Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission under Limited Awareness

Join Nicola Pavoni from Bocconi University, for this week's Theory Seminar

  • Mon 13 May 19

    16:00 - 17:30

  • Colchester Campus

    Economics Common Room 5B.307

  • Event speaker

    Nicola Pavoni

  • Event type

    Lectures, talks and seminars
    Economic Theory

  • Event organiser

    Economics, Department of

In this Economic Theory seminar Nicola Pavoni, from Bocconi University, discusses his paper on Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission under Limited Awareness


We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also has superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. The agent decides which of the available actions to reveal and which ones to hide.

We show that it is optimal for the agent to make the principal aware of extremes options, while leaving her unaware of intermediate ones.

We further show that unawareness has important effects on strategic information transmission: when principal and agent play a cheap talk game, reducing the principal’s awareness can expand the set of implementable equilibrium actions and thereby benefit both parties.

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