Event
Information acquisition and use by networked players
In an asymmetric coordination (or anti-coordination) game, players acquire and use signals about a payoff-relevant fundamental from multiple costly information sources.
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Wed 1 Nov 17
16:00 - 17:30
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Colchester Campus
Economics Common Room 5B.307
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Event speaker
Chris Wallace, University of Manchester
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Event type
Lectures, talks and seminars
Department of Economics Theory Seminars -
Event organiser
Economics, Department of
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Contact details
Some sources have greater clarity than others, and generate signals that are more correlated and so more public
Players wish to take actions close to the fundamental but also close to (or far away from) others' actions. This paper studies how asymmetries in the game, represented as the weights that link players to neighbours on a network, affect how they use and acquire information.
Relatively centrally located players (in the sense of Bonacich, when applied to the dependence of players' payoffs upon the actions of others) acquire fewer signals from relatively clear information sources; they acquire less information in total; and they place more emphasis on relatively public signals."
