Assignment Markets: Theory and Experiment by Arthur Dolgopolov

Join us for this week's event in the Behavioural, Experimental and Development Economics Seminar Series, Spring Term 2024

Join Arthur Dolgopolov, from the Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, as they present their research on Assignment Markets: Theory and Experiment.

Abstract

We experimentally test convergence to the core in two-sided markets for heterogeneous indivisible goods under different trading institutions. We use bargaining and strategic games as predictors that naturally generalize the core, accommodating non-equilibrium behavior. The performance of the competing theories reflects the differences in trading procedures - market outcomes are close to Nash equilibrium predictions under auction-like institutions and close to bargaining for institutions that feature decentralized negotiations. This difference may be driving the documented effect of fewer no-trade outcomes at the expense of a higher chance of suboptimal match under free-form bargaining.

This seminar will be held in the Economics Common Room on Wednesday 21st February, at 11.00am. This event is open to all levels of study and is also open to the public. To register your place, please contact the seminar organisers.

This event is part of the Behavioural, Experimental, and Development Economics Research Seminar Series.