Example Syllabus:
The focus this term will be Axel Honneth's critical social theory. Among the questions we want to discuss are the following: What is so special about Critical Theory? Does the Frankfurt School have a particular notion of 'critique'? Does the Frankfurt School rely on a notion of progress? What is recognition? What are struggles for recognition? Are Honneth's recognition-theoretical approach to issues such as justice, ideology, and reification convincing?
Week 1: Welcome Week
Week 2: What’s so Special About Critical Theory?
What are, across the generations, the components that distinguish Critical Theory from other forms of normative theorising? How do these components relate to each other? And what would it take to show that Critical Theory is still a viable option for us today?
Required Reading:
Axel Honneth, “A Social Pathology of Reason: On the Intellectual Legacy of Critical Theory”, in his Pathologies of Reason: On the Legacy of Critical Theory, Columbia UP, 2009, ch 2, pp. 19-42.
Week 3: Does the Frankfurt School Have a Particular Idea of “Critique”?
What is reconstructive social criticism, that is, the particular form of critique the Frankfurt School is famous for? How does this form of critique relate to other forms of critique, for instance, genealogical, world-disclosing, or interpretive forms of critique?
Required Reading:
Axel Honneth, “Reconstructive Social Criticism with a Genealogical Proviso: On the Idea of ‘Critique’ in the Frankfurt School”, in his Pathologies of Reason: On the Legacy of Critical Theory, Columbia UP, ch 3, pp. 43-53.
Week 4: Does Critical Theory Rely on a Theory of Progress?
It is often assumed that the Frankfurt School relies on a notion of historical progress. Honneth, for instance, speaks about the “Irreducibility of Progress” for the project of a critical theory. However, the idea of progress is, because of its “entanglements with racism, colonialism, and imperialism”, itself “in need of critical reconstruction” (Amy Allen). This week we examine whether critical theory indeed requires a notion of progress, and identify the challenges the project of disentangling it from its problematic history faces.
Required Reading:
Amy Allen, “Critical Theory and the Idea of Progress” (unpublished manuscript)
Axel Honneth, “The Irreducibility of Progress: Kant’s Account of the Relationship between Morality and History”, Critical Horizons 8:1 (2007), pp. 1-17.
Week 5: What is Recognition? What are the Species of Recognition? What is a Recognition Order?
What does it mean to recognise someone, or to be recognised by someone? Are acts of recognition mediated by norms? Does recognition denote the act of attributing to a person a positive property, or does the person recognising someone simply express that she perceived a positive property the recognised person already had? Why does recognition matter? Are modern societies recognition orders? How many, and which, spheres of recognition do modern societies encompass? Which norms structure the relationships of those participating in these social spheres?
Required Reading:
Axel Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser”, in N. Fraser and A. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, Verso, 2003, pp. 138-150
Axel Honneth, “Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions”, Inquiry 45:4 (2002), pp. 499-519.
Week 6: From Experiences of Misrecognition to Struggles for Recognition
After engaging with Honneth’s phenomenology of experiences of injustice, we examine how such experiences motivate struggles for recognition. We take a closer look at demands for redistribution and recognition of one’s culture, and ask whether social conflicts follow a moral logic.
Required Reading:
Axel Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser”, in N. Fraser and A. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, Verso, 2003, pp.110-134, 150-159, 161-170.
Week 7: The Recognition-Theoretical Reframing of the Theory of Justice
Can “recognition” serve as the fundamental concept of a critical theory of justice? Is Honneth’s critique of liberal and procedural theories of justice sound? Does he succeed in integrating social theory and normative theory in his theory of justice? Does the theory of justice Honneth sketches encompass all the components that are, in his view, characteristic of Critical Theory? What kinds of critical engagement with the status quo does Honneth’s recognition-theoretical approach to justice make possible?
Required Reading:
Axel Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser”, in N. Fraser and A. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, Verso, 2003, pp. 170-189.
Axel Honneth, “The Fabric of Justice: On the Limits of Contemporary Proceduralism”, in his The I in the We, Polity, 2012, pp. 35-55.
Week 8: Reading Week. No lecture/class
Week 9: Honneth’s Recognition-Theoretical Reframing of Ideology
Is it worth the effort to try to revive the idea of ideology critique which has played a central role in the first generation of the Frankfurt School but has, since then, faded into the background? Does Honneth’s recognition-theoretical approach provide us with the appropriate tools for such a re-actualisation?
Required Reading:
Axel Honneth, “Recognition as Ideology”, in. B. van den Brink & D. Owen (eds.), Recognition and Power:Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory, Cambridge University Press,
2007, ch 13, pp. 323-347.
Week 10: Honneth’s Recognition-Theoretical Reframing of Reification
Like the idea of ideology, the notion of reification has once been assigned a key role in the Frankfurt School’s attempt to conceptualise and criticise the pathologies characteristic of capitalist societies. Does it make sense to understand reification as “forgetfulness of recognition”? What is the critical potential of this re-framing?
Required Reading:
Axel Honneth, Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea, Oxford UP, 2008, pp. 40-63 and 75-85.
Week 11: A Recognition-Theoretical Reframing of the Critique of Capitalist Modernisation
We take a closer look at recent developments in capitalist societies in order to assess whether “structural economic changes have transformed historically developed recognitional expectations into disciplinary demands” (Honneth), thereby turning these normative expectations from a motor of progress into another element that stabilises the capitalist order.
Required Reading:
Martin Hartmann & Axel Honneth, “Paradoxes of Capitalism”, Constellations 13:1 (2006): 41–58.