‘Ties That Don’t Bind’: Justice And Trust In Eastern And Western Europe

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Abstract:
This study uses a comparative cross-sectional approach in order to measure citizen opinions on the topics of justice and trust in police in contemporary Eastern European (Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland) and the United Kingdom. Data are taken from the European Social Survey Round 5 which has been conducted in 20 countries. I use crosstabs and graphs to describe the differences in perceived fairness and impartiality in police decisions and the support that they get from citizens across six countries. In the same vein, I describe the issues of police doing a good or bad job as perceived by community members. In the UK three times more respondents think that the police are doing a good job in comparison with the ones who believe the opposite, while in Hungary the proportion shows that almost twice as more people believe their officers are doing a bad job in comparison with the ones who support them. I ran a four nested model linear regression including the dependent variable of trust in police and the independent variables of post-communist country, police effectiveness, fairness, police engagement in the community, perceived risk of victimization, socio-demographics, the risk of being caught if committing a crime and social and political trust. The findings fit with existing literature on trust in police.

1 Introduction

This study uses a cross-sectional approach in order to measure citizen opinions on the topics of justice and trust in police in contemporary Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland) and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is used to represent Western police culture while the other countries serve as exemplars for Central and Eastern European police culture. The historical background of liberalism began to consolidate starting with English Civil War in 1640s and which concluded with the King Charles’ execution (Sturgis, 1994). The formation of a radical political movement advocated for popular

sovereignty and had at its core the English philosopher's liberal concepts and the father of modern liberalism, Locke (MacIntyre, 1994). Locke introduced the radical notion that in order to remain legitimate, the government had to acquire consent from the governed (Coplestone, 1946: 39-41). Moreover, Locke also introduced the concept of the separation of church and the state, along with the social contract principle, that there is a natural right to the liberty of conscience which must remain protected from government authority and influence (Feldman, 2005: 29). In addition, Green's philosophy tasked society and political institutions with the enhancement of individual freedom, identity and the development of moral character, will and reason along with the state's power to respect all the above and to encourage genuine choice (Adams, 1998: 54-55).

Eastern and Central European post-communist cultures are represented in this study and the reasons behind this choice are that citizens in Central and Eastern Europe have motives to distrust their political and social institutions as these states had experienced authoritarian influence most of their lives which was targeted to subjugate individual interest to those of the Communist Party (Clark and Wildavsky, 1990). These are stark differences in comparison to the Liberal aspects that have shaped the development of the UK; Shlapentokh (1989; in Mishler and Rose, 1997: 419) argues that the variety of civil institutions such as the party, trade union or the Young Communists' League that could be referred to as targeting civil society, were in fact part of the state apparatus. In this context, citizens were forced to show obedience and false interest in participation in these organisations. In turn, these legacies affected popular trust in government bringing massive alienation and distrust in the Communist regime (Zaslavsky and Brym, 1978). The differences between liberal and communist ideologies reflect on individual trust in the state's institutions. Values and priorities change according to the political system implemented in a given context (Schwartz and Bardi, 1997). With this in mind, here individual trust in police and justice in general will be analysed. The data was taken from the European Social Survey *Round 5* (2011) which poses questions about perceived police and courts legitimacy, social and political trust along with human values and socio-demographic variables from across 20 countries.

Scholars have proposed various perspectives in measuring citizen trust in police. Two dominant approaches can be found in the expressive and instrumental models proposed by

Jackson, et al (2009), initially developed by Tyler and Boeckmann (1997). The former suggests that citizens' base their police performance evaluation on the extent to which they believe the police are tackling the rule-breaking behaviour based on morals and shared values. This is believed to weight more in trusting police than the actual fear of victimization or fear for safety. This approach suggests that police officers are considered guardians of the community; once signs of low social cohesion arise within the community, they threaten confidence in the local authorities (Jackson and Sunshine, 2007; Jackson and Bradford, 2008; Jackson, et al, 2009). The instrumental model of trust in police authority suggests that assessments of police performance, risk and judgements about distributive justice are highly linked to citizens' willingness to accept and cooperate with legal authorities. This instrumental perspective argues that police attract cooperation and acceptance from community members when they credibly promote sanctions for rule-breakers, when they show effectiveness in controlling crime and illicit behaviour and lastly, when they fairly distribute their services across people and communities (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003).

My aim in this paper is to test the theoretical merits of these approaches on the European Social Survey Round 5 (henceforth ESS 2011) dataset with interest in the differences between Western and Eastern Europe. In order to measure risk, effectiveness and fairness, I create three summated scales using questions on the likeliness of being caught if engaged in sub-criminal behaviour, questions regarding police perceived success at resolving crimes and questions on police decision-making and impartiality. I also add perceived shared values with the community and perceived risk of victimization. In addition, I introduce in my analysis, the concept of social trust, which is believed to encourage cooperation between social actors (Delhey and Newton, 2003) and political trust which according to citizens' normative expectations, it evaluates government functionality (Miller, 1974). The validity of my measures has been tested using the exploratory factor analysis which shows positive results. With trust in police as dependent variable and the factors described above as independent variables, while taking into consideration socio-economics, I ran four OLS regression models. Overall, the models indicate that there is significant difference between UK and Eastern European countries in terms of police confidence. Perceived shared values weight more than the assessment of becoming a violent crime victim; together they contribute substantially to increase in trust. Instrumental factors of perceived fairness, effectiveness and risk assessment

indeed contribute to rise in police trust, if low. In the same vein, high social and political trust increase confidence in police. I use social trust as latent factor for social capital which contributes to lower crime levels, stronger political participation and higher satisfaction with governments and their organs (Freitag, 2000, 2003; Putnam, 2000; Whiteley, 2000).

Following this introduction the structure of this paper is as follows: literature review, where I explain the instrumental and expressive models in measuring change in confidence in police as well as concepts that are used in the models: concerns about victimization, police public encounters and how this influences opinions on police and their performance; I explain the concept of social capital and the implications of political ideology on civic participation and social trust as well as value change under communist regimes and its repercussions for democracy. The methodology section introduces the dataset and features a discussion regarding reliability and validity of the measurements. Following this, I explain the top line findings regarding the police perceived shared values and their effect on obeying officers' decisions, the effect of police-public encounter and satisfaction on general trust in police and police fairness and police effectiveness using summated scales and factor analysis for social and political trust. The Data Analysis section concerns the tools used in measuring these concepts, such as summated scales, factor analysis, linear regressions, frequencies and crosstabs, the last two being used for the creation of graphs.

2 Literature

2.1 Jackson's instrumental and expressive models for Trust in Police and Courts

In Jackson, et al (2009), the authors propose two perspectives in public confidence in policing. Instrumental, perspective which refers to the belief that police officers' main job is to reduce crimes and to preserve the neighbourhood safety, judging for crime rates, fear of crime, perceived chances of being a victim etc. and expressive which argues that community members believe that police has a more comprehensive role. Using data from ten editions of the British Crime Survey, the study suggests that public confidence is based more on expressive concerns about neighbourhood stability as community members see police as representing community's shared norms and values, as figures of moral authority and order keepers. This is further suggested by two UK-based studies that public confidence in police is

triggered by the general community perceptions of social order, cohesion, trust and moral consensus (Jackson and Sunshine, 2007; Jackson and Bradford, 2008).

The expressive model is not concerned with fear of crime or perception of victimisation, but more with keeping community close together while improving the collective efficacy. To put it in other words, people expect police to resolve local issues, issues that create the image of losing control over the neighbourhood (Jackson, et al, 2009).Their original research question concerned the effect of the fear of crime on public confidence and their findings suggested that fear of crime itself does not affect confidence, but together these two variables are the source of the public's assessment of the non-criminal aspects of their neighbourhood. This explanation corresponds to Innes and Fielding's (2002) signal crimes concept which aims 'to capture the social semiotic processes by which particular types of criminal and disorderly conduct have a disproportionate impact upon fear of crime' (2002: 1). This approach suggests that particular crimes have different impact on people's opinion about law, order and policing. Signal disorders such as public drunkenness, signs of drugs usage, graffiti and litter account for lack of social control and danger existing in the community. These along with the crime rates shape people's assessment and satisfaction about their everyday life (Jackson, et al, 2009).

By using a path diagram, a five-stage model is portrayed as following: levels of deprivation and crime in respondents' neighbourhood, the three expressive drivers (disorder, cohesion and collective efficacy), instrumental drivers (fear of crime and perception of crime problem), components of police confidence (effectiveness, fairness and community engagement) and an overall judgement of confidence in local policing. The model asserts that firstly, the levels of deprivation predict the individuals' view on disorder and cohesion in their community. Secondly, the perception of expressive drivers account for people's opinion about the crime problem and as well as for the victimization concerns. Thirdly, it assesses separately the influence of expressive and instrumental drivers on different types of confidence. Here, the findings show that the demographic variable plays an important role in attitudes towards the crime problem and the fear of crime. The victimization concern reflects directly on confidence and the degree of engagement in the community, but disorder seems to be the most important predictor of judgements about police effectiveness. Moreover, views on police engagement

within the community are another key factor when thinking about confidence. It also has the greater impact on the overall index and it highly corresponds with the instrumental and expressive drivers. Finally, deprivation predicts environmental perception which in turn influences worry and public confidence. Thus, deprivation affects public confidence, but almost entirely because it has an impact on public's conception about their community (Jackson, et al, 2009).



Figure 2.1 – Drivers of public confidence in policing (Jackson, et al, 2009: 108)

In the next paragraphs, I will explain and relate the concepts of perception of victimization, social capital to the ones explained above: those of police fairness, police effectiveness and compliance with the law. This in turn will provide a better illustration of the differences between Eastern and Western European opinion on this matter. In addition, I will explain the post-communist effects on people's general values which accounts for the differences in opinion, general trust and engagement within the community. Moreover, these concepts will be quantitatively explored in the fourth section of this paper using various quantitative measures and tools.

2.2 Fear of crime effect on perceptions of disorder

Researchers suggest that citizens' fear of crime is highly correlated to social features distinct to the actual crime itself (Perkins and Taylor, 2002). Community disorder, cues in the social and physical environment, interpretations of media representation or social interactions among community members all contribute to shaping the perception of risk of becoming a victim in a given setting whether it is in Eastern or Western Europe. In this section, I will give a short account of the fear of crime concept in order to explain how this concept has been linked to others and the way has been quantitatively used in various models.

In a study conducted by Jackson (2004), fear of crime is assessed through a sociocultural perspective. By analysing the links between community's cohesion, disorder and crime, it is suggested that perceptions of risk are influenced by the individuals' view on the social and physical make-up of their community along with broader values, conceptions and judgements regarding the law and order providers. The author uses the findings of one of the first quantitative studies on fear of crime, Biderman, et al (1967), where data shown that perceptions of seriousness of crime exist independently of official estimates. Moreover, they argue that the public is misinformed and this may be the main cause for mistaken beliefs about crime, not the actual experience. Biderman, et al (1967) suggests that 'special significance of crime is at the social level' (1967: 164). More explicitly, they add, high levels of crime are perceived as dangerous for the community's balance, for order and cohesion, they are seen as 'signs of threats to the fundamental moral order' (1967: 164). Community members might see this process seriously alarming and deteriorating for the social and moral aspects of the society. Taken from Douglas's (1985) anthropological work, social values are believed to be the base for public judgements about crime and even small changes in crime can be taken as degrading the shared fundamental values.

The misinterpreted and exaggerated fear of crime conceptthas been linked to various environmental perceptions that stimulate the personal threat of crime (Covington and Taylor, 1991; Taylor and Hale, 1986). The fear-risk paradox is one vital example. Being a woman or elderly and walking alone at night rise high levels of feeling vulnerable, even though the increased rates of victimization concern young and adult males. Moreover, the 'quality of life issues' along with noticeable anti-social behaviour are very important when talking about the

perceived risk of victimization (Hollway and Jefferson, 1997: 60). Garofalo and Laub's (1978) research found an ambiguous relationship between victimization and fear of crime, where expressions of the latter represent more than feelings of anxiety about the actual experience as a victim. The quality of life is presented as a latent factor that follows the concern towards possible community degradation. It is determined by both objective and subjective circumstances. The former encompasses economic wealth, education levels and cultural facilities, pollution, housing and the extent of crime. The subjective experiences relate to concerns at the community level such as fear of crime, social instability, anxiety about strangers and perceived moral decline; and at the personal level such as personal achievement and individual freedom (Garofalo and Laub 1978:242).

Another aspect found to be highly related to the fear of crime is the perception of disorder; or incivility (as described in Hunter, 1978) or the notion of broken windows (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) or more recently, social disorganization (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993). According to Taylor (1999),'incivility indicators are social and physical conditions in a neighbourhood that are viewed as troublesome and potentially threatening by its residents and users of its public spaces' (1999: 65). Broken windows notion at the community level can be explained as a developing sequence between disorder and crime. Professionals agree that if in a building a window has been broken and left unrepaired, then soon the other windows will get broken as well. However, it does not occur on a large scale due to the window-lovers and window-breakers balance in a given area. The broken window is a symbol for indifference which usually means breaking more windows at minimal costs (Wilson and Kelling, 1982: 2). In a similar manner, social disorganisation refers to the lack of social norms that influence the group members and social control that allows a neighbourhood to self-regulate (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993).

Interpersonal relations along with media coverage also influence people perceptions on crime. It is suggested that individuals use this information in assessing the threat of becoming a victim in their immediate surroundings. Again, interpretations and perceived signs of incivility may infer that people and authorities have lost control over the community, their trust and legitimacy being brought into question (Hunter, 1978). While different aspects of the community may be seen as criminal or leading to criminal behaviour, disorder concerns the

quality of social relations and the ability of the law enforcers to maintain order (Jackson, 2004: 948). Fear of crime is often analysed through a symbolic interaction perspective. Ferraro (1995) suggests that central to citizens' evaluation of risk is the way in which they make sense of their world, using their own interpretations and judgements. This is how the author describes the situation: 'it includes a person's physical location and activities as well as actual crime prevalence, the physical environment, and victimization experiences and reports' (1995: 9). Individual perceived risk of crime should be defined by their own description of the situation along with their own experience or interpretation within its social context. Jackson (2004) added to this framework the feature of vulnerability operationalized as self-efficacy and perception of the consequence of victimization, along with perceptions of social cohesion, informal social control and social values such as trustworthiness and predictability of individuals.

2.3 Public–Police contact

Police-public contact plays a vital role in the context of trust as it represents the first opportunity for the individual to reinforce or change his or her already shaped opinion about police performance. In Bradford, et al (2009) it is argued that there is an asymmetry in the impact of public encounters with the police. Despite the media effect on delivering information and shaping opinions about police and despite decreasing levels of public confidence and police contact, it seems that personal experience plays a vital role. These experiences along with stories about the police heard from family or acquaintances are believed to be as important in shaping people's opinion (Miller, et al, 2004; cited in Bradford et al, 2009). Moreover, it is noted in the same study that the overall effect on confidence is negative, which reflects on lower levels of trust and confidence in police among those who had recent contact with police officers (Allen, et al, 2006; cited in Bradford, et al, 2009). This negative association (contact-confidence) is mainly believed to arise from the unsatisfactory contact between members of community and police. On the other hand, other studies have found that positive experience does not actually have a positive effect on the confidence levels. Skogan (2006) argues that officers cannot do much when it comes to reinforcing their services for gaining opinions on their side.

In explaining police-public contact, Bradford, et al (2009) argue that the difficult role that police have lowered their chances to appeal to the public. The police represent a service and an agent of enforcement which only rarely can offer concrete outcomes. On an instrumental level, few contacts with the police initiated by crime victims are likely to result in a positive outcome when referring to catching the offender or returning a stolen property. Also, police stops on foot or in a vehicle can also create inconvenience. In the cases of crime victims or people who are stopped, it is hard for the police to take back the experience and the humiliation that come with the contact. On the other hand, when encounters with the police are well handed and finish with a satisfactory result, sometimes the situation is counterbalanced by the way officers personally treat people (Bradford, et al, 2009: 5). Furthermore, it is suggested that the image that police officers have as enforcers of the law, order or of the nation-state social group is essential in people's experiences of personal contact (Jackson and Bradford, 2008; Jackson and Sunshine, 2007). Such ideas imply that police-public experience and interpretations do not depend on the performance of the officer in charge as people feel the encounter with the police in the context of their relationships to much broader social structures and situation. A relevant example is the socially marginalised individuals that, when in contact with the police may feel the experience as negative, influencing their overall opinions as well. People that are generally supportive of the police may feel that police duty is to provide good service, so their overall opinion will not be improved by satisfactory contacts. Also, the same individuals may have a negatively stronger reaction when it comes to poor service (Bradford, et al, 2009).

The London Metropolitan Police Service's Public Attitude Survey findings suggest that face-to-face interactions make it more difficult for officers to improve their image rather than damage it. Moreover, it has been shown that well-received contact can have a small but significant positive impact on their overall opinion on police fairness, level of engagement with community (in some cases). Having said this, contact and confidence association may not be inevitably negative after all, if the police continue having satisfactory encounters with the public. The procedural justice model proposed by Sunshine and Tyler (2003), recommends that the treatment considered fair and equitable by the public is most likely to result in an increase in in trust and confidence. Also, people's judgements on everyday performance of police within their community, are not focused on concrete outcomes such as the return of a

stolen good or the inconvenience created by being stopped, but the quality of personal contact. Moreover, this suggests that it is in the officers' hands to improve public opinion by their conduct and the way they communicate their decisions when in contact with community members. Overall, the procedural model brings into light the importance of perceived police legitimacy which is as important as or more important than perceived risk of being caught and punished according to the law. Police legitimacy represents the internal motivation for obeying the law and it is also a predictor for whether the police will receive a cooperative response in solving crimes from the community members' side.

Another study by Fitzgerald, et al (2002), found that perceptions about diffuse contact and behaviour are very important as well. For Londoners, visible and accessible policing is very important because it helps maintaining trust and cooperation of local people. This view is supported by recent MPS analysis which links perceptions of higher police visibility within the local area with better views on police effectiveness, fairness and community engagement. Also, Bradford, Jackson and Stanko (2009) add up the feeling of being more informed about police activities to a higher confidence in local policing.

2.4 Social Capital

Social capital makes us 'smarter, healthier, safer, richer, and better able to govern a just and stable democracy' (Putnam, 2000: 290). However, the political ideology that governed the Eastern European countries until 20 years ago, communism or totalitarianism, tends to have repercussions on citizens' general trust in their new democratic governments and rulers, manifesting as negative social capital (Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005).In this section, I will explore more in-depth the concept of social capital and the ways it can be theorised and measured quantitatively.

Dating back from Durkheim, where he emphasises that group life is an antidote to anomie and self-destruction, and Marx's 'distinction between an atomised class-in-itself and a mobilised and effective class-for-itself' (Portes, 2000:44), it is believed that participation in social groups has positive effects on citizens and community as well. Moreover, in a recent paper written by two political scientists Valdivieso and Villena-Roldan (2014), it is argued that general trust is a determinant of social participation. In their study, they use social trust as a continuous latent

variable where one's trust in others influences social participation by the number of pay-offs attributed to each member in their local network. Yet, social trust is determined by the levels of interaction with reliable people in social networks. The authors measure personal involvements in social networks by the individuals' civic engagement. Demographic and socioeconomic variables such as education, age, gender, marital status and religion are found to be extremely important when talking about civil engagement and social participation. For example, education provides skills and abilities necessary for social interactions; age, thus experience help in shaping social participation; gender accounts for biological and cultural differences; family status is important regarding the needs, tastes and resources available for social interaction and religion and race variables account for individual choices regarding their cultural background and interaction with community (Valdivieso and Villena-Roldan, 2014: 123). According to Bourdieu (1980) and Coleman (1990), social interactions are beneficial not only for the emotional, social and financial gains, but also for gains and costs for associative life.

Freitag (2006) describes social capital as comprising of social networks, cooperative norms and interpersonal trust, all of which provide resources to the individuals and social groups as well. Social capital has been linked at societal level to political, social and economic results. It has been said that existing social capital in certain communities and regions is highly associated with lower crime levels, high levels of happiness and health, economic expansion, better rates of education performance, stronger political participation and better satisfaction with governments and their policies (Freitag, 2000, 2003; Putnam, 2000; Whiteley, 2000). In Freitag's study (2006), social capital has been measured in terms of associational life which concerns formal (such as voluntary association) and informal social networking (for example schools, family, neighbourhood or workplace). However, some scholars question the role of people's engagements in voluntary organisations which is seen as 'limited and sporadic' (Newton, 1999:16), and put more accent on the informal networking. These institutions and experiences are believed to be highly influential on the origins of trust, reciprocity and cooperation (Freitag, 2006).

Regarding the role political institutions play in shaping social capital, many authors argued that the government is an influential actor (Curtis, et al, 2001; Rothstein and Stolle, 2003).

However, its role is vague (Freitag, 2006). Foley and Edwards (1996; cited in Freitag, 2006) suggest that 'the extent of associational life depends crucially on the larger political setting' (1996; cited in Freitag, 2006: 131) and Freitag further explains this in terms of the key effect of associations: representation, deliberation, counterbalancing of powers and exercising of political skills. In this case, associational life depends on the political institutions capabilities to respond to citizens' demands expressed through voluntary organisation, thus, the relation between the state and this type of volunteering associations highly influences the citizens' engagement in social activities. In terms of financial resources, certain policies regarding payments, goods or services influence distinctly citizens' material and life well-being along with their capacity to engage in social networks (Putnam, 2000; Rothstein and Stolle, 2003). On the other hand, if high expenditures are allocated for social services, then social obligation will become public and the interest towards voluntary initiatives provided by family, close social ties or community members will decrease. Thus, it is predicted a decline in investing in social relationship along with a decline in social capital (Norton, 1998).

It has been argued that citizens in Central and Eastern Europe are entitled to distrust their political and social institutions due to living under authoritarian regimes, experience which intended to subjugate individual interests to those of Communist Party (Clark and Wildavsky, 1990). In a totalitarian system, the dictator's goal is to absorb society into '*his system*' with everyone else under his control (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000: 7; original emphasis). Everybody has to be organised according to the party's rules and the dictator is the head of the party. All the organisations are integrated in the system, meant to generate loyalty and control. Here, the creation of instruments of repression and fear are central to controlling the population through fear, intimidation and high visibility. All voluntary organisations came under the direct control and supervision of the communist party, and the unofficial ones were abolished. Communist party made great efforts to eliminate all the possible non-system incentives in order to restrict and control all activities. The citizens learned to live under these conditions which reflected on their general trust in themselves and community. They learned to trust nobody, to obey the one in power and to take no initiative on their own (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000: 7). In addition, the citizens were forced to show involvement and compliance to the communist rule which together with official banning of joining independent

organisation created an environment prone to suspicion, distrust and alienation towards political and civil institutions (Mishler and Rose, 1997).

Thus, the adaptation to communist rule and requirements had reflected on the overall social capital and trust. In a study conducted by Fidrmuc (2008), a parallel is made between Eastern and Central European countries and Westerns one in terms of social capital differences. Economic development and institutions transition from communism doctrine to democracy, account for these differences. Social capital is found to be lower in the post-communist countries and the author argues that levels in social capital should rise or improve once the countries involved catch up with their economic growth and the quality of their institutions rise. The author suggests that it is very important that informal institutions develop in parallel with the formal ones, in order to be compatible and to lower the transition costs expressed in forms of corruption or tax evasion. Fidrmuc (2008) uses the dictatorship theory of missing social capital to explain the transition from communism to democracy. According to this theory (Raiser, 1999; cited in Fidrmuc, 2008), dictatorships destroy social capital and once the doctrine collapses, societies are likely to accumulate 'negative' social capital (taking the form of underground activities such as organised crime or corruption) which further obstructs economic growth. In this paper, I will use social trust as a latent definition of social capital, which measures community cohesion and relationships between members.

2.5 General values differences in post-communist countries

Hofstede (1980; cited in Schwartz and Bardi, 1997 affirms that basic values are seen as the very heart of culture. These values and their manifestation in the community can be seen culturallyin everyday practices, symbols and rituals, in what people believe is good or bad, their views regarding the actions that must be taken and what is considered as desirable or undesirable (Williams, 1970). In a study conducted by Schwartz and Bardi (1997), it is argued that the type of political system implemented has a certain effect on the basic values (such as freedom, prosperity, and security) of citizens. In this context, it is desirable to identify how the experience of living under communism affects the basic values of citizens in East European countries. The authors consider two primary processes which might have caused change in the human basic values of citizens: direct indoctrination of communist ideology and adaptation to living under communist rule. This approach differs from the economic form of

institution approach described above, focusing more on the individual inner values and priorities.

Regarding the process of direct indoctrination, historical evidence shows that residents of Eastern Europe have experienced for more than four decades the communist ideology (Roskin, 1991), which often produced negative reaction towards the regime and its symbols (Barghoorn and Remington, 1986). Moreover, many sociologists have argued that in Central Europe communism represented an alien ideology which once imposed attracted disagreement among citizens (e.g. Rupnik 1988a and1988b). Others have characterised the underlying political cultures – as repressed by the Soviet ideology- as tending to be more liberal (Almond, 1983). Broek & Moor (1994; cited in Schwart and Bardi, 1997) claimed that in terms of politics, religion and primary relations Eastern Europeans did not differ from the Westerners in 1990s. However, the formers showed less appreciation for initiative, achievement and responsibility in the work place. The second process, adaptation to life circumstances, is thought to be vital for value formation (Almagor, 1994), as it does not require acceptance for an ideology, but effective adjustment to the opportunities and constraints that arise in one's life. In this sense, communist regime structured heavily the living conditions of their citizens in terms of work, family, education or leisure, thus, adaptation should have led to the formation of a specific set of priorities (Kowak, 1988). One line of demarcation can be religion. The countries of interest appertain to Roman Catholic (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland) and Orthodox (Bulgaria) churches. The former places the Central European countries in a socio-economic and agricultural development and adaptation to worlds markets which places them between East and West (Gunst, 1989) along with a greater resistance and more oppositional movements to communism (Aschrson, 1992). Moreover, differences at socioeconomic level might account for value differences between East and West.

2.6 The present study

As described in this section, this study takes into consideration instrumental and expressive factors that shape trust in police. Firstly, I take into account police perceived fairness and effectiveness as components of police confidence and results of public-police encounters; and I test them together with the instrumental factor of fear of becoming a victim and the expressive

factor of perceived community cohesion represented by social trust. Together with social trust, I introduce political trust in order to construct a suitable environment which can predict changes in trust in police according to the country variable while taking into consideration important social actors such as government and community members. My interest is to determine differences between Western and Eastern Europe in this matter while using the factors described in the literature.

I deduced four empirical hypotheses concerning the effect of the factors introduced in my model on the expected outcome as following:

H1 The main effect of high perceived police fairness and effectiveness, controlling socio-demographic characteristics and worry about disorder levels within the community – is significant and positive.

H2 The main effect of decreasing perceived levels of disorder in the community, controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and other factors – is significant and positive.

H3 The effect of perceived high probability of being caught if engaged in criminal behaviour on trust in police, controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, instrumental and expressive factors, country variable –is positive and significant.

H4 The negative effect of living in an East European country on trust in police will significantly decrease when high social and political trust, controlling for socio-demographic variables and instrumental and expressive factors.

3 Methodology

Hence, a comparative cross-sectional approach is designed to measure the differences in trust in police across six countries: United Kingdom that symbolizes Western culture and post-communist countries Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland as representative for Eastern and Central European culture.

In order to analyse the differences on trust in police across my six countries of interest, using SPSS version 20, I will explore the dataset of the fifth round of European Social Survey which includes 45 questions on Trust in Justice. The study was conducted in 2010 involving 28 European countries, around 39,000 face to face interviews, translation and fieldwork, being ran and supervised at specific ESS Core Scientific Team standards. Subsequent to the country recoding where I have selected from the dataset only my six countries of interest, I have left with a total of 12,410 respondents as following: Bulgaria with 2,434, Czech Republic 2,386, United Kingdom 2,422, Hungary 1,561, Poland 1,751 and Slovakia with 1,856 respondents. Regarding the weighting variables which compensate for unequal sample selection probabilities, I have decided to continue with my analysis without including it as the population geographic and demographic accounts for the differences in the actual number of respondents for each country. However, I apply the weight variable when I run crosstabs and frequencies in order to avoid misleading estimates across population samples.

Reliability is concerned with consistency of measurement and it is represented by three factors: stability which checks if a measure is stable over time, internal reliability which tests whether the respondents' scores on any indicator are related to their scores on the other indicators and inter-observer consistency, which concerns the subjective judgements and lack of consistency in the researchers' decision on recording observations (Bryman, 2012). In order to test the reliability of my variables, I run a reliability test for my three summated scales (police fairness, effectiveness and the risk of being caught if committing a crime- that will be explained below more in detail) and Cronbach's alpha testing for internal reliability.

SummatedScales	Cronbach's Alpha
Police Fairness	.767
Police Effectiveness	.221
Risk to be caught	.856

Table 3.1

Validity refers to the issue of whether an indicator of a concept really is measuring the concept in question. In order to measure validity, several ways are established such as face validity, concurrent validity, predictive validity, construct validity and convergent validity (Bryman,

2012). In order to test for internal validity of my measures, I run a factor analysis for the variables that I considered indicating social and political trust. Firstly, political trust has been defined as an evaluation on how well the government is functioning according to people's normative expectations (Miller, 1974). I describe political trust as result of respondents' perception of their trust in political parties, trust in politicians and trust in country's Parliament. Social trust can be described as an abstract evaluation of the moral standards of society in which we live and it is postulated to encourage cooperation between social actors (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Social trust is used as citizens' perception on their community members.

In Valdivieso and Villena-Roldan (2014), interpersonal trust is measured through the use of the following question: 'Would you say that people in your community are very trustworthy, somehow trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy?' In the present dataset, social trust is measured as a sum of the three questions concerning citizens' opinion about their neighbours and neighbourhood. Thus, I have attributed the following latent variables: 'Most of the time people are helpful or mostly looking out for themselves ', 'Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful' and 'Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair'. In Allum, Patulny, Read and Sturgis (2010) it is argued that social and political trust tend to be correlated at the individual and aggregate country levels. The validity of social and political indicators has been confirmed by the non-significant Chi-square which shows that my model is a good fitting one. The full analysis will be discussed in the Data Analysis section.

Goodness-of-fit Test		
Chi-Square	df	Sig.
5.392	4	.249

Table 3.2

Testing the theories of Trust in Justice involves questions such as 'why do people break the law' and its opposite 'why they obey it.' The focus of this research is on the latter with the explanation that most people obey most of the laws, mostly due to their beliefs that it is the right thing to do or simply for the habit of doing so. The two sets of considerations are centred upon self-interest and normative or ethical considerations. While the former is taking into

consideration the individual's rationale of weighing the risks of being caught and the costs of punishment, the latter is based on citizens' motivation to behave according to their moral principles and respecting the others' rights, used in my analysis as social trust. The normative consideration is believed to be more durable and less costly to society if respected. However, it questions the role of the central institutions of justice such as police and the courts as forces for deterrence and coercion (European Social Survey, 2011).

Trust and legitimacy are two interrelated phenomena which concern the interaction police and wider public as following. If the aim of criminal justice policy is securing the normative compliance with the law, public trust in the system is vital as well as the acceptance of legal institutions' authority and their right to exercise it accordingly. Moreover, trust in justice holds the belief that its institutions can be relied upon to act competently, to exercise their authority procedurally correct, while maintaining equality and protection across society. Legitimacy concerns the fundamental property of legal institutions of having the right to govern and getting recognition from the governed as rightful. Here, the performance and arrangements of the system confer the base for the 'normative' legitimacy, while the actions of the authorities must account for substantive requirements such as efficiency, accountability and legality (Tyler, 2006). When citizens recognize justice institutions as legitimate, they perceive the system's right of determining the law, of governing through the use of force, of punishing illegal behaviour and of expecting cooperation and obedience from the public. Moreover, legitimacy arises when citizens believe their values are shared by the justice institutions, when the institutions follow their own rules, while taking into consideration the rules that govern that particular society. In a nutshell, legitimacy is the public recognition as well as the public justification of power (European Social Survey, 2011). In the ESS 2011, the study shows that in countries where people feel that the police forces share a moral consensus with the community, its people also tend to have a strong will to obey police instructions. In order to replicate this statement, I chose the variable 'Police stand up for values that are important for people like me' to measure shared values and the variable 'I generally support how the police act' for citizens opinion towards police decisions and conduct. The findings show as following: for each country, supporting police decisions is highly correlated to the perceived shared value with the community (see table below); however, the causality relationship cannot be expressed.

Cronbach's Alpha	
Support police , Police shares values	.742

Table 3.3

When measuring the public trust and institutional legitimacy, citizens' experience and circumstances of meeting the police officers must be taken into consideration. In Tyler and Fagan (2006), personal contact with police officers is seen as the main predictor of citizens' trust. The question used in the survey is asking if the respondents have been approached, stopped or contacted by the police in two years prior to the interview. The analysis reveals little variation in the proportion of police encounter experience across the six countries, varying from 16% in Bulgaria to 38% in the UK. However, the role the police carry is different from country to country, thus when the rates of police contact are high such in United Kingdom (38%) or in Hungary (37%), this might account for their other functions in that particular country and not for street and traffic stops (European Social Survey, 2011).

Approached, stopped or contacted by police in the last 2 years		
Country	Yes	No
UK	38%	62%
	892	152
Hungary	37%	63%
	586	992
Slovakia	35%	65%
	532	1309
Czech Republic	35%	65%
	794	
Poland	30%	70%
	532	1212
Bulgaria	16%	84%
	374	2050

Table 3.4

Another relevant question refers to judging the police performance. In the European Social survey documentation, the authors analysis shown that there is no necessary link between how much contact people have with the police and the levels of satisfaction in that circumstance. The analysis shows that approximately 70% of the respondents either chose not to answer the question or the data is missing. The general overview of the variable indicates that 57% of the respondents were very satisfied or satisfied with the police encounter in comparison with 43% which were either very dissatisfied or dissatisfied.

4 Data analysis

Police put into application the government policies. In the same time, police has to ensure neighbourhood safety and it has to respond and manage the wrongdoings in the society. One could easily argue that police is a mediator between government and the community members. When it comes to assessing police behaviour, decisions or contact experience, views across society differ according to various factors. In this section, I will explore more in-depth the questions in the dataset regarding police experience showing interesting findings.

For the question 'How often do police make fair, impartial decisions?' the results show that only 1.6% of the UK respondents answered 'not at all often', while the other countries scored almost twice and three time higher for the same answer. For the answer 'often', UK scored the highest 70%, while the Eastern Europe citizens' answers range from 48% (Bulgaria) to 60% (Poland and Hungary).



Figure 4.1 – How often do police make fair, impartial decisions?

The respondents were asked how often they think the police take bribes in their country and their answers were measured on a frequency Likert scale from 0 – Never, to 10 – Always. The chart below represents the average mean of each country respondents with error bars representing the confidence intervals around each mean. This tests the spread of my data showing that generally there is a substantial difference between views on police bribery between UK and Eastern countries. Clearly the UK has the lowest belief that police take bribes with the least standard error showing that the belief is consistent across the population sample making it a good representation of the population. In contrast with this, a high proportion of Bulgarian and Slovakian respondents do not trust in their police fairness regarding bribery; however there is a large variation within the sample. Expect for Poland, the other Eastern European countries error bars overlap, which accounts for no statistical significant mean differences on views regarding bribery in Eastern Europe.



Figure 4.2 – How often do police take bribes in your country?

Respondents were asked to answer to the following statement: 'Police are doing a good or bad job in the country'. As showed by the bar chart Figure 4.3, almost 3 times more of the UK respondents agreed that the police are doing a good job in the UK compared to the ones who scored 'bad'. The levels of positive opinions decrease reaching the minimum in Hungary with 41%. In Bulgaria, however, the opinions are shared by almost half.



Figure 4.3 – Police are doing a good or bad job in the country

When asked about their worries of becoming a burglary victim in their neighbourhood, the respondents answered as following: 16% of Bulgarians worry most of the time about their home being burgled, while the minimum is reached by Czech Republic with almost 2%. UK situates somewhere in the middle with 6%. For the answer 'Never', Bulgaria and Slovakia score the lowest value with only 28%, while Polish and Czech respondents score the highest with 50% and 41% (Figure 4.4).



Figure 4.4 – How often, if at all, do you worry about your home being burgled?

When asked about their experience of being contacted by the police, the highest rate of satisfaction and the lowest rate of dissatisfaction are achieved by the UK with 68% and 32%. Czech Republic is the following one with 58% positive experience. Hungary marks the lowest value of police contact satisfaction with 51%, and there is no massive difference among the last three, Bulgaria and Poland scoring 52% (Figure 4.5).



Figure 4.5 – Highest rate of satisfaction and lowest rate of dissatisfaction when asked about their experience of being contacted by the police

However, after introducing the country variable, along with trust in police (see Table 4.5), the data shows that low satisfaction with police attracts low trust. For example, in Bulgaria 70% of the unsatisfied respondents have no trust at all in police, while the satisfied respondents scored 73% complete trust. In Czech Republic, 33% of the satisfied citizens show no trust at all, while 37% of the unsatisfied scored complete trust. Poland reaches no trust at all with 10% of the satisfied respondents.

		Trust in Police										
Country	Satisfaction	No Trust	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Complete Trust
Bulgaria	Yes	30%	30%	43%	40%	55%	53%	74%	91%	80%	70%	73%
	No	70%	70%	57%	61%	45%	47%	26%	9%	20%	30%	27%
Czech	Yes	33%	34%	44%	46%	51%	54%	66%	75%	78%	79%	63%
Republic	No	67%	66%	56%	54%	49%	46%	34%	25%	22%	21%	37%
UK	Yes	29%	20%	32%	48%	58%	63%	75%	75%	81%	85%	90%
	No	71%	80%	68%	60%	42%	37%	25%	25%	19%	15%	10%
Hungary	Yes	21%	38%	34%	45%	45%	63%	61%	57%	60%	54%	65%
	No	79%	62%	66%	55%	55%	37%	39%	43%	40%	46%	35%
Poland	Yes	10%	19%	35%	39%	49%	50%	61%	69%	69%	68%	100%
	No	90%	81%	65%	61%	51%	50%	39%	31%	31%	32%	0%
Slovakia	Yes	31%	24%	38%	56%	49%	65%	58%	71%	83%	81%	94%
	No	70%	76%	62%	44%	51%	35%	42%	29%	17%	19%	6%

Table 4.5

For the question asking whether the citizens support police decisions (Figure 4.6), the results show that police judgements get support mostly in the UK 79%, while Eastern and Central European scored maxim support in Poland 65% and minimum in Czech Republic 43%.



Figure 4.6 – I generally support how the police usually act the police usually act.

Previously, in the Methodology section I discussed the relationship between agreeing with police conduct and the perceived shared values with the community across Eastern and Western Europe. In the table (Table 4.6) below I extend the analysis as following: in Bulgaria, 81% of the respondents do not generally agree with police behaviour and decisions which reflects on their opinion on whether the police officers share the community values. 76% of the Bulgarian respondents support the police and perceive them close to the community. The same trend applies to the other Eastern European countries, with the mention that overall, 57% of Czech respondents do not agree with the way police acts along with 52% of Slovakian, 49% of Hungarian and 35% of Polish respondents. Regarding United Kingdom, 51% of the respondents who agree with police conduct do not perceive them as sharing the same values as the community members, while 91% of the citizens who support them, also believe they are standing up for the same values.

		Police stand up for values that are important to people like me		
Country	Support Police Decisions	No	Yes	Total
Bulgaria	No	81%	24%	50%
	Yes	19%	76%	50%
Czech Republic	No	84%	30%	57%
	Yes	16%	70%	43%
UK	No	49%	9%	21%
	Yes	51%	91%	79%
Hungary	No	81%	27%	49%
	Yes	19%	73%	51%
Poland	No	66%	24%	35%
	Yes	34%	76%	65%
Slovakia	No	87%	31%	52%
	Yes	13%	69%	48%

Table 4.6

In order to analyse quantitatively perceived police trust and legitimacy, I have created two summated scales for perceived police fairness and effectiveness. For the former, I have included the following three questions, all three being measured on a scale from 1 to 4 (not at all often, not very often, often and very often): 'How often do police treat people in country with respect?', 'How often do police make fair, impartial decisions?' and 'How often do the police explain their decisions and actions when asked?'. Police effectiveness summated scale is measured on a 10 point scale where 0 is extremely unsuccessful ('slow' for the last question) and 10 is extremely successful ('quickly') constructed with the following questions: 'How successful police are at preventing crimes in country?', 'How successful police are at catching house burglars in country?' and 'How quickly would police arrive at a violent crime/burglary scene near to where you live?' For police fairness, the Cronbach's Aplha is very high 0.767 which accounts for the reliability of the scale. The variables showed in the correlation matrix medium to high correlation. For police effectiveness, the Cronbach's Aplha was not as high, but

still showing reliability 0.221. Again, the variables have medium to high correlation among themselves as shown in the correlation matrix. (See Table 4.7 and Table 4.8)

	Police effectiveness	1	2	3
1	How successful police are at preventing crimes in country			
2	How successful police are at catching house burglars in country	.660**		
3	How quickly would police arrive at a violent crime/burglary scene near to where you live	.140**	.132**	

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4.7

	Police Fairness	1	2	3
1	How often do police treat people in country with respect			
2	How often do police make fair, impartial decisions	.642**		
3	How often do the police explain their decisions and actions when asked	.472**	.495**	

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 4.8

After building a cross tab with the police fairness variable on the column section and the country variable on the rows (Figure 4.8), the findings show that UK has the highest rate of perceived fairness when compared to Eastern and Central European countries and the difference is clearly statistical significant. However, in the UK the trust in police fairness shows the highest variability across the population sample, thus the Eastern European countries

representation fits better for the whole population with best fit in Slovakia and Czech Republic. For them, the police fairness is perceived lower than in the UK.



Figure 4.8 – Perceived police fairness according to country

The graphic representation of police effectiveness is shown by the Figure 4.9. This time, UK rate their police effectiveness lower than the other countries, while Czech Republic scores the highest values for police effectiveness. However, for UK population, this representation shows good fitting, when compare to Eastern countries which show larger variation. There is no statistical significant difference between UK and Bulgaria and Hungary, but there is a big difference between Bulgarian and Polish, Slovakia and Czech respondents in terms of their police effectiveness.



Figure 4.9 – Perceived police effectiveness according to country

In addition, I introduce another summated scale to measure the instrumental factor of perceived risk of being caught committing infractions. This factor is important for a rational choice perspective which asserts that people are governed by self-interest which takes the form of sanctions or incentives. Further, citizens will comply with the rules if they believe they will be caught and punished if engaged in criminal behaviour. If this is confirmed to be true, then proof that the police are effective in fighting crime and punishing the rule breakers is important, for cooperative behaviour to be encouraged (European Social Survey, 2011). Thus, I create a new variable which has three components:

1) 'How likely to be caught if made exaggerated or false insurance claim?'

2) 'How likely to be caught if bought something that might be stolen?' and

3) 'How likely to be caught if committed traffic offence?'

Cronbach's Alpha is higher than the previous two summated scales with 0.821 and the correlations between variables are very strong as shown in the tables below.

Cronbach's Alpha	
Risk of being caught	.821

Table 4.9

		1	2	3
1	How likely be caught if made exaggerated or false insurance claim			
2	How likely to be caught if bought something that might be stolen	.701**		
3	How likely to be caught if committed traffic offence	.558**	.555**	

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4.10

Figure 4.10 below displays the representation of the risk of being caught across UK and Eastern and Central European countries. The Slovakian respondents rank the risk of being caught the lowest out of all countries and this applies to all Eastern countries when compared to UK as there is no statistical difference among them. However, when comparing Slovakia and UK, there is a significant statistical difference between their views, the former scoring lowest on the scale and the later having the highest score on scale of perceived risk of being caught. UK has the largest variation within the sample, thus the sample is not as better fit for the population as it is in Poland.



Figure 4.10 – Perceived risk of being caught according to country

Social trust and political trust measurements have been created using the exploratory factor analysis technique which examines the patterns of inter-correlation between variables. Social or 'generalised' trust concerns the beliefs that people have about the other society members' behaviour (Delhey and Newton, 2005). However, this type of trust also called 'thin' or 'horizontal' is different from the 'instrumental' trust that people invest in their family members, close acquaintances, colleagues or known institutions (Putnam, 2000). The latter type of trust is developed and worked upon through personal experience, while the social trust is more like an abstract evaluation of the moral standards that the society that we live in holds (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Social trust can also be described as the link that disconnected people with different inclinations form in order to reach social and economic prosperity (Arrow, 1974). Moreover, it is argued that social trust is linked to a wider notion of social capital (Sturgis, et al, 2012). Here, I will measure social capital by using three latent variables as explained below. I add political trust which can be defined as a basic evaluation of government performance as well as its operation according to people's normative expectations (Miller, 1974). The path diagram below (Figure.4.11) explains the correlation between social and political trust as explained in Allum, Sturgis and Read (2010). Thus, citizens who tend to trust their society members, tend also to have trust in political institutions.



Figure 4.11

The Exploratory Factor analysis technique involved an oblique rotation. There are two factors retained with an Eigenvalue higher than 1 which together explain about 68% of the

covariance. The pattern matrix after rotation shows high factor loading on the two factors latent variables as shown in the table below. The high Chi-square of 5.392, along with the p-value (much higher than 0.05), together measure a good fitting model.

Factor	Eigenvalue	% of variance	Cumulative %
1	3.149	45.229	68.004
2	1.552	22.775	

Table 4.11

Pattern Matrix	Factor	
	1	2
Trust in politicians	.967	-.027
Trust in political parties	.918	-.024
Trust in country's parliament	.781	.054
Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair	-.047	.790
Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful	.001	.786
Most of the time people are helpful or mostly looking out for themselves	.052	.669

Table 4.12

The variables explained above have been included in four OLS regression models predicting general trust in police measure on a 0-10 scale from 'No trust at all' to 'Complete trust.' Predictors in the models are: living in one of the post-communist countries, age, sex of the respondent, whether the respondent has a higher education degree (Bachelor, Masters, PhD), whether the respondent's occupation is labelled as low job, respondent living with partner, all

introduced as socio-economic variables; police fairness, effectiveness, perception on risk of victimization and opinion about police sharing the community member moral values account for instrumental and expressive model; risk of being caught and political and social trust.

Model 1 shows that the post-communist country variable has a negative effect of -1.524 on the police trust scale. In the second model, age is not statistical significant, but all other variables are significant at $p<0.010$ for occupation and $p< 0.05$ for the others. The results show that for males the trust in police decreases with 0.225 controlling for the other socio-economic variables. In terms of education, if the respondent has a higher degree, then his or her trust increases with 0.155. If the respondent works in low ranked occupation, his or her trust decreases with 0.172 controlling for the other variables. And sharing the same home with a partner increases the trust in police with 0.155.

The results of model 3 clearly supports H1 with a positive and highly significant ($p<0.001$) coefficient of 0.435 for police fairness and 0.039 for police effectiveness. Also note that all the variables in the model are statistically significant at the $p<0.05$ level, except for high education ($p<0.01$) and occupation which loses its statistical significance; getting older decreases the trust in police with 0.041 on the trust scale; having a higher degree increases the trust with 0.125 and living with a partner increases it as well with 0.112; less worries about victimization increases trust with 0.208 on the police trust scale; lastly, trusting police shares the same values as community members increases trust with almost 1 point on trust scale.

Model 4 incorporates all the independent variable from model 3, but adds the perceived risk of being caught if engaged in criminal behaviour along with political and social trust. H3 is proved by the model, where perceived high probability of being caught if engaged in criminal behaviour increases trust in police with 0.035. The model also supports H4 and its positive and significant effect triggers a steep increase in R^2 and a significant decrease in the negative coefficient of the country variable. It elaborates H4 by including Social and Political trust as additional predictors of increased trust in police according to country of residence. The rise in R^2reaches 45%, while other variables' coefficients drop. High education together with occupation and living with a partner lose their significance. The age effect still remains negative with -0.065 along with gender which decreases police trust with 0.078 for males;

perceived police shared values with the community increases the trust in the justice organs with 0.774; country variable coefficient is still negative and reduced more than twice when compared to model 1; high political trust accounts for almost 1 point rise on the trust scale, while social trust increases trust with only 0.341.

Variables in model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	6.251***	6.174***	.675***	1.514***
	(.062)	(.112)	(.172)	(.170)
East Block	-1.524***	-1.524***	-1.084***	-.620***
	(.070)	(.070)	(.063)	(.057)
Age		.026	-.041*	-.065***
		(.024)	(.021)	(.019)
Sex		-.225***	-.150**	-.078†
		(.059)	(.051)	(.045)
High Education		.155*	.125†	-.072
		(.076)	(.019)	(.059)
Low status job		-.172†	-.065	.017
		(.089)	(.076)	(.068)
Living with partner		.155*	.112*	.062
		(.060)	(.052)	(.046)
Police Effectiveness			.039***	.027***
			(.003)	(.003)
Police Fairness			.435***	.335***
			(.016)	(.015)
Police shared values			.975***	.774***
			(.058)	(.051)
Perceived risk of victimization			.208***	.113***
			(.029)	(.026)
Risk get Caught				.035***
				(.009)

Variables in model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Political Trust				.934*** (.026)
Social trust				.330*** (.029)
R2	0.61	.066	.305	.451
Standard error of the estimate	2.493	2.488	2.146	1.908
Statistical significant change in R2	-	.005	.239	.146
F	472.731***	84.395***	316.751**	455.659***

† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Number of cases: 12410

Table 4.13

5 Discussion

This study investigated differences in trust in police between UK and Eastern and Central Europe. Using elements from instrumental and expressive models proposed by academia, its contribution lays in trying to compare Eastern and Western trust in police using tools and concepts majorly applied on UK and US societies.

Overall, there is a general tendency for Eastern and Central European countries to distrust their legal authorities. Questions on police decision-making, impartiality and assessed police performance show that UK respondents believe in their police officers' efficiency and impartiality; these results are in contrast with any of the Eastern and Central European countries. Moreover, police decisions received greater support from UK respondents, while in Eastern and Central Europe the opinions were almost evenly shared between positive and negative experiences. Regarding police sharing the values central for community members,

the analysis showed that previous experience and agreement with officers' decision-making reflect on citizens' opinions. Again, UK respondents find their police officers closer to the community than the Eastern and Central European citizens do.

The results presented above show that shared values are a very important factor in police-public relationship. Community members need police officers to deal with the types of criminal behaviour that attempts to erode social control and social cohesion. This is in line with previous studies which asserted that trust and confidence in police are shaped by the evaluations of the values that underpin community life (Jackson and Sunshine, 2007). My third model shows that lower fear of crime contributes to rise in trust in police; however, police sharing community values has a stronger effect. This further implies that police need to re-engage actively in the community, to represent and defend community values, norms and morals (Jackson, et al, 2009).

Perceived police fairness and effectiveness showed high increase in trust in police, and they account for positive police-public experience and low perceived risk of victimization within the community. This finding is reinforced by Jackson, et al (2009) where components of police confidence rise if low perceived community disorder.

Analysing the risks of being caught shows that higher perceived risk attracts higher trust in legal authorities. This instrumental perspective argues that police officers attract positive cooperation and acceptance from community members when they promote sanctioning illicit behaviour, when they show effectiveness in controlling crimes and fairness in distributing their services across communities (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003).

My model showed that trust in community members highly increases general trust in police; together with trust in country's political system, they highly diminished the country's variable negative effect on trust in police (Eastern Europe countries).

Some limitations might be related to omission of other important socio-economic variables. For example, introducing aspects of citizen's social class, variables concerning ethnic

minorities, overall satisfaction with quality of life, variables related to religious practices or previous criminal record could be explored as additional antecedents of trust in police.

6 Conclusion

Throughout this paper I have explored the differences in trust in police between Eastern and Western Europe. The models provided by the literature bring into question useful and complex concepts such as values that characterise a certain community, perceived disorder, citizens' cooperation with each other, with their institutions and many more. Attempts to measure them quantitatively while getting access to a population's opinions is a task that gets tackled towards reaching balance and perfection with every study conducted. Moreover, bringing them together cross-nationally with the purpose of comparing civilizations and the core values that their cultures underpin is a fascinating process which deserves investing time and resources. This paper's ambition is to contribute to the bigger picture quantitatively analysing the existent data following the popular models used to study trust in police.

Yet, trust in police is a complex concept which must be studied from various angles in order to determine other causal predictors. There are many aspects and experiences of citizens' lives that might trigger positive or negative reaction towards police and trust in legal authorities in general. The several factors that I have mentioned throughout this paper are indeed very important such as police-public encounter, bounding with community members or willingness to improve quality of services provided. However, further research should be encouraged with better coverage of surveys across Europe in order to determine these predictors' origins.

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