Dr Marie Guillot

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Email
marie.guillot@essex.ac.uk -
Telephone
+44 (0) 1206 872405
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Location
6.147, Colchester Campus
Profile
Biography
Marie studied philosophy in France, at the Ecole Normale Superieure (Fontenay St Cloud), at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales and at the Institut Jean Nicod, where she did her PhD as well as an M.Sc. in cognitive science. She also studied fine arts at the Ecole Nationale Superieure des Arts Decoratifs (Paris). Before joining Essex, she was a research fellow at the Institut Jean Nicod, at LOGOS (Universitat de Barcelona), and at University College London. She has published articles in journals such as Ergo, Synthese, Teorema, the Review of Philosophy and Psychology and Philosophical Explorations. With Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (LOGOS), she is co-editor of a volume of essays on the "mineness" of conscious mental state, and related notions, entitled Self-Experience (forthcoming with OUP). In 2021-3, she is working on truth, trust and dishonesty as a Fellow within the Honesty Project (Wake Forest University / Carnegie Mellon University): https://honestyproject.philosophy.wfu.edu/funding-competition-winners/.
Research and professional activities
Research interests
Philosophy of mind
philosophy of language
epistemology
philosophy of psychology
Speech acts
Current research
The first person (linguistic and mental)
indexicality
context-dependent representations
de se content
subjectivity
self-knowledge
self-consciousness
consciousness
phenomenal concepts
Teaching and supervision
Current teaching responsibilities
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Topics in Contemporary Philosophy (PY950)
Previous supervision

Degree type: Occasional Postgraduate Study
Awarded date: 13/1/2019
Publications
Journal articles (8)
Guillot, M. and O'Brien, L., Self Matters. Ergo
Guillot, M., (2017). I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 8 (1), 23-53
Guillot, M., (2016). Thinking of oneself as the thinker: the concept of self and the phenomenology of intellection. Philosophical Explorations. 19 (2), 138-160
Guillot, M., (2014). Identification-free at last semantic relativism, evans's legacy and a unified approach to immunity to error through misidentification. Teorema. 33 (3), 7-30
Billon, A. and Guillot, M., (2014). Can Fregeans have 'I'-thoughts?. Revista de Filosof�a de la Universidad de Costa Rica. 53 (136), 97-105
Guillot, M., (2013). The limits of selflessness: semantic relativism and the epistemology of de se thoughts. Synthese. 190 (10), 1793-1816
Guillot, M., (2012). Anscombe aurait-elle été relativiste?. Répha. 6, 55-71
Guillot, M., (2004). Wittgenstein, Freud, Austin : voix thérapeutique et parole performative. Revue de métaphysique et de morale. 42 (2), 259-259
Books (1)
(2023). Self-Experience. Oxford University PressOxford. 019880539X. 9780198805397
Book chapters (4)
García-Carpintero, M. and Guillot, M., (2023). Introduction. In: Self-Experience. Oxford University PressOxford. 1- 24. 019880539X. 9780198805397
Guillot, M., (2023). The Phenomenal Concept of Self and First-Person Epistemology. In: Self-Experience. Oxford University PressOxford. 223- 249. 019880539X. 9780198805397
Guillot, M., (2019). Thinking of oneself as the thinker: the concept of self and the phenomenology of intellection. In: Conscious Thinking and Cognitive Phenomenology. Routledge. 44- 66
Guillot, M., (2014). Connaissance de soi et connaissance du mien : Pour une approche phénoménale unifiée de l’immunité aux erreurs d’identification. In: Connaître. Questions d’epistémologie contemporaine. Editors: Chevallier, J. and Gautier, B., . Editions d'Ithaque. 978-2916120553
Grants and funding
2021
Truth and trust: bullshit as a via negativa towards understanding morally excellent honesty
Wake Forest University