Bargaining over Heterogenous Pie with Mechanisms and Incomplete Information

Join us for this weeks Microeconomics Research Seminar.

Professor Marcin Peski from the Department of Economics, at the University of Toronto will present their research on Bargaining over Heterogenous Pie with Mechanisms and Incomplete Information.

This paper consider an alternating-offer model of bargaining over a heterogeneous pie, with one-sided incomplete information about preferences and where players can offer arbitrary mechanisms to determine the allocation. When the pie has two parts and offers are frequent, there is a unique limit of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcomes: the uninformed player proposes the optimal screening menu subject to the constraint that each type of the informed player gets at least her payoff under complete information. We explain that this outcome is equivalent to a constrained commitment. With more than two dimensions, there are equilibria in which the informed player may receive strictly less than her complete information benchmark.

This seminar will be held via webinar on Zoom. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public. To register your place and gain access to the webinar, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Microeconomics Research Seminar Series.