This seminar will be held via Zoom on Monday 19th April at 4pm. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public. To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.