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Introduction

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This edition presents work across a wide range of topics, among them for example: consumptions and individual choice; policing and policing culture; Japan, performance and gender; female genital mutilation; digital media and structural inequalities; the impact of HIV/AIDS on LGBT communities; attitudes towards sexuality in Finland and Russia; digital surveillance and privacy; the privatisation of probation; and the democratisation of the image.

All of the work published here has achieved a grade of 85%+ (1st year students), or 80%+ (2nd & 3rd year students).

We are pleased and proud to be able recognise our undergraduate achievement in this way.

Congratulations to all and best wishes,

The IDEATE Editorial Team

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How far is consumption a matter of individual choice? Discuss using examples.

Sara Nascimento Ascensao

Consumption is a crucial part of people's everyday lives and is commonly assumed to be a matter of individual choice. By analysing the common idea that people have full authorship of their consumption decisions, and by presenting challenging alternatives to that notion, this essay aims to discuss the extent to which this assumption is true. The goal of this text is to argue that social and structural influences, such as socio-historical context, ethnicity, gender, and advertising, can shape consumption to a much greater extent than is often recognised. I will then briefly present the Frankfurt school perspective on the subject. This will then be followed by a discussion of the problem of agency in a coercive society.

In the common sense view, humans are in control of their choices, due to the existence of free will. An action is ordinarily defined as free if there is the absence of both internal limitations (such as having an intellectual disability, for example) and external restrictions (obviously one's decision to give money to a criminal is not free if they have a gun pointed to their head) on one's behaviour (Vonasch et al., 2018). Applying that line of thought to the topic, it is the case that people buy certain products because they want to, not because they were explicitly forced to do it. Therefore, any cognitively capable individual possesses total control when it comes to their consumption choices.

However, there are a few points that this perspective fails to consider. Sam Harris (2012) argues against the popular notion of free will, since even if people act in accordance with what they want to do, their own desires are a product of many factors that are out of their control. Individuals tend to be unaware of all the background aspects that shape their thoughts and actions (Harris, 2012). From a sociological perspective, if the common sense view holds that people are free if they choose according to their desires, then one must analyse the complex web of collective social forces that shape and inform those same desires.

Coffee is a good example of how external circumstances outline consumption. Taking a production of culture perspective, there are six key elements of production that interact with each other and influence coffee culture: technology, law and regulation, industry structure, organization structure, occupational careers and market (Morris, 2013). For instance, the digital revolution and the emergence of self-autonomous working practices correlate with the growth of coffee shops in the UK. The relatively high prices that British customers pay for their coffee usually includes 'rent for time', meaning that they have a suitable space to work on their laptop or relax. The way in which this beverage is served reflects this: the milky drink takes time to consume, which caters to people who want to stay in the shop for longer periods of time working. In contrast, this product has been historically subjected to price controls in Italy (about 1 euro a serving), which makes it incompatible with the UK shop

business model. Italian costumers tend to have simpler and smaller espresso style beverages, which they can drink quickly (Morris, 2013).

Secondly, one's membership of a certain social category, such as ethnicity and gender, can largely influence one's pattern of consumption. There is a case to be made that because certain minority groups have been economically disenfranchised throughout history, they possess below average economic power (Hirschman, 1985). This results in marketers perceiving ethnic minorities as less important. As a result, marketing campaigns will disproportionately tailor to the ethnic majority, which constitutes a way in which ethnicity can shape consumption (Hirschman, 1985). An example of this would be the exclusion of black women from the beauty industry by not producing products adequate to their specific skin tone.

Consumption can also be a fairly gendered phenomenon (Pettinger, 2015). One specific example of that would be women's use of makeup at work (Dellinger and Williams, 1997). When a job does not explicitly demand makeup use, wearing it in those settings is commonly seen as a matter of individual choice. In reality, women's cosmetic consumption in this specific context is shaped by workplace culture. A significant link has been found between what is deemed to be appropriate use of makeup and assumptions about health, heterosexuality and credibility, which ultimately plays a huge role in women's career success (Dellinger and Williams, 1997).

Advertising can be highly influential when it comes to the consumption behaviours of people defined as working class. In his paper, Moore (2012) discusses the ways in which advertisements appeal to consumers' impulses. Companies make use of advertising campaigns that emphasize the pleasures of consumption (such as highlighting the aromatic scent or the delicious taste of a cup of coffee, for example). The triggered emotional anticipation process can be so overwhelming to the point of causing a conflict between self-control and impulsivity (Moore, 2012). In order to reconcile both, there is an attempt to rationalize people's yield to consumption impulses (which explains why brands like McDonald's use slogans such as "you deserve it" in their publicity adverts). This falls in line with the idea that in a capitalist society the attractiveness of consumer goods is attributable to their novelty and promises of pleasure, instead of their utilitarian function (Pettinger, 2015).

According to the Frankfurt School perspective, cultural consumption controls individuals much more than individuals control their cultural consumption. Under the late stages of capitalism, mass production of culture is heavily shaped by profit motives, 'infecting everything with sameness' (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2007: 41). As art becomes a standardized product designed to appeal to the most people possible, it loses its previous subversive and liberating properties. It is created to require the minimum amount of critical engagement by the public, which creates a complacent working class. On those grounds, the 'culture industry' is a form of social control that "endlessly cheats its consumers out of what it endlessly promises" (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2007: 53). Although they cannot fulfil humans' true psychological needs, they can serve as a temporary escape from the oppressive

process of labour, just so they can go back to cope with the same exploitative work (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2007). In this way, a person's class position can play a role when it comes to their experiences in regards to cultural consumption.

It is important to clarify that the different perspectives discussed do not aim to erase human agency. In fact, the Frankfurt School writers developed what is called Critical Theory, which concerned the unveiling of inequality and oppressive power dynamics in order to advocate for positive social change (Pettinger, 2015). In other words, when it comes to consumption patterns linked to oppressive systems, the broader cultural influences are inescapable. However, by analysing and critiquing those oppressive systems individuals can contribute to the shaping of that same culture. For example, although workplace culture highly impacts women's makeup use, that does not mean they cannot collectively organize to challenge society's coercive beauty expectations.

In conclusion, the common sense view of consumption as a matter of individual choice does not hold up to scrutiny. People's consumption behaviours are a product of a complex interaction of social forces and external factors, such as socio-historical context, gender and ethnicity. Consumption of culture industry can also be a form of social control, which keeps the working class subordinate to the whims of capitalism. However, it is important to view individuals as not mere passive receptors of oppression, but as agents heavily moulded by broader institutions who nonetheless still retain some power to shape their own lives.

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Quantitative Data Analysis Report

Freya Harvey

The variable of interest in this quantitative data analysis report is from Round 8 (2016) of the European Social Survey. The variable chosen is 'feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark'. This variable relates to sociological and criminological topics of victimisation and fear of crime. The key academic literature this report will refer to is by Benjamin Roberts' (2014) chapter '*Fear of Walking Alone at Night*' as it links to the chosen variable very explicitly. In Roberts' chapter, he states:

since the 1960s, the fear of criminal victimization has become an increasingly prominent socio-political concern among researchers and policymakers alike, most notably in the United States, Britain, and Europe but progressively in developing countries too (*Ibid.*: 1).

Therefore, the chosen variable has significance in contemporary sociological research and the countries chosen. Additionally, literature by Jackson and Kuha (2010) will be used to compare my results with at the end of the report.

The countries chosen to compare in this report are Italy and Norway. Italy is a country with millions of tourists every year, so it would be interesting to see if they feel more safe or unsafe. Similarly, Norway also experiences tourism but not as much as Italy. Norway is a country known for being safe and civil with low crime rates, so it will be interesting to discover if they feel safe within their neighbourhood. Furthermore, the police structure of the country will contribute to how safe individuals feel in their local area.

The variable is coded as a categorical variable, ordinal in particular, with four responses for participants to choose. Also, the point scale of this survey question is 1-4. 1 being 'very safe', 2 being 'safe', 3 being 'unsafe' and 4 being 'very unsafe'. The number of valid participants for this survey question is 4116. Only 55 individuals refused to answer or 'didn't know'. Therefore, this variable has a high response rate and a highly engaged audience.

Firstly, this quantitative data report will start by presenting a frequency table, summary statistics and a histogram of the variable combining Italy and Norway's responses. Secondly, the report will highlight differences in responses between Italy and Norway by using an independent *t*-test. Next, the report will show gender differences in responses between the two countries. To conclude the report, a summary of the findings will be presented in the style of a news article.

After generating a frequency table, summary statistics and a histogram on SPSS, the data revealed that the majority of the participants feel 'very safe' or 'safe' when walking alone in

their local area. Firstly, this is revealed when looking at the frequency table, where the cumulative percent of ‘very safe’ and ‘safe’ is 75%, which is $\frac{3}{4}$ of the all the valid participants (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 - Frequency Table - Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very safe	1215	29.1	29.5	29.5
	Safe	1872	44.9	45.5	75.0
	Unsafe	786	18.8	19.1	94.1
	Very unsafe	243	5.8	5.9	100.0
	Total	4116	98.7	100.0	
Missing	Refusal	8	.2		
	Don't know	47	1.1		
	Total	55	1.3		
Total		4171	100.0		

The summary statistics table reveals measures of central tendency. Firstly, the mean is 2.01 (see Figure 2). Secondly, the mode reveals the most common response, which is 2.00 (see Figure 2). Lastly, the median, the middle value, is 2 (see Figure 2). All three of the central tendency measures fall into the ‘safe’ category, validating that the feeling of ‘safe’ is the main consensus amongst all the participants. As a result of all three measures being the same, it is important to carry out further statistical tests to understand the variable in more depth.

Figure 2 - Summary Statistics Table - Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark


N	Valid	4116
	Missing	55
Mean		2.01
Median		2.00
Mode		2
Std. Deviation		.850
Range		3
95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	1.99
	Upper Bound	2.04

The summary statistic table also reveals some measures of variation. Firstly, the standard deviation is a statistic which is used to measure how dispersed observations are from the mean. In this observation, the standard deviation is .850 (see Figure 2). This is a small standard deviation which could be a result of the range being small. The range in this data set is 3. As the range is small, there are only a few categories participants choose as their answer. Secondly, the confidence interval for the mean is a range of scores constructed such that the population mean will fall within this range in 95% of samples. If you repeated samples and

construct confidence intervals, then 95% of them will contain the population value. In this survey, the confidence interval is between 1.99 and 2.04 (see Figure 2).

Lastly, the histogram provides a visual representation of the results (see Figure 3). The peak stands slightly to the left of the centre revealing a positive skew with a tail falling to the right of the peak. The highest peak is 2, which is ‘safe’, further validating the overall consensus that individuals feel safe in their local area.

Figure 3 – Histogram - Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark



In this observation, the null hypothesis would be that there is no difference between the feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark in Italy and Norway. Whereas, the alternative hypothesis would be that there is a difference between the feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark in Italy and Norway.

From the group statistics table, there is a clear a difference between the mean for Italy and Norway. Italy’s mean is 2.31, whereas Norway’s mean is 1.52 (see Figure 4). Therefore, Italy’s mean falls into the ‘safe’ category, whereas Norway’s mean falls into the ‘very safe’ category, which suggests that Norwegian participants feel safer than the Italians when walking alone after dark. Secondly, the standard deviation for Italy is .809, which is larger than Norway’s deviation of .668 (see Figure 4). This demonstrates that the Italian participants have a wider variety of responses, compared to the Norwegian participants.

The independent *t*-test compares two means which allows a more in-depth insight into the survey results than what was shown in the previous section with the summary statistics. This is useful for this observation as the three measures of central tendency were very similar. The *p*-value in this sample is revealed by looking at ‘Sig. (2 – tailed)’ which is .000 (see Figure 5). However, the *p*-value cannot be 0. Therefore, SPSS has rounded the figure to 3 decimal places. As the figure is less than 0.05, it is statistically significant, which means we can reject the null hypothesis. This implies there is a significant difference between Italians and Norwegians relating to the feeling of safety of walking alone in their local area after dark.

Figure 4 – Group Statistics Table – Italy and Norway - Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark

	Country	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area in the dark	Italy	2574	2.31	.809	.016
	Norway	1542	1.52	.668	.017

Figure 5 – Independent Samples *t*-Test for Italy and Norway - Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area in the dark	Equal variances assumed	29.926	.000	32.242	4114	.000	.788	.024	.741	.836
	Equal variances not assumed			33.819	3721.637	.000	.788	.023	.743	.834

Lastly, the mean difference, the difference between the means, on the *t*-test is .788 for Italy and Norway (see Figure 5). Considering the point scale is only 1-4 for this survey question, .788 is a significant difference between the means of Italy and Norway's level of fear.

In this observation, the null hypothesis would be that there is no difference in the feeling of safety of walking alone in a local area after dark between men and women. Whereas, the alternative hypothesis would be that there is a difference in the feeling of safety of walking alone in a local area after dark between men and women.

Firstly, looking at the group statistics table for men in Italy and Norway, the mean for men in Italy is 2.13, and is 1.30 for men in Norway (see Figure 6). Similar to the group statistics table for the two countries, Italian participants fall into the 'safe' category, whereas Norwegian participants fall into the 'very safe' category. The standard deviation for Italian males is .779, which is more significant than the .519 for Norwegian males (see Figure 6). This validates a wider variety in responses from the Italian male participants, compared to the Norwegian male participants.

Figure 6 - Group Statistics Table – Male, Italy and Norway

Male	Country	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area in the dark	Italy	1262	2.13	.779	.022
	Norway	830	1.30	.519	.018

Furthermore, looking at the group statistics table for females in Italy and Norway, the mean for females in Italy is 2.48 and Norway is 1.78 (see Figure 7). Similar to the group statistics table for the two countries and the males, Italian participants fall into the ‘safe’ category, whereas, Norwegian participants fall into the ‘very safe’ category. The standard deviation for Italian females is .800, which is more significant than the .725 for Norwegian females (see Figure 7). This shows a wider variety in responses from the Italian female participants, compared to the Norwegian female participants.

Figure 7 – Group Statistics Table – Female, Italy and Norway

Female	Country	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area in the dark	Italy	1312	2.48	.800	.022
	Norway	712	1.78	.725	.027

Furthermore, there are differences between men’s and women’s answers in Italy and Norway. Firstly, men and women in Italy both fall into the ‘safe’ category with means of 2.13 and 2.48, respectively (see Figure 6 and 7). In comparison, the difference between men and women in Norway reveals that they both fall into the ‘very safe’ category with means of 1.30 and 1.78, respectively (see Figure 6 and 7). This emphasises that, whatever gender you are, the country you live in has more significance in contributing to how safe you feel walking alone in the dark at night. Lastly, the standard deviation for females is more significant than the men’s, which illustrates that females’ answers are more varied than males’, both in Italy and Norway.

The p-value for men and women both in Italy and Norway in this sample is 0.000 (see Figure 8 and 9). However, as mentioned in the previous section, the p-value cannot be 0; therefore, SPSS has rounded the figure to 3 decimal places. Nevertheless, as the figure is smaller than 0.05, it is statistically significant, which means we can reject the null hypothesis. This suggests there is a difference between male and female Italians and Norwegians relating to the feeling of safety of walking alone in their local area after dark.

Figure 8 - Independent Samples *t*-Test – Male, Italy and Norway

Male		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances				t-test for Equality of Means			95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area in the dark	Equal variances assumed	42.429	.000	27.012	2090	.000	.830	.031	.770	.890
	Equal variances not assumed			29.250	2089.602	.000	.830	.028	.774	.886

Figure 9 – Independent Samples *t*-Test – Female, Italy and Norway

Female		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances				t-test for Equality of Means			95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area in the dark	Equal variances assumed	29.689	.000	19.498	2022	.000	.703	.036	.632	.774
	Equal variances not assumed			20.075	1585.903	.000	.703	.035	.634	.722

News Article

Is the fear of crime and being a victim enough to stop individuals walking alone by themselves in their local area after dark?

This observation focuses on male and female participants in Italy and Norway relating to how safe they feel when walking alone after dark in their local area. This observation revealed in the first section of the report that the average response from participants from Italy and Norway was 'safe'. But when looking at the countries in more depth with the independent t -test, it revealed that Norwegian participants felt 'very safe'. In contrast, Italian participants on average felt 'safe'. Findings also revealed that women feel less safe than men in their local area, which could be linked to the stereotype that women are weaker and more vulnerable when alone. However, this stereotype is questionable, as when looking into crime statistics it reveals that women are more likely to be victims of domestic crimes with offenders being people they know, rather than by a stranger on the street.

There are several factors which could contribute to the way the participants feel. One factor for this could be that Italy and Norway are both wealthy European countries. In contrast, a comparison between a European country and a country from the Global South may reveal more significant variations where it is more common for war and conflict to occur on the streets. With both countries being wealthy, their governments have more public budget to spend on public safety and welfare. For example, an increase in funding of street lighting will make individuals more visible and consequently they may feel safer when walking alone after dark.

Another factor which may contribute to the difference in how safe citizens feel in Italy and Norway is the national police structure. For example, Italian police officers are allowed to be armed at all times. Even if Italian police officers are off duty, they are permitted to carry a gun around if it is concealed. Conversely, Norwegian police are not armed while patrolling the streets day-to-day. So, although the primary function of guns is protection, the findings of this observation may suggest that the presence of guns makes individuals feel less safe and more worried as it foreshadows crime.

Lastly, the population size may be another factor as to why citizens feel safer in Norway than in Italy. Norway has a population of 5.238 million, whereas Italy's population is 60.48 million. This means that Italy's population is twelve times that of Norway, which may be a reason why participants in Italy may not feel as safe as those from Norway. Having a more sizeable population increases the opportunity of crime, and with Italy having high tourist levels, there is a lot of temporary immigrants on the streets which may make them feel less safe.

In their 2010 paper, Jackson and Kuha created a cross-national analysis between European citizens and their worry about crime. Unlike the data provided by the variable in this

observation from the European Social Survey, they focus on specific crimes such as burglary and violent crime. Their paper omits statistics from Italy, which is compared throughout this report, so it is not very easy to create a clear comparison to their data. However, as with the findings of this report, their research revealed that Norway is the country in which people feel the least concerned about crime.

Finally, Roberts' (2016) highlights a criticism of 'walking alone at night' survey questions for being too vague. Therefore, for future research, the question needs to be more specific in what it is asking, such as in Jackson and Kuha's paper. For example, if they are scared, what are they scared of? Is it being alone? Is it being raped? Is it being followed? Therefore, it may be useful to complete some qualitative research which will allow the researcher to ask individuals more in-depth questions relating to how safe they feel walking alone after dark. In-depth interviews can provide more productive answers with reasoning. Creating qualitative data will require sacrificing a more significant number of participants as it takes longer to carry out, making it less valid and more difficult to make generalisations. However, it allows participants to have a voice rather than being pigeon-holed into one of four categories.

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While policing policy improves, does police culture?

Lucy Sharp

It is almost impossible to imagine a world where the police as an institution does not exist, whether their policing style is militaristic and oppressive - as is the case in totalitarian dictatorships - or dismissive and lax, such as the over-policing and under protection of indigenous Canadians (Razack, 2000). However, the police always appear to be at least in the background of society, enforcing laws and dealing with criminal delinquents. But the identifiable institutional subculture of the police force that we know today is more recently developed, along with the introduction of Sir Robert Peel's policing principals and the creation of the first recognizable police force in the United Kingdom.

The main goal of this paper is to explore the concept of 'the police' and 'police culture' to discover how the role of the police has evolved and changed along with our society, as well as the role police culture plays in the police force of other countries and societies. Through exploring this concept, we will be particularly assessing what change in the police looks like at the core of their organization, not just the aesthetic changes of police procedure and policy which might be, at first, tempting to focus on as evidence of substantial institutional change within the police force itself. This paper will also attempt to highlight the changes within intersectional social contexts of gender and race, including the policing of ethnic minorities and women and, more broadly, the way in which women and ethnic minorities play a role in police institutions today. To conclude, this paper will find that neither the police nor policing practices have changed a substantial amount concerning interactions with ethnic minorities and women, despite legislation created to prevent a toxic police culture from manifesting itself.

Since the study of policing was first introduced, there has been an inherent focus on the police as a state agency, despite further critical study of policing branching out into the behavior of policing itself undertaken by other, less formal community agents such as educational and religious institutions (Jones et al, 2017: 769). The police are an interesting phenomenon of state-sponsored law enforcement endowed with powers closely related to the judiciary branch of government - interpreting law to facilitate an arrest - while being controlled by the laws created by the legislative branch and, through executive powers, enforcing the law at their discretion with the power to employ coercive force (Bittner, 1970).

The original separation of powers idea was first described by Montesquieu in his 1748 work, *Spirit of the Laws*, where he talked about how liberty is surrendered to tyrannical rule if the judiciary is not separated from the other two powers (Cohler et al, 2013). Despite this, Peel's creation of the police force rested on the police acting as members of the community, bridging the gap between state protection as described in *The Social Contract* (Hobbes, 1998) and community, becoming "a totemic symbol of unity and order" (Jones et al, 2017: 788).

However, there is the argument that the police in certain less democratic societies - and even in our own modern societies - are failing to protect and even taking far too much power over the individual through the social contract - especially those individuals from minority backgrounds. There has been some argument about whether policing, like any other profession, truly fits into the community as an unbiased party in the legal and political discourse of the UK. An example of this is the controversy surrounding the Criminal Justice Act of 2003, which permits police officers to serve in jury trials in England. This has been contested not only because other common law countries in the UK, such as Scotland and Ireland, do not allow for it but also because of the apparent bias this brings into the criminal justice process by the very nature of the police officer's job being more inclined to lean on the prosecution side of a criminal case (Akhtar, 2016: 30).

This proposition is working under the assumption that police culture is different from the culture of the individual and therefore cannot be considered in the same way other individuals in state institutions, such as those within the education system, are considered. It is important to highlight the precarious position modern policing falls within today and its brief history in order to show the complicated nature of the police force as an institution and explain how this then goes on to individualize the police force and create an arguably toxic subculture.

In sociology, the concept of a subculture is widely accepted and usually attributed to the Chicago School of Sociology (Newburn, 2009), although there is no evidence to substantiate this claim (Blackman, 2014: 497). A subculture is essentially a new or exaggerated set of cultural norms followed by a certain group of people that function and are usually upheld in tandem with the wider norms of society (Morgan et al, 2012: 68).

Police culture, coined by Waddington (1999), is unique in its manifestation through the workforce - policing is a very important job, where individuals are assigned with the power to limit someone else's freedom and the responsibility of protecting the population. That is quite a heavy workload and Waddington argues that police culture is a coping mechanism for the psychological and social hardships that policing as an occupation creates. Some subcultures operate as closed societies, like monasteries or cults. Uniformed occupations can also come to operate in the same way perhaps because of their physical grouping - e.g. uniforms increasing unity in behaviors as seen in Zimbardo's 1971 prison study - or shared experiences that create shared values, acting as a microcosm of Parson's (1951) social stability theory that suggests the importance of internalized values for structuring individual behavior.

The creation of these shared values is explored eloquently through Reiner's (2000) work, where he presents the general characteristics of policing, including the need to identify dishonesty; consequently, suspicion becomes a strong element of their subculture. Additionally, the occupation of policing includes unorthodox working hours and a reliance on team members for your own safety - hence making it difficult to socialize with non-police. Other than this, there is a certain level of moral and political conservatism associated with policing, due to the conservative nature of laws in the UK and an outdated machismo linked to traditional working-class masculinity and values. Conti (2006) argues for the importance

of 'preprofessional' socialization (Brown, 1991) of police recruits during police training as aiming to form a strong commitment between the individual and the role of policing, which creates a moral identity (Katz, 1975) in-line with police culture.

So why is police culture as we know it viewed as negative? Throughout countless literature on police culture, it is widely understood that police officers find their job stressful; of course, when you are dealing oftentimes with criminal offenders and victims inside your job, work unconventional hours and dedicate your life to the job of protecting others, it is easy to become stressed and feel as though the only people understanding of this are those in a similar position to yourself. This kind of thought process can lead, as described by Crank and Caldero (2000), to police officers feeling undervalued by society - especially in those communities where policing is more densely focused and there might be a reaction from the community against police officers as a result of feeling over policed.

The police believe they are doing their job by concentrating resources in high-crime areas and feel disrespected by understandably negative community reactions to the centralization of resources, which leads to a strengthened comradery within police institutions. These ideas of police officers having moral superiority over the public is appealing because then the public can then be viewed as not understanding the nuances of police work, hence they have unquestionable authority and the grievances of the general population are ignored (Crank & Caldero, 2000).

This has led to what McIvor (2010) termed 'defensive practices', wherein institutions - in this case, the police, will protect themselves from being found legally liable for the harm of an individual resulting from an absence of police protection. An example of these defensive practices is *Hill v The Chief Constable of West Yorkshire*, which was a House of Lords decision where the mother of Jacqueline Hill - the final victim of the serial killer Peter Sutcliffe - attempted to claim police work neglect resulted in her daughter's death. This claim was found to be legally insufficient and hence set up a principle known as the Hill principle, stating that police officers do not owe a duty of care to the public. This was controversial because it was the police acting defensively in their responsibility to the public and can be an example of defensive police cultures described by Crank and Caldero (2000) seeping into the occupation of policing, which can be argued is a dangerous precedent to set for an institution given so much power, if they only respect the opinions of each other and do not consider public opinion as important to their occupation.

Another way police culture has manifested itself in recent years is through loyalty in questionable circumstances involving the police. Because loyalty is an important attribute in policing due to reliance on each other in dangerous situations, it can be misused in the case of investigations into police misconduct. Kleinig (1996: 67) summarizes this concept well with the line in his work: 'When an organization wants you to do right, it asks for your integrity; and when it wants you to do wrong, it demands your loyalty'. This has been significant in the past of policing misconduct that has been covered up through this culturally developed loyalty, notably the Hillsborough incident, where police officers, post-incident, were using

leading questions about drinking as an attempt to shift blame for the incident onto the victims of the tragedy (Scruton, 2013: 5), as well as leaking false claims to the press as an attempt to avoid placing blame on fellow officers for police misjudgment resulting in their deaths.

Years later it was found that the police were criminally liable for the events that took place that day and a significant amount of cover-up had to be searched through in order to reach that conclusion. It is easy to assume that police culture has changed since then, especially with all the backlash against police culture and the introduction of systems to identify police misconduct, such as PACE in 1984 and the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1981. However, there are still incidents like this taking place. At the London G20 summit protest of 2009, Ian Tomlinson was killed by a police officer's unnecessary use of force upon him. However, if it was not for video footage and witness accounts of the incident by members of the public, this would have never been public information. The police reported that Mr Tomlinson had simply fallen to the ground and died and because the coroner's report confirmed this lie there was no reason to believe otherwise. Police culture functions, to this day, as a dangerous catch-22 that police officers must avoid when it comes to police corruption and misconduct.

It is only natural to assume that social movements that have created equal opportunities for women and minorities in society would change the way police culture functions, but there is evidence that police culture perpetuates oppressive and racist ideas that can impede on their ability to provide the ideal form of policing in our society (Macpherson Report, 1999). Despite this, Reiner (2000: 85) argues that it is crucial to study 'cop culture' - the way in which police officers act that permeate their work - which is proven to differ from 'canteen culture' - how off duty police officers might behave and socialize.

Goff et al (2016), follows on from this by arguing 'canteen culture' is not an indicator of racist behavior through the medium of policing. This paper would like to go a step further and look at how police culture discriminates internally against ethnic minorities, even if police culture is not believed to directly cause racist behavior in policing the general population. Despite the aesthetic change of the make-up of the police, outdated views are still perpetuated through police culture. In Australia relations between police and indigenous people are historically poor, and frustration lies within the fact that police from Anglo-Australian backgrounds have trouble coping with different cultures. The Fitzgerald report (1989: 200) emphasized an 'unwritten police code' that included abuse of police powers. Police culture might not have a direct impact on police upholding the law, but it is undeniable that attitudes perpetuated by police culture and the lack of ethnic minority and female police officers contribute to systemic issues in dealing with the general population.

Franklin (2007: 4) describes the definition of police culture in the most liberal criminological literature on the subject as a 'manifestation of male group interaction' that is exacerbated by the danger, stress and isolation that the policing occupation uniquely entails. It is from this definition that we can explore the role of women in the police force and how they both affect police culture and are affected by police culture themselves.

In the UK, female officers are becoming increasingly common, but to measure this as an indication that police canteen culture or subversive sexism in the institution of policing has dissipated is incorrect - with the introduction of women in the police force it has meant that a new 'soft' policing model has evolved through female policing that aims to 'create a more legitimate structure for female police officers to work within'. This could be considered an example of policing evolving to a less masculine and 'macho' environment where aggressive policing practices are encouraged, creating a 'niche' for female officers to fill within policing (McCarthy, 2013: 261).

Not only are police cultures changing, but female policing has created progressive new ways of policing different groups of people, lending more nuance to the systems in which police can operate. However, this could be used as evidence that police culture has affected the ways women can integrate into the workforce, forcing most female police officers to dig out a space in which they can work successfully in a police environment. It can be said that previous literature on the subject of women in the policing profession has consisted of animosity towards the area of 'soft' policing because it is seen as departing from the 'traditional' sense of policing and a threat to what men working in the policing profession they have been practicing all of their life, but it could be argued this animosity stems from the fact soft policing is related to a caring traditionally feminine role, that the police force has historically rejected through its androcentric ideas of policing (Holdaway, 1983). After all, there has been research into the way policing as an occupation and police culture rejects the concept of 'emotion work' (Pogrebin et al, 1991) and women are also viewed in wider society as more emotional than men, hence women might be seen as unqualified for their positions in important work that emotions could possibly intrude upon.

Whatever the progress being made towards a more equal society, as of March 2018, still only 30% of officers in the 43 operating police departments of the UK are women, when half of the general population identify under this label (Hargreaves et al., 2018: 33). Could it be that, despite the progressive changes that women have made to police work in the UK, "[male police officers] just don't want the women in police work" (Balkin, 1988: 33)? To look elsewhere, in Brazil police culture and claims of sexism in the workplace have seemingly been heard and corrected, through the implementation of all-female policing stations beginning in 1985 in Sao Paulo (Santos, 2005).

However, in her work, Santos cites dialogue from a member of these police stations when describing a case of domestic abuse: 'She should fight back' and 'many women are beaten up because they are asking for it' (2005: 5). This talk of domestic abuse as a 'fight' is a masculine term and way of viewing a serious criminal incident, but it echoes the sentiments of Brazilian popular culture and demonstrates the insidious sexism prevalent within police culture and views of female victims, exemplifying the adoption of masculine policing methods by female officers to be accepted. While all-female police departments were successful in the reporting of more crimes against women and the socio-political weight that creating such a gynocentric institution can have, it seems more of a government 'co-op' of a

political feminist movement in Brazil than actual progress being made to create a safe environment for female police officers to operate within a sexist police culture.

In conclusion, police culture has developed a veneer of inclusivity - with the introduction of women and minorities into the police force - and it may have even been affected by the introduction of new systems to monitor policing and the negative effects of police culture on fair and impartial criminal justice processes. However, the culture around policing still maintains outdated cultural values which breeds a relentless loyalty. It can be argued that this very loyalty is the most dangerous aspect of police culture, contributing to a tendency for police officers to circulate outdated views, defend each other throughout police malpractice inquests and even manifests itself in a proclivity to treat suspects of crime in an unjust manner.

All things must adapt with time and policing is no exception to the rule: the introduction of women and minorities into the police force are evidence of this; does this evidence a significant change in police culture? I would argue that is a bold assumption to make, owing to the fact police misconduct derived from loyalty to one another is continuing in the UK and elsewhere. Where police culture is causing conflict with the ability of police officers to do their innate police duty of protecting innocent lives, there is a problem unchanged by time and new social movements that have seemingly allowed for women and minorities to engage in the institution of policing.

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Are ‘the police’ changing? Discuss with reference to the culture of policing and the role of women and minorities?

Alec Castillo

The idea of policing is to enforce social order and exhibit a form of authority. Police organisation varies in different societies, and therefore the culture of policing is defined in different ways. Reiner referred to it as ‘the values, norms, perspectives and craft rules which inform police conduct’ (1992: 109), while Peter Manning suggested that it implies ‘accepted practices, rules, and principles of conduct that are situationally applied, and generalised rationales and beliefs’ (1989: 360). With critical analysis, both definitions construct opposing perspectives on police culture. Manning identifies the culture-independent from the police’s conduct as some attain a certain degree of proficiency when policing the streets. In contrast, Reiner proposed that police culture permeates within individuals that influence how they police their community. Both differences set aside, they mutually argue that there is a conventional custom of norms and values that possibly influences how the police operate in society. This police culture involves the domination of a patriarchal and a predominantly white ethnic group of task forces. Sociologists and criminologists have studied the underlying impact these factors have on the form of policing they operate in: biases and prejudiced acts.

From this, I will be arguing that ‘the police’ has changed to an extent, whereby there is a significant difference regarding the increase in female and ethnic minorities in the force and the decrease in prejudiced policing. However, there is also a significantly unequal ratio of female to male and white to ethnic minority officers. In this essay, I will be enumerating a brief history of policing with accounts of the hegemonic sexuality and racial background statistics within ‘the police’. I will be further noting the emergence of women and other ethnic groups entering the police department, supported by academic literature from feminists and critical race theorists.

Crime, as an inevitable constant in society, resulted in the necessity of policing. The majority of these were petty crimes, such as theft or disturbance of the peace. By the mid-18th century, policing was operated by parish constables and watchmen – a group of men who ‘patrolled a short beat or stood in a kiosk at night time’ (Paterson and Pollock, 2011: 22). They were commonly well-educated and intellectual men and were held accountable by local magistrates of peace. Ideally, the visibility of peacekeepers to the public is efficient in preventing people from committing crime and deviance. However, the system of watchmen and constables involved victims paying a cost to acquire a ‘thief-taker’ in investigating a crime. During that period, the ‘system provided little incentive for constables (in particular) to deal with low-level crime and was subject to corruption’ (Paterson and Pollock, 2011: 26). Hence, a few years after Sir Robert Peel was delegated as the Home Secretary in 1822, he founded the Metropolitan Police (1829), which established the first structured system of law enforcement in the UK. Alongside, Peel forwarded a set of principles – ‘Peelian’ principles –

that denoted general instructions issued to police officers, such as crime and disorder prevention, using physical force as a last resort and to a minimum degree if necessary, and to recognise that the ‘police are the public and the public are the police’ (Home Office, 2012).

Whether researchers take on Manning’s or Reiner’s definition of police culture, it can be argued that both suggest how values affect the way officers are policing the streets; either their values are presented through their behaviour of policing or their values exhibit professionalism that it does not affect their policing. This was evident in John Crank’s literature, ‘Understanding Police Culture’ (2014 [1998]), where he discusses police organisational structures, corruption, policies and all other areas of police work:

In the heart of every cop is a sense of morality, strong in some and weak in others, but always present... Cop culture works in large part because cops start with a residue of moral values associated with the traditional, small-town that symbolises mainstream America... Police culture transforms and unifies cops with a shared perception of social justice (Crank, 2014 [1998]: 43).

The values within police culture differ from individual officers. However, there is a possibility that their values are influenced by earlier thinking. Post the Second World War, ‘migrants have changed the demography of Britain’ as the number increased from the late 1940s to the 1950s (Panayi, 2010: 25). This was due to the decline in employment rates from people’s respective countries. Since then, ‘successive generations of black communities have felt under-protected as victims and over-policed as suspects’ (Palmer, 2012: 26). Locals who do not possess the same norms and values as the migrants lead residents to feel unease towards them. Therefore, Cohen (1972) argued they are referred to as the ‘folk devils; an identifiable object (or individuals) onto which social fears and anxieties may be projected’ (in Hier, 2002: 313). A moral panic is said to be created, which is a mass concern relating to the specific threat. Because of this, the police placed an emphasis on migrants as the ‘enemy’ of society. Attitudes acted on by the police is a form of societal response to the rise of migrants in Britain.

Decades following on, the police force in Britain displayed similar behaviour and values with the murder case of Stephen Lawrence. He was 18 years old when he was ‘stabbed to death in an unprovoked attack by a gang of white youth’ (BBC, 2018). After the incident, the report was filed to the police. Yet, Lawrence’s family noticed the lack of action being put into the case and not much was being done. Black communities in the UK unified to convey their rage towards this. The family took to the matter of attaining justice by ‘holding press conferences’ and ‘launching a private prosecution’ of the convicts (BBC, 2018). This murder case continues to infiltrate the news and media after nearly three decades since it occurred. Researchers have used it as a form of case study when studying racism within the police as a social institution. Hence, the value placed onto the police as a social agent of control is decreasing.

According to statistics, ‘at the end of March 2019, 93.1% of police officers were from the White ethnic group and 6.9% were from other ethnic groups’ – Asian, Black, and Mixed (ONS, 2019). A plausible cause of this could be internal racial discrimination within the task force regarding recruitment. Wood *et al* (2009) conducted a field experiment, whereby he submitted a thousand job applications using a combination of names associated with white and ethnic minority backgrounds. Results show that one out of nine applications with names associated with white people received a notice for an interview, in comparison to one out of sixteen for applications using names associated with ethnic minorities (Wood *et al*, 2009). Thus, the lack of ethnic minority representatives in the force is because of the historical values attached to police culture. A common concern that law enforcement often tackles is that the police department does not tend to represent the communities they serve. This has led to the ‘loss of faith in the police’ (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003: 1). The relationship between the police and the public is highly significant because as Peel stated, ‘police are the public and the public are the police’ (in Home Office, 2012). Police rely on the public for information; witnesses are called to testify in court, conduct interviews regarding a crime within a neighbourhood, etc. If they lose the support and trust of the public, the flow of information ceases and they have to resort to military policing, such as swamping an area.

In contrast, a different perspective for the low rates of ethnic minority police officers in the UK is external to the individual; the problem is not within the individual, i.e. their behaviours, attitudes, and values. Rather, ‘the pressures, demands, and expectation of community’ makes it difficult to recruit individuals into the force (Meade, 2016). In 2018, 74% of people have felt so stressed that they have been overwhelmed or unable to cope (Mental Health, 2018). If so, then people suffering from mental health issues are probably incapable of managing the pressure involved with becoming a police officer. Referring to previous conflicts the police have had against the community, there is a fear among potential applications of the amount of strain involved and the high expectations from other members of society; it is seen as an ‘uncertain and dangerous career’ (Meade, 2016). It becomes more difficult to recruit and hire law enforcement officers when people do not attain certain natural skills. There is competition within employability as ‘skilled, competent, and professional officers are a valuable commodity’ (Meade, 2016) and are more likely to be hired. The Ministry of Defence Police stated that an individual must go through educational training in understanding policing and police law, be accepted as a ‘probationary constable’ and have a chance to ‘work in armed operational specialist units, such as the Tactical Firearms Unit (TFU)’ (MOD, 2017). Police culture changes overtime and as mentioned, it is different in various communities. Therefore, this displays the complexity of joining the force and that the reasoning behind the predominance of white police officers is not purely explained by racial discrimination.

Race is not the only conflict that arises from the culture of police; gender contributes to the way officers are policing the streets. Before World War II, the majority of the women were either not in employment or restricted with their occupation for ‘protection’. Therefore, Parson and Bales (1955) argued that the lack of female employment leaves women to expressive roles and thus, limits their ability to enter paid work (in Finley and Schwartz,

2006). Yet, when the war began, the number of men in factories that manufacture weapons and other war necessities declined. The women stood as substitutes for the lack of labourers and were moved into the labour force during economic failure. However, they are treated as marginal workers as it is assumed that their primary role is at home. Consequently, they are often paid less because it is assumed that they are financially dependent on their husband's earnings; they are a source of cheap labour. This is just an example of the structure of how the position of women in society shifts gradually over time concerning women in general employment.

As stated by the Metropolitan Police (2013), women being allowed to enter the police department was officially introduced in 1918, alongside the legislation of women having the right to vote. The importance of this does not only impose diversity for the sake of presenting diversity; it stands as a model for girls within education and exhibits the significance of employment in general. Gender inequality is not a new concept. This caused the formulation of a political and social movement that aims to 'promote the rights of women' – feminism (Giddens and Sutton, 2013: 664). Angela McRobbie (1994) explored the changes from feminism and studied women's magazines. She conducted research and found that in the 1970s, the magazines emphasised the importance of marriage, whereas in today's society, they contain images of assertive and independent women who symbolise positive role models for young girls. Consequently, students demonstrate hard work to acquire the grades and qualifications they need to be successful in their occupational and career prospects (McRobbie, 1994). In a similar study, Sue Sharpe (1994) carried out a longitudinal interview to investigate changing female aspirations. She obtained interviews with girls from 1974 and asked them to rank six areas of life in order of importance with one being the most important and six being the least. Results denote that girls prioritised 'love' in 1974 and neglected 'career', whereas in 1994, 'career' was valued the most and having 'children' was the least important area (Sharpe, 1994). The value of women in the police force denotes a rejection of employment as a patriarchal social institution (male-dominated). With the force mainly focusing on fieldwork that involves violence, women were seen to be incapable of handling such a job. Hence, this is why authorities hired men as 'watchmen' to patrol the streets at night.

In the 21st century, statistics have shown that '30% of all officers were female' which is 'the highest proportion on record (for women in the force), and 34% of joiners were women' (ONS, 2018: 7). Women's interest in joining the police has increased immensely since the Metropolitan Police officially began recruiting women. There is a higher proportion of young girls in education taking Social Studies and Law, in comparison to young boys. According to statistics from 2017, 139,915 female students enrolled in a Social Studies course, whilst only 81,685 male students did so (HESA, 2018). An example of how this takes place within the force is exemplified by the case study involving Commissioner Cressida Dick, 'the force's first female Commissioner', appointed in 2017 (Evans, 2017). Despite positive outcomes on the promotion of involving women in the force, the Commissioner, in a celebration marking the centenary of this enforcement, wanted a balanced figure in the number of female and male police officers (Dodd, 2018):

I want to use this celebration to appeal to all women to consider having a career in the Met. Being a police officer is a diverse and challenging job, but it is extremely rewarding and you get to make a difference to so many people. Today, we have launched our female-specific recruitment campaign and there is no better time to be a woman in the Met (Dick in Dodd, 2018).

The current 30% rating is expected to increase over the years in terms of recruiting more female officers in the force. Gender inequality within the police department continues to exist and until a balance between male and female police officers is achieved, it will remain patriarchal. This is why Commissioner Dick intended to have more women; it stands for the power that women also possess. The more that this is enforced in various aspects of society, the more positive others' attitudes and values will be.

In conclusion, this essay has elaborated on the police culture and the values that officers display when they police the streets and neighbourhoods. Within police, culture is the domination of white male officers and this does not represent the community they serve. Leading on to contemporary society, we have seen the increase in ethnic minorities and women in the force. Despite this, racial and gender inequality still exists. The 6.9% of ethnic minorities in the force is too insignificant of a figure to be considered as an immense change from the historical attitudes and situation of the police. Nevertheless, this percentage is seen to gradually increase annually. Positive changes may occur in one's community but the process does not happen overnight; members of society need to be aware of such inequalities so that they can make a radical change. This includes the police force; it could be that the lack of ethnic minorities and women as social agents of control is either because of historical contexts or the difficulties facing recruitment today. Still, the police play an important part in maintaining social order and if conflicts emerge between them and the public, attaining peace would be a struggle, and thus affect society as a whole. Social agents of control and citizens need to unify so that society can function properly.

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"FGM is not cultural, it is criminal; it is not tribal, it is torture." Keith Vaz MP. Discuss.

Claudia Marmol

Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) has been a subject of debate for quite a long time. There are many activists that are trying to stop this practice in countries where it is commonly done, especially in Africa and the Middle East. In this essay, I will take a deeper look into MP Keith Vaz's quote, dividing the essay and quote itself into two parts. For the first part of the quote, 'It is not cultural, it's criminal', I will discuss the double standard of considering FGM, a procedure commonly done in African countries, 'criminal' while considering male circumcision, which is commonly done in western countries, acceptable. With regards to the second part of the quote, I will discuss the similarities between procedures such as labioplasty and FGM. One is considered as a form of torture whilst the other is simply classed as cosmetic surgery. I will use this comparison to analyse the on-going attempt to make Western value standards the acceptable norm. These standards shape the behaviour of international organisations which attempt to force them onto societies that vary culturally from those of the Western world.

"It is not cultural, it is criminal"

First of all, we cannot address FGM as just one thing. There are four different types of FGM according to the World Health Organisation:

- **Type 1:** 'this is the partial or total removal of the clitoral glans (the external and visible part of the clitoris, which is a sensitive part of the female genitals), and/or the prepuce/ clitoral hood (the fold of skin surrounding the clitoral glans)' (World Health Organization, 2020).
- **Type 2:** 'this is the partial or total removal of the clitoral glans and the labia minora (the inner folds of the vulva), with or without removal of the labia majora (the outer folds of skin of the vulva)' (World Health Organization, 2020).
- **Type 3:** 'Often referred to as **infibulation**, this is the narrowing of the vaginal opening through the creation of a covering seal. The seal is formed by cutting and repositioning the labia minora, or labia majora, sometimes through stitching, with or without removal of the clitoral prepuce/clitoral hood and glans (Type I FGM)' (clitoridectomy) (World Health Organization, 2020).
- **Type 4:** 'This includes all other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes, e.g. pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterizing the genital area' (World Health Organization, 2020).

FGM and male circumcision are widely seen as something completely different. People tend to argue that while FGM presents several health risks for women and girls during and after the procedure, male circumcision is completely safe for men and boys. They also argue that the motives for each procedure are different. They argue that FGM is done to control women's sexuality inside a patriarchal society, as a form of oppression, while male circumcision is done for customary or religious reasons. These claims are both misleading. First of all, both can cause physical, sexual and physiological pain. According to the NHS (2019), there are major health risks related to FGM, such as cysts, or problems during childbirth. On the contrary, there is research by gynaecologists and others that have demonstrated that a high percentage of women who have had genital surgery have rich sexual lives, including desire, arousal, orgasm, and satisfaction, and the frequency of their sexual activity is not reduced (Public Policy Advisory Network on Female Genitalia Surgeries in Africa, 2020: 22).

On the other hand, male circumcision also has negative effects on men's health. In 2011, 11 babies had to be treated in the UK for life threatening haemorrhage, shock or sepsis relating to the circumcision (Earp, 2014) and it is estimated that 100 boys die in the US as a result of circumcision (CIRP, 2013). FGM is seen as barbaric because it is thought that the ritual is performed most of the time in a non-hygienical environment by a person who does not have a medical degree, and it is strictly condemned no matter how minor the intervention, nor if it is performed in a hospital with the adequate equipment. It is always seen as an abhorrent event. On the other hand, in the United States, any person can circumcise a male child, in any setting, with any available tool, for any reason, legally (Geisheker, 2013: 21), and it is not seen as something of a 'criminal' nature. However, according to the NHS, male circumcision presents health benefits like HIV prevention (NHS, 2018).

Both present health benefits and both present health risks. These risks can vary from the type of procedure, to the tools used, who performs it or how sterilised is the place where it takes place, but only FGM (which again, includes four different types of procedure) is considered a human rights violation and it has been banned in the UK since 1985.

Moreover, as I stated earlier, many argue that this is a procedure done to oppress and control women and that male circumcision has different motives, but both FGM and male circumcision are performed for various reasons with different meanings. It is wrong to believe that the purpose of FGM is strictly about the control of women.

For instance, in Sierra Leone:

Among the Kono there is no cultural obsession with feminine chastity, virginity, or women's sexual fidelity, perhaps because the role of the biological father is considered marginal and peripheral to the central 'matricentric unit.' ... Kono culture promulgates a dual-sex ideology ... [The] power of Bundu, the women's secret sodality [i.e., initiation society that manages Female Genital Cutting (FGC) ceremonies], suggest positive links between excision, women's religious ideology, their power in domestic relations, and their high profile in the 'public arena (Shell-Ducan et al, 2020: 285)

And almost everywhere where FGM is done, it is performed by women who do not see it as a form of oppression but, on the contrary, even see it as empowering, as a rite of passage with relevant cultural value, and believe it is hygienic (Earp, 2014). In cultures where FGM is common, many women see the procedure as part of their cultural heritage and defend the tradition from people who seek to stop it. And it is only natural that they do so. Why should someone, who is not part of their community, who has not experienced or shared traditions and cultural values with them, tell them that what they are doing is criminal’?

On the other side of the coin, the usual claim is that male circumcision has nothing to do with the control of men’s bodies. But male genital cutting has been historically used as a form of sexual control and even as a punishment. The Jewish philosopher Maimonides argued that decreasing sexual sensitivity was part of the reason for performing circumcisions (Earp, 2014). Moreover, during the Victorian period, it was used to fight masturbation and forced circumcision was used as a form of humiliation. Although these reasons may not be the reasons why parents choose to circumcise their children today, it is interesting to at least see where this tradition may have come from. Putting it into simpler terms, both parents in Africa and the United States have the same reasons to perform circumcision on their children: Both promise cleanliness and the absence of odours as well as greater attractiveness and acceptability (Lighthfoot-Klein, 1989).

Therefore, we can see that it is not a question about health or motives. It is a question about where it is performed. And that is where Keith Vaz misses the mark. It is something cultural. There is a cultural bias regarding which procedure is ‘criminal’ and which one is acceptable. Western societies consider male circumcision as acceptable because it is widely performed in their countries, but when it comes to FGM, they see it as an atrocity because it is done somewhere else, even though they both present similar health risks and are both done for similar reasons. What is ‘criminal’ is trying to force a set of values that have been forged within a culturally similar group of people onto a completely culturally different society, undermining them and their culture, and trying to establish Western contemporary thought as the higher moral ground as if Africans, their traditions and their heritage are inferior to ours.

“It is not tribal, it is torture”

When MP Keith Vaz said FGM is torture he was implying that all types of FGM are. According to the World Health Organisation (2020), Type 4 of FGM includes ‘piercing the genital area’, something commonly done as a beauty enhancement in the West. Moreover, there are a number of female genitalia cosmetic surgeries (FGCS) performed to alter the vagina. Procedures as such include:

those designed to reduce and make symmetrical the labia minora (known variously as labiaplasty, labioplasty, and nymphectomy); those designed to ‘augment’ the labia majora through fat grafting, removal of loose skin or liposuction (vulvar lipoplasty), which is also applied to the mons pubis (pubic mound); those designed to tighten the vagina (so called ‘vaginal rejuvenation’ or vaginoplasty) through muscle realignment

or fat grafting; perineum ‘rejuvenation’ (perineoplasty); hymen ‘reconstruction’ (hymenoplasty); clitoral ‘unhooding’ (hoodectomy); and the so-called G-shot, a collagen injection into the anterior wall of the vagina which increases the size of that patch of tissue (the ‘G-spot’) (Braun, 2009: 233)

Western women are free to do any of these ‘beautifying’ procedures without it being considered ‘torture’. Why can’t a woman in a non-western country do so? There is a double standard by which citizens from different birthplaces, cultural contexts, skin colours and traditions are subject to different laws/relations with the state (Ibid., 2009: 235). This imperialistic treatment that women who go through FGM receive is just a mere manifestation of the rooted racism in Western society.

Women are individuals with the capacity to think. Stating that they are ‘brainwashed’ or ‘alienated’ into FGM is unacceptable. It seems like choice and consent are not seen as possible by people that try to eliminate these practices. If a non-Western woman chooses to have female circumcision done to her, it is seen as being overdetermined by culture and therefore impossible. Western women are culturally free and empowered, but non-western women are culturally oppressed, duped and victimised, unable to step beyond culture into autonomy and agency (Ibid., 2009: 235).

Again, Vaz’s choice of words is poor. It is tribal. It is part of their culture. Women (in most cases) are choosing to undergo this procedure, just as Western women pierce their genital area or have genital cosmetic surgery. This is part of the constant attempt of Western countries to influence, manipulate and dictate over non-Western countries, over their cultures and traditions. Once again, the procedures are of similar natures but are perceived in vastly different ways. Vaz says FGM is torture. If he was consistent with his values, and looked at both cases under the same lens, he would consider Female Genital Cosmetic Surgery (FGCS) to be torture as well.

In conclusion, one cannot use the same values and standards for each case. There are different cases of FGM as well as different cases of male circumcision. Some women consent to it being fully aware of the procedure. Some do it because it is tradition. Most of the times is done in a sterilised environment, sometimes it is not. The same applies with male circumcision and again with piercings or cosmetic procedures. There are no absolute rights or wrongs and we can definitely not dictate that their traditions, their heritage and their culture is ‘criminal’ or ‘torture’. International organisations that are formed by countries with different cultures and experiences cannot expect to have just one set of ‘acceptable rules’ according to which all must act. Every country, every town and every village has a different story. If people like Vaz are really concerned about FGM and its consequences, they should not tell non-Western women what they must do. It is a matter that is in their hands, it is their choice and female empowerment does not mean the same in every society. All we should do is give them all the information available, let them make their choice and let them be the judges of their own culture.

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How is gender used as a performance in Japan and how does this relate to Japanese views of gender?

Rowan Moony

In her 1988 essay *Performing Acts and Gender Constitution*, Judith Butler (1988) made the claim that gender is performative. She meant that gender is socially constructed and is a series of behaviours a person enacts in order to 'fit in' with their society. However, in many instances gender can be a literal costume. The reasons for this are varied and occurrences are not unique to Japan, however 'gender performance' in Japanese culture is rather distinctive and in many ways is different to the West.

One of the ways gender is used as a costume is, unsurprisingly, to entertain. In the West, the most famous form of 'gender entertainment' is undoubtedly drag, which is typically a bawdy exaggeration of gender designed to entertain an audience, but it is not the only form of gender entertainment. Burlesque and similar performances are also examples of gender entertainment because part of the attraction is the exaggerated perfection of gender. The typical image of a burlesque dancer, with the corset and immaculately groomed hair, is an exaggeration of gender that is different to drag but is still using gender as a costume. Of course, as anyone who has seen either will know, gender entertainment is almost never directly about gender and rather will incorporate other forms such as music or comedy.

In Japan, gender entertainment manifests in a number of ways, one of which is companionship entertainment. Entertainment in the form of artificial companionship has been a part of Japanese culture for a long time, traditionally with geishas and more recently with host and hostess clubs. Geishas, who can be recognised by their refined clothing and white makeup, are women who are highly trained in the arts of music, dancing, and entertaining (Layton, 2020). They are hired as entertainers for parties or would entertain groups or individuals (clients are typically men but could be women or couples, especially in more modern times) at traditional teahouses, and much of the appeal of geishas is that they are 'perfect women' (Inside Japan Tours, 2020; Layton, 2020). Similarly, hosts and their more modern female equivalent, hostesses, entertain individuals or small groups of opposite gender patrons at host(ess) bars with conversation, drinking, and flattery (Blair, 2016). In all instances, the entertainment is not a show but is still similar to burlesque in the fact that the central principle is the culturally based perfection of gender. It could actually be argued that the 'perfection' of geishas and hosts/hostesses is more exaggerated than in burlesque because they have to act the part rather than simply look the part. Either way, the end result is the same in that gender and gender expression are used as a costume in order to entertain customers.

A 'subgenre' of host clubs in Tokyo are *onabe* bars, which provide the same service but are staffed by men who were assigned female at birth (Longinotto and Williams, 1995). For

many bar owners, their *onabe* status is an advertising point (Keehn, 2017), which suggests that while *onabe* is a self-identification label it is also a costume designed to entertain and draw custom. What differentiates *onabe* bars from host bars, aside from the sex of the hosts, is the fact that *onabe* bars also serve as a safe space for people who do not fit societal norms of gender and sexuality (Okamoto & Smith, 2004).

The initial modern usage of *onabe* refers to a lesbian who was perceived to be more dominant or masculine in a relationship (Sugiura, 2007) and in some contexts still broadly refers to lesbians (Okamoto & Smith, 2004). However, *onabe* now refers more specifically to a ‘female with symptoms of gender identity disorder’, which does include transvestites but more commonly refers to those who were assigned female at birth but who’s ‘social and emotional identity is male’ (Nihongo Master, 2020). *Onabe* (meaning ‘pan’) seems to have developed as an opposite to the older term *okama* (meaning ‘pot’) but in modern usage they are similar but not exact opposites. This is because *okama* is far broader in that it is an umbrella term for gay man, drag queens, and trans women (Keehn, 2017). In this way, *okama* is an example of the way gender is performative because within colloquial Japanese there is a clear grouping of femininity as an identity and femininity as a performance.

The rise of *onabe* bars has raised awareness of the existence of transgender people in Japan, who have also recently received attention in mainstream consciousness due to media coverage of topics such as lavatory access and sterilization (Demetriou, 2019; Knight & Doi, 2019). Most of these issues are being highlighted by young people, who are pushing the boundaries of gender and gender expression in a number of ways. An example of this is the way young men are adopting a style of ‘genderless *danshi*’. *Danshi*, which means young men in Japanese, are characterised by their androgenous look and their tendency to borrow women’s styles such as loose trousers and makeup (Rich, 2017). The fashion of genderless *danshi* seems to be less about gender directly and more about self-expression and pushing boundaries in a society that highly restricts male expression (ibid). Again, an example of gender and gender expression can be used as a costume. However, rather than the costume being designed to entertain it is a symbol of rebellion and innovation so would be comparable to revolutionary Western fashion movements such as the punk movement or the mini skirts of the 1960s.

Non-traditional genders have also appeared increasingly in popular media due to, for example, the all trans pop group Secret Guyz and the increasing liberties of gender in anime. An example of this is in the 2006 anime *Ouran High School Host Club*, which explores concepts of heteronormativity and performative gender. The protagonist, Haruhi Fujioka, is a girl who spends much of the series ‘disguised’ as a boy in order to work for the school’s host club. This highlights the fact that, at least for Haruhi, gender is a costume that she dons in order to achieve a goal because privately she expresses a rather indifferent view of gender that is commonly associated with asexuality, or a lack of gender identification (Igarashi, 2006). Furthermore, the fact that some characters, notably the anime’s primary male lead, react differently to Haruhi before and after finding out she is not a boy (ibid), shows how gender can influence how people behave towards an individual.

In the series, the difference in how people treat her does not affect Haruhi's gender but in reality it is a different story. It is highly possible that a person is socialised into their gender and specific gender roles as a result of how other people treat them due to their perceived gender. It has been shown that mothers interact with children differently depending on their perceived sex (Smith & Lloyd, 1978), which would explain why gender expression is distinct cross culturally because parents would expect different expressions of gender, or merely value different traits. This would cause them to respond differently to childhood behaviour and would lead to varied 'typical' gender. For example, Japanese men scored higher for femininity on the Bem Sex-Role Indicator than for masculinity (Sugihara & Katsurada, 2000), which suggests that masculinity is expressed differently in Japan than in America, where the BSRI was created. It should be noted that women performed about the same as men on femininity but lower on masculinity (ibid), which could mean that at least part of the cross-cultural difference is due to values rather than gender differences.

Although the media has only recently started to address genders that fall outside the fixed binary found in the Western world, the concept is not actually all that new to Japan both within and without the entertainment industry. *Onnagata* (female impersonators) were featured in *kabuki*, which is a traditional form of theatre that involves dancing and drama, from as early as the 17th century. Maki Morinaga explains that *onnagata* were not restricted to the theatre but had a notable social role, which changed greatly between the 18th and 19th century (2002: 246). During this period, the role of *onnagata* shifted from the 'military masculinity' associated with *wakashu* to an 'idealised femininity', which saw them categorized alongside women in those that perform femininity (ibid). Similar to the term *okama*, this highlights a trend in Japan to connect gender as an identity to gender as a performance. This phrasing also shows that the idea of gender as something one *does* rather than something one *is*, is a relatively old concept in Japan. When the performance of *onnagata* changed, so did their social role despite the fact the biological sex of the performers stayed consistent, which demonstrates that gender can be divorced from biological sex so must be socially constructed. In addition, the idea that gender is something that you do (ibid) further supports the concept of socially constructed gender and Butler's (1988) claim that gender is inherently performative. It was not until after older men took on the role of *onnagata* (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019) that the change in social role occurred, which suggests that while age influences society and social roles, it is society that influences gender because the gender of *onnagata* itself did not influence the social role of the individual.

Wakashu, mentioned above, were young attractive males who adopted the clothing and mannerisms of women from puberty to early adulthood and were not restricted to traditional social conventions when it came to sexual relations (Chira, 2017). *Wakashu* were originally young acolytes or samurai pages, known as *chigo* (McLelland, 2005), but they soon became associated with the theatre district. Indeed, they were the first to take on the role of women in *kabuki* after the 1629 actress ban (Morinaga, 2002: 246) but, unlike later forms of *onnagata*, existed as what some have dubbed a 'third gender' due to their 'androgenous appearance and variable sexuality' (Kunimoto, 2017). Although age did influence the status of a *wakashu*, it

was not central to the title as older men could still be a *wakashu* if they adopted the manner and dress of one despite having come of age (Buruma, 2017). This would suggest that the performance of gender is more important than physiological features like age, which highlights Butler's assertion that gender is a performance. However, *wakashu* did always have a penis so physiology is not entirely absent from the concept.

The acceptance of some gender variance in Japan before the influence of the West could be, at least in part, due to the precedent set by Shintō, which is the indigenous religion of Japan that remains ingrained within the culture to the modern day despite the long standing influence of Buddhism (Hirai, 2020). There are several gender ambiguous or genderless *kami* (deity/dieties) within the Shintō pantheon. For example, the mountain *kami* Oyamakui is sometimes thought to be transgender (Stephen, 2015; Conner et al., 1998: 259), possibly due to the fact his male gender and connection to mountains, which are traditionally masculine due to their pointy nature, seems somewhat contradictory to his shrine's association with childbirth (Martin & Martin, 2012). Furthermore, *shirabyoshi* were female or transgender *kami* who's priests performed rituals in traditionally masculine clothing (Conner et al, 1998: 305), which predates *onabe* bars but does set a certain precedent for them. In addition, this practice establishes the idea of gender expression and 'crossdressing' being used as a costume not to entertain but, in this case, to honour and worship a higher power.

Additionally, in Japanese folklore *kitsune* (literally, 'fox' in Japanese) are considered to be shapeshifting trickers who disguise themselves as beautiful women to cause mischief and/or to seduce men (Tyler, 1989: xlix). Their origins can be traced back to classical Chinese folklore and are not the only trickers *yokai* (a general term for a class of supernatural creatures) found in Japanese tradition (Foster, 2015). What is interesting about *kitsune* is that despite their mischief they are not considered malevolent but rather are seen more as morally neutral so should not be trusted but do not need to be dispelled either, similar to how the fae are perceived in Irish folklore. Indeed, there are stories of men marrying *katsune* and staying faithful to them even after finding out their true nature (ibid). It should be noted also that *kitsune* always appear as or possess (depending on the telling) beautiful women, never as beautiful men, regardless of their true sex (Tyler, 1989: xlix). This is a clear example of gender, and to an extent sexuality, being used as a costume in order to achieve a goal or fulfil a desire within Japanese culture. The *kitsune* uses femininity and womanhood as a literal disguise in the same way a geisha adopts a perfected expression of femininity to entertain patrons.

Genders outside of the fixed binary are not unique to Japan either (Independent Lens, 2015). The Bugi people of Sulawesi, which is governed by Indonesia, have one of the largest ranges of gender diversity with three sexes and five genders that all have distinct social roles (Graham Davis, [2007] 2014: 6). Of these, *bissu* are priest-like figures who are thought to be able to act as mediators between the human and spirit worlds (Graham, 2007). It is not uncommon for third (or, as with the *bissu*, fifth) gender people to be associated with spirituality and with the *bissu* their gender is central to their spirituality because their 'meta-gender' is what allows them to act as mediators (ibid). Gender playing a role in the position

of priesthood is similar to the aforementioned *shirabyoshi*, but where the *shirabyoshi* priests wear traditionally masculine clothes for their rituals, *bissu* have their own style of dress that is neither masculine nor feminine (ibid).

Closer to Japan, in Korea, the *hwarang* or ‘flower youths’ were a band of near legendary warriors who were famous for using makeup and adopting a very pretty and feminine appearance (Rutt, 1961: 22). The *hwarang* are less an example of gender being used as a costume but rather highlight the fact that gender roles and the separation of ‘boy things’ and ‘girl things’ are completely arbitrary and often vary across cultures. Variation can also occur within cultures across time, as one can see by the fact that high heels in Europe were originally worn by men as a sign of virile masculinity and, later, of status (Kremer, 2013).

Perhaps the most famous third gender people are the Thai *kathoey*, a title which is often loosely translated to ‘ladyboys’ and refers to people who are born male but have a ‘female heart’ (Independent Lens, 2015). Such language in the English-speaking West would refer to male to female (MtF) trans women but in Thai, *kathoey* is much more similar to *okama* in that it refers broadly to a range of people including effeminate gay men and transvestites. In fact, many MtF Thai women use other terms available in their language to describe their gender (Winter, 2003). This is likely an attempt to differentiate themselves from the view of *kathoey* as prostitutes and/or drag queens. According to Serena Nanda, the association of *kathoey* with prostitution is part of a wider association of, particularly, male gender divergence with sex work and sexual deviance, as well as the problem of Western scholars’ tendency to underestimate the cultural variation of sex work (Nanda, 2014: 6).

What can be concluded from the above research is that while gender in Japan is much more fluid than a Western audience might expect due to the strict conservatism in modern Japanese society, there is an enduring thread of order and structure. Gender is fluid, but gender roles are still rather strict with femininity being associated with weakness and being considered secondary to masculinity (Longinotto & Williams, 1995). This strict gender separation is not particularly unique to Japan but is deeply ingrained in the culture, to the point where it is still evident today even amongst those that do not necessarily fit the traditional gender binary such as *onabe*. Part of the reason for this strict gender separation can be found in the Japanese myth of creation, Izanami-no-Mikoto, which explicitly states that there are consequences for a woman speaking before a man (Maguire, 2018). However, myths are typically written as a way to explain or justify phenomena such as natural events or cultural attitudes, therefore, it is likely that these gender roles were erected before the myth was formed.

The idea of gender being more about behaviour and appearance than physiology can explain the gender fluidity in Japan despite the conservatism because it is easier to change the way one behaves than the way one is physically constituted. Indeed, the fact that gender can be used as a costume at all indicates that it is more of an abstract concept than something physically evident like sex. In this way, it is comparable to the way culture is something somebody does while skin colour is a biological fact. Like gender and sex, culture and skin colour broadly overlap but one is not always a guarantee of the other. Going forward, it is

important to differentiate between the biological fact of sex and the variable nature of gender and gender expression in order to further examine what gender is and why it manifests so differently yet so similarly all over the world.

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Digital media is best understood in terms of structural inequalities between the ‘information rich’ and the ‘information poor’. Discuss.

Daniel Cranmer

One of the world’s most severe issues is the ever-increasing gap between the wealthy and the poor. A small percentage of the world’s population have access to countless opportunities that those in global poverty simply do not have access to. A key aspect of this cultural and class division is the digital divide, which refers to situations where there are gaps in the market in terms of access to the use of ICT devices (Singh, 2012). Throughout developing nations in Africa, Asia and South America access to digital technology is limited whereas in developed nations the majority enjoy the convenience provided by such technology, as well as having access to the educational opportunities made available by ICT (Tiene, 2002). There is a digital divide between ‘wealthy, educated Internet users and poor, disproportionately non-white nonusers’ (Schiller, 1999). The digital divide is influenced by many factors, such as social, economic, geographical and political factors which can lead to structural inequalities across the world. In this essay I shall analyse the extent of the structural inequalities between the ‘information rich’ and the ‘information poor’ and shall discuss the impact of the digital divide and how it is influenced by social, economic, geographical and political factors. I shall refer to Herbert Schiller’s influential theory of the ‘information rich’ and ‘information poor’ (1983) throughout the essay in order to analyse the structural inequalities caused through unequal access to digital media within the United Kingdom, as well as on a global scale.

Vincent Mosco’s (1989) description of a ‘pay-per society’ demonstrates that the ability to ‘pay’ is a factor in terms of acquiring access to digital information (Webster, 2014). From this it can be inferred that the more privileged people of higher socio-economic class acquire access to more information than those who are less privileged, therefore those of a lower socio-economic class have access to inferior data and information than the higher socio-economic classes, highlighting the fact that there are paramount social and digital inequalities, as a result of the digital divide. There is a major divide between the ‘information rich’ and the ‘information poor’. Herbert Schiller distinguishes the difference between the ‘information rich’ and the ‘information poor’ as the ‘access to information becomes a factor of wealth and income... the division inside the society between information ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ deepens just as it does between nations, making the less-developed ones the ‘information poor’ (Schiller, 1983: 88). Digital participation is highly correlated with a university education, employment, urban residence, being male, and having broadband access. 89.9% of people with bachelor’s degree or higher have access to the Internet and computer, but only 36.9% of people without high school degree have access (File, 2013). In addition, EU citizens in the top 20% of income distribution are 45 times more likely to engage with online data than the bottom 20% (World Bank, 2016). This suggests that there is

a paramount difference in life opportunities between the information rich and poor as a result of access to digital media. The ‘information poor’ are consumers who can use traditional mass media information such as telecasting, DVDs, wi-fi and magazines. They can be considered as irregular consumers of information and are inactive users of new developing technology such as downloading digital e-books or downloading music (Feather, 2008). There is a link between the ‘information poor’ and the disadvantaged, as there are 4.1 million adults living in social housing that are offline and 27% of disabled adults (3.3 million) have never used the internet, in the United Kingdom (Prescott, 2015). This suggests there is a correlation between low digital access and social inequalities. In comparison, the term ‘information rich’ refers to the able within the digital information society. They are involved in attaining and dealing with digital information, for example operating online applications with competency. The consumers can access the information that they demand to increase the value of their previous knowledge. The disadvantages that face the ‘information poor’ include the fact that they will not have access to the same general information as the ‘information rich’. This links to the ‘knowledge gap theory’ which suggests that as the global access to mass media increases, there will be segments of the population that gain information faster and hence the wide gap increases with the ‘information poor’ and lower economic status groups within the population (Donohue, et al, 1975). From this it can be deduced that the digital divide demonstrates the socio-economic structural inequalities between the ‘information rich’ and the ‘information poor’ to a major extent, as the extent of opportunities the ‘information rich’ have in comparison to the ‘information poor’ as a result of access to digital media is colossal.

A critique of the ‘information rich’ and ‘poor’ models is that it fails to consider the complexity and range of different positions in a class-divided society (Webster, 2014). This suggests that the model fails to consider sociological factors i.e. race or gender, whilst evidence suggests that digital divides exist along the categories of ethnicity, gender, education level, disability and age (Goggin, 2017). ‘In the same way that offline marginalisation is often experienced in multiple and overlapping ways, so are digital divides, which make individuals with multiple marginalised identities even more likely to be offline’ (Robinson et al., 2015). There is a digital divide between genders, as the use of digital technology can positively influence and affect women’s economic, social and political empowerment (Hernandez, 2018). Despite this, many women are being left behind; in low- and middle-income countries women have less access to digital technology than men and have ‘unequal access to mobile technology which threatens to aggravate the inequalities women already experience’ (GSMA, 2018: 2). Digital inequalities ‘tend to mirror existing social inequalities in terms of socio-economic status, education, gender, age, geographic location, employment status, and race’ (Robinson et al., 2015). The gender digital divide regarding female access to the internet remains largest in the world’s least developed countries at 32.9% (ITU, 2016). The internet gap is largest in the continent of Africa, whilst in terms of mobile phone ownership, the gender digital divide is the largest in South Asia where women are 26% less likely to own a mobile phone in comparison to men (Plan International, 2019).

In addition, the fact is that the global gender divide in internet use ‘grew from 11% in 2013 to 12% in 2016’ and there is now more than 250 million fewer women online than men (ITU, 2016). From this it can be suggested that there should be severe international intervention and schemes that help the government make digital ICT tools more accessible, available, and affordable to females across the world, in order to bridge the digital divide, as this would generate multiple opportunities for females to use and have access to resources in new ways. It can be suggested that the digital gender divide reflects gender inequalities in modern society and can negatively impact the future prospects of females across the world. This suggests that the digital divide demonstrates wider social issues, for example research shows that 46.1% of Caucasian Americans have access to digital and information technology whilst only nearly 23.5% of African Americans and 23.6% of Hispanic Americans acquire access to digital and information technology. In addition, Asian Americans exceed all racial minorities at 56.8% (Jarboe and Alliance, 2001). Minority groups are undoubtedly at a disadvantage when it comes to having access to digital media, yet Solomon states that this is not due to the fact they are minorities, rather that their limited access is due to the fact that they are at a systematic socio-economic disadvantage due to lower education levels and poorer incomes (Solomon, 2002). Their disadvantaged circumstances may lead to inadequate technological infrastructure in the area which could hamper opportunities to access and understand digital technology, as the ‘information poor’ do not have access to the ‘global digital economy’. The global digital economy has changed the geography of the economy, with the use of the internet, e-commerce and digital economies rapidly growing and playing a key role in the international economy, this suggests that the nations with higher digital connectivity are able to influence the global economy and policies to a larger extent than those with lower digital connectivity. From this it can be inferred that structural inequalities between the ‘information rich’ and the ‘information poor’ lead to smaller nations being unable to contribute politically on the world scale, meaning that the gaps between leading nations and developing nations may continue to grow as their concerns may not be addressed, as they cannot contribute due to the inadequate technological infrastructure within the countries, therefore hindering the development of developing countries to a major extent.

Additionally, in the United Kingdom there is an ‘urban-rural digital divide’. The digital divide can be demonstrated through geographical location as well as the socio-economic factors of areas. Despite the fact that broadband access has spread throughout the world in developed regions, there is a distinct geographical gap in broadband access throughout the United Kingdom, an example of this is the fact that there are 4.1 million adults living in social housing that are offline (Prescott, 2015). It has been concluded through analysing Ofcom infrastructure data that there are characteristics of an ‘urban-rural digital divide’ in Great Britain- ‘there are territorial inequalities in digital infrastructure’ (Philip et al., 2017). ‘Around 17% of rural premises are not getting decent broadband services, compared to just 2% in urban areas’ (Ofcom, 2017). This has led to a sizeable minority being unable to engage in online activity that is considered to be ‘normal’ and increasingly expected of private citizens in modern society. This digital divide is largely due to inadequate infrastructure (Philip et al, 2017: 397) which means that residents of rural areas may struggle to access connection to digital media and technology in the areas they reside. From this it can be

inferred that there are structural inequalities between the 'information rich' and the 'information poor' to a major extent, as those in built up urban areas have higher digital access while there is unequal access to digital media and broadband for those in rural areas. This is a current and developing topic, with the Labour party proposing to nationalise part of BT and making high speed broadband available for all, with the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn stating that broadband is 'now an essential utility' and that the proposed scheme 'will deliver a massive boost to productivity and bring half a million people back into the workforce' (Walker, Stewart and Syal, 2019). The fact that the Labour party have prioritised addressing the digital divide implies the severity of the structural inequalities caused by the digital divide, as well as the inequalities of those in rural areas, as the labour party believe it will increase employment and lifestyle opportunities for the 'information poor' in rural areas.

Moreover, structural inequalities between the 'information rich' and the 'information poor' are also politically regulated through government policy. 'Democratic political regimes enable faster growth of the Internet than authoritarian or totalitarian regimes' (Guillen and Suárez, 2005). This suggests that the Government exercises control over the internet to influence society and its people. An example of this is in Iran and China, where the authorities have denied people the ability of inhabitants to access certain websites and digital information. Iran has prohibited the use of high-speed Internet in the country and has restricted broadband in order to halt the influence of Western ideals culture, such as music and television (Tait, 2006). Also, The World Wide Web Foundation's annual web index report states that 94% of countries do not adequately monitor government internet interception and 30% of them regulate and censor political content (Web Index, 2014). From this it can be inferred that the internet use in several nations is being subjected to censorship. Governmental control directly affects the use and quality of access of digital media, this links to the digital divide to a major extent, as the public in the countries with regulated content have access to less content, which could lead to the those in these countries becoming a part of the 'information poor', as those belonging to a controlled atmosphere suffer in regards to digital opportunities and new information (Schiller, 1983: 88). This may lead to the digital divide between liberal and conservative nations, as those who live in liberal countries without censorship have more access to digital media than those who don't, and therefore can be seen as the 'information rich' as they have access to software, images, video, social media as well as information, which suggests that those in liberal countries are more likely to be well educated as they have access to far more information than those in conservative nations. This highlights the structural inequalities, and the division between countries that uneven digital media access can cause.

In conclusion, digital media is best understood in terms of structural inequalities between the 'information rich' and the 'information poor' to a major extent. This is due to the fact that access to digital media can play a hugely substantial role in the lives of the 'information rich' in terms of communication, access to online shopping technologies, information and learning skills needed for technical digital jobs, such as graphic design. The digital divide is influenced by socio-economic categories, as well as ethnicity, gender, education level, disability and age, as well as geographical and political factors which lead to structural

inequalities across the world. It can be argued that international governments have a vital role to play in supplying the public with access to crucial digital technology, for example education tools to as many people across the world as possible. This would enhance gender equality, as well as providing equal access to technology between genders and ultimately bridging the digital divide and subsequent gap between the information rich and poor. The disadvantages that face the 'information poor' stem from the idea that they will be unable to access the same general information as the 'information rich' meaning the information rich will gain and have access information faster, increasing the divide with the 'information poor' and the lower economic status groups within the population with lower digital accessibility. This links to the fact that in my personal experience as a student at a higher education institution, that access to digital technology is crucial for all aspects of work, as it is essential to access required reading and even to submit work, that must be typed on computer. This demonstrates how the 'information poor' may be unable to reach the university level of education, and that the internet is not a luxury but a necessity in modern society, therefore the 'information poor' face severe inequalities that hamper opportunity, as a result of the digital divide.

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Outline and discuss the impact of HIV/AIDS on LGBT communities.

Georgia Luckey

Throughout this essay, the impact that HIV/AIDS had and still has on LGBT communities will be outlined and discussed. It was not an uncommon occurrence for the LGBT community to be mistreated, victimised and targeted, even before the emergence of HIV and AIDS. Firstly, the development of HIV and AIDS and what it is will be discussed, examining the devastating effect that it had on LGBT communities. Then, the impacts such as re-medicalisation and re-criminalisation will be reviewed, as well as discussing the shocking amount of deaths that occurred with the appearance and spreading of HIV and AIDS. The re-emergence of homophobia and ignorance from the public will also be reviewed. Lastly, the new era of activism and the rise of campaigns to support those in need will be discussed.

Human Immunodeficiency, commonly known as HIV, is a virus that can cause AIDS, Acquired Immuno-deficiency Syndrome, by attacking the body's immune system. However, there is a difference between the two: those who are HIV positive are not necessarily ill, they are individuals who have been exposed to the virus, causing them to become a carrier. HIV/AIDS emerged in the early 1980s and was 'recognised as a lethal infectious disease with complex social causes as well as complex clinical and psychological manifestations' (Carceres and Race, 2010: 176). This is due to it being considered a gay virus as it was 'first recognised in the large urban centres of industrialised countries among members of the gay community' (Ibid). This assumption had a detrimental effect on the LGBT community, which will be discussed later on. It is known that 'HIV affects mainly young people, being transmitted by sexual intercourse, sharing of needles and from mother to fetus' (Nye and Parkin, 1994: 1), therefore having the ability to infect anyone, regardless of an individual's sexual identity.

Nowadays, there are multiple actions that can be taken to prevent HIV/AIDS from spreading, such as practicing safe sex with the use of condoms; as 'were it not for HIV and AIDS, condomless sex would not only be the norm among gay men, it would not even be considered an issue' (Carballo-Diequez et al, 2010: 205). This was revealed in a survey by asking gay men what bareback meant. Therefore, widespread education about safe sex is hugely important in aiding in the prevention of the spread of HIV and AIDS. There are preventative measures that an individual can take in order to avoid spreading HIV. Medication such as PrEP (Pre-exposure prophylaxis) can be taken by individuals before and after sex to reduce the chances of getting HIV. Unfortunately, HIV cannot be eradicated and cured entirely 'as the virus integrates into the host chromosome, and therefore all infected cells would have to be removed' (Nye and Parkin, 1994: 65). However, there is treatment for those who are already affected by HIV/AIDS, including specific anti-retroviral therapy, which works by stopping the replication of the virus in the body.

The LGBT community has been affected enormously by the emergence of HIV and AIDS, unfortunately in a negative manner, as ‘those infected and their families had to deal not only with the disease, but also with ignorance, bigotry and the stigmatisation associated with being gay’ (Wood and Ellison, 2003: 117-118). Medicalisation is ‘a process by which non-medical problems become defined and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of illnesses or disorders’ (Conrad and Angell, 2004: 32). In this case, homosexuality was immensely medicalised. LGBT individuals had reached a certain stage of de-medicalisation, right up until the epidemic of HIV and AIDS, at which point they were re-medicalised. Many members of the LGBT community were re-medicalised, especially men who have sex with men (MSM), as they ‘are at greater risk of infection by HIV when compared to heterosexual men’ (Oliveira et al, 2017: 1008). As previously stated, HIV and AIDS were viewed as gay diseases, even though there was no knowledge of how the disease surfaced and where it surfaced from, suggesting that those who were homosexual were not ordinary human beings and that they were a different biological species. Large levels of homophobia surfaced once again, with individuals from the public suggesting that if homosexual people were to die the problem of HIV and AIDS would disappear. This is due to the lack of knowledge about the disease as well as stigmatisation. This stigmatisation has an immediate effect on the LGBT community and:

how and when someone physically accesses services, including testing, support and treatment. It also affects how people interact with each other, including friendships, intimate partnerships and professional relationships, and how someone perceives themselves and their self-esteem (Dalton, 2017: 64-65).

Therefore, re-medicalising members of the LGBT could cause multiple psychological issues, as well as physical issues. Individuals suffering with HIV/AIDS avoided seeking medical help in fear that they would be judged by medical staff, which could then worsen their condition enormously if it is not seen to. Many members of the public started to suggest that those who suffer with HIV/AIDS, should have their illness presented on their ID, which would have had a detrimental impact, psychologically, on a person as ‘the medicalisation of HIV has contributed to a silencing of HIV within wider public discourse’ (Dalton, 2017: 67), which was instigating people to suffer in silence, instead of seeking the help that they need.

There were many claims about the LGBT community, especially ‘that gay men had ‘caused’ AIDS by citing lack of adequate sex education and STD care as the ultimate reasons for widespread transmission’ (Patton, 1994: 66-67). This has led to the re-criminalisation of the LGBT community as it has been:

argued/found that prosecutions will tend to increase stigma and reinforced expectations that people with diagnosed HIV will disclose their infection to all sexual partners. Others have argued that prosecutions are likely to prevent openness between HIV patients and their health care providers (Dodds and Keogh, 2009: 136).

This implies that fear spread across the LGBT community as many were too afraid to be open that they were infected with the disease due to the stigma being increased, which once again

causes individuals to live secretly, without accepting any help. Individuals can have legal action taken against them if they have unprotected sex, knowing they are HIV positive and do not tell their sexual partner. 'there are more than 60 countries in which it is defined a crime to expose someone else to the HIV virus' (Doyal and Doyal, 2013: 178). Despite this, many people have the ignorant opinion that 'two homosexual men, neither of whom are infected with HIV, can transmit AIDS to one another during sexual intercourse' (Joffe, 1995: 1). This suggests that homophobic members of the public had hopes that men having sex with men would be further criminalised. Homosexuality has not always been legal and 'in some countries, even when homosexual acts are legal, the state may encourage attacks on LGBT people, or fail to protect them from attack' (Baird, 2004: 140). In countries such as Afghanistan it is illegal to be homosexual for both men and women, and if they were to be caught as such, the maximum penalty is death (Ibid). Therefore, in certain countries, individuals face criminalisation for being a homosexual, as well as some possibly having HIV/AIDS, resulting in individuals suffering massively, physically and psychologically.

One of the most detrimental effects that HIV/AIDS has had on the LGBT community was the enormous amount of lives that the disease took. HIV/AIDS spread rapidly, and to this day, people are still dying from AIDS. Unfortunately, there is no cure, however, there is treatment to help fight HIV and the complications that arise from it, such as anti-retroviral therapy as mentioned previously. There was a devastating amount of deaths 'with the death toll from AIDS-related illnesses over 35 million people worldwide' (Promislo, 2019: 9). This death toll is extremely high and should have never been allowed to increase as much as it has. One of the many reasons as to why countless people died from AIDS when it first emerged, was the slow response to the disease from the public health. 'From the early 1980s until the mid-1990s, lack of effective treatment for HIV resulted in AIDS being seen as 'a death sentence' and a focus on primary prevention' (Caceres and Race, 2010: 177). The slow response possibly occurred due to the illness being stigmatised and associated with gay men, whilst being openly gay throughout this period was an already enormous battle.

Many people have died from HIV/AIDS as they did not want to know if they had the disease due to fear and possible denial. Sexual intercourse is one of the main ways an individual can spread HIV/AIDS. Many men who had sex with other men did not consider themselves to be gay, therefore, numerous individuals held the opinion that they cannot catch HIV/AIDS as they were not gay. If individuals do not seek medical help, the disease could possibly worsen and lead to death. There was also fear of judgement from medical staff, 'which severely impeded individuals' willingness to engage with sexual health services in the UK' (Jaspal and Williamson, 2017: 1380), causing individuals to avoid seeking medical help. This implies that the stigmatisation of HIV/AIDS could cause people to lose their lives due to fear of discrimination.

Ignorance and homophobia towards the LGBT community re-surfaced with the development of HIV/AIDS. There was a 'reaction against gays, lesbians and bisexuals who were accused of bringing the threat of AIDS to the population at large' (Baird, 2004: 91), and those who do not have HIV/AIDS will still be experiencing homophobia and discrimination, as it 'quickly

became known as the ‘gay plague’ (Ibid). Although this homophobic opinion is extremely uneducated and untrue, it was very much believed, which caused marginalisation of the LGBT community, putting the blame on them. The LGBT community became targeted and stigmatised, with people suggesting that those who were HIV positive should be quarantined and separated from society. This was because of the uneducated, ignorant thoughts that HIV could be spread by shaking hands or sharing a drink with someone who was HIV positive. The LGBT community were violated and stripped from their basic human rights as there is:

overwhelming evidence of massive homophobia, leading to the wholesale denial of our rights as gay men to resources appropriate to our needs and entitlements as the group most vulnerable to HIV infection in Europe (Watney, 2000: 82).

This implies that gay men found it difficult to reach out for any type of help as they were unsure of where their basic human rights were applied. As well as there being ‘continuing hostility towards lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people and as a result they may be isolated and especially reluctant to seek medical care’ (Doyal and Doyal, 2013: 33), worsening their condition. This homophobia will not just be received from strangers, but the individual with HIV/AIDS could experience homophobia from friends and/or family and could be receiving rejection rather than support, which could make them feel lonely, thus having a negative effect on their mental health, leading to depression. Discrimination and homophobia against those who are part of the LGBT community and have HIV/AIDS could also happen in a working environment; bullying and segregation could occur, or if they are trying to look for a job, their options could be limited. Many may also feel that it would be easier to revert into ‘the closet’ and cause others to never be open about their sexuality, due to fear of judgement.

It seems that the homophobic and ignorant nature towards the LGBT community brought a notion of activism. When activism came about for HIV/AIDS, the communities that needed it most were ignored, such as the LGBT community, prostitutes and drug users. Therefore, self-help was created, and ‘for many, more active involvement demonstrates the desire to tackle the disease itself as part of the process of reshaping their sense of themselves’ (Doyal and Doyal, 2013: 54). This indicates that those who started to partake in activism felt as if they had a sense of self-worth. Many people protested to focus ‘mainly on the issue of stigma and on the need for more research to produce effective treatment and to widen access’ (Ibid). This allowed for the increase in campaigns to educate those in need, as well as providing an education of how to prevent HIV/AIDS. When activism arose in Britain, ‘British AIDS activism was honourably and bravely confrontational with the press, against companies which discriminated against HIV-positive employees, and so on’ (Watney, 2000: 263). This activism aimed to shame those who were discriminative towards the LGBT community and it was claimed to be successful in achieving its goals. Some campaigns included ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power), which was formed in 1987. ACT UP aimed to end the AIDS epidemic by producing effective advertising campaigns, with those arguing that ‘the priority of the activist movement should be the establishment of socialized medicine for all’

(Watney, 2000: 103), which would help many people suffering, but it fails to address those who need medical treatment immediately.

‘Don’t die of ignorance’ (Street, 1988: 483). This message was targeted at everyone and ‘every home in Britain had been sent a leaflet on how AIDS was transmitted and how it could be avoided’ (Street, 1988: 490). This leaflet aimed to educate those who were unaware of how to prevent themselves from getting HIV/AIDS, as well as including lots of information about the disease. Its aim is to teach people to reach out and get help if they need it, as there was an increase in information and assistance for those who need it, with no judgement being passed. Activism showed support for the LGBT community with individuals helping from all over the place. However, these precautions should have been acted on sooner to prevent the devastating effect that HIV/AIDS has had on the LGBT community in general.

The impact that HIV/AIDS has had on the LGBT community has been outlined and discussed throughout this essay. By firstly discussing what HIV/AIDS is and how there are medications for it, then by discussing how it cannot be cured completely. Then by exploring how members of the LGBT community were re-medicalised and treated as if being a homosexual was a medical condition, and the negative impact that this had. It also discussed the re-criminalisation of the LGBT community. One of the most traumatic effects of HIV/AIDS was death, and how that had a huge impact on the LGBT community was discussed, with many people losing their loved ones due to lack of medical help and preventative education not being provided sooner. Ignorance and homophobia emerged once again, discriminating against the LGBT community and stigmatising them. However, activism was the first step towards change, with people fighting for those with HIV/AIDS, which has allowed for the emergence and development of treatments that are used to this current day to aid those in need.

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A study of attitudes towards sexuality in Finland and Russia

Harriet Willett

Using the European Social Survey Round 8 (2016), I sought to attain an understanding of attitudes towards sexuality and whether they differ between Russia and Finland, using data produced via SPSS. I operationalised my research through the dependent variable ‘freehms’ which represents the question: ‘Gays and lesbians are free to live life as they wish’. An ordinal scale was issued to measure responses in this survey ranging from 1-5, with 1 being ‘agree strongly’ and 5 being ‘disagree strongly’. My research hypothesis (H1) postulates that there is a significant, meaningful difference in attitudes towards sexual attitudes between Russia and Finland. This hypothesis is bolstered by literature pertaining to the demarcated hostility of Russia juxtaposed with the liberal attitudes punctuating Finland. For instance, in 2013, just three years before the survey occurred, it was reported that in Russia, President Putin had ‘declared war on gays and their allies’ in the form of arrests and imprisonment, including anyone who even spoke in support of the LGBTQ+ community (Fierstein, 2013). In tandem, laws were enacted prohibiting what was perceived as ‘Gay Propaganda’, forbidding the formation of Gay Pride Parades (Engle, 2013). Starkly contrast this with Finland, a country that hosts Helsinki Pride each summer and has been recognised as a galvanising force for pioneering egalitarian movements in favour of gay and lesbian human rights, founding a Sexual Equality charter in 1974 (SETA; Stalstrom and Nissinen, 2000). In opposition to H1, my null hypothesis (H0) asserts that there is no significant difference in attitudes between countries.

Summary Statistics

Within my research, I used a sample (n) of 2200 in Russia and 1917 in Finland, shown in Figure 1 with a mean of 1.84 for Finland and 3.96 for Russia.

Figure 1: Case Processing Summary for Finland and Russia

Country		N (Valid)	Percent (Valid)	N (Missing)	Percent (Missing)
Finland	Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish	1917	99.6	8	0.4
Russian Federation	Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish	2200	90.5	230	9.5

The measurement of the range for each country is displayed in Figure 2, with a value of 4, implying that the highest and lowest scores selected were the same and fluctuated between 1-5. However, when using the interquartile range (IQR), which takes the middle 50% of answers, differences in dispersion surfaced; Russia produced an IQR of 2, exceeding Finland’s IQR of 1. Standard deviation situates the results on a normal distribution (see Figure 2), and both scores for standard deviation are relatively low, implying that the

distribution of scores are close to the sample mean produced. However, Russia’s standard deviation is slightly higher than Finland’s at 1.179 and 1.019 respectively, which means the responses for Russia are dispersed further away from the mean than Finland, albeit minimally. As a sample has been collected, confidence intervals enable a 5% margin of error within said sample, meaning that we can be 95% confident that the true mean is reflected somewhere between the two values produced. For Finland this would entail a true mean falling between 1.79 (lower bound) and 1.88 (upper bound), while for Russia, this would be 3.91 and 4. Both of these confidence intervals are narrow, which is beneficial to my research; a higher interval range means a more diluted result as the possible true mean lies among a wider scale – the smaller the confidence interval the better. In addition, the standard error (SE) asserts how close to the truth the scores in my sample are, with a lower standard error indicating a more accurate estimate. Each standard error is low: Finland has a SE of 0.023 and Russia has a SE of 0.025 allowing me to infer that the statistics produced are indicative of the parameter (the true population).

Figure 2: Descriptive Statistics for Finland and Russia

Country		Statistic	Std. Error
Finland Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish	Mean	1.84	0.023
	Range	4	
	Interquartile Range	1	
	95% Confidence Interval for Mean - Lower Bound	1.79	
	- Upper Bound	1.88	
	Standard Deviation	1.019	
Russian Federation Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish	Mean	3.96	0.025
	Range	4	
	Interquartile Range	2	
	95% Confidence Interval for Mean - Lower Bound	3.91	
	- Upper Bound	4	
	Standard Deviation	1.179	

Independent Samples T-Test

As the mean score for Finland was around 2, we can assume that on average most respondents ‘agree’ that gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish. In Russia, the mean was higher signifying an average response of 4 (‘disagree’). These differing attitudes support the research hypothesis that there are differences in attitudes towards sexuality in Russia and Finland, visible in both Figure 3 for Finland and for Russia, which display dichotomic skews with a positive skew for Finland and a negative skew for Russia.

Now that the means have been ascertained and a difference established, an independent samples t-test can be employed to identify whether these differences are significant, illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 3: Attitudes towards Sexuality for Finland and Russia




Figure 4: Independent Samples T-Test

		T	Sig (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the difference	
Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish		61.223	.000	2.118	Lower 2.050	Upper 2.186
	Equal variances assumed					

The overall mean difference between Russia and Finland with equal variances assumed is 2.118, and we can be confident that the mean difference within 95% of the population would fall between 2.050 (lower bound) and 2.186 (upper bound), but we need to understand if this is a significant figure. The t-test provides us with a p-value (Sig 2-tailed) – the probability value – which again works with the 5% margin of error. As such, if the p-value falls below 0.05, the null hypothesis can be rejected, and the mean discrepancy is deemed significant. The p-value reflected in Figure 4 falls below this figure at .000 which suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis which asserts a significant difference between the two means. Moreover, the t-test value itself exceeds 2, which is again grounds to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternate one. The missing cases summary visible in Figure 1 may also be indicative of cultural differences when it comes to attitudes towards sexuality; an attrition sum of 230 meant a large number of participants in Russia failed to answer the question, compared with just 8 in Finland. This aligns with my opening synopsis that to be part of the LGBTQ+ community in Russia is vilified by the Government. To summarise, the data suggests that we cannot accept the null hypothesis (that there are no differences in attitudes towards sexuality between Finland and Russia) as there is substantial data to support the alternative hypothesis displayed in the figures.

Differences in Gender using the Independent Samples T-Test

Having deduced that there is a significant difference between Russia and Finland in terms of attitudes towards sexuality, I added an additional variable, gender. In Finland, a sample of 957 men and 960 women was used, producing differing results of 1.95 and 1.72 respectively (see Figure 5), situating women slightly closer to the ‘agree strongly’ category on average and creating a mean difference of 0.227 (see Figure 6). In Russia, there was also a visible difference, although on a smaller scale: the mean-average response for the 953 male

respondents was 4.00, and for the 1247 females it was 3.92 – both either on or bordering on the ‘disagree’ response and creating a mean difference of 0.087.

Figure 5: Male and Female Responses in Finland and Russia

Country			N	Mean
Finland	Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish	Male	957	1.95
		Female	960	1.72
Russian Federation	Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish	Male	953	4.00
		Female	1247	3.92

As the differences have been identified, an independent samples t-test was then undertaken once more to exemplify whether these differences were significant. The H1 for this test would be that there is a meaningful difference in terms of gendered attitudes towards sexuality in Finland and in Russia; the H0 would state that there is no distinction within each country in regard to gender.

In Finland, the t-test value exceeded 2 at 4.905, indicating that the null hypothesis can be rejected. This is emboldened by the p-value of 0.000 which is smaller than the 0.05 needed to reject H1. As such, in Finland the mean difference between men and women’s attitudes towards sexuality is significant, and we can be sure that the mean difference within 95% of the true population will fall between 0.136 and 0.318 as per the confidence interval scores formulated. However, Russia’s results differ to Finland’s; their t value does not exceed 2. Moreover, the p-value exceeds 0.05 at 0.087, both of which mean that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. As the two confidence interval values cross over a 0 value (-0.013 – 0.186), this augments the inability to reject the null hypothesis for Russia, as there is insufficient evidence to support the research hypothesis: there is no significant difference in men and women’s attitudes towards sexuality in Russia.

Figure 6: Independent Samples T-Test for Men and Women in Finland and Russia

Country		T	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
Finland	Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish	4.905	0.000	0.227	0.136	0.318
Russian Federation	Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish	1.712	0.087	0.087	-0.013	0.186

In summary, the results emerging from the SPSS analysis suggest the following conclusion: the null hypothesis must be rejected in favour of the alternate hypothesis which propositions a meaningful difference between attitudes towards sexuality in Russia and Finland. In terms of gender, there is a significant difference in Finland between men and women, while Russia maintains a homogenous hostility towards the LGBTQ+ community irrespective of gender. Such findings correlate with literature pertaining to the ongoing struggle of this marginalised group for agency in Russia, and evinces a completely polar attitude to more open-minded countries, such as Finland.

Russia's continuing opposition to LGBTQ+ community exposed in new survey

68% of the Russian public do not believe gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish, major survey suggests.

Press Association

Friday 6th Jan 2017 10.14AM GMT

On average, Russians disagree with the notion that gays and lesbians should be entitled to autonomy to act as they choose.

This austere attitude towards the LGBTQ+ community has been revealed in the European Social Survey 2016, in which over 200 of the participants in Russia failed to even provide a response to the statement: 'gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish'.

Those who did respond, however, tended to disagree, with the survey suggesting a monumental 45.4% percent of the Russian population are strongly opposed to the idea; a pitiful 14.8% either agreed or strongly agreed.

This comes in the wake of Russia's continuous pursuit to outlaw non-heterosexuals, with the possibility of criminalising public displays of non-heterosexual identities, including jail time.

Tanya Cooper of Human Rights Watch has denigrated these propositions, stating:

'It is hard to exaggerate the sinister absurdity and abusive intent of this bill – it would effectively outlaw being lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) and penalize people for expressing their identity, a crucial part of anyone's existence.' (Human Rights Watch, 2016)

With such a hostile climate at present towards the LGBTQ+ population in Russia, and little Government support, are the results of the survey all that surprising?

Elsewhere in the world, it is a different story, with an ever-expanding egalitarian movement in favour of cementing the rights of those whom populate the non-heterosexual community.

For instance, Finland produced almost entirely different results to Russia. On average, the Finnish public are all for the freedom of the LGBTQ+ community, agreeing in response to the notion that gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish.

In fact, over 88% were in favour of gays and lesbians maintaining independence to act as they wish and express their sexuality, an attitude which seems to be prevailing in the rest of Europe, and has done since the early 2000's, in opposition to Russia's quest to curtail LGBTQ+ rights.

The European Parliament stipulates that the human rights of LGBTQ+ community must be preserved, and any form of discrimination is prohibited. In 2000, the Employment Equality

Directive was enacted, forbidding any form of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.

With rising acceptance and pressure from the EU to ensure the implantation of rights for all, will Russia take a leaf out of Finland's book and move forward in support of their own LGBTQ+ population? Only time will tell.

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Digital surveillance and privacy

Jonathan Hendry

This paper will discuss how state surveillance and surveillance capitalism have come to the forefront of the digital privacy debate and suggest ways to reduce their impact on an individual level. Firstly, this paper will explore the concept of state surveillance and its development in recent years, with a focus on the San Bernardino Apple and FBI encryption case. Secondly, it will discuss surveillance by private organizations for marketing purposes, commonly known as surveillance capitalism, as well as how surveillance capitalism has expanded in recent years, especially as seen in the case of Cambridge Analytica. Finally, some solutions to counteract these problems will be offered for both personal and professional use. While surveillance by both state and commercial entities is on the rise, there are still some solutions possible for those who seek to protect themselves.

To begin, the definitions which need to be stated are digital surveillance, surveillance capitalism and cookies or trackers. Surveillance is the process of gathering information on individuals or parties either with or without their consent. State surveillance is intelligence gathered by the state and is often used for monitoring or suppression. Surveillance capitalism is the gathering of information and intelligence, primarily on individuals, for market research and advertisement. Cookies and trackers are files saved on the user's hard drive when they visit a website that are used to track actions, such as websites visited, on each device they are installed on.

State Surveillance

State surveillance has been used both nefariously and judiciously by states for thousands of years. This has been noted in instances from Julius Caesar spying on his citizens at court to Elizabeth I of England intercepting letters to her sister Mary, Queen of Scots, detailing plans of an invasion (Zurcher, 2013). Only recently, however, has this surveillance shifted into the digital realm. A systemic shift on how states intercepted and spied on communications for both intelligence gathering and dissident control came towards the end of World War II. A team of codebreakers led by Alan Turing developing a codebreaking machine that intercepted and decrypted German military communications which subsequently saved countless lives and hastened the end of the bloodiest war in history (DiSalvo, 2013). In the years following World War II, states have increased their digital and technological surveillance on both foreign and domestic actors (Hopkins, 2013). One of the most significant examples in recent history is the Apple and FBI encryption dispute.

States have looked for increasingly more forceful ways to intercept data as seen most notably in the 2016 Apple and U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) lawsuit over iPhone encryption, one of the most high-profile digital privacy cases to date. During an official F.B.I investigation, officers recovered from the scene of the crime an iPhone belonging to the murderer. The phone in question was locked with a passcode that encodes and encrypts the

hard drive so it can only be accessed with the correct passcode combination. iPhones are designed to erase the hard drive after a specified number of incorrect passwords are entered to protect the personal information, especially in instances where a phone is stolen (Yadron, 2016). The officers were unable to access the phone as they did not have the correct password and approached Apple, the designer of the phone, for assistance. Apple initially complied with all the requests for information, including providing back-ups from the phone, making Apple engineers available to advise the FBI, and granting access to the iCloud account in question (Cook, 2016). Unable to find evidence from the information provided, the F.B.I went to court to seek a bypass for the encryption of the iPhone. A move that Apple, backed by tech giants, the public, and politicians saw as setting a dangerous precedent (Brandom, 2016). The product the F.B.I requested was, in essence, a master key that would allow the owner to unlock any iPhone in their possession. This was a tool that Apple and others felt would jeopardize the entire concept of privacy in the digital realm, as once such a tool existed it could be used not only by the US government to exercise their powers unconstitutionally, but should it fall into the wrong hands, it could wreak havoc with profound consequences around the globe (Calamur, 2016).

Apple issued a public statement stating that while they had complied with valid subpoenas and search warrants and offered ideas on a number of investigative options at their disposal, they did not possess and felt it too dangerous to create such a 'backdoor' to bypass encryption, as once that information was known, encryption could be defeated by anyone with such knowledge (Cook, 2016). In the end, the FBI was able to find a third-party tool to extract the information from the phone and withdrew their case. The entire saga highlighted just how insecure our data potentially is and the lengths the government would go to procure it.

In this case, the information was sought to aid law enforcement in solving a shooting case, but the potential for such a tool to exist and fall into the hands of the wrong parties who could use it to break the encryption on any phone in their possession was an alarming one (Calamur, 2016). While the intentions of the FBI in the Apple encryption case might have been honourable, other governments might not be as scrupulous when it comes to collecting information on their citizens. While states have been and will continue to infringe on individual privacy, private corporations are increasingly starting to use digital market surveillance for their own gain.

Surveillance Capitalism

Market surveillance, or surveillance capitalism, is not a new concept at all, but it is one that is becoming more of a concern in the digital privacy world because of an increasingly aggressive use of digital surveillance for market research and targeting purposes, as companies' use innovative and often questionable methods of intelligence gathering to refine their targeted advertising (Schofield, 2019). The term 'surveillance capitalism' was popularized by Shoshana Zuboff in her seminal piece, *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power*, in which she describes it as a process where 'our personal experiences are scraped and packaged as the means to others'

ends' (Zuboff, 2019; 6). She further explains it as the process in which our behavioural data is combined with advanced computational capabilities to produce predictions of human behaviour (Kulwin, 2019).

Surveillance capitalism is more than just companies following you around to see if you like white trainers and bombarding you with advertisements for white trainers. It is a systematic and thorough system of data collection that Erik Sherman describes in *Forbes* as a concept where all the tiny choices made and actions, such as how you move, respond, react, and dress, are collected to become massively invasive and effective indicators which allow business entities to 'follow people and then nudge them into behaviour that is more commercially rewarding for the companies' (Sherman, 2019). Surveillance capitalism comprises of more than just tracking cookies; there are a plethora of methods and behavioural data such as browser fingerprinting, mouse movements, pauses, clicks, sweeps and taps which can be used to build a virtual identity which can be exploited by interested companies for the right price (Naughton, 2019).

One such company that used consumer data for profit was Cambridge Analytica. An investigation by *The Guardian*, *The Observer* and *The New York Times* revealed that the political data firm Cambridge Analytica harvested information from 50 million Facebook users without their consent and subsequently sold that information to American political campaigns in violation of electoral laws (Rosenberg, Confessore and Cadwalladr, 2019). A whistle-blower, later named as Christopher Wylie, a former employee of Cambridge Analytica revealed to the *Observer* how the organisation had used personal information gathered without the user's knowledge or consent, starting in 2014, to build a system that could profile individual US voters in order to target them with personalised political advertisements. The ensuing examination by the *Observer* found that Facebook was aware of the data breach within a year and did not take any significant steps to alert the individuals in question or secure the information, and did not even tighten security to avoid other companies using the same loophole to collect data surreptitiously (Rosenberg, Confessore and Cadwalladr, 2019).

The data originated from an app by a psychology professor at the University of Cambridge named Dr. Aleksandr Kogan entitled *thisisyourdigitallife* which offered personality predictions. All of the users who took the personality test in the app knowingly gave consent to have their data collected for academic research when registering for the test (Grewal, 2018). The problem arose when the application used Facebook's 'platform policy' which at the time allowed the gathering of mutual connections to 'Enhance user experience' as a means to collect information on the original test taker's friends on the network, which was then harvested and stored. While the data acquisition was allowable in the terms and conditions of the Facebook app platform, the subsequent sale of that data to third parties including SCL/Cambridge Analytica and Christopher Wylie of Eunoia Technologies, Inc. was in violation of the terms of service (Grewal, 2018). This data was used by Cambridge Analytica to develop a system that could evaluate individual Facebook profiles to determine personality traits linked to voting behaviour, which became a crucial ingredient in the highly

specifically targeted Facebook ads which were used during the 2016 United States Presidential election (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018).

While already widely reported, this story came to the forefront of the news cycle when it was revealed several Republican candidates including Senator Ted Cruz of Florida and Republican Presidential Candidate Donald Trump had used this data to build a system which developed highly targeted ads to be delivered to specific voters based on the information gathered on them (Isaak and Hanna, 2018). While there is no conclusive evidence to suggest the targeted ads made any difference in the election, suddenly tens of millions of Facebook users around the world knew their private data, such as hometown and things they had liked on the network, were available without their knowledge or consent to the highest bidder (Timberg and Dwoskin, 2018).

However, this tracking data is not just limited to users of social networks, with companies now being able to build a detailed profile of individuals without social media accounts as shown in research last year by the non-profit organisation, Privacy International. Their studies showed over forty percent of free apps on the Google Play store could share data with Facebook whether or not the user has a Facebook account (Privacy International, 2018). The New York Times carried out a separate study which revealed over a thousand applications across the Android and Apple app stores revealed location information up to 14,000 times a day to over seventy-five advertising companies. These companies would use this information, collected under the guise of benign activities like ‘traffic routing’ and ‘updating sports scores’, to compile a detailed profile on each phone user which is then sold for as little as two cents per user (Valentino-DeVries et al., 2019).

Solutions

While the statistics and information provided can be alarming, some steps can be used to protect oneself from surveillance by both state and commercial entities. For the average consumer, there are several simple precautions which can drastically reduce the amount of marketing surveillance data collected (Privacy International, 2018).

Firstly, one of the simplest ways to protect your data is to keep your devices updated and set up a passcode for your phone and laptop. This process encrypts your data to prevent it from being accessed by anyone who has access to your phone. Most computers and Android phones even have a guest account which can be enabled for when someone needs access to a device, but keeps the owner’s private data and the information separate so it cannot be accessed without the password (Simon, 2019).

Secondly, verify that you are using a secure browser or have tracking blockers enabled. One of the easiest ways to protect personal information from digital surveillance is to use a private browser like Firefox or Tor, as browsers such as Google Chrome are known to have inconspicuous trackers. For example, when you sign into Gmail on a Google Chrome, the tracking cookies enable Chrome to send your entire browsing history to Google. Tracking blockers such as Ghostery and UBlock Origin prevent sites from leaving cookies or loading

tracking ads and can easily be installed on most computers and mobiles. Users of all browsers can clear the browser history and cache, which removes the cookies and trackers already downloaded. (Techworld, 2019).

Thirdly, uninstall applications that you do not regularly use, or can easily be accessed via the browser version. Applications often collect location data even when not in use which can be used to track you and may even contain malware; and regularly review your app permissions page in your phone settings to see which ones can access settings such as your location and microphone (Valentino-DeVries et al., 2019).

For those who are at an increased risk of targeting, such as journalists and activists, further options ranging from Virtual Private Networks, commonly known as VPN's, which conceal the user's location from the internet provider, and encrypted messaging apps such as Signal and Telegram which cannot be intercepted by third parties are available. Additionally, all E.U. residents are particularly fortunate due to a recent European Parliament resolution entitled the *General Data Protection Regulation* (GDPR) which came into force on May 25, 2018. This act gives residents the right to obtain and request the deletion of all information a company holds on them, which is especially helpful for deleting unused accounts and cleaning up your digital identity and footprint (European Parliament, 2016). From simple tasks like deleting browser history periodically, to using a Virtual Private Network, there are ways of minimizing digital surveillance and surveillance capitalism for all levels of technical proficiency.

In conclusion, digital privacy and surveillance are issues that have been brought to the forefront in recent years. State surveillance has become increasingly more commonplace and governments are going to great lengths to acquire data, as seen in the Apple and FBI encryption case. Private organisations are also making greater use of digital surveillance to the point of infringing on digital privacy, as exemplified in the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which saw tens of millions of consumers data gathered without consent and sold to third parties. Parallel to the advancements in privacy infringement there have also been improvements in digital privacy protection and tools such as private browsers and virtual private networks that can help offset and protect against some of these infringements. While both state surveillance and surveillance capitalism are growing and expanding, so are new and innovative ways to keep one's data secure and maintain online privacy in this increasingly digital world.

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Are ‘the police’ changing? Discuss with reference to the culture of policing and the role of women and minorities.

Saif Bodhee

Society’s definition of crime has been ever changing since the 1700s, alongside the general principles of morality and various attitudes towards deviant behaviours. Perhaps it is society’s progressive nature from which the changes in crime deterrence emerged as a response to crime becoming ‘an object of wide public concern’ (Erikson, 1996: 67). These changes and shifts in crime deterrence are arguably a result of the long-established police characteristics, namely: their sense of mission, a desire for action and excitement, the ‘in-group’ isolation and solidarity, its authoritarian conservatism, and the suspicion held by the police towards the law and legal procedures (Waddington, 1999: 287). These core referents of police characteristics represent a narrow operational definition of police culture to be a specific set of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours that are exhibited by those in law enforcement, when in fact, these beliefs are a part of a ‘broader theoretical construct,’ in which the role of women and minorities within society have largely impacted the police (Waddington, 1999: 288). On the one hand, pessimistic stereotypes against gender, race, and ethnic class that has manifested in an era without mass media or a literate population (Nadal et al, 2015), have arguably been instilled into today’s society through the rise of technology and media outlets, which in turn has arguably led to certain biases developing within the policing system (Lea, 2000). This is evident from the institutionalised distrust towards women (Walklate, 2012), as well as the multiple instances of institutional racism within police organisations (Lea, 2000). On the other hand, the police as an organisation have progressed from the glorification of violence as seen from the initial ‘public vs. police’ mentality (Waddington, 1999) to becoming vessels for public safety and ultimately a ‘force for good’ (Delsol, 2015). This essay will attempt to convey the argument that the police have indeed changed to accommodate the more progressive views that society now have towards issues regarding both race and gender. Moreover, the essay will identify various police characteristics in an attempt to describe how they are changing, all while discussing how the role of women, minorities, and police culture has impacted the progression of the police as a whole. It is to be noted that both the benefits and shortfalls of these factors will be discussed in an attempt to illustrate how far the police have changed in relation to the betterment of society. Both the role of women and minorities, coupled with police culture, create an inviting opportunity for theorists and scholars such as Reiner, Loftus, Lea and Butler to be used throughout the essay as a means of clarifying whether the police really are changing.

In order to understand whether or not the police are changing, it is relevant to discuss the impact that police cultures and subcultures have had on policing. Police cultures therefore, have long been defined as a specific set of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours that are exhibited by those in law enforcement (Waddington, 1999). It is without question that the police have a significant level of authority over the public, especially when considering their powers to

arrest, question and search individuals when certain conditions are present (Sun et al., 2008). When taking into account the large amount of time an officer spends dealing with crime, it becomes clear that a notion is being perpetuated that the public are untrustworthy and potentially hostile towards the police (Bittner, 1970). This, coupled with the fact that prominent characteristics of police cultures include unity and teamwork, creates a dynamic that the public is against the police due to the overbearing control and authority they have collectively (Mathews, 2016). Scholars such as Robert Peel (1829) identified such police cultures and hired police officers from the working class, in hopes that a societal bond between the police and the public would form (Delsol, 2015). Peel intended for these new set of officers to be very visible by making them 'follow rational bureaucratic rules and procedures, use minimum force, be separate from the government and be accountable to the public' (Reiner, 2010: 39). Evidently, Peel's (1829) ideas and advancements have had multiple effects on modern-day policing, this is accentuated through the description Banton (1964) gives to police officers: 'policemen on patrol are primarily peace officers rather than law officers'; they supervise and respond to requests for assistance (Banton, 1964: 6). Although scholars of criminology have interpreted Banton's (1964) view to be a critique of the police, others argue that the label of 'peace officers' emphasises that the presence and visibility of police alone acts as a deterrence for crime (Bittner, 1974). This is further highlighted by the fact that the police are being increasingly viewed as vessels for public safety; rather than the narrative of 'the police vs. public' (Mathews, 2016) being enforced, there is an area of consensus whereby they are instead performing a service for the public and are ultimately a 'force for good' (Delsol, 2015). Thus, it can be argued that the police are not only changing, but these changes are beneficial for the safety of society.

On the other hand, contrasting this would be the fact that alongside the aforementioned virtues of teamwork and unity to be characteristics of police culture, there are also certain characteristics in police culture that have presumably prevented the police from changing. This is outlined through police culture being branded by various traits, namely; suspicion, isolation and solidarity, moral conservatism, old-fashioned machismo and pragmatism (Reiner, 2010: 121). These characteristics are all prominently highlighted in various ways, for instance: the police's exaggerated sense of mission and craving for work that promises excitement (Loftus et al, 2015). They celebrate masculine exploits, as seen from their willingness to use force during interactions with the public, and engage in informal working practices that privilege experience over evidence (Loftus et al, 2015). Furthermore, officers are continually suspicious and socially isolated from civilian members of the public which cause them to display a defensive solidarity with their colleagues (Loftus et al, 2015). However, this solidarity between colleagues, is not always presented as a strength of police culture, considering their culture is littered with inferences of cynicism, pessimism, and secrecy; it can be argued that police officers may do whatever it takes to save face. An example of this is accentuated through the Hillsborough disaster in which 'ninety-six people died in a severe crush at an FA Cup semi-final at Hillsborough Stadium' (Scruton, 2013: 1). The incident resulted in judicial inquiries which found 'serious institutional failures in the policing and management of the capacity crowd,' to which police organisations and authorities responded by wrongly claiming that 'drunken, violent fans had caused the fatal

crash' (Scruton, 2013: 1). This misinformed accusation of the fans being at fault provides connotations that officers want to get their job done with minimal hassle and therefore abuse their authority in an attempt to maintain a clean reputation (Skolnick, 1966: 141). Thus, the argument can be presented that, the police are indeed not changing, instead, characteristics that arise from police cultures are ultimately reopening the narrative of the 'police vs. the public' (Matthews, 2016).

Another point which highlights significant changes within the police would be how society's adapting views on gender roles have impacted the police as an organisation. It is common knowledge within the criminological field that research on organisations has historically paid little attention to the significance of gender; however, in recent years, a concern with how organisations are themselves gendered has emerged (Silvestri, 2012). Police organisational cultures are powerful sites where symbols, images and other forms of consciousness that justify gender divisions are created and sustained, as a result of these symbols being attached to actions rather than biological sex (Silvestri, 2012). This in turn means that old-fashioned stereotypes of the police being 'masculine' are gradually being subverted (Reiner, 2010). Further illustrating this would be that fact that the current commissioner of the Metropolitan Police is Cressida Dick, 'the first woman to take charge of London's police force in its 188-year history' (Thornton, 2019: 279). This prominently outlines the positive impact that gender roles have had on the police. Initially, police work was a means whereby men could differentiate masculinity from femininity (Silvestri, 2012), as a result of the perception of police work to involve 'danger, [action, and strength]' (Reiner, 2010: 121). However, the appointment of a woman in a position of power within the police subverts the 'gendered substructure' found in organisations which features the notion that only men can hold authoritative positions in both institutional and individual levels (Silvestri, 2012: 24). Perhaps, the aforementioned can be used to bring light to the fact that the police are changing for the betterment of society, rather than the narrative of 'the public vs. the police' being perpetuated (Matthews, 2016). Instead, areas of consensus are arising between the public and the police. This is further highlighted through feminist scholars that have voiced the goal of feminism to be something that 'does not push men out so as to bring women in, but rather to gender the study of crime' (Renzetti, 1993: 232). Cressida Dick's appointment to commissioner gives weight to this point, proving that societal views on gender have changed to the point that women can be in a position of power, authority and significance. As a result, one could argue that the police are indeed changing, evidently through society's more liberal views on gender being illustrated through the appointment of women in authoritarian positions within the police.

However, despite society's increasing liberal stance towards gender roles being enforced through the appointment of women in senior positions within the police, the issue remains that the gendered nature of power still exists in the modern era (Little, 2004). In research that identified such issues, it was found that women in positions of power find 'managerial masculinity' tough and competitive (Silvestri, 2012: 39), meaning that these senior policewomen have to access male power structures and are forced to adapt to them in order to be successful (Little, 2004). These 'male power structures' and 'androcentric conceptions'

(Little, 2004: 808), can be described as catalysts of police behaviour, especially when considering the common notion that policing involves dangerous work (Matthews, 2016). It can be argued that the presence of physical risk reinforces a culture of masculinity as well as the dominant image for the ideal man to be autonomous, brave and strong (Edwards, 2004). This in turn, perpetuates the image that both male and female officers can be under intense pressure to conform to a masculine identity that values the image of a physical crime fighter. The aforementioned is further highlighted by Deborah Meyerson (2001), who argues that male officers are expected to exert a significant amount of effort to demonstrate these masculine attributes in order to prove their worth and fit in (Silvestri, 2012: 79). This is reinforced by the occupational values of predominantly male officers who view policies that promote citizen interaction to be diminishing their powers by challenging their authority and judgement of public safety (McCarthy, 2013). It is likely that in an attempt to exert their masculinity, officers may unnecessarily cause violence (Banton, 1964). This links to Humm's (1997) critique that the structural system of male domination is sustained through the persistence of gender stereotypes, which have become socially endowed labels (Humm, 1997). Perhaps society has become so indoctrinated by these labels that we are unable to awake from our 'androcentric slumber' or escape from the 'malestream' ideologies that are still present in the modern era (Cook, 2016: 334). Thus, it can be argued that the police have not changed since old-fashioned views on gender and masculinity still exist and are evident in police organisations.

Although police cultures and subcultures both maintain and reinforce certain prejudices including racism, masculine bias and sexism (Waddington, 1999), there has been a significant shift in society's views on ethnic minorities, one that involves the condemnation of such prejudice and discrimination towards race. This has ultimately led to changes within the police as a whole (Savage et al., 2007). Despite numerous scholars advocating that the operation of the current criminal justice system is the most effective, efficient and successful method of preventing crime and deviance, it is also known that there are shortfalls to such a system, the multiple 'miscarriages of justice' are prime examples of this (Savage et al., 2007: 83). As Walker (1999) rightfully notes: miscarriages of justice are 'wrongful convictions, or failures to act in response to victimisation'; while it is clear that these miscarriages of justice are the antithesis of a proper functioning criminal justice system, it cannot be denied that they act as catalysts for reform by exposing the 'systemic deficiencies and shortcomings in justice systems' (cited in Savage, 2007: 84). This is greatly accentuated through the Stephen Lawrence case; the prominent case featured a young black man who was a victim of gang murder (Lea, 2000). The victim was initially stripped of all forms of justice when officers ruled off the murder as just another racially motivated crime (Lea, 2000). As a result of this, the Lawrence family began a process of mobilising support to expose the whole series of events subsequent to murder (Savage, 2007). The 'Lawrence campaign' ultimately led to a public inquiry into the case in the form of the Macpherson inquiry, which had a significant influence on: police investigations policy, police recruitment, police treatment of victims and even the general law on race relations (Savage, 2007). Perhaps, the argument can be made that these campaigns have illustrated that the infinite spotlight on ethnic minorities that have been cast by both the media and the police, have led to adaptations and changes to the views

that the police hold over minorities (Loftus et al, 2015). The aforementioned is further supported through the police's attempts to extend their police family to be more representative of its local community (Loftus et al, 2015). This is evident from the fact that 35% of officers are recruited from an ethnic minority background, which is a significant increase from the 3.3% of ethnic minority officers recorded in 1992 (Johnston, 2006). Thus, referring to the aforementioned arguments and empirical evidence, the point can be raised that the police are indeed changing for the betterment of society, not only have the police recognised that minority officers in covert situations would appear more 'natural' in certain situations (Loftus et al, 2015), but the discrimination and prejudice towards ethnic minorities have considerably declined in recent years.

On the other hand, although campaigns against racism and miscarriages of justice have led to positive changes in the way in which the police recruit and approach issues regarding race, it cannot be ignored that such a misguided culture was present within the police force to begin with. Despite the common notion of the police being enforcers of the law and acting as the entrance to the criminal justice system, there are cases in which police officers in particular have over exercised their power. The methods in which police officers can be deemed to be corrupt seem to be limitless, such methods range from: bribery, opportunistic theft and internal payoffs, to the protection of illegal activities such as prostitution, drugs and pornography (Newburn, 1999). However, Kleinig et al (1996) provides a broader definition as to what corruption at this level may be, he claims that: 'Police officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing to exercise their authority, they act with the primary intention of further private or departmental advantage' (Kleinig, 1996: 166). Essentially, police officers are defined to be corrupt when they fail to exercise their legal power or when they use such power for personal gain. Moreover, such corruption is more prominently outlined by the institutional racism within police culture; for clarity, this is the 'collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people due to their colour, culture or ethnic origin' (Lea, 2000: 220). Evidence of such corruption is accentuated through the aforementioned sabotaged investigation regarding the killers of Stephen Lawrence (Lea, 2000). In research that studied the investigation, it was inferred that this corruption within the police department stemmed from the 'professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior officers' (Lea, 2000: 221). However, police culture also has a role in this, as it was previously stated – officers usually work in isolation of from each other (Reiner, 2010), but in 'background spaces' such as the 'canteen' officers have the opportunity to express and pass on to new recruits racist beliefs and stereotypes – hence the term: 'canteen racism' (Waddington, 1999: 288). Therefore, the argument can be made that the police are not changing, since the outdated views on minorities and racist behaviours are still evident in police cultures and actions in the modern era.

In conclusion, I believe the arguments in favour of the fact that the police are indeed changing, far outweigh the points that argue otherwise. The issues of police culture, the role of women and minorities are of wider significance than might be assumed. At first glance, it appears to only affect minor issues such as the recruitment of officers, certain niches within the police department and trivial biases that officers may have. However, these factors all

provide connotations of the wider structural value that they have on society and as a result the police as a whole. When arguing the case that the police are changing, the key points to note are that the police have shifted from the narrative of 'the public vs. the police,' and instead have become vessels for public safety and a 'force for good' (Delsol, 2015). This is accompanied by the fact that the appointment of women in positions of power within the police illustrate that society's more liberal and adapting views on gender roles have impacted the police to the extent that the occupational 'gender hierarchy' is being undermined (Silvestri, 2012). Moreover, the police have, over time, progressed from old fashioned views on race, moving away from prejudice and discrimination towards ethnic minorities, evidently through the record number of officers recruited from ethnic minority backgrounds (Johnston, 2006).

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What are the core benefits and disadvantages of the privatisation of probation?

Jessica Waddington

In 2013, the Ministry of Justice published the *Transforming Rehabilitation* (TR) agenda, under which a series of reforms, including privatisation, were outlined with the aim of improving probationary supervision in Britain (Justice Committee, 2018). This essay seeks to present and evaluate the key benefits and disadvantages of privatising probation. The following discussion will be divided into four parts: firstly, there will be a brief account of the history of probation in Britain and the contemporary influence of New Public Management (NPM) on its services. Secondly, the core benefits of the privatisation of probation outlined by TR (cost-effectiveness and service expansion) will be discussed. Then, the key disadvantages of privatisation will be presented, referring to the structural failings of TR, probation's poor service provisions and working conditions, and an acknowledgement of ethical concerns. Lastly, there will be a reflection upon how well probation fulfils its purpose, regardless of whether it is publicly or privately owned. The paper will conclude with a reflection of the benefits and disadvantages of privatising probation, emphasising that probationary supervision must be reformed in order to deliver an effective service, regardless of who owns it.

The British probation service has a long history (Canton, 2011). Originating in the 19th century, Canton (2011) notes that probation was originally used as an attempt to reform and deter young people from reoffending without punishing them. Instead, it was the duty of the Probation Officer (PO) to 'advise, assist and befriend' their supervisee (Probation of Offenders Act, 1907 in Canton, 2011: 20). Over the last century, probation has grown in terms of 'workload, level of training, expertise and influence' (Deerling and Feilzer, 2015:7), requiring at least one punitive element during supervision (Canton, 2011). More recently, probation has become almost entirely privatised under TR reforms (Walker et al, 2019; Burke and Collet, 2016). The privatisation of probation falls within the wider context of NPM and neoliberalism, popularity for which originates within Margaret Thatcher's 1979 Conservative Government (Albertson and Fox, 2019; Siltala, 2013). NPM has transferred neoliberal market rationalities from the private to the public sector, leading to the implementation of extensive targets, to measure performance, and cost-cutting measures, such as privatisation of contracts, for many governmental institutions (Siltala, 2013; Albertson and Fox, 2019). This has been evidenced in probation. In 2014, central control of probation was dismantled and split into two sectors: a National Probation Service (NPS), and twenty-one Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) (Justice Committee, 2018). The NPS would remain under governmental control and supervise people whose convictions were deemed a 'high-risk' to the public, whereas CRCs would be contracted out to private investors and would supervise those who were regarded as 'low-risk' (Justice Committee, 2018). Privatisation was widely believed to

be a suitable way of achieving the aims set forth by TR, including delivering value for taxpayers and reducing recidivism (Justice Committee, 2018).

The core benefits of privatising probation include cost-effectiveness without reduction in quality of services, and the expansion and innovation of supervision. Privatisation is highly attractive as it allows companies to improve their business-efficacy in ways the government would be unable to do without increasing taxes or borrowing, particularly during periods of austerity (Burke and Collet, 2016; Walker et al, 2019). In this sense, privatisation of certain services is supposed to alleviate some of the government's economic strain and allow the national economy to stabilise (Burke and Collet, 2016). The TR Inquiry (Justice Committee, 2018) stated that there would be three forms of payment to CRCs: 'a fee for service', 'payment by results', and a 'fee for use'. The fee for service was estimated to cover around 20% of costs and would be given regardless of outcomes, as this payment would be required to provide basic services; payment by results would cover up to 70% of costs depending on the CRC's ability to meet targets; the fee for services would cover 10% of costs and would be paid if the CRC used the work of other parties to improve supervision (Justice Committee, 2018). It could be argued that withholding full pay would encourage companies to provide effective supervision for probationers in order to achieve targets quickly and efficiently. If CRCs were a success, they would prove to be highly cost-effective for the government and the taxpayer. Furthermore, Albertson and Fox (2019) note that privatised markets revolve solely around supply and demand rhetoric – the public demand supervision of individuals leaving prison and the private sector is willing to provide a supply of POs and provisions. In theory, the market is free from political and ideological values as it only exists to provide a service to consumer; therefore, CRCs may strive to reject moralistic and retributivist judgements of how people with convictions 'should' be treated and instead focus on ways to successfully rehabilitate them in order to meet targets and receive payment.

Privatisation under TR has allowed the probation service to expand its provision of care to a greater number of users. For example, Albertson and Fox (2019) note that before privatisation, probation only supervised people who had spent longer than 12 months in prison; by contrast, the service is now able to support all those who have served a minimum of two days in custody. The expansion of provision was estimated to increase the number of parolees under probationary supervision by around 40,000 (Justice Committee, 2018: 13). The Through the Gate (TGT) scheme was also introduced to provide support for people who were in the final 12 weeks of their sentence in order to prepare them for life outside prison (Justice Committee, 2018). The increased level of provision offered to people currently under probationary supervision and those preparing to leave prison has the intention of helping people achieve desistance from criminal activities. Furthermore, TR states that privatisation allows CRCs to innovate the ways in which offenders are supervised, and actively encourages POs to flexibly distribute their services to suit the needs of each probationer (Albertson and Fox, 2019). By allowing CRCs to innovate, it is suggested that this will increase their ability to achieve targets and protect the public (Albertson and Fox, 2019). As this section has demonstrated, the benefits of a privatised probation system are greatly interlinked and cyclical: if the system is privatised, this will save the government money whilst allowing

probationary services to innovate and improve chances of rehabilitation; if individuals are rehabilitated, the CRC will receive full payment and be able to reinvest in rehabilitation techniques. However, the benefits of privatisation are often only realised on paper as the reality of TR is extraordinarily flawed.

In May 2019 it was announced that probation is to be renationalised by the end of 2020 due to a series of TR reform failures (BBC, 2019a), thereby highlighting disadvantages to privatising probation. These failures include the structural issues of CRCs, the poor services delivered to probationers by an overworked taskforce, and ethical concerns regarding penal populism and increased supervision. TR aimed to create an economically efficient probation service that would save taxpayers' money; contrarily, CRCs have proven to be far more costly than originally predicted due to inherent structural issues in how they were paid and operated (Justice Committee, 2018). The TR Inquiry stated that the original 'fixed' payment rate of 20% given by the government varied greatly – the National Audit Office (NAO) reported that this rate often fluctuated between 44% and 99.8% depending on the CRC (Justice Committee, 2018: 17). The NAO reported that CRCs had fallen into extensive debt and £342 million would be given to rectify this (Justice Committee, 2018). Additionally, a further £170 million would be granted to stabilise CRCs before contracts expire in 2020, two years earlier than originally planned (Albertson and Fox, 2019). CRCs have also been critiqued for operating through 'black box' contracts, described by Rory Stewart OBE MP as being:

...almost entirely orientated around the question of reoffending rates. The black box basically said that the CRCs, provided they achieved those outcomes, could do it in almost any way they wanted (in Justice Committee, 2018: 16).

Likewise, the HM Inspectorate for Probation (HMI Probation) explained that black box contracts gave CRCs too much flexibility, leading to ineffective practices that inhibited rehabilitation (Justice Committee, 2018). These structural issues are encapsulated in the example of Working Links, a major CRC owned by the German risk management company Aurelius (Busby, 2019). In February 2019, it was announced that Working Links had gone into administration and had been misclassifying people with violent convictions as 'low-risk' to meet commercial targets (Busby, 2019). This greatly undermines the legitimacy of CRCs to provide a suitable service that operates to rehabilitate people and protect the public. Likewise, it may be reasonable to doubt the cost-effectiveness of CRCs when a major contractor has gone into administration. Somewhat surprisingly, despite evidence of the economic failings of CRCs, the government has declared that the integrated NPS will spend around £280 million a year on outsourcing innovative rehabilitation and supervision techniques from private companies and charities, thereby emphasising the strong neoliberal belief regarding the relationship between private enterprise and innovation (Carr, 2019).

The privatisation of probation has also had very little success in reducing recidivism. The NAO has stated that recidivism rates have 'skyrocketed' (BBC, 2019a) due to CRCs' insufficient supervision. For example, before privatisation, probationers were able to contact

their PO's personal work-phone if they needed support. Now, they must ring a call centre to arrange appointments rather than speak to their PO directly (BBC, 2019a). This has led to probationers feeling as if they are no longer adequately supported by their PO, so turn to charities for quicker access and more relevant help than offered by probation (Robins, 2019). Likewise, Robins (2019) stated that probationers have reported that meetings with their PO often felt like a tick-box procedure, if they were able to arrange a meeting at all. TR reforms have also impacted upon POs' experiences. At current, probation has a staff-vacancy rate of 11-16% as it has become common knowledge that POs are overworked, underpaid and often suffer ill-health resulting from the stress and pressure of their workloads rendering the job highly unattractive (Robins, 2019; BBC, 2019b). Staff also claimed that cases were not allocated to POs based upon skill or training but through who is available thereby undermining the provisions offered (Burke and Collet, 2016). This is highly important, as the HMI Probation (2014, 2015, 2016) reported that the probation service has failed to deliver adequate provision or complete successful interventions in around two-thirds of cases (in Burke and Collet, 2016). Therefore, it may be unsurprising that there is no evidence suggesting that privatised institutions in the CJS are more effective than those provided by the public sector (Stacey, 2012). In fact, it can be reasonably suggested from the above discussion that privatisation has caused the effectiveness of probation to plummet.

Discussions into all forms of privatised corrections question whether it is ethical to profit from punishment, and whether this may unnecessarily lead to an expansion of the CJS (Montes, 2019). It could be argued that expanding the provision of services to a wider number of people may serve to increase the numbers of people in the CJS rather than reduce them (Cohen, 1985), particularly if there are financial incentives involved (Montes, 2019). It has been suggested that privatisation of probation has left POs feeling conflicted over their role as they must promote desistance, but are aware that, if they are always successful, they may experience job vulnerabilities (Robins, 2019). This emphasises the tensions between commercial profit and successful rehabilitation. Likewise, the public media often draw upon the notion of 'taxpayer money', which could suggest that probation is somehow 'owned' by 'the taxpayer', thereby emphasising that services 'should' be in the interests of the public, not the probationer (Stacey, 2012). Fitzgibbon (2007) identifies that duties of probation have changed in recent years to compliment public fears of the probationer as a 'risky' individual who must be protected against (in Crook and Wood, 2014). Crook and Wood (2014) state that viewing individuals as 'risks' may lead to increased levels of penal populism – whereby policies are created to appease the public, rather than promote the offender as a person in need of support. This coupled with commercial profit, leaves people with convictions vulnerable to overly punitive punishments that primarily benefit the investor. Arguably, this tension between rehabilitating people and making money from their punishment is irreconcilable, thus placing ethical concerns for the delegation of punishment firmly within academic view.

Regardless of debates surrounding the benefits and disadvantages of privatised probation, it may be of equal or greater importance to question how far probation fulfils its purpose of promoting desistance. In the view of the Home Office (2004), the primary purpose of

probation is now to protect the public from convicted individuals, whilst rehabilitating the person under supervision is deemed of secondary importance (in Stacey, 2012). This often neglects the difficulties probationers face. For example, Durnescu (2011), adapting the work of Gresham Sykes' (1958), has suggested that people under probationary supervision experience various 'pains' like those experienced during imprisonment, such as deprivation of autonomy and time, financial costs, and stigmatisation effects. Furthermore, Stacey (2012) suggests that many probationers give very little thought or care as to who is supervising them or providing services; instead, they are more concerned with the value and relevance of support to relieve painful experiences caused by supervision. As previously stated, Robins (2019) identifies that probationers often turn to the voluntary sector to receive help that is of greater relevance and importance to their needs. The charity Revolving Doors (RD) works with individuals involved in different stages of the CJS. After two years of evaluating the effectiveness of CRCs, RD developed a series of policy suggestions for the House of Commons (2018). The suggestions were far reaching and included the view that prospective CRC contractors should provide a plan to the government demonstrating the services (beyond consultation) that will be provided to probationers and how that contractor believed these services would increase rehabilitation and social integration (RD, 2018). RD (2018) also emphasised that a higher standard and frequency of contact between the PO and their probationer was of paramount importance, as well as the implementation of compulsory trauma training for all POs in both CRCs and the NPS so that they may understand the impact of imprisonment and stigmatisation upon their client. Likewise, Montes (2019) suggests that ethical treatment of probationers requires providers to: prioritise correctional goals; use ethical means to achieve these goals; provide high quality services; protect the individual's rights; operate cost-effectively; and have a process in place to address ethical issues if and when they arise. If these goals are met, it may be of little importance whether the probationer is supervised by the public or private sector (Montes, 2019). In this respect, it could be suggested that probation must be reformed so that the person under supervision is once again at the centre of the discussion, rather than public fears and expressions. Of course, in instances such as Working Links misclassifying probationers (Busby, 2019), it is understandable as to why the media have increasingly focused upon fears of 'risky' people (Fitzgibbon, 2007 in Burke and Collet, 2016). However, it is suggestable that these fears will always be present if probation does not effectively provide individuals with long-lasting and satisfactory alternatives to criminal activities.

To conclude, this essay has presented the history of probation, including the most recent phase of privatisation under NPM. The core benefits of privatising probation include cost-effectiveness for taxpayers, whilst being able to expand and innovate services. However, TR reforms have been unsuccessful. This has led to various disadvantages including structural issues of economic failure and operational standards, the rapid decline in the standard of provisions provided to service users, and ethical concerns regarding profit and the delegation of punishment. It is suggestable that the disadvantages of privatisation have outweighed the benefits of TR reforms. RD (2018) has suggested that probation in Britain requires regulation of CRCs, improvements in the PO-probationer relationship, and compulsory trauma training for all POs in CRCs and the NPS in order to improve the services offered by probation.

Whilst privatisation has proven to be a failure, this may partly be the result of issues within probation more generally. Therefore, it could be suggested that probation must be reformed in order to provide a service that successfully promotes desistance before discussions regarding privatisation of probation begin.

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What challenges do the digitisation of court services pose for the achievement of justice? What benefits?

Abigail King

The criminal courts of England and Wales have recently transformed to ‘digitising’ their court services, within a backdrop of financial and operational pressure to improve the administration of the criminal justice system over the last decade (House of Commons, 2018: 4). The number of cases reaching court has increased in recent years, and many courts are struggling with the pressure. Remarkably, HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS) have created a £1.2 billion programme to modernise courts which includes the efforts made to digitise court services (House of Commons, 2018: 3). The idea which led to this progression was that by advancing our criminal justice system in a digital way, for example by allowing defendants and victims to appear in court via a video link, waiting times and transport costs, which were said to have had an impact on achievement of justice, are reduced (GOV.UK, 2019). To clarify, the concept of ‘achieving justice’ refers to the idea that the ‘fair’ and ‘properly handled’ outcome has been achieved by the court system. However, since the introduction of this reform, critics have proposed many disadvantages to this new way of streamlining courts to become modern, time and cost efficient, and have argued against it contributing to the achievement of justice. In particular, Ward (2015: 341) presented the idea that the introduction of ‘virtual courts’ could undermine procedural due process, which shall be analysed further in this essay. Overall, this essay will outline and evaluate the challenges and benefits of the digitisation of court services for the purpose of achievement of justice, including arguments from various perspectives using policy evidence and using contemporary examples of digitised court services in England and Wales.

Firstly, the recent digitisation of court services has been critiqued by Jenni Ward (2015) as potentially undermining procedural due process. This is commonly referred to by scholars as ‘fairness of procedure’ (Ward, 2015: 345). Ward suggests that by endeavouring to manage the court with ideals of ‘economic efficiency and expedience in service delivery’, this might lead to shortcutting the protections in place for the wrongly accused (Ward, 2015: 355), an important placement which must remain in the process of achieving justice to keep the procedure ‘fair’. Ward argues that streamlining the court service procedures has grown from neoliberal economic policies of cost efficiency and time management (Ward, 2015: 355), which is the underpinning reason as to why she argues, and indeed the arguments that follow, ‘virtual courts’ are not leading to achieving justice in England and Wales but instead creating further difficulties of ‘fairness’ for the system.

Alongside the challenge highlighted by Ward (2015) of undermining procedural due process, a recent policy report by Penelope Gibbs (2017) from the charity ‘*Transform Justice*’ also found that neoliberal ideals of efficiency in the court service means that important changes have to be raised to practitioners and politicians about challenges which have been

highlighted by recent evidence about the use of ‘virtual courts’. A prominent disadvantage to the digitisation of court services found in Gibbs’ report would be technical difficulties and failures (Gibbs, 2017: 8). From this report, it can be argued that technical difficulties within the court service will cause disruption and may lead to cases being postponed to a later date. Consequently, this does not allow for the desired outcome behind the money spent towards the reform of a more streamlined court service and will additionally cost more money for the court to resolve. Moreover, Gibbs’ report leads to questions of how the digitisation of court services might be maintained to avoid technical difficulties and failures. According to the HM Courts and Tribunal Service report ‘*National Remote Link Sites Protocol*’ (HMCTS, 2018: 8), at HMCTS sites a Digital Support Officer will carry out equipment checks and HMCTS staff report faults to the Justice Video System (JVS) helpdesk. Additionally, staff at establishments managed by Police and Crime Commissioners have to contact their IT helpdesk in case of problems. This could be a disadvantage to the digitisation of court services and delay the achievement of justice because reporting and resolving technological issues is time consuming and costly. Gibbs (2017: 8) illustrated numerous examples of digital equipment difficulties in court. One example was a from a police officer, making a complaint that there was a suspension between video and audio, so the defendant was struggling to follow what was happening in the court service. The officer continued, by saying ‘the system seemed so temperamental it would have been quicker to transport him from the prison to the court’ (ibid.), which therefore supports the idea that digitising court services does not seem to save money for the criminal justice system, but rather cause further problems in the ultimate goal of achieving justice. Additionally, the fact that the defendant was struggling to follow the court service places them in a vulnerable position and questions whether the procedure was ‘fair’ at all.

Furthermore, the disadvantage of technical difficulties in ‘virtual courts’ directly contradicts the advantage listed by the government on their website giving guidance on ‘video conferencing’, which states that digitising the court service offers a practical solution to problems of transporting prisoners, for example, reducing costly and long-distance journeys (GOV.UK, 2019). According to the example given by the police officer in Gibbs’ report as previously mentioned, although the government had the intention of reducing transport time and cost, empirical evidence found by Gibbs (2017: 8) showed that this has not been the case so far. On the other hand, it could be said that with enough time, tribulations such as delays in audio and video could be improved alongside the advances in technology.

Moreover, another disadvantage to digitising court services is that the traditional composition of the those appearing in court is dramatically changed and the physical absence of the individual appearing via video-link may affect the achievement of justice because they do not feel confidence in the court service. A noteworthy example given by a criminal barrister in Gibbs’ report (2017: 8) portrayed that a defendant appearing in court via a video link can only see one person on their screen at a time, and therefore cannot read the body language of anyone else in the court. This comes as a significant modification to the traditional arrangement of the courtroom, in which Paul Rock pointed to the court as a form of ‘stagecraft’ in which the manner of the participants was ‘theatrical’ (1993: 55). The

courtroom has been this way for many years and justice has been able to be achieved in the past numerous times in this manner. For this reason, it could be seen that justice will not be achieved by this alteration to the courtroom system. As well as this, by the defendant not being able to see the full courtroom, this may go against their view of court legitimacy and they may lose confidence in the court system. Therefore, defendants appearing in court via video link may not think that justice has been achieved because it contradicts their own moral and ethical code that they should be able to see the face of everyone in the courtroom that is making decisions on the outcome of the process (Jacobson and Hunter, 2015: 12).

In a contrasting light, there are arguments in favour for the digitisation of court services that have been encouraged by neoliberal ideals. Firstly, it could be argued that by adapting the court and all those who work for the system to adjust to a business management mindset, people are encouraged to work to deadlines, improve 'success rates' and manage cost efficiency in court. This idea comes from the 'New Public Management' systemisation of criminal justice, including court services, to be managed in an efficient fashion as a way of maintaining a 'streamlined' court system and keep control over pressures of the number of cases that come to court (Cox, 2019: 34). Although this idea of efficiency and neoliberal ideals has previously been suggested as a criticism, a recent assessment of the Crown Prosecution Service's performance lead HM Chief Inspector of the Crown Prosecution Service to conclude that 'dealing with hard copy media is still an issue, impacting on effective case progression', thus indicating that digitising the court system and service leads to greater progression and therefore it is with hope that this leads to the achievement of justice (HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, 2018: 12). Therefore, although Ward (2015) and Gibbs (2017) found the business management-style of the courts to be detrimental to the system, the comments made by HM Chief Inspector of the Crown Prosecution Service saw this alteration as having positive consequences in the courts.

Furthermore, another advantage to digitising the court service is that the traditional structure of persons in a courtroom may have discouraged victims from coming forward in the past due to intimidation and the processes involved such as having to be in the same room as the defendant and being asked intense questions which could bring back traumatic memories. However, due to video links to courtrooms, victims can now be seated in a separate room and be present in the courtroom process virtually. This might encourage more victims to come forward and receive justice for what has happened to them as the process is less intimidating. It could be argued that justice may be achieved in this way because if witnesses and victims feel comfortable enough to come forward and participate in a court service, then justice will be able to be carried out as prosecution will have enough evidence to go forward with their case against that of the defendant and their legal aid.

Digitising court services can be beneficial for people living with anxiety and mental health issues, not only victims giving evidence but also other members of the courtroom who may have to cope with such issues. For example, Beidel at al. (2014: 912), on their research into social skills training, described a lawyer with social anxiety disorder who avoided appearing in court for a fear that he would be unable to speak or that he would stumble in his speech

which lead him to believe that his supervisor would fire him for ‘incompetence’. Therefore, for those in society that suffer with mental health issues such as anxiety, provisions of digital court appearances could be put in place in circumstances such as the one mentioned above. At present, transforming the court service so that those working *for* the criminal justice system can have their mental health needs met seems quite a far stretch, as it is usually a priority for the criminal justice system that the needs of the public are met first (Davies, 2015: 27). However, it might be something which can be made more available for everyone in years to come with enough financial and policy support. Fundamentally, addressing the reality of anxiety and public performance by digitising court services could help achieve justice because it relieves the pressure on those involved in the courtroom (such as the victim, defendant and legal aid) and enables them to present themselves in a more comfortable manner, therefore ensuring that they are better positioned to say all they want to say and that the correct steps are taken towards procedural due process. This goes again with the idea that if people feel like they are sufficiently being looked after by the criminal justice system, they are encouraged to enhance their performance.

Lastly, the digitisation of court services can be said to reduce security risks and the potential harm to prisoners and the public (GOV.UK., 2019). For example, high profile cases with immense media attention might mean that members of the public become violent outside court when they see the accused enter the building. For the safety of the accused and their legal aid, appearing in court via a video link is perhaps the appropriate option. This could be said to be the reason why Maurice Robinson, the individual recently in court in relation to the Essex lorry deaths, appeared in Chelmsford Magistrates’ Court via a video link while he was held in remand in custody in the court (BBC News, 2019). In this very recent case, in which thirty-nine people were found dead in the back of the refrigerated lorry Mr Robinson was driving, the whole world has been in shock and upset over such a horrendous tragedy. On the day of his first appearance in court, there were many cameras, news reporters and members of the public gathered outside of Chelmsford Magistrates’ Court, all hoping to get a glimpse of Mr Robinson. For this reason, perhaps his video link appearance was for his own safety. Additionally, because thirty-nine families are desperate for justice and there is now a large-scale investigation into a wider criminal network, Mr Robinson’s appearance in court via video link is potentially keeping in line with the court system’s motive for efficiency in the process and being the least time-consuming journey towards justice.

In conclusion, the advantages and disadvantages presented by the official government website ‘GOV.UK’ give the most balanced evidence to the various arguments from both sides on whether digitising court services will achieve justice, especially through procedural due process as mentioned by Ward (2014: 345). It is important to add that on this website report, it is written that there is insufficient evidence that digitising court trials and sentencing procedures impacts justice, but perhaps as digitising the criminal justice system advances, more evidence on the matter might become apparent. However, there are reports such as that from Gibbs (2017) which give evidence from criminal justice workers (barristers, police officers etc.) that the digitisation of court service reform has so far been unsuccessful (Gibbs, 2017: 33). On the other hand, it is important to bring to light that more institutions and

organisations are considering mental health issues and the changes made to the court service seem to respect that, particularly the digitisation of court services. Therefore, even though the various arguments presented in this essay indicate that the disadvantages of digitising court services outweigh the contrasting advantages, it can be agreed that video links are paving the way towards better support for issues of mental health and court appearances, especially with victims of crime. However, it cannot be ignored that creating 'virtual courts' to manage the high numbers of cases that reach court has led to a 'conveyor belt justice' as explained by Gibbs (2017). What is more, The Guardian recently published an article that the £1.2 billion programme is failing to take into the account the experience of court users (Bowcott, 2019), suggesting that the government could be overlooking empirical evidence of court services and instead is money-driven in their motive. The overall evidence found by Gibbs (2017) points towards larger structural problems linked to New Public Management and attempts to save money have resulted in inadequate performances within the court service. Thus, the legitimacy of the courts has been questioned by defendants and many have felt that justice cannot be achieved by the process of digitising court services.

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What are the core benefits and disadvantages of the privatisation of probation?

Ellie Symonds

In order to answer the question ‘what are the core benefits and disadvantages of the privatisation of probation’, probation must first be defined and a brief history provided, which will detail how probation in the United Kingdom has progressed from a public government-funded service, to being privatised and therefore funded by private agencies. This will then segue into discussing the distinct benefits and disadvantages of the privatisation of probation, focusing on the reasoning behind the privatisation, the effectiveness of it, how profit interferes, and staff perceptions. Probation is a court-ordered period of correctional community supervision, which is generally viewed as an alternative to incarceration (Maruschak and Parks, 2014: 1-2). There are over 250,000 people under the supervision of the probation services at any one time in the United Kingdom, meaning it is an area of high importance within crime-control (Ministry of Justice, 2019: 3).

Probation has origins in 19th century America with John Augustus who is viewed as the father of probation for criminal offenders. In 1841, Augustus spotted a ‘drunkard’ about to be tried in court, and intervened stating that he would reform the gentleman, making him take a ‘pledge’ on the spot to never drink alcohol again (Panzarella, 2002: 39). Augustus returned to court a month later as promised with the gentleman, who appeared rehabilitated, thus the judge imposed a token sentence of a one-cent fine and court costs (Ibid; 39). Augustus (1972: 98) reported that societies would be more successful in reforming drunkards if they ‘should visit the abode of the drunkard [and] more frequently visit the families of drunkards’. This, therefore, laid the precedent for the development of probation, as it demonstrated its value as a humanistic treatment, and the involvement of a form of supervision over an individual who has committed a crime. The first official probation statute originated in Massachusetts, United States, shortly after Augustus’ death in 1878, and focused on the individualised rehabilitation of convicted persons (Carter, 1962: 43).

In regard to probation services in England and Wales, the Probation of Offenders Act (1907) stated that a person could be released ‘on probation’ after the court had had regard to his character, antecedents, age, health, or mental condition (Gard, 2007: 943). More recently, in 2000, the National Probation Service was established in England and Wales, which was a statutory criminal justice service responsible for the supervision of offenders within the community (Tangen and Briah, 2018:136). The probation practise in England and Wales has changed dramatically over the past century in response to changing political and policy demands, as well as fluctuations in crime patterns and sentencing policies (Deering and Feilzer, 2017: 158). However, potentially, the most profound change in probation services came from the coalition government’s ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’ reforms, which led to the restructuring of probation services in England and Wales in 2014 (Millings and Burke,

2018: 61; Robinson et al., 2016: 161). The reforms were suggested in an effort to 'free up' funding in order to enhance and extend rehabilitation services (Ministry of Justice, 2013a: 3). It was stated that protecting the public was at the heart of the proposed reforms, and that this would be achieved through improved probation services which would result in a reduction in reoffending (Ibid: 20). Furthermore, the intention of the reforms was that they would be underpinned by 'more robust commissioning mechanisms that focused on the outcomes achieved' (Burke, 2016: 118). This reconfiguration of the probation service resulted in the split of the probation practise into two new organisations: a public-sector National Probation Service (NPS), and 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs), which are essentially private-sector providers of probation services (Deering and Feilzer, 2017: 158). The NPS had the responsibility for the work involving high-risk offenders, whereas the CRCs were tasked with managing medium and low-risk offenders (Robinson et al, 2016: 162). To allow for a range of organisations to bid to deliver probation services, the CRCs were selected from a competition-style process (Ministry of Justice, 2013: 3). The Ministry of Justice (2013b: 20) stated that the proposed NPS would improve by carrying out risk assessments of offenders in order to identify and manage high-risk offenders (and subsequently allow the CRCs to manage the medium and low-risk offenders) thus protecting the public in the process.

An initial disadvantage in regard to the privatisation of probation is that there were concerns raised from actual probation staff. Very little media attention was paid to the reforms, which were particularly controversial amongst probation staff and probation academics (Deering and Feilzer, 2019: 17). The proposals drew opposition from the National Association of Probation Officers (NAPO), who stated that they were 'baffled' by the plans to privatise probation, as in October 2011 the 'probation service was awarded the British Quality Foundation's Gold Medal for Excellence' (Fletcher, as cited in Fitzgibbon and Lea, 2014: 25). Furthermore, Fletcher (2013) notes how, in 2012, the probation service met, or exceeded, *all* of the Ministry of Justice's set targets, provoking a sense of confusion at the time regarding the sudden shift to privatisation. NAPO attempted to bring the issue to public attention, starting campaigns to attempt to 'keep probation public', which involved taking strike action, and seeking judicial review; however, this was to no avail (Robinson et al., 2017: 147-148).

In regard to the financial implications of the privatisation of probation, the effects of the 2007-2008 global financial crash meant that austerity measures were pursued as an effort to reduce public expenditure through a variety of methods, including the privatisation of public services. For around 7 years after the 'crash', the probation service successfully avoided privatisation and continued to adapt to changing political and punitive demands (Senior et al., 2007). However, the introduction of the 'Transforming Rehabilitation' reforms shifted this focus, resulting in immediate concerns regarding the privatisation of probation, with the main concern regarding the ethics of private companies essentially profiting from crime (Deering and Feilzer, 2017: 159). As the provision of probation services was opened up to a variety of providers, a key proposed change outlined in the reforms was that it introduced innovative new payment mechanisms to incentivise a focus on reducing reoffending (Ministry of Justice, 2013b: 25). This essentially meant that providers must demonstrate a significant decrease in

reoffending, and therefore operate with a system of ‘payment by results’ (PbR) (Fitzgibbon and Lea, 2014: 25-33). For the providers to be ‘fully rewarded’, they must ‘achieve both an agreed reduction in the number of offenders who go on to commit further offences, and a reduction in the number of further offences committed by the cohort of offenders for which they are responsible’ (Ministry of Justice, 2013b: 15). Therefore, there may be an incentive for private providers to *not* report breaches and re-offending that occurs, as this may incur delays or penalties in their ‘PbR’ payments (Fitzgibbon and Lea, 2014: 33). This could consequently have implications in regard to the achievement of justice for individuals as it would not consider the protection of potential future victims (Smith and Vanstone, 2002: 818). For this reason, this might mean that the privatisation of probation may have a negative effect, as the main focus may be centred on financial profits, rather than on the rehabilitation of the offender.

A further disadvantage of the privatisation of probation linked to the ‘PbR’ scheme is that it may discourage knowledge-sharing of what truly works in helping to reduce reoffending and therefore maintaining desistance (Sodha, 2013). Data from the *‘Works Programme’* details how there is a high level of variance in the performances of different private probation providers; therefore, a key question in this debate is: what are some providers doing to reduce reoffending that is more effective than the others? As the focus may be on profit, providers are likely to be over-protective of their methods and less likely to share them, as there is somewhat of a commercial interest in them. This is obviously a major disadvantage of the privatisation of probation, as there is a tension between profit and the public interest. Walker et al (2019: 7) state that the assumption that the privatisation of public services and the introduction of competition lead to an improvement of quality and to a reduction of costs, and that this means that quality will be improved and costs reduced, is a neoliberal ideology which essentially encourages non-market institutions to function in market-like ways. As probation has shifted from a public service to one predominantly in the private sector, it has shifted from ‘a people-orientated service into one of commodities and products that can be competed for in the market-place’ (Whitehead, 2010: 89). This increasing marketisation through the privatisation of public services such as probation detail a distinct disadvantage as private companies may attempt to undercut each other in order to secure payments (Harper, 2013: 39).

An additional disadvantage of the privatisation of probation is how there was a lack of planning and foresight before the actual privatisation took place. Before the reforms were rolled-out, the Coalition Government of the time held two pilot studies; however, did not wait for their completion before proceeding with the full changes, which has since been acknowledged as a ‘mistake’ (House of Commons, 2018). The Ministry therefore ‘set itself up to fail’ in regard to how it approached the reforms (National Audit Office, 2019: 10). One of the major issues represented within the reforms has been the high workloads for the CRCs, which has consequently led to ‘shortcuts’ being made. For example, there has been a shift toward more automated services under the CRCs. For instance, Travis (2017) reported how the part-privatisation of probation services led to tens-of-thousands of offenders being supervised by telephone calls instead of face-to-face meetings, reflecting troubling

organisational problems within the private probation providers. This led to concerns over the effectiveness of the privatisation of probation in assisting the rehabilitation of individuals, and thus reducing reoffending as promised in the initial reforms. Robins (2019) discusses about an individual who had just completed three months on home detention curfew detailed how he has worked to be 'in a good place...but no thanks to the probation service'. The individual with whom Robins (2019) was conversing, states that under the terms of his license, he was supposed to meet with his probation officer at least once a week, yet had seen him just three times in three months, demonstrating the inadequacies present within the 'reformed' probation service.

An additional disadvantage in regard to the privatisation of probation is in relation to its impact on staff members. During the restructuring of the probation services in 2014, all of the existing probation staff were to be transferred into either the NPS or the CRCs, and the CRCs were sold through a competitive, complex bidding process in 2014 and 2015 (Robinson et al., 2016: 162). During the bidding process for the CRCs, the prospective buyers' identities were kept hidden, making it a challenging period for existing probation staff who were unaware of who their future employers would be (Robinson et al., 2016: 162). Due to the uncertainty that the workers experienced during this time, Robinson et al. (2016: 161) studied staff identity, and identified a number of troublesome themes, including status anxiety, a concern regarding legitimacy, and a lack of trust. Most troubling of all, it was noted that the staffs' previous identity within the 'honourable profession of probation' was under strain as a result of fears that the private sectors' values may 'taint' the profession (Ibid: 174). It could therefore be viewed that the staff were experiencing ontological insecurity, which refers to the loss of confidence in one's own self-identity (Van Marle and Maruna, 2010: 8). Additionally, Walker et al. (2019: 116-117) detail how 'whistle-blowers' from within the probation sector documented increased caseloads, and organisational pressures that affected the wellbeing of staff. The fact that the staff had such a lack of confidence in the privatisation of probation, and that this had such a major impact on them, shows how the privatisation had a negative effect, and is therefore a disadvantage of the privatisation of probation.

Building on the work of Robinson et al. (2016), Deering and Feilzer (2017: 160) analysed an online survey conducted on probation practitioners in regard to their views of the then-forthcoming division of the National Probation Service. The survey focused primarily on legitimacy, and self-legitimacy, which is 'the extent to which those within an organisation see it as legitimate' (Ibid: 159). It was suggested that the changes imposed as a result of the 'Transforming Rehabilitation' reforms had the potential to affect legitimacy, which Sparks (1994: 16) refers to as 'an issue for every practise of punishment or sanctioning'. Therefore, a 'legitimate organisation' is one that is perceived to be following socially acceptable goals in a socially acceptable manner (Robinson et al, 2017: 140). Legitimacy is an important concept because 'when citizens recognise the legitimacy of an authority they believe that the authority has the right to prescribe and enforce law-abiding behaviour' (Murphy et al., 2015: 4). Questions of legitimacy in regards to the privatised probation services have been raised, and comments by the practitioners in Deering and Feilzer's study include the concern of the

erosion of probation values over time, and a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of private providers delivering probation services in the future (Deering and Feilzer, 2017: 166).

Countering this, the changes made to the probation service obviously have procedural legitimacy and legal validity as the legislation was passed to allow the changes to be made in the first place (Deering and Feilzer, 2017: 160). Furthermore, despite Deering and Feilzer's study on staff identity uncovering many negative themes, positive points were raised in relation to the process of identity reconstruction (Ibid: 171). It is noted that several participants discussed their hopes regarding being liberated from 'desktop computers, from cumbersome data management 'systems', and from National Standards' which governed probation work for the past 20 years (Ibid: 172). Therefore, the reforms appeared to be interpreted as a 'fresh-start' for these participants. Additionally, despite many disadvantages regarding the privatisation of probation being raised, there obviously must have been some problems with the state of probation prior to this, thus leading to its privatisation. The aims of the 'Transforming Rehabilitation' reforms are stated as attempting to drive down the rate of reoffending, and to reform offenders so that they do not go on to commit further crimes (Ministry of Justice, 2013a). However, despite there being an overall 2.5% reduction in reoffending from 2011 to 2017, there was a 22% overall increase in the number of re-offences per re-offender in the same period, thus showing that the reforms' aim to reduce reoffending has been unsuccessful (National Audit Office, 2019: 6).

Until the implementation of the 'Transforming Rehabilitation' reforms in 2014, probation was a public-sector service, rooted from an act of philanthropy in 19th century America. The privatisation of the probation service in England and Wales appeared to confuse many individuals within the sector, and academics alike. Writing two years after the reforms, Burke and Collett (2016: 130) state that 'there are more questions than answers about the efficacy of such a radical reorganisation of probation'. Despite the reforms being suggested under the coalition government in 2013-2014, the problems were recently acknowledged by the current Conservative government, as the Ministry of Justice announced in July 2018 that the CRC contracts would be terminated two years earlier than planned, thus leading to *another* restructuring of the probation services (Deering and Feilzer, 2019: 17). However, in May of 2019 it was announced that probation services were to be renationalised by 2021, just several years after they were privatised, again reflecting the dramatic fluctuations in probation's history (Grierson, 2019). This decision was made following continual criticisms from MPs and former probation officers and specifies that the private sector will still play a role in the provision of probation services, but the core function of probation services will be publicly provided. These dramatic changes in the past two years detail how the privatisation of probation clearly held more disadvantages than benefits, and in somewhat returning to a service similar to which probation used to be run before the reforms, shows that there may not have been any deep-rooted issues in the publicly provided service after all. As detailed in the 'Transforming Rehabilitation' reforms, a key focus in regards to the future of probation services must be to reduce reoffending and to protect the public, but it is probable that the future of probation is uncertain, and that more reformations will be made in the near future.

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“You Press the Button, We Do The Rest”: A sociological approach towards the democratisation of the image

Irene Gomez

‘One day, quite some time ago, I happened on a photograph of Napoleon’s youngest brother, Jerome, taken in 1852. And I realised then, with an amazement I have not been able to lessen since: I am looking at the eyes that looked at the Emperor’, writes R. Barthes as the opening sentence of *Camera Lucida* (Barthes, 1993). With this innocent anecdote at first sight, the French philosopher and literary theorist lightens up some concurrent themes regarding the accessibility and reproduction of pictures. Along these lines, this essay will explore the ways in which the development of photography produced a new ‘democracy of the image’ and their consequent echoes in modern life. In the first section, *The commodification of photography*, I will analyse the success of Kodak in putting technology in the hands of ordinary people through the lens of technology, industrialisation and the politics of representation. Following from that, the section entitled *The implications of a mechanically transcribed truth* will engage with contemporary criticism concerning the ‘aura’ of images in the present avalanche of information and the rise of a new set of skills. In order to illustrate this, this essay will discuss new practices adopted in the world of journalism to match the changing landscape of photography, with a particular focus on the phenomenon known as ‘citizen journalism’. With the goal of providing a sustained and critical argument, this essay will make use of a wide range of sources with a trans-disciplinary perspective.

I. The commodification of photography

Portrait is the dominant genre of photographic practice, with its latest global manifestation: the *selfie*. In Western countries, the face has historically been viewed as the site of expression and character, the reflection of the soul and the self (Negrin, 2002). At every hour of the day, portraits accompany us in our wallets, phones and identification cards, and confirm not only our existence but also our uniqueness as human beings. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that this notion of self-identity linked to the face is the reason why the portrait is profoundly linked to our culture and the sense of individuality. In the nineteenth century, however, the practice of photographic portraiture was limited to aristocratic classes; to have one’s portrait was a luxury which itself conferred social prestige (Tagg, 1988). Working both as a descriptive mechanism of the individual and as a solid inscription of a social status, as J. Tagg states in *A Democracy of the Image: Photographic Portraiture and Commodity Production*, the photographic portraiture was a powerful expression of aristocratic classes (Tagg, 1988). The conventions of display and body arrangement of aristocratic portraits depended entirely on the limitations of cameras at that time: the person had to sit for twenty minutes in a room full of light without making any movement, which resulted in very static and reasonably serious portraits of the British upper classes. From the 1830s onwards, the innovations in chemistry and optics improved the conditions of the photographic practice and

hence created a growing demand for cheaper and affordable portraits by rising middle and lower-middle classes. It was at this particular moment when the United Statesian entrepreneur George Eastman played a key role in approximating for ordinary people, something that had been for centuries a privilege of the wealthy minorities.

Perhaps one of the most celebrated moments in the history of photography is Eastman's Kodak, first launched in 1888, which was the turning point to a new era: the 'democracy of the image'. With his purpose to dominate the world of photographic trade, as he stated, 'the manifest destiny of the Eastman Kodak Company is to be the largest manufacturer of photographic materials in the world', he decided to introduce his product to the wider general public (Taylor, 1994). Aiming his box cameras at a mass market centered on middle and lower-class families, the purpose of Eastman's film and cameras was to reach amateurs. According to J. Taylor, Kodak's target audience were 'the inexpert amateurs who wanted nothing to do with the technical side of photography, and who could be persuaded to engage with it as practitioners only if they found it affordable and effortless' (Taylor, 1994: 136). Eastman's company was certainly the major actor in bringing the practice of photography closer to the lower classes due to the fact that they put the possibility of producing images in the hands of ordinary people. What had long been a marginal activity, limited only to a certain elite, was now an experience available to all segments of society. However, the equation that put Kodak as the leading company in democratising the world of photography does not solely lie in their approach to a new clientèle but it is intimately linked to the mechanised process of production.

Under the slogan 'you press the button, we do the rest', Eastman re-defined the boundaries of photographic practice where the relationship between the object and the consumer switched in multiple ways. Placed 'conveniently out of sight', Holland says that Kodak's crucial move was the separation of the photographer from the knowledge process of the stages involved in the making of an image (Holland, 2015). Along these lines of thought, the British sociologist D. Slater argues that 'by making the process opaque, one makes the practice transparent, if not visible: it requires no thought to operate' (Slater, 1983: 251). The basis and success of Eastman's brand laid in the simplicity of taking a photo, which was reduced to just clicking a button, and the reliability of the process behind the scenes. So, in essence, it is imperative to examine Kodak's success as the pioneer example of a mass production company aimed at a mass market; the 'democracy of the image' needs to be understood hand in hand with the industrialisation of photography.

In addition, the role of advertising must be taken into consideration when examining the process of standardising the exercise of photography. The association of snapshot photography with the celebration of leisure and consumption of middle and lower-middle class families was the central axis of Kodak's widespread advertising campaigns, according to M. Lister (Lister, 2015). In *Photography: A Critical Introduction*, the author notes that this association was vital in integrating photography into the quotidian rhythms of everyday life and social relations (Lister, 2015). At the heart of this, the democratic potential of putting power in the hands of ordinary people opens a new front in the discussion concerning the

politics of representation. Kodak promised access to create memories and, in such a way, consequently the company opened the path for lower classes to situate themselves in history. As active participators of recording and documenting their lives, these classes gained the capacity to represent themselves to themselves and to others through acts of recognition, which had an impact on a national scale. J. Taylor, the author of *A Dream of England: Landscape, Photography and the Tourist's Imagination*, says that Kodak showed its costumers how to 'enjoy a deep, horizontal comradeship with other Britons, and link themselves to historical time' (Taylor, 1994: 20). Nonetheless, it would be naïve to attribute all these progressive social changes to Eastman's company without taking into account the context in which these developed. With a critical eye, J. Taylor examines this increasing sentimental attachment to the home life as a refuge from military life, given the fact the First World War broke-up families (Taylor, 1994). During this period, he also points out the fact that outdoor photography was largely forbidden for safety reasons, so domestic snapshots became more popular as a response of these constraints (Taylor, 1994). In conclusion, he claims 'family life became the focus for rebuilding the unity and sense of purpose of the nation' (Taylor, 1994: 121). So, finally, it is crucial to situate the developments of photography in its specific context so as to comprehend its multiple layers both in industrial and domestic terms.

II. The implications of a mechanically transcribed truth

Images stand for reality and become the signs of experience and the self; by translating our realities into images, all experiences become democratised. In modern life, the implications of the 'mechanically transcribed truth' (Tagg, 1988: 38) can be articulated in parallel terms: while the saturation of information might challenge the value of images, this also gives rise to the development of new skills to curate the abundance of material.

As W. Benjamin argues in *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, one of the consequences relative to the developments in the technology of reproduction is that it drastically changes the reaction of the masses towards art (in Wells, 2003). Photography is not a sacred ritual anymore, it is now a common ordinary experience. With mechanical reproduction, the democratic promise of photography destroys the uniqueness of a work of art, its 'aura', and dilutes the unicity of its meaning, multiplying and fragmenting their readings at the same time (Berger, 1973). That is, the value of the picture is abolished when photographic practice is not remarkable anymore, when pictures become 'items of passing interest with no residential value', as J. Tagg defines it, 'to be consumed and thrown away' (Tagg, 1988: 56). The anxiety of the shallowness, however, is not particularly new: it was already in the late nineteenth-century when Pictorialists – with little success – invented special techniques to imitate the effects of drawing in a photo in the worry of leveling the spirit down, willing to reestablish its 'aura' (Tagg, 1988). It is difficult not to imagine the diversification of meanings in current times. The reader also plays the role of the author when making sense of a visual record or, as J. Berger writes, 'The way we see things is affected by what we know or what we believe' (Berger, 1973: 8). Fundamentally, therefore, the capacity to reproduce images in a large scale causes a crisis of unity of meaning, provoking an infinite

number of readings which ultimately construct a more plural and thus democratic understanding of reality – or, more accurately, *realities*.

Undoubtedly, images are consumed rapidly in the age of ‘liquid modernity’. Facebook, for instance, claims that 100 million pictures are uploaded daily (in Holland, 2015). As such, there is an urgent need to develop a new set of abilities in order to survive this avalanche of information. Holland argues that the development of photography brings with it ‘a new skill’, that of ‘selecting, framing and achieving’ the content of an image (Holland, 2015: 186). According to the author, deleting images is now an important practice among younger users, who perceive this practice as an exercise of preservation (Holland, 2005). Along these lines, these changes and new practices in curating pictures can also be extrapolated to the landscape of journalism, which has also been drastically altered. With the developments of technology in the digital age, and specifically photography integrated into smart mobile phones, it is feasible for anyone who possesses these types of devices to provide a live-report for a global audience. In the world of journalism, this is materialised in the shape of ‘citizen journalists’. As M. Lister documents in order to exemplify this phenomenon, the first 50 images that reached the mainstream media in the 7/7 London bombings were from people commuting to work (Lister, 2015; Huck, 2005). So, what does this mean? The increasing numbers of people able to participate in the dissemination of information has transformed the dynamics of the newsroom: rather than a one-way communication, the newscycle is now interactive (Briggs, 2016). In *Changing Journalism*, the author argues that the news process is challenged by audience participation, which transforms the traditional relationship and difference between producers and consumers and shifts the power from journalists to the audience (Lee-Wright, 2012). With the latter becoming more and more involved in the process of journalism, some scholars ask themselves what is the distinction between journalism and mere content (Hammond, 2011). In the face of this alteration and the rising questions of the role of institutional journalism in a more connected world, C. Porlezza and S. Russ-Mohl claim that *accuracy* is the deepest difference between professional journalism and lay communication (Porlezza and Russ-Mohl, 2013). ‘There is no such thing as information overload, only filter failure’, says C. Shirky in that way (in Briggs, 2016: 253). User-participation, rather than undermining the role of professional journalists, strengthens the necessity to develop the skills to source and check information in the tsunami of information, as happens with the young mobile phone users that Holland mentions. At the core of journalism, the notion of journalism in a contemporary sense is not just about communicating, but rather the task of the verifying information in a more horizontal panorama where citizens have a participatory role in the creation of information. Thus, the technological developments in photography have not only changed the world of cameras itself but also echoed this onto other fields; the ‘democracy of the image’ has expanded to the ‘democracy of the media’ as well, and forced professionals to adopt new practices to match the new dynamics of the world.

Conclusions

The Oxford Classical Dictionary asserts that the word ‘democracy’ first emerged in the 4th century BC after revolts in Athens that removed absolutism of tyrants from power.

Demokratia, in etymological terms, literally means the rule (*kartos*) of the people (*demos*). In

the Greek ancient notion, one can argue that the development of photography produced a new ‘democracy of the image’ in the late nineteenth century in the sense that photography ceased to be a luxurious activity for the minority and became a practice available for all publics, regardless of class. What had long been a symbol of higher status became an ordinary activity, and Kodak’s industry was the major player in bringing power horizontally to the world of photography. The ‘democracy of the image’ is intimately linked with the force of Kodak adopting an early model of capitalist growth, where the industrialisation of production matched the demands of a mass consumer culture. Kodak’s success incarnates the three giant forces of the contemporary world, according to the categories established by Chambers in *The Metropolitan Experience*: industrialisation, capitalism and urbanization (Chambers, 1988). Along these lines, however, it is critical to consider how the standardisation of photography and the technology of reproduction impacted on the value of images and the subsequent practices of curating material, while paving the way towards a more plural reading and the development of new skills, as the second part of this essay has explored.

Last but not least, the slogan ‘you press the button, we do the rest’ is still very much in force in today’s world. Although it is not in use by Kodak anymore, these rhetorics of no-effort could certainly be the motto of a wide range of companies such as *Amazon* or *Just Eat* – among an infinite number of brands. If you click the button, this incredible hoover will arrive at your front door tomorrow. If you click the button, you will get your favourite takeaway food from the Chinese restaurant located in the town centre in the blink of an eye. It is as easy as that. You press the button, we do the rest.

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What are the core pressures on legal aid and how have they been justified?

Sophie Joyce

Comprehensive criminal legal aid was developed in England and Wales during the 1970s and ensured that those arrested and held in custody were entitled to legal aid. This ensured that defendants were covered within the criminal court by the state subsidising the cost of their defence. Within the past three decades, legal aid has suffered tremendous setbacks in the form of reforms conducted by the government. These recent reforms are based on the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO). LASPO is a piece of legislation which sets out what services are available in the scope of legal aid and the requirements needed to be met to secure legal guidance. Such requirements include an individual needing to prove that they cannot afford to pay for legal costs. Beneficial in aiding those who cannot afford legal services, legal aid ensured that all persons had access and were represented fairly in court. These reforms significantly affect legal aid and create pressures that some services are unable to defend against, therefore leaving England and Wales with bleak prospects in relation to legal aid services. I will be discussing the core effects that governmental cuts have had on legal aid by analysing in depth how funding cuts in particular have resulted in a revision of what is covered within the scope of legal aid. Particularly, how these have dramatically affected those who require the services, with primary focus on how barristers and solicitors have been impacted and the resulting consequences for members of society.

To begin with, the LASPO 2012 reforms concerning legal aid have resulted in a depletion of services around the UK and Wales. Sarah Moore and Alex Newbury discuss the effects of funding cuts to legal aid services. Firstly, examining how recent reforms set out in LASPO 2012 saw the governments' annual spending on legal aid be dramatically reduced from £2.2 billion to £1.6 billion over the period of seven years (2017). Consequently, this saw depletion in solicitors' and barristers' fees and also changed the scope for legal aid provision as multiple areas of law are no longer covered. These areas include family law cases which lack evidence of domestic abuse, child abuse, or child abduction (Moore and Newbury, 2017). The reasoning behind these cuts, according to Tom Smith and Edward Lloyd-Cape, were that legal aid, both civil and criminal, are considered a prime source of savings by the government who were reeling from the 2007-08 global financial crisis (2017). Due to these cuts and re-evaluation of what is covered, entitlement to legal aid becomes limited, and those requiring services may be left without. Thus, legal aid services are thrown into calamity.

Moreover, these reforms have led to negative impacts, especially spatial concerns, as numerous services have been forced to close without the funding from legal aid. For instance, the cumulative effect of these funding cuts has resulted in the dramatic depletion of services available across the UK and Wales. For example, a BBC investigation discovered the

decimation of legal aid by referencing statistics portraying how the reduction of solicitor firms providing legal aid have resulted in 'legal aid deserts' (Gilbert, 2018). These cuts are leaving millions of people without access to legal aid and causing many to travel excessive miles in order to find an available service. For example, A Rights of Women survey discovered that 31.3% of respondents found it difficult to secure a legal aid solicitor, unfortunately having to travel between 5 and 15 miles in order to find one (Shah, 2015). So, legal aid experiences unwanted pressure as solicitors and barristers are without meaningful pay to cover cases of legal aid and many of those who require the services are left without them due to funding reductions, which are more than likely eaten up by other costs elsewhere in the system.

Secondly, funding cuts conducted by the government under the recent reforms within LASPO 2012 have had a detrimental influence on barristers and solicitors. Often, legal aid and duty solicitor work is an important method of firms attracting new clients, as those firms with a duty solicitor contract are able to represent suspects throughout the criminal justice process. Governmental cuts are reducing the amount of firms with duty contracts which in turn restricts new clientele and inhibits firms from remaining as viable businesses and, as stated earlier, reduces the level of choice for suspects and defendants generally (Smith and Lloyd-Cape, 2017). Therefore, reducing firms with duty solicitor contracts has resulted in more barristers and solicitors being unable to retain their jobs. Without the necessary work, much of which comes from representing as legal aid, firms are incapable of remaining sustainable and as mentioned previously, the country suffers mass closure of services and leaves citizens without aid.

Furthermore, many lawyers are left stressed by the current prospects that legal aid has left to offer, as many are deeply unhappy with these reforms imposed on legal aid and are worried for the future of the criminal justice system. They argue that government funding cuts are damaging the fundamental right to legal defence by threatening the 'effectiveness, tarnishing the reputation of our system as a whole, and undermining the rule of law' (Dearden, 2018). Inasmuch, defence lawyers are becoming demoralised in their workplace as they are pressurised to complete work such as reviewing unused prosecution material without remuneration (Dearden, 2018). This leads to excessive pressure on solicitors and barristers as they no longer have the time nor pay to complete such work to a required standard which can be damaging to their firm and clients. In particular, government reforms concerning legal aid have been justified through statements of reducing annual spending, yet have resulted in defence lawyers becoming stretched in their duties and experiencing unwanted pressure to complete them to a standard in which they do not receive the fair remuneration. Continuing these cuts have led to the criminal justice as a whole losing its ability to operate effectively. Thus, cutting back funding may aid the government, yet it is leading the British criminal justice system to question its future.

Carrying on, the reforms to legal aid have increased the amount of defendants representing themselves in court as they are either no longer entitled to receive legal aid or the services around them have shut down. Gibbs and Ratcliffe (2019) conducted research for Transform

Justice into the concerns voiced by the Law Society and other lawyers' representative organisations that the reduction of fees for legally aided criminal work is affecting the availability and quality of representation. They discovered that the Perry and Welch Solicitors firm gave a formal notice that they will no longer be accepting any more criminal legal aid cases due to them being financially unstable (ibid 2019: 13). The firm have explained the reasoning behind their decision as the cuts suffered to the legal aid scheme. Though they strive to, they can no longer provide justice to their clients as any legal aid will have to be subsidised from their own pay and will not meet the standards that they and their clients demand (ibid 2019: 13). This lack of funding has caused numerous firms and services to turn potential clients away or even close entirely as they are no longer capable of funding the representation of those in need (Gilbert, 2018). Consequently, those who are in need of legal services are left without, often representing themselves in the courtroom. An issue that derives from a litigant in person (LiP) is that judges and lawyers are concerned that they are at a disadvantage, yet are unable to help due to a potential conflict of interest. New guidelines from the Law Society, Chartered Institute of Legal Executives, and the Bar Council in 2015 outlined the uneasy tension lawyers can feel when representing one party against a LiP (Moore and Newbury, 2017). Moreover, Gibbs (2016) for Transform Justice discovered that unrepresented defendants often do not understand the criminal legal process. Subsequently, they plead guilty when they would have been advised not to due to a lack of understanding about what they are being charged with and receiving longer sentences because of a lack of knowledge of how to mitigate. Hence, the only solution would be for legally aided lawyers. However, the government is adamant on justifying these cuts as a method of reducing costs in a society reeling from a financial crisis. Yet, when you take into account all the knock-on consequences of these cuts, it is unlikely that the state is gaining the desired savings it wants. As, the Ministry of Justice and Legal Aid Agency suggest that these types of cases are likely to increase costs of financing the courts by an additional £3 million per annum (Moore and Newbury, 2017).

Thirdly, the reforms have had a significant effect on vulnerable and marginalised groups. Mind (2018) conducted research into the impact of reduced legal aid representation on those vulnerable and marginalised groups as they were worried the cuts would have adverse effects. Legal aid is in force to aid those who are the most vulnerable, yet with the current reforms, it appears that even the most defenceless are left to fend for themselves in the court. Often, vulnerable individuals experience their pre-existing conditions worsening due to the stress caused through legal problems. The primary stress stems from a loss of income or financial strain due to many individuals becoming unemployed due to their legal troubles (Mind, 2018). Therefore, these individuals are left uncertain as to whether they will be eligible for aid and with the added pressure of knowing they cannot afford other alternatives due to their employment issues. Similarly, Amnesty International (2016) also conducted a study investigating the harms of the cuts. Offering a more in-depth analysis examining how it is not only those who suffer from mental health who struggle to access legal aid, but also those with learning difficulties; low numeracy and literacy levels; language barriers; alcohol and drug dependencies; and those with medical conditions such as terminal illnesses (Amnesty International, 2016: 43). These factors can impede on an individuals active understanding of

their legal situation and raises serious questions as to what would happen if their only option is to represent themselves in court. For instance, there have been examples where parents with mental health problems, learning difficulties, or other communication difficulties were unable to conduct their own case and were rendered vulnerable (Amnesty International, 2016: 44). Consequently, these individuals are left feeling alone and scared about what they can do concerning their situation. Unfortunately, increased cases are seeing litigants in person who struggle with the criminal justice system. Thus, considering those with further factors which can hinder their ability to cope, there is added pressure in a difficult situation. Overall, upon discovering and examining the various conclusions of how the reforms within LASPO 2012 have significantly altered the opportunities of vulnerable and marginalised groups in receiving legal aid, it is evident that the criminal justice system is lacking in representing everyone fairly and ensuring that individuals have a safety net. Therefore, failing in some of the core foundations it was established upon.

Finally, even with the numerous pressures imposed on legal aid, there are various justifications constructed by the government. For instance, the primary justification is the significant savings made by reducing spending within the legal aid scheme. For example, it has been suggested that reducing the annual spending from £2.2 billion to £1.6 billion from 2009 to 2016 on the basis of reducing expenditure supports the argument that the austerity agenda has deprioritised criminal legal aid (Smith and Lloyd-Cape, 2017). As expected, when a country suffers a financial crisis such as the one the UK experienced between 2007 and 2008, they must actively reduce the 'footprint' on both economic and social policy (Smith and Lloyd-Cape, 2017). Furthermore, the reforms aimed to significantly reduce the legal aid bill by removing and adjusting many parts of what is contained within the legal scope (Mind, 2018). Unfortunately, legal aid was at the forefront of resolving the financial crisis as it was deemed a prime source of savings. Therefore, the service derived during post-war welfarism no longer resembles the model based on the foundations of ensuring all citizens have access to public services (Smith and Lloyd-Cape, 2017). In turn, funding cuts are required for the government to handle the financial crisis, especially when there are services which require the funds more than legal aid. For that reason, it can be noted that the culture of austerity influenced the reduction of legal aid services by significantly inhibiting their funding, yet it was deemed necessary for the halting of the financial crisis and ensuring economic growth.

However, although the government appears capable of justifying their vicious cuts to legal aid, the reforms have unquestionably hindered the integrity of the criminal justice system as a whole. It is with no doubt there is an overall viewpoint which believes that these cuts undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. According to Cook:

confidence in the criminal justice system relies on citizens feeling that they are of equal worth and are treated as such, with dignity and respect: they need to trust that the law, and its implementation, is both just and legitimate (2006: 21).

Without this trust, the system lacks legitimacy and therefore fails to represent everyone fairly and justly. The reforms to legal aid are a prime example of how the government is

unknowingly preventing the criminal justice from representing everyone equally. Moreover, the lack of funding experienced by the legal aid scheme is resulting in excessive pressures for the lawyers and clients. This in turn can and has resulted in further costs on the government, for instance, the additional £3 million per annum spent in financing the courts for cases where the defendant is representing themselves (Moore and Newbury, 2017). Overall, the government manages to justify their actions by promising outcomes that are beneficial for other sectors within society, however, leaving legal aid with an unfortunate result which is extremely uncertain regarding its future. So, is it time to re-evaluate the current state of legal aid, review the scope urgently and provide the amount of funds required to ensure all involved are treated fair and just?

In conclusion, legal aid offers a good-quality legal service to those who cannot afford other legal alternatives with their own resources. Therefore, the reforms implemented in The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 hindered these foundations. Substantial funding cuts have raised unwanted pressures. Barristers and solicitors experienced a reduction in their funding, yet are expected to complete work to a required standard. In turn, this creates unpleasant working environments as defence lawyers are under excessive pressure and scrutiny from the government and society. Not only concerning barristers and solicitors, the reforms led to less work and therefore, a reduction in available services across the UK and Wales which subsequently inhibited those who require legal advice. Then, citizens were left without services and were expected to travel instead. Those without the means to travel and without any legal alternative were abandoned with only one option: to represent themselves in court. Litigants in person resulted in more pressure for the criminal justice system as it caused strain on the courts due to defendants not understanding how the legal system operates. This is a stressful situation for any person, but also detrimental for those with factors influencing their mental health, learning abilities and health in general. Overall, the governmental direction inflicted on legal aid has been one of damaging outcomes, with the primary goal of reducing spending. Without re-evaluation of the legal aid scheme and re-established funding, the criminal justice system in England and Wales will lose its effectiveness and fairness.

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Book Review: on *A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala* by Diane Nelson.

Megane Holl

Anthropologist Diane Nelson paints a colourful and vivid picture of body politics in Quincentennial Guatemala by the means of a thorough ethnography. Each of the nine chapters focuses on a specific topic linked by a common thread: the formations and articulations of ethnic identities emerging with the birth of a democratic and modern nation after years of civil war and military government. These identities are ambiguous and almost never straightforward, seemingly naturally opposing for instance, hence Nelson's interest in exploiting those contradictions and breaking them down. The ethnography's two-part title in itself, and more generally all the chapter titles, are resourceful and give the reader an intriguing yet clear insight into what Nelson is exploring. Indeed, 'un dedo en la llaga' participates in the extended metaphorical depiction of Guatemala as a wounded body, gives a clear image of the context in which the ethnography will be delving and thus creates an intelligible illustration for the less experienced reader. As the second part of the title indicates, this ethnography is about Quincentennial Guatemala, the five-hundred anniversary of Christopher Columbus' arrival in the Americas and the conquest started by this discovery of 1492.

However, much of the book is actually filled with research from Nelson's fieldwork in the 80s and general information from much earlier; the establishment of this much needed timeframe helps the reader understand how Quincentennial Guatemala came to be and the complex political past which still shapes Guatemala. Indeed, Nelson's ethnography was published in 1999, only 20 years of democracy after 150 years of martial government: it is not an easy nor instantaneous feat to change set ways which have prevailed for so long. The imaged body of Guatemala thus represents both its metaphorical condition as a contingent open wound and the physical bodies scarred during the Conquest and displaced or dead during the civil war. To dress that wound, the need for globalisation is put forward and Nelson's ethnography serves as an exploration of the need for a whole, homogenous and functioning modern nation whose struggles are often blamed on 'premodern identities' and the division between ladinos and indigenous populations. Although, one cannot see this division phenotypically¹ anymore due to centuries of mestizaje which have rendered cultural markers primordial as identification markers to tell who is and who is not Indian. Her ethnography is extensive and covers legal aspects, denominations of indigenous populations (and the question surrounding nation, First Nation, territorial rights) and the transnational reliance and implications of those denominations as well as the connections to gender, feminism and hostile markings.

First of all, the construction of a homogenous and whole nation is highly complex in Guatemala due to the various existing stereotypes and ideas surrounding unstable identities

¹ What is an Indian? A ladino with no money. (Nelson, 1999: 231).

such as the negatively identified ladino (*non-Indian*) and the delegitimised empty-headed Indian, both of whom translate anxieties about mestizaje and Mayan empowerment. Diane Nelson's work in such a difficult terrain is complicated even further by her own identity as a gringa anthropologist coming to Guatemala for the first time in 1985 when the political context was unstable and dictatorial. Nelson thought of herself as a researcher and activist in solidarity with the oppressed pueblos, thus giving a partial account. This changed with the perspective of Quincentennial Guatemala: Nelson found her accounts to be partial in the sense of incomplete instead of subjective. The work she was doing had to be reconsidered entirely as she was confronted with heterogeneous pueblos and Mayas' suspiciousness of Nelson's work as a representative and authoritative voice for their culture. This reconsideration is part of the natural process of ethnography and so is Nelson questioning her own identity and including herself in her ethnography: keeping this into the final draft is however part of what makes *A Finger in the Wound* so realistic and approachable.

It may have been hard for Nelson to leave behind her preconceived and clear-cut ideas of being a 'nice gringa' and the pleasure which came from positioning herself as a partial anthropologist against the unjust state but, by questioning her identity, she learned much about the articulation of gringo, maya and ladino identity in Guatemala. She discovered that imaginings of an exotic and ancient Guatemala driving people, including herself, to the country are actually untrue: Maya intellectuals have PhDs, United States culture penetrates remote village (habitants know some Metallica lyric and watch the famous television series *V2*). Indeed, the focus of the book is on the vulnerability of bodies, the metaphorical and physical wounds on bodies. One might think this applies to Mayas only, however, Nelson believes all identities in a country are inter-penetrating, each dependent on the other. Nelson explores the vulnerability of gringos by analysing the lynching of June Weinstock, an environmental activist on vacation, beaten and raped for hours because she was thought to have abducted an indigenous child.

This comes from the rumours surrounding organ and child theft, rumours so potent they caused national hysteria in many Latin American countries. For instance, the vampire-like figures of Kharisiris terrorised many in Bolivia: this fear of theft from whiter people is very real, tangible even because of its power to create panic and because it is based on reality to a certain extent. Even though Nelson, put in a very difficult position, could have easily let rage and anger get the better of her as she describes it in a personal reflection, she attempted to rationalise this incident and came to the conclusion that the indigenous people who beat June Weinstock were not fully responsible, their actions were complex, based on self-defence (Nelson, 1999: 69) from a fear which knows no boundaries³ and rooted in many indigenous peoples' hearts and souls. This lynching served a great purpose to the state because it

² Nelson refers to herself continuously in her ethnography as the Lizard Queen portrayed in *V*, a recurrent image which amuses the readers but also deeply unsettles them: in truth, gringos are assimilated with the aliens coming to take resources of the planet earth in Guatemala.

³ Anthropologist Andrew Canessa's (2012) work in Bolivia confronted him to the very real fear of kharisiris: indigenous people are terrified of organ stealers and baby-snatchers, always white-skinned, which connects race with fear-induced behaviours.

portrayed Indians as savages again which is a good enough justification for the state to oppress them. On the contrary, the attack was a wake-up call for Nelson: she learned that the pueblo she was in solidarity with is no longer all benevolent, is in the image of cross-cultured humanity, asymmetrically gendered, heterogenous and can be violent. So, even though anthropology is sometimes perceived as the handmaiden of colonialism by natives (and it is a valid opinion), June's wounded body and the tensions from Guatemala's historical past emerge and create a sense of vulnerability among formerly all-powerful gringos, such as Nelson, who deeply question their position as anthropologist, white - and female in Nelson's ethnography.

Nelson uses a wide range of ethnographic methods in *A Finger in the Wound* such as conducting partial fieldwork and being in solidarity with the Guatemalan pueblos as seen above. Again, this is a personal approach which is completed by a political and theoretical overview of the state, from the military dictatorship to the rise of a democratic, civilian government and their various policies regarding indigenous populations. Nelson focuses on culture as the bandage which is used to repair Guatemala's wounded body and identifies the state as a fetish-like entity of its own, also represented by a metaphorical piñata. Nelson's thorough work of research and interviews mentions several government regulations used to assimilate indigenous populations into a national project; in other words, to ladinoize the population and create a homogenous pueblo. Here are a few ways the government attempted to do start this process of ladinoization: the military dictatorship of the 70s and 80s used army recruitment (sometimes forced, sometimes much desired) to get Indians out of their communities and used racism as a way to both ladinoize and masculinise soldiers by ridding them of their indigenous identity. The army does so because they cannot kill off the entirety of the indigenous population, so they kill what is Indian and leave the bodies (Nelson, 1999: 91).

This idea is omnipresent in Nelson's ethnography: Indian bodies are *useful* to the state for physical labour (Nelson, 1999: 348) and in terms of ideology. The desire to leave one's village comes from the fact that Mayan identification is highly community-bound and, beyond the economic issues, another dangerous double-bind about the incarceration of Indian-ness is put forward by Nelson: once an Indian gets out of his village, he starts the process of ladinoization, and his own village rejects him. Some genuinely want to leave behind their identity because it is associated with backwardness and poverty, so they change their clothes, name and even food intake by any means possible: leaving for the city, leaving with the army, etc... This would mean that authentic indigenous identity is tied to being traditional, community-bound, rural, poor and without any access to modernity which in turns defines ladino identity as the exact opposite. So, is authentic indigenous identity lost? Culture is a product of history and so, as Nelson points out sarcastically, proof of authentic indian-ness does not come from a 'Jurassic park-like' (Nelson, 1999: 134) reincarnation of Tecún Umán.

Additionally, the reality is that even though it seems incongruous, the primitive-modern divide is a fantasy and science-fiction and Mayan hackers' reprogramming work are

potentially helping us articulate the inter-penetration of boundaries and help anthropological work. Indeed, it is a resistance against the stereotypical ahistorical vision of both Guatemala and indigenous populations as somehow retrograde in the world and in their own country. So, the cyberspace and science-fiction metaphors counter ethnonostalgia and modernity as the antidote to archaism. As mentioned above, the army is not only violent but also relies on ideological apparatuses which Nelson calls hostile markings⁴ to both incite indigenous populations to ladinoize willingly and to assimilate them to a national project. Paradoxically, ladinos are in need of indigenous populations in order to bandage their wounds but associate a successful state with modernity and getting rid of the traditional culture to which they do not identify: they both require ladinoization and need traditional indigenous cultures which may take the form of the *mujer maya*.

The Serrano civilian government, on the other hand, does not know how to address the ethnic question and is as lost as the children of La Llorona and ‘caught with their pants down’ (Nelson, 1999: 103). To help the nation is about negating the notion of a homogenous national culture and replacing it with an understanding of Guatemala as a multicultural country whose unity rests upon ethnic multiplicity. Culture thus becomes instrumental, something to be used, because it gives a good image of the country and becomes the first source of income for Guatemala with the rise of the tourism industry. Ladinos view Mayan culture with contempt, believing they are ‘tourists in their own country’ or profound ignorance: Nelson quotes a ladino friend of hers who does not know that there are separate traje for different ethnic groups, implying he puts all Indians in the same basket. As stated above, this is deeply contradictory because on the one hand, ladinos want a modern nation but on the other, they desperately need traditional culture as a link to a golden age to attract tourists. Many other examples in Nelson’s ethnography fuel those remnants of racist ideas which are not seen as such by ladinos who believe they are being benevolent. So, the state still struggles to show how vitally important culture is to those who are worried of a race war and believe the Mayas are already fully integrated and that any special treatment would be discriminatory to others.

In both cases, Nelson encountered lots of people whose opinions varied, and she warns us readers of the dangers of categorising and stereotyping in Manichaeans ways. As she points out, culture is often the chosen culpable for all ills a nation may be facing hence why indigenous people often take the blame for Guatemala’s poverty. State fetishism may thus magically carry the dream that the state, representing modernity, and culture can work together in Quincentennial Guatemala to better the nation. In order to do so, Mayan activists step in: one of their goals is to renew pride in indigenous identity. Indeed, a lack of indian representation caused the erasure of the Maya, except when they are in positions of servitude which is a pejorative depiction which does not make people want to embrace their indigenous identities as it is such a derogative image. Mayan activists are not alone in their endeavours, indeed, the state in 1990 has validated support to indigenous communities in the form of the

⁴ Religion (Catholicism to rid Indians of their beliefs), clothing to homogenise the population and degrade the image of regalia and language so that indigenous dialects disappear.

legalisation of the Guatemalan Mayan Language Academy or ALMG (Nelson, 1999: 153), institution promoting salvaging and diffusion knowledge of the Mayan cultures and languages as those are the only positive identity markers still available to indigenous populations.

Thanks to the birth of Quincentennial Guatemala, Mayas and other indigenous communities in Guatemala are appropriating tradition and transform culture into power which is deeply unsettling for ladinos. Quincentennial Guatemala shows how dependent modernity is of tradition, how ladino identity used to be solid, modern and civilised whereas Indian identity was fixed, bound to rural areas or bound for ladinoization: positions which are no longer valid starting from 1992. The convention 169 from the International Labour Organisation also helped indigenous populations articulate their relation to territory and their specific status within a state as different in terms of cultural, economic, social positions and descendants from Pre-Conquest people whose presence unsettles some ladinos afraid of the creation of autonomous indigenous territory. As of 1999, there was no commonly accepted contemporary international law definition of Indians and as of yet, none has been determined internationally although some statutes⁶ have been passed: this is not necessarily causing prejudice as identifications are fluid and interdependent, they are formed through articulations and interactions with the Other.

Much of Nelson's ethnography is also about gender, a topic which is both difficult and important to explore for Nelson, as a feminist, white, female anthropologist. Her conception of feminism was challenged by many things, including one Mayan woman telling Nelson she is Maya before she is a woman and sees feminism as western imperialism. So, Nelson's ethnography is also exploring gender and its articulation in regard to the indigenous population in Guatemala in the metaphorical form of the traje which helps us understand and gender the ethnic-national identity. Nelson makes it clear that it is women who continue to wear the traje consistently and are the majority of monolingual Mayan speakers whereas only a few men in villages wear it and so, culture and the money brought by tourism are incarnated by the *mujer maya* in the highlands as it is her who passively carries the weight of tradition and actively guards the national culture at the same time.

Another traditional aspect of indigenous life is the making of tortillas, a tedious hours-long process manually. A leader of the ALMG told Nelson that a woman is not a woman unless she makes tortillas and that his wife would be ashamed and lose the dignity of being a woman if she did not make tortillas. This proves that there is a sense of incarceration of the Mayan woman within traditional boundaries and some instance of misogyny. Men would not bake tortillas nor wear traje and so, wearing regalia is feminised and indian-ness is gendered as female. The *mujer maya* is also rarely depicted talking and writing but always cooking or

⁵ The first mention of the word 'indigenous' in United Nation discourse was in 2002.

⁶ INDIAN TRIBAL JUSTICE TECHNICAL AND LEGAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2000, 2000 Enacted S. 1508, 106 Enacted S. 1508, 114 Stat. 2778, 106 P.L. 559, 2000 Enacted S. 1508, 106 Enacted S. 1508. This bill was passed in the United States of America and recognises Native American territories (in the form of reservations) in 2000.

with a child which channels sexuality into reproduction: having children is what makes indigenous women legitimate. Even when Mayan women are described as throwing themselves at ladino men, their sexuality is still channelled into reproduction: ladino men need to believe this fantasy of Mayan women enticing them in order to rape them and whiten the nation with a mestizo child.

Nelson however repeatedly uses the example of Rigoberta Menchú, indigenous woman who won the Nobel Prize in 1992 in order to counteract those ideas. Indeed, Menchú, wearing traditional clothing in her everyday life, has chosen to remain childless⁷, talks to an international audience and writes which is transgressive of the idea of traditional Mayan womanhood and instigates profound anxieties in ladino men, suddenly confronted to a phallic Mayan woman wielding 'their' powers (literacy and rhetoric) and being better at it. Rigoberta Menchú is both an example to follow for Mayan women seeking emancipation and also a living demonstration of the fluidity of the ethnic, gendered and national borders. She is also rejected by some ladinos: mestizaje is not integration but sublation in her opinion and she supports the unification of the Mayan people, their strength, homogeneity and flourishing, everything the ladinos are not. One way of coping with her international renown is through macabre humour, something Guatemalans seem quite famous for: it is how they deal with Rigoberta, a woman in traje, winning the Nobel prize. Jokes are a way to deflect and recode events which gives structure to anxiety and is thus both reassuring and bond-forming for ladinos telling each other jokes excluding Indians and ladino or Mayan males telling jokes excluding women. Jokes are vital in Guatemala: it is the 'only way to deal with this terrible situation' (Nelson, 1999: 174), meaning the metaphorical wound around ethnicity and the political situation. An issue to be raised with the use of women as prosthetic to cure the wound of the nation is that it works for activists and for the image of the nation but not necessarily the women themselves. Even after the civil war ended, males expressed their anxiety of living in a world in which women are able to gain utility and validation through jokes (Nelson, 1999: 272): women finally walk ahead of men but only because there may be leftover land mines from the war. Many Mayan women cannot get rid of the pressure to remain free of modernity or to choose between their desires to either have a family or a career as not all of them are able to win a Nobel Prize and earn their freedom.

To conclude, what is striking in this ethnography is the interwoven authorial voice present nearly everywhere and the relevance of the theoretical research. Diane Nelson has spent years in the field; the reader can tell she knows Guatemala, yet she writes with no arrogance or pretentious behaviour. Her preconceived ideas about Guatemalan traditionalism were quickly overturned as she was greeted by children in Nebaj who called her the Lizard Queen: this first shock made Nelson realise there are no boundaries preventing modernity and pop culture from influencing tribes lost in highlands or remote locations and that they are not living in a bubble preserved from the consequences of history which has deeply and positively affected her work. Originating from the United States, her perspective of racism in Guatemala might

⁷ Rigoberta did eventually marry and have a child which in no way lessens her or her beliefs: femininity and feminism express themselves in various ways, all of them personal to each.

has been affected by her own subconscious bias due to an upbringing in the US however, she rapidly let herself be open to discourses which may have been challenging personally and innovated the work of the anthropologist as a scientific but also a human being whose identity and articulations are just as fluid as her informants and research subjects. Even though Nelson's work very much focuses and revolves around fellow activists and ALMG members, she managed to illustrate her arguments with examples from the field and quotes from indigenous people, including Rigoberta. She leaves no member of the pueblo behind and communicates with them instead of treating them as a research subject incapable of having a discourse of their own or interpretations of their identity. This refreshing insight into a country's convalescence is well-written, sarcastic and makes one almost familiar with the author, reading in her voice, imagining her typing up her field notes.

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Report on the association between attitudes towards social welfare and gender

Morgane Sabatini

Studies suggest that there are differences in attitudes towards social welfare between men and women. Women seem to rely more on support from the government than men do. According to Lewis (1998), women seem to accord more importance to social welfare problems than men, specifically when touching individuals in need, or making use of the welfare system, for instance. Therefore, in this paper, I will ask *if there is an association between attitudes towards social welfare and gender?*

Before conducting any data analysis, several hypotheses arose from what I expected from the results:

- H1: Men are less supportive than women when it comes to social welfare.
- H2: Socioeconomic components, such as income, impact the association between attitudes towards social welfare and gender.
- H3: The impact of income on attitudes towards social welfare will be stronger for individuals coming from the ethnic majority (White) than for individuals from an ethnic minority.

In order to conduct my data analysis, results will be analysed from statistical tests carried out in IBM SPSS Statistics 25, by analysing the data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 2010. This specific wave of the Survey focuses on topics such as attitudes towards education and welfare. To carry out the survey, a questionnaire was used, with a self-completion part and an administered part. The wave of the survey used in this data analysis contains the attitudes of 3297 participants selected using a random sampling method, and a dataset comprising 878 variables in total.

As different variables seemed to be covering the topic of social welfare, an outcome variable was created manually by using the cumulative effect of four different variables from the dataset to be used as a dependent variable. This manually created variable was named 'social welfare attitudes', or 'SWAT'. The four variables used all have questions and results that seem to touch on the issue of social welfare towards the ones in need, which is what this paper primarily examines. All four variables are measured on the same five-point Likert Scale, making them all continuous interval variables that can be cumulated together. All variables were coded as follows:

1. 'Agree Strongly'
2. 'Agree'
3. 'Neither Agree nor Disagree'
4. 'Disagree'
5. 'Disagree Strongly'

Consequently, all variables with low numbers represent a negative attitude towards social welfare, while the high numbers suggest a more positive attitude. This coding was maintained as it was in complete accordance with the objectives of the data analysis. The four cumulated variables are:

1. *WelfHelp*: stating that ‘the welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other’.
2. *SocHelp*: stating that ‘many people who get social security do not really deserve help’.
3. *DoleFidl*: stating that ‘most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another’.
4. *WelfFeet*: stating that ‘if welfare benefits were not so generous, people would learn how to stand on own feet’.


These four variables seem to measure one unique aspect of individuals’ attitudes towards social welfare. However, before making the dependent variable by cumulating the four variables listed above, it is crucial to see if there is a correlation between these variables. If so, it is necessary to then do a factor analysis so as to ensure that they all cover a broad enough dimension related to attitudes and to reduce the variables into a fewer number of dimensions.

Table 1: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of the Four Variables.

	The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other	Many people who get social security don’t really deserve any help	Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another	If welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their feet
The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other	1.000	0.517	0.473	0.536
Many people who get social security don’t really deserve any help	0.517	1.000	0.667	0.646
Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another	0.473	0.667	1.000	0.669
If welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their feet	0.536	0.646	0.669	1.000

Looking at Table 1, the variables all seem to be correlating positively. Indeed, correlations fluctuated from 0.473 to 0.669, which are moderate and strong correlation scores. The existence of such positive correlation then allowed the running of a factor analysis.

Figure 1: Scree plot of the model



According to the result of the factor analysis that was run above, my expectations are supported and Table 2 reveals that there is only one underlying factor behind four analysed items. Looking at Table 2, it is clear that all variables have especially high factors fluctuating from 0.635 to 0.831. As a result, it is not necessary to rotate the factor solution as the interpretation of this specific structure is simple enough, allowing us to see the shared underscoring dimensions of the variables, that all loaded well with one unique concept. The results also show an eigenvalue score of 2.761, showing how much of the variance between the variables was explained by the explanatory factor analysis.


Table 2: Factor Analysis Results Summary

Variable names	Factor
“The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other?”	0.635
“Many people who get social security don’t really deserve any help?”	0.819
“Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another?”	0.810
“If welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on own feet?”	0.831
% of variance explained	60.523
Eigenvalues	2.761
Cronbach’s Alpha	0.849

Furthermore, even though certain factors seem to have been extracted, according to Table 2, only one factor has eigenvalues superior to 1, meaning that this factor was saved, as other factors with low eigenvalues were not meaningful and therefore were not used in our model and scree plot (Figure 1). 60.5% of the cumulative percentage of variance is accounted for by that factor. In addition, the Cronbach’s Alpha for the four variables is of 85%, which suggests that the items have relatively high internal consistency and are hence dependable enough to be used as scale. With the results of explanatory factor analysis conducted above, it is thus appropriate to create a new summated scale using the four items, and thus, the new variable ‘SWAT’ was created to be used as a dependent variable in my subsequent model. Figure 2 is a histogram of the computed variable’s frequency distribution, which relatively follows a normal distribution, aside from the small number of people who seem to have chosen the

most extreme responses in every question. Therefore, Figure 2 seem to be illustrating the fact that the dependant variable is reliable enough to use in a linear regression model.

Figure 2: Frequency Distribution of ‘SWAT’ Variable



Aside from the manually created dependant variable ‘SWAT’, my models will also be considering the participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, level of education and income. Since the main emphasis of this study is gender, other demographic variables such as age, ethnicity, level of education and income are to be considered as covariates and control factors in this study.

The variable for gender is to be recoded 1 for male and 0 for female as to satisfy the purpose of this study.

Age is a continuous variable with ages ranging from 17 to 95. No further coding seems to be needed in this case.

Ethnicity was initially constituted of eleven different categories, with several groups, including ‘Asians’, ‘Blacks’, ‘Mixed’ and ‘Whites’. To make the study easier, a dummy variable was created as to see if the participant is part of the ethnic majority (white) or ethnic minority (black, Asian, mixed and other minority ethnicities). Therefore, the ethnic majority was coded 0 and the minority coded 1.

Education is initially constituted of seven categories referring to different levels of education going from 1-‘Degree’ to 7-‘No qualifications’. As to make the study and its interpretation easier, the variable is to be recoded into a new scale in which 1 corresponds to ‘No qualifications’ and 6 to ‘degree’. The category entitled ‘foreign qualification or other’ was voluntarily recoded as missing values as it would have been hard to interpret or make sense of, or find a UK equivalents for.

Income is a variable with values from one to ten, categorising the participants’ earnings per month going from 1 ‘less than £430 per month’ to 10 ‘£3.601 or more per month’. The same coding is maintained.


To test my various hypotheses and examine whether gender differences in the attitudes towards social welfare will remain significant when controlling for the different socioeconomic factors listed above, multiple nested models will be created. Age, ethnicity and education are to be considered as antecedent variables and incorporated in the models as they could affect the findings if they are not controlled for. Models are the following:

Model 1: SWAT= gender + (age + education + ethnicity)

Model 2: SWAT= gender + (age + education + ethnicity) + income

Model 3. SWAT= gender + (age + education + ethnicity) + income + education*income

I anticipated that gender will directly affect attitudes towards social welfare, whilst this effect will explained to some extent through income, which is anticipated to be a mediating variable. The interaction between education and income will be included in the model. It was also anticipated that individuals with a higher educational background will have a more pejorative view towards social welfare as compared to individuals with lower educational backgrounds, due to the biased ideas of individuals with a low educational background in society. The study's anticipations are summarised in this model:



The predictors included seem to account for 0.7% of the variance in attitudes towards social welfare in our first, second and third model.

Model 1

The participants' gender, education level, age, and their ethnicity seems to explain 0.7% of the total variance in attitudes towards social welfare as illustrated by the r^2 value. The constant is 7.040 which illustrates that the prediction made about attitudes towards social welfare is 7.040 on the scale when all independent variables take the value of zero. The t-test is 17.879 and is statistically significant. Consequently, it is very unlikely that the constant in the general population is 0. Gender seems to indicate that males score an average -0.503 less than females on the attitude scale when controlling for other variables in the table. This relationship is statistically significant. Therefore, being of the male sex is associated with holding less positive attitudes, and these findings can be generalised to the British population. The first model thus seems to support the first hypothesis that there is a gender difference in social attitudes.

Table 3: Summary of OLS Regression Findings

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B (Sd error)		B (Sd error)		B (Sd error)	
Constant	7.040 (0.394)	***	7.074 (0.396)	***	7.090 (0.396)	***
Gender (male)	-0.503 (0.181)	**	-0.493 (0.181)	**	-0.491 (0.181)	**
Age	0.016 (0.005)	**	0.015 (0.005)		0.15 (0.005)	**
Educational level	0.048 (0.051)		0.049 (0.051)		0.50 (0.51)	
Ethnicity (Minority)	0.474 (0.345)		0.473 (0.345)		0.340 (0.364)	
Income			-0.004 (0.005)		-0.005 (0.005)	
Ethnicity*income					0.18 (0.16)	
R ²	0.007		0.007		0.007	
Standard error in ().	* p<0.05., ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001					

Furthermore, from looking at Table 3, all other factors presented impact formation of more positive attitudes. As participants are getting older for example, they seem to become slightly more supportive of social welfare (0.016). This also goes for individuals with a higher education and those from ethnic minorities, who seem to also have more negative attitudes. Age is statistically significant and the results for age can thus be applied to the general population. The results for the educational level and ethnicity of the participants' do not allow the findings to be generalised to wider population as the p-value is greater than 0.05. Although not statistically significant, ethnicity seems to be the best predictor according to this model as its standardised coefficient beta value is the highest (0.474).

Model 2:

When including income in the second model, the predictor still accounts for 0.7% of the variance in attitudes. Looking at the results for income, it seems that a rise in earnings has a slightly negative impact on attitudes. Indeed, the more people earn, the less supportive they become (-0.004). This result is however not statistically significant and cannot be applied to the general population. A gender difference still seems to exist with males scoring on average -0.493 lower than females on the attitude scale. The direct positive effect of gender on attitudes is thus still present. The second model thus seems to support my first hypothesis as there is still a gender difference in attitudes. However, as gender is still significant after income has been introduced into the model, with no major changes in the gender coefficient, the effect of gender on attitudes does not seem to be mediated through income, as the coefficient for gender changes, which contrasts with what was anticipated in our second hypothesis.

Model 3:

In the third model, interaction between income and ethnicity was added into the regression analysis. The percentage of variance in attitudes is still the same, with a low 0.7%. Gender is still significant and thus still illustrates the fact that there seems to be a clear difference between British women and men in attitudes, which is, according to the still statistically significant finding, a true and valid claim to make for the general population in Britain. Age

remains significant too, while education, ethnicity and income remain insignificant, illustrating that the added interaction term did not have any impact on their relations with attitudes. The interaction term is however not statistically significant as its p-value is 0.250 (>0.05), which means that the effect of income on attitudes toward social welfare is the same among different ethnic groups (between the ethnic majority of ‘whites’ and ethnic minorities). However, if the interaction term was statistically significant, including the interaction term that according to the level of income, differences in attitudes occur between ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority. Therefore, with an increase in earnings individuals from ethnic minorities on average become slightly less supportive of the social welfare than individuals from the ethnic majority (white) with the same income, when controlling for all other variables in the table. Thus, the effect of income onto attitudes would be stronger for ethnic minorities than for the ethnic majority, which contradicts my original hypothesis.

Now to have an even closer look at the association between gender and social attitudes, I shall produce a binary logistic regression. To do so, the variable stating that ‘many people who get social security do not really deserve help’, or ‘*SocHelp*’, will be recoded into a binary variable. Originally, the variable was coded with 5 different categories: 1- ‘Agree strongly’, 2- ‘Agree’, 3- ‘Neither agree nor disagree’, 4- ‘Disagree’, 5- ‘Disagree strongly’. It should be noted that the category ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ was intentionally excluded from the analysis and coded as missing as it does not fall into the objectives of this paper, as we are looking for opinions and not neutrality here. The variable should thus be recoded with 0- ‘Disagree’ and 1- ‘Agree’. As for the independent variables, the same variables of gender, age, education, ethnicity and income will be used to draw more specific conclusions regarding one specific question regarding attitudes, using the variable *SocHelp*. The same nested models used in the OLS regression will be used here.

Table 4: Summary of the Results from the Binary Regression

	Model 1 Exp(B) (Sd error)		Model 2 Exp(B) (Sd error)		Model 3 Exp(B) (Sd error)	
Constant	1.934 (0.230)	**	1.894 (0.232)	**	1.895 (0.232)	**
Gender (male)	1.246 (0.104)	**	1.241 (0.104)	*	1.242 (0.104)	*
Age	1.003 (0.003)		1.003 (0.003)		1.003 (0.003)	
Educational level	0.825 (0.029)	***	0.825 (0.029)	***	0.823 (0.029)	***
Ethnicity (Minority)	1.105 (0.204)		1.112 (0.205)		1.182 (0.215)	
Income			1.002 (0.003)		1.003 (0.003)	
Ethnicity*income					0.988 (0.013)	
Nagelkerke R ²	0.049		0.050		0.051	
Standard error in ().	* p<0.05., ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001					

Model 1

From Table 4, we can see that for our first model, the predictors included seem to account for 4.9% of the variance in attitudes. Gender and education added significantly to the prediction/model, but age, and ethnicity did not add significantly to the model. Table 4 seems to show that the odds of agreeing to the statement ‘many people who get social security do not really deserve help’ is 1.246 greater for males than females. A better education level also

seems to be associated with an increased likelihood to agree to such a statement. Therefore, for each increase of 1 on the scale of *SocHelp*, the odds of men agreeing compared to women increase by 25%, and odds of having a higher education when agreeing to the statement compared to lower education levels decreases by $1 - 0.825 = 0.175$, or 17.5%. Both these probabilities can be applied to the general population as both are statistically significant. Although not statistically significant and thus not generalisable to the global population, we also notice that with a one unit increase in age the odds of scoring 1 increase by 0.3%, so as people grow older, their odds grow a little bit, thus older people seem to be more likely to agree with the statement. Similarly, although also not statistically significant, it seems that for each increase of 1 on the scale of the statement, the odds of ethnic minority individuals agreeing as compared to ethnic majority individuals (white) increase by 10.5%. So, if the results for gender seem to still show that there is a significant difference between men and women when looking at attitudes, thus supporting my first hypothesis, people from ethnic minorities seem to have more negative attitudes than the ethnic majority which still contradicts one of my original hypotheses.

Model 2

According to the second model, the predictors included seem to account for 5.0% of the variance in attitudes, which is slightly higher than in our first model. The inclusion of income seems to reveal that with a one unit increase in income, the odds of scoring 1 increase by 0.2%. Thus, as participants become richer, their odds seem to grow a little, and richer individuals thus seem to be more likely to agree with the statement and therefore have more negative views towards social welfare. This finding is however statistically insignificant meaning that it cannot be generalised to the general population in Britain.

Gender and education still seem to have a probable impact on attitudes as both are still statistically significant. When income is added to the model there are no major changes suggesting that income is still not mediating between gender and attitudes. Age and ethnicity seem to still be statistically insignificant, with the coefficient changing slightly with the addition of income in the model. Therefore, income does not seem to mediate or be an intervening factor between gender, its covariates and attitudes.

Model 3

The third model incorporates the variables from the models above, with the additional interaction variable of 'ethnicity_income', in order to see if the effect that was noticed on ethnicity remained the same with different incomes. Though the percentage is still very low, this model seems to explain more variance in attitudes compared to the previous model, accounting for 5.1%. Therefore, although the increase is very small, the new variable added more explanatory power to the third model. The third model still seems to support my first hypothesis as gender is still significant. Thus, we can state that it is likely that there is indeed a difference between men and women in their attitudes towards the fact that 'many people who get social security do not really deserve help'. In addition, as gender is still significant, the claim is therefore generalisable to the population of Britain. The interaction term is, however, not statistically significant which means that the effect of income on the social

welfare variable is the same among different ethnic groups. The control variable 'education' is still significant, and its coefficient has slightly changed by 0.002, which would have indicated an impact from the interaction term if it was significant in its relationship with attitudes.

Conclusion:

It was therefore established that there seems to generally be a gender difference and gap in attitudes towards social welfare between men and women in Britain. However, this difference does not seem to have been explained through income like we anticipated. Even though it is not statistically significant in the OLS regression, education still seems to be the best predictor of attitudes towards social welfare. Furthermore, there seems to be no statistically significant interaction term, which suggests that the effect of income on the attitudes is the same among different ethnic groups. Even when narrowing the analysis to one specific social welfare variable and running a binary logistic regression to look at the probable effect in the population, there is still a significant difference in gender when looking at attitudes. Therefore, we can say that there is a clear association between gender and attitudes towards social welfare, and more specifically, that men seem to have more negative views than women. Gender thus seems to have a stronger influence on attitudes than socioeconomic factors such as income. However, even if the analysis provided some results on the formation of British attitudes towards social welfare, the study's scale is small, and further research will be needed to analyse the topic in more in depth.

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What challenges does the digitization of court services pose for the achievement of justice? What benefits?

Diksha Ramchurn

By 2023, there is set to be a £1 billion digitalisation programme to modernise Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) across England and Wales (Hall, 2019). This digitalisation programme will enable people to access justice in a more accessible and futuristic way. The three main areas set to be reformed include: the new 'Online Court' (wherein litigants use interactive software to articulate their claims and upload evidence), the simplification of procedures so that there is a uniform procedural regime for justice and, finally, modernisation of the court estate in order for buildings to have more purpose (Hopkins and Mallen, 2017). With some progress made already, the main reforms are set to be in place by 2020 (ibid, 2017). Nevertheless, there are many challenges for the digitalisation of court services that even the House of Commons acquiesces that 'such sweeping changes will be extremely challenging to deliver' (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2018: 3). The ultimate challenge that remains is whether digitisation can lead to justice being achieved or not, as according to the Times (2018), more than 80% of barristers fear digital courts will lead to 'justice being trampled on' and conclude with 'cheap' rather than 'just' decisions (Frances, 2018). However, the digitisation programme does bring important benefits to the table such as cost-effectiveness, reliability and some efficiency in terms of accessing justice, and if digitisation is handled efficiently in the future, it can in fact bring a modern and fresh way of achieving justice in a digital era.

This paper will be structured by first explaining the different type of justice and will then go onto highlighting the challenges of digitalisation in terms of the service being provided too fast and early court closures, issues with technology and less articulate/unrepresented litigants being overlooked. I will then go on to state the benefits of digitisation, such as cost effectiveness, reliability and access to justice in one paragraph. A conclusion will then be provided summarising the essay and giving my opinion.

Firstly, we need to understand what the term 'justice' means and the different types of justice. While justice in simplistic terms means fairness in the way people are treated, there is no one set definition. David Piachaud (2008) in the chapter 'Social Justice and Public Policy: A Social Policy Perspective' provides an explanation as to what justice is according to scholars such as John Rawls, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Piachaud highlights Rawls' principle of 'fair equality of opportunity according to which those with similar abilities should have similar life chances' (Piachaud, 2008:35). On the other hand, Piachaud argues that scholars such as Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen rejected the 'utilitarian' concept of justice and instead defend the capabilities approach in which Sen saw 'the requirement of a just society...as having certain capabilities' (Piachaud, 2008: 35). These approaches thus formed the foundations for the modern notion of 'justice', which are now branched out into

different types of justice: distributive, procedural, social and open justice. Distributive justice can be defined as ‘perceived justice of the principles and rules that regulate resource distribution’ and focuses more on outcomes as opposed to procedure (Sabbagh and Schmitt, 2016: 6). Procedural justice is ‘the justness of procedures according to which resource distribution takes place’ and focuses on procedures rather than outcomes (Sabbagh and Schmitt, 2016: 6). Retributive justice refers to ‘the expected negative outcomes related to resource distribution’; when the valence of the resource is framed as ‘bad’, e.g. punishment (Sabbagh and Schmitt, 2016: 6). Social justice can be defined as ‘the relative distribution of rights, opportunities and resources within a given society, and whether it deserves to be regarded as fair and just’ (Cramme and Diamond, 2009: 3). There is also the case of ‘open justice’: the legal principle describing legal processes characterised by openness and transparency (Pfanner, 2013) and is seen as a fundamental right guaranteeing liberty. For the purpose of this paper, I will be focusing on procedural, social and open justice as I feel they are the most relevant forms of justice to the theme of digitisation. I will also use these types of justice to measure the extent to which digitisation can be achieved in court services.

One of the challenges to the digitalisation of courts is that, despite HMCTS pushing the deadline to 2023, the imperative to transform courts and close existing courts across the country risks not allowing time for meaningful consultation and can lead to problems in terms of litigants achieving justice. According to a report by the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2018), HMCTS is operating at a ‘rapid pace’ and limits the time available to stand back and consider the wider impacts of the changes on the justice system as a whole and for those who use it (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2018: 5). Representatives of the legal profession told the House of Commons Committee that HMCTS was paying ‘lip service’ to engagement rather than acting on concerns (ibid, 2018: 5). Other unintended consequences included a rushed court closure in Chichester which led to a debate about the court’s use and the impact on users (ibid, 2018: 5-6). This could impact access to fair justice, especially procedural justice as rushed court closures and delivering new state-of-the-art courts can change how cases are processed and increase costs elsewhere in the system. Additionally, Penelope Gibbs, director of the campaign Transform Justice (2019), said:

I know it is going to cost, but they (HMCTS) need to slow down even further. The problem is that they are taking one thing and assuming they are going to do it. Then they are moving video into civil and so on (in Hall, 2019).

Therefore from these observations, even if it may take some more time, I think it is necessary for HMCTS to conduct research more extensively in terms of digitisation and focus more on the quality of delivery rather than making a rushed and clumsy decision of digitised court services in order for litigants to achieve procedural justice.

Another challenge of the digitisation of court services is that problems with digital technology could in fact impact on court users’ access to justice. A source from the Criminal Justice Joint Inspection (CJJI) (2016) states that, whilst 92% of cases are transferred to the Crown Prosecution Services (CPS) from the police electronically, it requires a lot of

extensive user input in terms of procedures and processes to turn paper documents electronic (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2016: 3). This is not wholly digital working or an efficient process for transferring case information from the police to the courts (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2016: 3). This can also mean that information can be lost or misinterpreted and whether the information will still be 100% credible is also questioned. Also, despite a significant amount of public funds being invested in digitising information, criminal justice agencies still rely on manual processes such as scanning paper documents and producing hard copies of digital images in order to compensate for the ‘lack of a wholly intuitive digital capability’ (ibid, 2016: 3). The source explains that ‘this has associated wasted cost on all agencies involved, an increased risk of error and undermines the benefits that could be realised from full digital working’ (ibid, 2016: 3). Although this explanation seems rather periphrastic, what I have come to gather is that, due to the ‘increased risk of error’ of not using full digital services, it could impact the litigant’s case and affect their achievement of procedural justice as there is a lack of efficiency with the procedures that are being dealt with in court. Furthermore, there is also the problem concerning sensitive or confidential audio/visual images being produced in ‘hard format’ and transported between parties involved in the criminal justice process and there are also anxieties about misplacing the hard media discs (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2016). The reason this is so concerning is because the misplacing of sensitive or confidential information demonstrates a breach of privacy and confidentiality and also brings into question the reputation of the criminal justice agencies involved. This issue can also cause many people to lose faith in the justice system and question whether they would want to access procedural and open justice from a system which mishandles information. Similarly, lawyers Harley and Said (2018) argue that malfunctions in digital and audio recordings can be ‘disastrous’ and may need retrials. Not only are retrials time-consuming and cumbersome, but it again makes litigants and court users question whether digital courts are indeed a suitable way to access justice.

An additional challenge to the digitisation of court services is that less articulate or unrepresented litigants may be overlooked and there is also the case of unconscious bias in the legal system when it comes to making a decision. The blog ‘on screen but disconnected?’ from Transform Justice (2017), discusses a virtual court observation in Kent and found some rather disturbing observations. With the defendants in video custody suites in police stations and the lawyer in a courtroom in Chatham, it appeared that all the defendants seemed vulnerable by their isolation and no one had family or supporters with them in custody or in the court. This anxiety of isolation was accentuated by their separation from their lawyer and anyone else who needed to help them (Transform Justice, 2017). The blogger remarks that there was a probation officer, but apparently her services seemed to be ignored since the video link time was limited (ibid, 2017). Two defendants who were unrepresented faced prison sentences and no one asked why or suggested that they seek legal advice (ibid, 2017). Also, nearly every defendant who appeared on the video link had a medium or severe mental health issue, but there was apparently ‘no liaison or diversion service’ at the police station and one defendant begged to be sectioned and started howling ‘I think I’ll be dead, I want to kill myself...’ (ibid, 2017). Although this observation is recounted by one person and therefore not all the findings will be consistent, I did find the issue of no liaison with

defendants suffering from mental health issues particularly significant as the court users are more or less undermining the basic Rawlsian position of fair access to opportunity and justice and thus a lack of social justice (Duignan, 2019). Similar criticisms have also been noted as Judith Townend (2019) writes ‘less articulate or unrepresented voices are overlooked, in particular individual litigants in the civil and family courts and witnesses, victims, defendants and their families in criminal courts’ (Townend, 2019). Additionally, with the case of the use of video in court, ‘there is a clear demonstration in research from the US that, where judges and decision-makers engage with people over a video link, they have a lower degree of empathy than when dealing with someone face to face. This can lead them to being more likely to disbelieve someone they are seeing over a video link and this can lead to harsher sentences being passed and could lead to innocent people being convicted or harsher sentences being passed than is appropriate’ (Hall, 2019). From this we can see that this issue of unconscious bias needs to be dealt with accordingly as it shows a lack of transparency in the judicial system and with regards to ‘open justice’ and unfair sentences or decisions for litigants.

On the other hand, there are many benefits of the digitisation of court services, most of which are practical benefits and some for the achievement of justice. According to GOV.UK (2019), the HMCTS Digital Case System ‘has saved more than 100 million sheets of paper and more than 500 tonnes of paper saved since 2015’ (Frazer cited in GOV.UK, 2019). The Digital Case System has been used in all Crown Courts across England and Wales since 2016 and allows case related information to be accessed online by court users including the defence, prosecution and probation (Tickle, 2017). Additionally, more than 35,000 applications for divorce have been made online since the system was launched in May 2018 with errors in applications cut from 40% (with the old paper-based service) to 1% (Frazer cited in GOV.UK, 2019). From this example we can see that digitisation does allow for more cost-effective, reliable and faster access to justice as well as being more eco-friendly. One other benefit I thought was noteworthy is that digitisation of courts can aid deaf participants during a trial, with real-time transcription or audio amplification, and improve the quality of translation and interpretation (Harley and Said, 2019). Therefore, the court services will be able to help such groups achieve social justice, as people with disabilities are factored in too. So, as opposed to the critique of digitalisation that vulnerable participants are overlooked, digitalisation can instead help certain vulnerable groups with their more user friendly audio-video recordings being accessed outside the courtroom. Another notable benefit of digitisation is that ‘open justice’ can be achieved as court and tribunal hearings allow for more openness and transparency between the users of the court and the general public. In spite of these examples relating to being more cost-effective, and easier access to justice for people filing for divorce or people with disabilities, I still think that these are only particular examples and the larger problem still remains that the less articulate and unrepresented participants are overlooked and this needs to be mitigated.

In conclusion, it can be argued that digitisation of court services has its fair share of challenges and benefits as examined above, with the main challenge being unrepresented or vulnerable victims not being able to achieve justice. In my opinion, because we live in such a

tech-savvy society, digitisation of court services can in fact help people access justice more effectively than the old paper-based services as it allows for real time transcription and allows for transparency too for example. HMCTS just need to shorten the pace, do further research and have a more people-centred approach to procedural and social justice in order for digitisation to work in the future. Ultimately, as Tomlinson (2017) puts it, we need to remember that the endpoint of digitising court services is ‘to get a better overall *justice* system, not a more efficient one’ (Tomlinson, 2017: 17).

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