Event

The 15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)

  • Mon 12 - Thu 15 Sep 22

    00:00

  • Colchester Campus

  • Event type

    Conferences

  • Event organiser

    Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, School of

  • Contact details

Welcome to SAGT 2022

The 15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) will take place at the University of Essex in Colchester, UK, September 12-15, 2022.

The purpose of SAGT is to bring together researchers from Computer Science, Economics, Mathematics, Operations Research, Psychology, Physics, and Biology to present and discuss original research at the intersection of Algorithms and Game Theory.

General information

Scope

The program of SAGT 2022 will include invited lectures, and presentations of  peer-reviewed submissions. Foundational work is solicited on topics including but not limited to:

  • Solution Concepts in Game Theory
  • Efficiency of Equilibria and Price of Anarchy
  • Complexity Classes in Game Theory
  • Computational Aspects of Equilibria and Fixed-Point Theorems
  • Repeated Games and Convergence of Dynamics
  • Algorithmic Mechanism Design
  • Reputation, Recommendation and Trust Systems
  • Network Games and Graph-Theoretic Aspects of Social Networks
  • Cost-Sharing Algorithms and Analysis
  • Computing with Incentives
  • Computational Social Choice
  • Fair Resource Allocation
  • Decision Theory, and Pricing
  • Auction Design and Analysis
  • Economic Aspects of Distributed Computing
  • Incentives in Blockchain
  • Internet Economics and Computational Advertising

Industrial application works and position papers presenting novel ideas, issues, challenges and directions are also welcome.

The symposium proceedings shall be published by Springer in its LNCS/ARCoSS series. Accepted papers will be allocated at most 18 pages in the proceedings (in particular, at most 16 pages for the technical part and at most 2 pages for references, in line with the submission guidelines). Alternatively, authors of accepted papers can choose to publish a one-page abstract in the proceedings, along with a URL pointing to the full paper.

There will be a SAGT 2022 Best Paper Award, accompanied by a prize of EUR 1,000 offered by Springer. Selected papers from SAGT 2022 will be invited to a special issue of Theoretical Computer Science.

Important Dates

  • Submission deadline: 10th May 2022 16th May 2022, 23:59 AoE
  • Notification: 1st July 2022
  • Camera ready: 15th July 2022
  • Tutorial Day: 12th September 2022
  • Conference Dates: 13th-15th September 2022

Submission Instructions

Authors are invited to submit original research for possible presentation at the symposium. Each paper will be evaluated on significance, originality, technical quality, and exposition. It should clearly establish the research contribution, its relevance, and its relation to prior research.

Submissions must be prepared in LNCS style. Each submission must be at most 18 pages long; at most 16 pages for technical contribution (including title page), and at most 2 pages containing references only. Additional material can be added in a clearly marked appendix which will be reviewed at the discretion of the program committee.

Results previously published or presented at another archival conference prior to SAGT, or published (or accepted for publication) at a journal prior to the submission deadline, will not be considered for publication as regular papers. Simultaneous submission of regular papers to another conference with published proceedings is not allowed.

Simultaneous submission of results to a journal is allowed only if the author intends to publish the paper as a one page abstract in SAGT 2022.

Submission link: Submit your paper through EasyChair.

Submission deadline: 10th May 2022 16th May 2022, 23:59 AoE

It is expected that every accepted paper will be presented at the symposium by one of the authors.

Committees

Programme Committee

Organising committee

Steering Committee

Accepted papers

  • Jack Dippel and Adrian Vetta. An Improved Bound for the Tree Conjecture in Network Creation Games
  • Fuga Kiyosue and Kenjiro Takazawa. A common generalization of budget games and congestion games
  • Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin and Warut Suksompong. Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting
  • Sumit Goel and Wade Hann-Caruthers. Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions
  • Edith Elkind, Sonja Kraiczy and Nicholas Teh. Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment
  • Leora Schmerler, Noam Hazon and Sarit Kraus. Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams
  • Martin Hoefer and Lisa Wilhelmi. Seniorities and Minimal Clearing in Financial Network Games
  • Matan Gilboa and Noam Nisan. Complexity of Public Goods Games on Graphs
  • Paul Goldberg and Matthew Katzman. PPAD-Complete Pure Approximate Nash Equilibria in Lipschitz Games
  • Qian Wang. On Tree Equilibria in Max-Distance Network Creation Games
  • Shaul Rosner and Tami Tamir. Cost-Sharing Games with Rank-Based Utilities
  • Yichen Yang, Kai Jia and Martin Rinard. On the Impact of Player Capability on Congestion Games
  • Kazuhisa Makino, Shuichi Miyazaki and Yu Yokoi. Incomplete List Setting of the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Maximally Satisfying Lower Quotas
  • Fabien Gensbittel, Dana Pizarro and Jérôme Renault. Competition and Recall in Selection Problems
  • Matthias Bentert, Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger and Tomohiro Koana. Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals can be Harder than Strict Preferences
  • Yasushi Kawase and Hanna Sumita. Online Max-min Fair Allocation
  • Jason Milionis, Christos Papadimitriou, Georgios Piliouras and Kelly Spendlove. Nash, Conley, and Computation: Impossibility and Incompleteness in Game Dynamics
  • Yuki Amano, Ayumi Igarashi, Yasushi Kawase, Kazuhisa Makino and Hirotaka Ono. Fair ride allocation on a line
  • Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang and Almog Wald. Lookahead Auctions with Pooling
  • Sahar Jahani and Bernhard von Stengel. Automated Equilibrium Analysis of 2x2x2 Games
  • Reshef Meir and Riccardo Baldeschi. Explicitly Simple Near-tie Auctions
  • Ronen Gradwohl and Moshe Tennenholtz. Coopetition Against an Amazon
  • Ruben Brokkelkamp, Sjir Hoeijmakers and Guido Schaefer. Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruism
  • Sushmita Gupta, Pallavi Jain, Daniel Lokshtanov, Sanjukta Roy and Saket Saurabh. Gehrlein Stable Committee with Multi-Modal Preferences
  • Martin Durand and Fanny Pascual. Collective Schedules: Axioms and algorithms
  • Alon Cohen, Argyrios Deligkas and Moran Koren. Learning Approximately Optimal Contracts
  • Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh and Paul Goldberg. Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy
  • Sophie Klumper and Guido Schäfer. Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents
  • Roy Shahmoon, Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz. Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents
  • Liad Blumrosen and Yehonatan Mizrahi. How Bad is the Merger Paradox?
  • Stavros Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer and Carmine Ventre. Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Priorities
  • Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Papasotiropoulos and Artem Tsikiridis. On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets
  • Ryann Sim, Stratis Skoulakis, Georgios Piliouras and Lillian Ratliff. Fast Convergence of Optimistic Gradient Ascent in Network Zero-Sum Extensive Form Games
  • Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos and Francisco Marmolejo-Cossio. Decentralised Update Selection with Semi-Strategic Experts

Invited speakers

Tutorials

Programme

Our preliminary programme can be downloaded as a Word document.

Monday 12 September

Time Event
 9.00am - 9.30am Registration - Coffee

9.30am - 12.30pm

(includes a coffee break)

Tutorial

Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Alexandros Hollender

Total Search Problems in Game Theory and Economics

 12.30pm - 2.00pm Lunch

2.00pm - 5.00pm

(includes a coffee break)

Tutorial

Rohit Vaish

Fair Division of the Indivisibles

 5.00pm - 7.00pm Welcome reception

Tuesday 13 September

Time  Event
9.00am - 9.30am Registration - Coffee
9.30am - 10.30am Invited talk - Speaker TBA
10.30am - 10.50am Coffee break
10.50am - 12.30pm

Sumit Goel and Wade Hann-Caruthers - Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions

Ruben Brokkelkamp, Sjir Hoeijmakers and Guido Schäfer - Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruism

Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang and Almog Wald - Lookahead Auctions with Pooling

Reshef Meir and Riccardo Baldeschi - Explicitly Simple Near-tie Auctions

Sophie Klumper and Guido Schäfer - Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents

12.30pm - 2.00pm Lunch
2.00pm - 3.40pm

Jack Dippel and Adrian Vetta - An Improved Bound for the Tree Conjecture in Network Creation Games

Qian Wang - On Tree Equilibria in Max-Distance Network Creation Games

Fuga Kiyosue and Kenjiro Takazawa - A common generalization of budget games and congestion games

Shaul Rosner and Tami Tamir - Cost-Sharing Games with Rank-Based Utilities

Yichen Yang, Kai Jia and Martin Rinard - On the Impact of Player Capability on Congestion Games

3.40pm - 4.00pm Coffee break
4.00pm - 5.20pm

Ronen Gradwohl and Moshe Tennenholtz - Coopetition Against an Amazon

Alon Cohen, Argyrios Deligkas and Moran Koren - Learning Approximately Optimal Contracts

Ryann Sim, Stratis Skoulakis, Georgios Piliouras and Lillian Ratliff - Fast Convergence of Optimistic Gradient Ascent in Network Zero-Sum Extensive Form Games

Roy Shahmoon, Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz - Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents

Wednesday 14 September

Time Event
9.00am - 9.30am Registration - Coffee
9.30am - 10.30am Invited talk - Speaker TBA
10.30am - 10.50am Coffee break
10.50am - 12.30pm

Best Paper: Stavros Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer and Carmine Ventre - Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Priorities

Martin Hoefer and Lisa Wilhelmi - Seniorities and Minimal Clearing in Financial Network Games

Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Papasotiropoulos and Artem Tsikiridis - On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets

Liad Blumrosen and Yehonatan Mizrahi - How Bad is the Merger Paradox?

Fabien Gensbittel, Dana Pizarro and Jérôme Renault - Competition and Recall in Selection Problems

12.30pm - 2.00pm Lunch
2.00pm - 3.40pm

Paul Goldberg and Matthew Katzman - PPAD-Complete Pure Approximate Nash Equilibria in Lipschitz Games

Matan Gilboa and Noam Nisan - Complexity of Public Goods Games on Graphs

Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh and Paul Goldberg - Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy

Jason Milionis, Christos Papadimitriou, Georgios Piliouras and Kelly Spendlove - Nash, Conley, and Computation: Impossibility and Incompleteness in Game Dynamics

Sahar Jahani and Bernhard von Stengel - Automated Equilibrium Analysis of 2x2x2 Games

3.40pm - 4.00pm Coffee break
4.00pm - 5.20pm

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin and Warut Suksompong - Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting

Martin Durand and Fanny Pascual - Collective Schedules: Axioms and algorithms

Leora Schmerler, Noam Hazon and Sarit Kraus - Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos and Francisco Marmolejo-Cossio - Decentralised Update Selection with Semi-Strategic Experts

7.00pm - 9.00pm Conference dinner

Thursday 15 September

Time Event
9.00am - 9.30am Registration - Coffee
9.30am - 10.30am Invited talk - Speaker TBA
10.30am - 10.50am Coffee break
10.50am - 12.50am

Yasushi Kawase and Hanna Sumita - Online Max-min Fair Allocation

Edith Elkind, Sonja Kraiczy and Nicholas Teh - Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment

Yuki Amano, Ayumi Igarashi, Yasushi Kawase, Kazuhisa Makino and Hirotaka Ono - Fair ride allocation on a line

Sushmita Gupta, Pallavi Jain, Daniel Lokshtanov, Sanjukta Roy and Saket Saurabh - Gehrlein Stable Committee with Multi-Modal Preferences

Matthias Bentert, Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger and Tomohiro Koana - Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals can be Harder than Strict Preferences

Kazuhisa Makino, Shuichi Miyazaki and Yu Yokoi - Incomplete List Setting of the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Maximally Satisfying Lower Quotas

12.50pm - 2.00pm Lunch

Registration

SAGT 2022 registration is now open.

The registration fees for SAGT 2022 are described in the following table.  Note that online registration is available until 4 September 23:59 BST and that only cash payments will be accepted on site. (The early registration deadline is 24 August 23:59 BST.)

  Early (on or before 24th August)  Late (until 4th September) On site (cash only)
Student registration  £200 £250 £300
Regular registration £250 £300 £350

Student participants will be asked to prove their student status at the venue. Note there are registration waivers available to students; see section Student Scholarships for more information.

The fee covers the following:

  • Attendance to all sessions and invited talks
  • Welcome reception
  • Coffee breaks
  • Lunches
  • Conference dinner

Please register online with Eventbrite. For any questions, please email us at sagt2022@essex.ac.uk


Register with Eventbrite

Student scholarships

We are delighted to announce that with the support of AIJ we are able to offer a small number of student registration waivers. The purpose is to enable students to participate in SAGT 2022.

To be eligible, you must be registered as a full-time student at a higher education institution (e.g. university). Please note that attending the conference is a requirement for being supported.

Please email the following documents to sagt2022@essex.ac.uk by 3 August 2022:

  • A brief case for support that includes reasons why the registration fee should be waived
  • A letter/email of support from the applicant’s advisor.

We will notify you of our decision by 5 August 2022.

Venue and travel information

SAGT participants can choose to book (student) accommodation available at Colchester campus. This is priced at £55.00 per night including breakfast in an en-suite bedroom (you don’t need to be a student to book one if you are registered at SAGT).

You can make your booking online, or call +44 1206 872358. When making your booking, make sure to quote SAGT22.

Usual booking websites, like booking.com, contain comprehensive lists of hotels in Colchester. You can check out how to get to Colchester Campus for more information on bus services to and from the conference venue (University of Essex campus).

Parking is free for SAGT participants. Please get in touch with sagt2022@essex.ac.uk if you plan to park on campus so that we can register your vehicle.

Please visit Find Your Way for a map of the campus to help you during your stay.

History of SAGT

Code of conduct

In an effort to combat bullying, discrimination, and harassment, SAGT 2022 endorses the code of conduct outlined in appendix D of the Report from the Ad hoc committee to Combat Harassment and Discrimination in the Theory of Computing Community (.pdf).

Sponsors