GV907-7-FY-CO:
Comparative Political Economy
2023/24
Government
Colchester Campus
Full Year
Postgraduate: Level 7
ReassessmentOnly
Thursday 05 October 2023
Friday 28 June 2024
30
13 April 2023
Requisites for this module
(none)
(none)
(none)
(none)
(none)
This is a graduate course on political economy. The course presents topics in both international and comparative political economy.
The course is divided into different themes addressing how domestic and international politics affect domestic and international economics, as well as the reverse: how domestic and international economics affect domestic and international politics. For example, we will cover how domestic and international politics affect areas like trade policy, industrial/labour policy, foreign direct investment, financial market dynamics, fiscal/debt policy, monetary/currency policy, and social/regional transfers.
We also examine how domestic and international economics affect areas like voting preferences and electoral behaviour, party systems and political stability, redistribution and the welfare state. The class emphasizes core theoretical insights, using them to delve into traditional and more recent theoretical and empirical debates. The module also emphasizes research using quantitative methods to test theoretical argumen
The main aims of the module are:
1. To introduce students to contemporary scholarly research on political economy topics,
2. To introduce students to key models in political science and their substantive applications,
3. To stimulate students to form original ideas for promising quantitative research projects in the area of contemporary political economy
Students will require, use and develop the following key skills:
1. Transfer of ideas: students will be helped to follow and assess quantitative research in other modules – parties and elections, comparative politics, IR, and so on;
2. Improving independent learning and performance: Students will learn to address their own research topics in a quantitative framework with an eye towards scholarly publication;
3. Communication, interaction, and peer review: Classes involve not only questions from me but also group discussions; students are required to give formal feedback to other students in written form;
4. Writing: Students learn how to theorize, generate empirically testable hypotheses, and report on and discuss results of quantitative analyses.
By the end of the module students should achieve the following learning outcomes:
1. read, understand, and evaluate quantitative analyses and scholarly work published in the leading journals;
2. understand evaluation methods for particular research questions, research designs, and variables;
3. measure variables of interest and conduct empirical analyses using various statistical methods;
4. analyse quantitative data;
5. complete a replication activity and present it.
The module is the core module for students on the MA/MSC/MRes in Political Economy and can be taken as an option by students on other Masters courses in the Department of Government.
Students will require, use and develop the following key skills:
1. Transfer of ideas: students will be helped to follow and assess quantitative research in other modules – parties and elections, comparative politics, IR, and so on;
2. Improving independent learning and performance: Students will learn to address their own research topics in a quantitative framework with an eye towards scholarly publication;
3. Communication, interaction, and peer review: Classes involve not only questions from me but also group discussions; students are required to give formal feedback to other students in written form;
4. Writing: Students learn how to theorize, generate empirically testable hypotheses, and report on and discuss results of quantitative analyses.
The module will run over 20 weeks. There will be a two-hour class.
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Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel (2003) ‘Institutionalism as a Methodology’,
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15(2), pp. 123–144. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629803015002645.
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Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2000) ‘Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective’,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), pp. 1167–1199. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2586922.
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Svolik, M.W. (2013) ‘Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy’,
American Journal of Political Science, 57(3), pp. 685–702. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12005.
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Arthur Spirling (2016) ‘Democratization and Linguistic Complexity: The Effect of Franchise Extension on Parliamentary Discourse, 1832–1915’,
The Journal of Politics, 78(1), pp. 120–136. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1086/683612.
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North, D.C. and Weingast, B.R. (1989) ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’,
The Journal of Economic History, 49(4), pp. 803–832. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700009451.
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Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ‘Protection for Sale’,
The American Economic Review, 84(4), pp. 833–850. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2118033.
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Bonica, A. (2016) ‘Avenues of influence: on the political expenditures of corporations and their directors and executives’,
Business and Politics, 18(4), pp. 367–394. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1515/bap-2016-0004.
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Weschle, S. (2021) ‘Parliamentary Positions and Politicians’ Private Sector Earnings: Evidence from the UK House of Commons’,
The Journal of Politics [Preprint]. Available at:
https://www-journals-uchicago-edu.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/doi/full/10.1086/710087.
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Mancur Olson (1993) ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’,
American Political Science Review, 87(3), pp. 567–576. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2938736.
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Daniel Y. Kono (2006) ‘Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency’,
The American Political Science Review, 100(3), pp. 369–384. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27644361.
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Carles Boix and Milan W. Svolik (2013) ‘The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships’,
The Journal of Politics, 75(2), pp. 300–316. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613000029.
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Mattozzi, A. and Merlo, A. (2008) ‘Political careers or career politicians?’,
Journal of Public Economics, 92(3-4), pp. 597–608. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.10.006.
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Baerg, N.R., Gray, J. and Willisch, J. (2021) ‘Opportunistic, not Optimal Delegation: The Political Origins of Central Bank Independence’,
Comparative Political Studies, 54(6), pp. 956–988. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020957679.
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Cruz, Cesi (no date) ‘Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines’,
American Economic Review, 107(10), pp. 3006–37. Available at:
https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150343.
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Cirone, A. and Van Coppenolle, B. (2018) ‘Cabinets, Committees, and Careers: The Causal Effect of Committee Service.’,
Journal of Politics [Preprint]. Available at:
https://search-ebscohost-com.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bsu&AN=130370292&site=ehost-live&authtype=sso&custid=s9814295.
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Clayton, A., O’Brien, D.Z. and Piscopo, J.M. (2019) ‘All Male Panels? Representation and Democratic Legitimacy’,
American Journal of Political Science, 63(1), pp. 113–129. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12391.
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Ran Abramitzky, Leah Platt Boustan and Katherine Eriksson (2012) ‘Europe’s Tired, Poor, Huddled Masses: Self-Selection and Economic Outcomes in the Age of Mass Migration’,
The American Economic Review, 102(5), pp. 1832–1856. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41724607.
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Neil Malhotra, Yotam Margalit and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo (2013) ‘Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact’,
American Journal of Political Science, 57(2), pp. 391–410. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/23496604.
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Adrian J. Shin (2017) ‘Tyrants and Migrants’,
Comparative Political Studies, 50(1), pp. 14–40. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015621076.
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Harris, A.S.
et al. (2020) ‘Oiling the bureaucracy? political spending, bureaucrats and the resource curse’,
World Development, 127. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104745.
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Nikolova, E. and Marinov, N. (2017) ‘Do Public Fund Windfalls Increase Corruption? Evidence From a Natural Disaster’,
Comparative Political Studies, 50(11), pp. 1455–1488. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016679109.
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David Doyle (2015) ‘Remittances and Social Spending’,
American Political Science Review, 109(4), pp. 785–802. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055415000416.
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Jeffrey K. Staton and Georg Vanberg (2008) ‘The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions’,
American Journal of Political Science, 52(3), pp. 504–519. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00326.x.
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Popova, M. (2010) ‘Political Competition as an Obstacle to Judicial Independence: Evidence From Russia and Ukraine’,
Comparative Political Studies, 43(10), pp. 1202–1229. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010369075.
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Strong, C. and Yayi, C.L. (2023) ‘The political affiliation of central bankers and government debt: Evidence from Africa’,
International Review of Economics & Finance, 85, pp. 603–620. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2023.02.016.
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Leslie Johns (2007) ‘A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats’,
International Organization, 61(2), pp. 245–275. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070099.
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Julia Gray (2009) ‘International Organization as a Seal of Approval: European Union Accession and Investor Risk’,
American Journal of Political Science, 53(4), pp. 931–949. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00409.x.
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Songying Fang and Randall W. Stone (2012) ‘International Organizations as Policy Advisors’,
International Organization, 66(4), pp. 537–569. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000276.
The above list is indicative of the essential reading for the course.
The library makes provision for all reading list items, with digital provision where possible, and these resources are shared between students.
Further reading can be obtained from this module's
reading list.
Assessment items, weightings and deadlines
Coursework / exam |
Description |
Deadline |
Coursework weighting |
Coursework |
Critical Writing Assignment 1 |
|
20% |
Coursework |
Critical Writing Assignment 2 |
|
20% |
Coursework |
Peer Review Assessment |
|
15% |
Coursework |
Pre-registration Final Paper |
|
30% |
Coursework |
Powerpoint Presentation |
|
15% |
Exam format definitions
- Remote, open book: Your exam will take place remotely via an online learning platform. You may refer to any physical or electronic materials during the exam.
- In-person, open book: Your exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may refer to any physical materials such as paper study notes or a textbook during the exam. Electronic devices may not be used in the exam.
- In-person, open book (restricted): The exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may refer only to specific physical materials such as a named textbook during the exam. Permitted materials will be specified by your department. Electronic devices may not be used in the exam.
- In-person, closed book: The exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may not refer to any physical materials or electronic devices during the exam. There may be times when a paper dictionary,
for example, may be permitted in an otherwise closed book exam. Any exceptions will be specified by your department.
Your department will provide further guidance before your exams.
Overall assessment
Reassessment
Module supervisor and teaching staff
Dr Allyson Benton, email: allyson.benton@essex.ac.uk.
Allyson Benton
Module Supervisor: Allyson Benton, allyson.benton@essex.ac.uk
Yes
Yes
Yes
Dr Damien Bol
King's College London
Senior Lecturer
Available via Moodle
Of 26 hours, 26 (100%) hours available to students:
0 hours not recorded due to service coverage or fault;
0 hours not recorded due to opt-out by lecturer(s), module, or event type.
Government
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