Information acquisition and use by networked players

In an asymmetric coordination (or anti-coordination) game, players acquire and use signals about a payoff-relevant fundamental from multiple costly information sources.

  • Wed 1 Nov 17

    16:00 - 17:30

  • Colchester Campus

    Economics Common Room 5B.307

  • Event speaker

    Chris Wallace, University of Manchester

  • Event type

    Lectures, talks and seminars
    Department of Economics Theory Seminars

  • Event organiser

    Economics, Department of

  • Contact details

Some sources have greater clarity than others, and generate signals that are more correlated and so more public

Players wish to take actions close to the fundamental but also close to (or far away from) others' actions. This paper studies how asymmetries in the game, represented as the weights that link players to neighbours on a network, affect how they use and acquire information.

Relatively centrally located players (in the sense of Bonacich, when applied to the dependence of players' payoffs upon the actions of others) acquire fewer signals from relatively clear information sources; they acquire less information in total; and they place more emphasis on relatively public signals."


Related events