

## **PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND SYSTEM LEGITIMACY IN ESTABLISHED AND NEW DEMOCRACIES**

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### **Abstract**

Although students of democratic politics believe that party identification is directly related to the legitimacy of democratic political systems, we know very little about the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship. Drawing on public opinion survey data collected as part of the *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems* (CSES) along with the *Manifestos Research Group* (MRG) project data my study examines the role of party identification for system legitimacy in established and newer democracies across Europe. I argue that partisanship operates on system support in two important ways. First, partisanship can stimulate citizen support for the political system if it signals allegiance to party-based democratic governance. This is certainly the case in established democracies, but not in new democracies of East Central Europe where in the initial stages of democratization partisanship predominates among supporters of former Communist parties. More importantly, however, partisanship operates on system legitimacy indirectly, that is, by providing a link that allows parties to communicate their opinions to citizens more effectively. This persuasion effect is particularly strong in new democracies, where low levels of political sophistication and high uncertainty associated with democratic transitions makes citizens especially susceptible to opinions of the political elites.

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Partisanship has played a central role in studies of public opinion and behavior since the inception of survey-based research. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, party identification has been often considered a major factor in the expression of public support for, and the persistence of, political parties, the party system and political order in which they are embedded. People who identify strongly with a party are generally expected to be more supportive of the political system and political parties as institutions that are necessary for the functioning of democratic governance than non-partisans (Holmberg 2003; Miller and Listhaug 1990). This relationship has been assumed to be of direct relevance to the health of, and the outlook for, a democratic political system (Dennis 1975, Dalton 1996, 1999, Holmberg 2003; Torcal et al. 2002, Miller and Shanks 1996, Budge et al. 1976, Miller and Listhaug 1990). In a recent study, Russell Dalton (1999, 66) argued that the declining strength of party identification across most Western democracies signals not only a weakening of party but also a progressive disengagement from politics amongst electorates. In his view, weakened party attachments might erode beliefs in the need for parties as the major actors in democratic politics and lead to declining support for party-based democracy (see also Holmberg 2003).

Yet, the existing literature has yet to examine the partisanship-support link in more detail. Instead, scholars routinely and naïvely assume that the effect of partisan attachment on political support is essentially uniform across citizens attached to different political parties. In other words, the existing view implies, for example, that citizens who identify with protest parties in established democracies or communist parties in new democracies are as supportive of the political system as citizens attached to more mainstream parties. Such assumptions, however, are unlikely to be met in real life or, at the very least, are worthy of examination. This paper therefore explores the role of party identification in shaping citizen views about their political system and examines it in both established and new democracies. I suggest two

causal mechanisms by which that partisanship operates on system legitimacy. First, I expect that partisanship has a direct effect on citizen attitudes towards the political system, that is, partisanship stimulates a psychological attachment to democratic governance. This relationship, however, is likely to be strong only in established democracies. In new democracies of East Central Europe, where partisanship was concentrated among supporters of former Communist parties in the initial stages of democratization, party identification should generate a negative effect on citizen support for the new political regime. It is only over time, as citizens develop attachments to new political parties, that we can expect the effect of partisanship to change from negative to positive.

Furthermore, I expect that partisanship operates on system legitimacy also indirectly, that is, by providing a link by which political parties can communicate their views to partisans. Given that politics is rather complex and remote from the concerns of many ordinary citizens, it is not surprising that partisanship encourages citizens to rely on their political parties as a legitimate source of information as to what should be believed and valued. Political system evaluations should be no exception to this rule. I expect that positive party statements about the political system should lead to more system support among party identifiers. Conversely, parties that express negative statements about the status quo of the system generate more cynicism about the political regime among their partisans.

This effect of party persuasion should be much stronger in newer democracies than in established ones. Socialized in the previous regime, citizens in new democracies often lack political sophistication necessary to form their opinions independently, especially in the environment of high uncertainty associated with political and economic reforms. As a consequence, party identifiers in new democracies should be more susceptible to their party opinions than partisans in older democratic regimes.

In the empirical section of my paper, I test my hypotheses by specifying a simultaneous non-recursive model that allows me to separate persuasion effects from the effects of strategic position taking by political parties. The first stage of the model is designed to generate predicted party positions toward the political system that are then mapped onto citizen attitudes towards the system. In the final section of my paper, I offer concluding remarks and discuss more general theoretical and policy implications of my findings.

### **Party Identification**

Party identification is one of the most important and widely used theoretical constructs in the study of electoral behavior and public opinion formation. It has often been referred to as an individual's enduring attachment to a political party (Campbell et al. 1960, 1966). Following Campbell et al. (1986), Converse and Pierce (1987), Green and Palmquist (1990), Miller (1991), Blais et al. (2001), I assume that there are two important elements to party identification. First, partisans are partisan because they *think* they are partisan. As Campbell and his colleagues put it: “[partisans] are not necessarily partisan because they vote like a partisan, or think like a partisan, or register like a partisan, or because someone else thinks they are partisan. In the strict sense, they are not even partisan because they like one party more than another. Partisanship as party identification is entirely a matter of self-definition” (1986, 100).

The second important characteristic of party identification is that it reflects an enduring orientation. Partisanship was conceptualized as a long-term attachment in *The American Voter* (Campbell et al 1960, 529), the first study that examined the American electorate using nation-wide survey data. Early attempts to employ party identification in the European context, however, did not show the same stability. Partisanship in European

electorates appeared to be highly correlated with the vote, and sometimes it was found to be even more volatile than the vote (Thomassen 1976, Borre and Katz 1973, Butler and Stokes 1969, LeDuc 1981). Thus, contrary to the U.S. electorate, European party loyalties did not seem to reflect long-term attitudes distinct from the vote. These findings led scholars to question the measurement and applicability of the concept developed in the U.S. to the European electorates, and even doubt the utility of the concept itself, arguing that it may simply be another measure of vote choice and therefore tautological.

More recent research, however, shows much more stability in party loyalties in the European context. Drawing on the analysis of survey data from Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands in the 1980s, Richardson (1991) argues that party loyalties are highly stable among supporters of traditional cleavage parties. Other studies based on panel surveys confirm that party loyalties are stable across many established democracies (see Bartels 2002, Schickler and Green 1997, Green and Palmquist 1990, Sears 1975). Drawing on the evidence from eight panel surveys from Great Britain, Canada, and Germany, Schickler and Green (1997) argued that it is imprecision of survey methods that often create the appearance of partisanship instability and its responsiveness to short-term forces. Having accounted for measurement error, their results indicate high over-time individual-level stability in party identification.

Furthermore, existing research suggests that partisanship continues to have a pervasive influence on electoral behavior as well as on citizen perceptions of, and reactions to, the political world (Bartels 2002, Richardson 1991, Sanders 2003). Thus, given that partisanship remains to be an important characteristic in the relationship between citizens and political parties, there are strong reasons to suspect that partisanship also plays an important role in shaping people's attitudes towards their political system.

## **Party Identification and System Legitimacy**

The main idea examined in this study is that party identification operates on system support essentially in two important ways. First, drawing on the existing literature (e.g. Dalton 1999, Holmberg 2003, Dennis 1966, Anderson et al. 2005, ch.5), we can expect that in established democracies attachment to a political party stimulates citizen support for the political system because it signals allegiance to party-based governance, that is, political system, in which parties operate as key actors. From this perspective, regardless of the nature of a party a citizen identifies with, partisanship should lead to higher levels of democratic support. After all, even protest parties signal some allegiance to a political regime by the very fact that they organize themselves via political parties. In fact, Miller and Listhaug (1990) suggest that protest parties can be effectively used also to channel discontent back into the decision-making arena and therefore increase the levels of political trust in a country. Viewing from the perspective, party identifiers should generally hold more positive views about the system than non-identifiers. We therefore can formulate our first general hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1a:** Citizens with party identification will have higher levels of support for the political system in their country than non-identifiers in established democracies.

The relationship between partisanship and system support should be less clear in new democracies. Transition to democracy is usually associated with the emergence of many new political parties. It should not be surprising that the levels of party identification in new democracies are relatively low because it is only over time, that is, through a continuing experience with these political parties that citizens can develop party loyalties. As in older democracies, we can expect that party identification with the new political parties that

emerged in the process of democratization will translate into citizen support for the political system.

What is peculiar about new democracies in East Central Europe is that many of them have inherited Communist parties from the previous regime. Ironically, these former communist parties much better equipped for competition in new democratic elections than other parties because of their organizational resources and a substantial base of party loyalists in the electorate from the Communist regime (Bielasiak 1997). Despite this advantage, democratization for Communist parties and their supporters was associated with dismantling if their political power and policy hegemony enjoyed in the previous regime. Predominance of partisanship among supporters of former communist parties suggests that a positive relationship between partisanship and citizen support for the system that we observe in established democracies is unlikely in post-communist societies of East Central Europe.<sup>1</sup>

Instead, we can expect that in the first stages of democratization partisanship will have negative effect on system legitimacy. Over time, however, as citizens develop loyalties to new political parties, the effect of partisanship of system support in East Central Europe should change from negative to positive. Given that survey data used in our empirical testing come from mid- and late- 1990s, the time when most East Central European countries were conducting their second or even third democratic elections, our next hypothesis is the following:

**Hypothesis 1b.** Partisanship will have no clear effect on system legitimacy in new democracies of East Central Europe because negative effect of communist partisanship and positive effect of identification with new political parties will cancel each other out.

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<sup>1</sup> Some studies suggest that the very concept of political party had negative connotations for many as a consequence of compulsory party membership in the single-party dictatorship of a Soviet regime (McGrath 1995: 241, Bielasiak 1997, Rose et al. 1998, Rose 1995, Misher and Rose 1997). This explains why many new organizations in the initial stages of democratization preferred alternative labels, such as movements, forums, confederations, or unions (Belasiak 1997).

## **Partisanship as a Medium for Party Persuasion**

In addition to a simple contagion effect that attachment to a political party may have for citizen attachment to a political regime (Dalton 1999, Holmberg 2003), I expect that partisanship plays an important indirect role on system legitimacy. Specifically, we can conceptualize partisanship as a link between political parties and their partisans that helps parties to communicate their views about the system to their partisans. In other words, partisanship can be conceptualized as a medium for party persuasion. This approach is not uncommon in the existing literature. Partisanship has been often conceived as an information economizing device, as a cue that people use to orient themselves in political world. As Warren Miller put it, “The existence of the group, with acknowledged leaders who articulate the group’s values and interpret the group’s interest in the stream of public affairs, is crucial to the group member’s ability to relate to the larger world” (Miller 1976, 22). This is not surprising given that for most ordinary citizens politics is too complex and remote from their immediate concerns. Partisanship therefore helps to orient citizens towards their political party as a legitimate source of information as to what should be believed and valued (Miller 1976, Borre and Katz 1973, Jacoby 1988, see also Conover and Feldman 1989).

If parties shape views of their identifiers on a variety of issues, this should be true also with respect to citizen support for democratic governance. A recent study of the American electorate shows that political elites exercise considerable persuasion over their supporters with respect to system support. Empirical evidence indicates that high levels of political cynicism evident among third party supporters did not precede their support for a third party candidate, but rather were a consequence of their identification with a third party (Koch 2003). More generally, we therefore can expect that, if political parties convey positive outlook towards the system, their supporters will also to develop favourable attitudes towards

the political regime. Conversely, political parties that express negative positions towards status quo of the system should generate more cynicism also among their supporters. Thus, our next general hypothesis is the following:

**Hypothesis 2:** Political parties with positive positions about the political system will produce more support for the political system among their supporters than parties with skeptical positions.

Generally speaking this relationship should be applicable to both established and new democracies. Protest parties in older democracies or communist parties in new democracies of East Central Europe are both likely to express more negative views about the system than other political parties in their country. As a consequence, their partisans are likely to be more cynical about the political system than citizens who identify with other political parties or unaligned voters. However, the magnitude of the coefficients should be higher in new democracies. I expect that partisans in emerging democracies are more susceptible to party persuasion than citizens in older democracies. Socialized in previous regime, post-communist societies lack political sophistication and experience with the functioning of democratic governance (Rose et al. 1998; Mishler and Rose 2002; Kitschelt et al 1999). What is more, citizens in new democracies face high uncertainty associated with political and economic transitions that makes it even more difficult for them to evaluate the system independently of guidance from the political elites. As a consequence, we can expect that partisans in new democracies will be more likely to rely on their party opinions about the political system in shaping their own attitudes about democratic governance compared to partisans in established democracies. We can therefore formulate our next hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 3:** Party positions about the political system will have a stronger effect on partisan support for the system in new democracies than in established ones.

## Data and Measures

My individual-level data come from surveys collected as part of the *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems* (CSES), 1996-2000 (ICPSR Study No. 2683, 4<sup>th</sup> February 2004 version). Party-level indicators are from the *Manifestos Research Group* (MRG) project data. Countries that provided the most important survey items and that had a sufficient number of cases for multivariate analysis are eight established democracies: Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Great Britain, the United States, and five new democracies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, and Ukraine.<sup>2</sup>

To estimate the impact of party positions on citizen attitudes towards their political systems, I specified a simultaneous two-stage least squares model. This non-recursive model ensures that the effects we refer to as persuasion are not the artifacts of strategic position taking by political parties. The first stage of the model predicts party positions towards the system. In the second stage, predicted party positions towards the system are used as an instrumental variable to estimate citizens' opinion about the political regime.

## Dependent Variables

I use two dependent variables from the CSES survey data that tap citizen attitudes towards their political system—satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy. Given the state of debate about the conceptualization and measurement of system support broadly conceived, I relied on a straightforward definition of political support as satisfaction with

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<sup>2</sup> A number of countries had to be dropped due to missing values on important variables. Some or all survey items used for constructing party identification variable were missing for Belgium, New Zealand, Slovenia, Australia, and Canada. Belarus was not in the MRG data set and therefore was missing critical party-level variables. Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Sweden, Poland, and Russia were dropped due to the absence of variation on the independent variable of main interest – the Constitutionalism Index. Finally, Japan was excluded from the analysis because of missing values for Left-Right self-placement variable.

democracy. The relevant survey measure asked citizens whether they are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. For the purpose of this study, I reversed the original scale: the answer categories range from 0 to 3, with 3 denoting the most positive response.

Satisfaction with democracy measures system support at a low level of generalization (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svenson 1995, 330, Anderson and Guillory 1997, 70). It does not refer to democracy as a set of norms or democracy and an ideal; instead, it focuses on people's responses to the actual process of democratic governance and their attitudes toward a country's 'constitutional reality' (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svenson 1995, 328, Anderson et al. 2005, 41, Linde and Ekman 2003). Neither does the indicator tap diffuse or specific support in the Eastonian sense, but a form of support that was not recognized or adequately conceptualized by Easton (Kuechler 1991, 279, Fuchs and Klingemann 1995, Anderson and Guillory 1997). According to Easton, specific support is based on short-term citizen evaluations of system outputs, whereas diffuse support refers to "a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants" (1965, 273). In other words, diffuse support represents an affective enduring "attachment to a political object for its own sake" (Easton 1965, 274), whereas specific support is based on short-term performance-oriented evaluations. The satisfaction with democracy item represents neither of them, because, unlike diffuse support, it measures support for the performance of the political regime (Klingemann 1999, Norris 1999, Linde and Ekman 2003, Anderson et al. 2005, 41), and therefore captures an evaluative rather than purely affective element of political support. At the same time, the satisfaction with democracy item cannot be equated with specific support because the latter focuses on the immediate system outputs, usually generated by the government (or administration) in power, whereas the former is designed to capture

respondent's opinion about regime performance that goes beyond specific administration output evaluation.

In a recent paper, Canache, Mondak, and Seligson (2001) challenge the use of satisfaction with democracy measure. However, they do not present a strong case against its validity because they assume incorrect causal structure of political support attitudes. The causal structure that they have in mind is based on the desire to observe the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of system support (508, fn.1). Canache, Mondak, and Seligson believe that system support exists and that we can indicate it through a battery of questions about the constitution, political institutions, and electoral formula (508, fn.1). This leads them to the causal construction in which survey responses are expected to be uncorrelated. From this perspective, finding nonzero correlations signals that a common source (i.e. one's system support) has not been taken into account, and, they argue, it prevents us from drawing any well-grounded inferences or making comparisons across nations.

This approach, however, is fundamentally flawed because it is based on the erroneous causal structure of political support attitudes. Being more or less "satisfied with the way democracy works or is developing in one's country" is a causal antecedent to system support rather than a consequence of it. As Easton (1975, 445-5) argues, it is a positive experience with the regime that over time accumulates into a reservoir of goodwill. In other words, it is the attitudes that are evaluative in nature that causally lead to affective system support – diffuse support. As mentioned above, survey questions that ask about satisfaction with democracy invite an evaluative rather than purely emotional response (Anderson and Guillory 1997, 70, see also Kuechler 1991), and therefore precede system support in a causal structure of political support attitudes. What is more, it should not be surprising that satisfaction with democracy is correlated with other political support attitudes. One would be worried if support for democratic principles or regime performance had nothing to do with citizen's

satisfaction with democracy. Within the causal structure of support attitudes one can situate regime performance and support for democracy in principle as the driving forces of satisfaction with democracy, which, in turn, then operate on diffuse system support.

My second dependent variable tapping citizen attitudes towards their political system is external efficacy or citizens' assessments of whether the system is responsive to their preferences. Political efficacy is "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, ... the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change" (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954, 187). A sense of influence on the political process depends on internal efficacy, that is, whether an individual feels he or she has the means to affect the process, and external efficacy that refers to citizens' beliefs about system openness and responsiveness to their attempts to influence the system (Lane 1959, Balch 1974, Miller and Listhaug 1990, Anderson et al. 2005, 42).

To measure external efficacy, I used an additive index of responses to two CSES survey questions: whether political parties in the respondent's country care what people think, and whether members of parliament know what ordinary people think. A reliability test measuring how well both items tap a uni-dimensional latent construct shows that the two items are sufficiently correlated (Cronbach's alpha is .53) and could be combined to form a single and reliable scale that ranges from 0 to 8. Higher values on this additive index indicate a greater sense of respondent's external efficacy. Using both external efficacy and satisfaction with democracy items allows me to generalize beyond the particular indicators and make more general statements about system support in comparative perspective.

## **Independent Variables**

### **Party Identification**

The measurement of party identification has long been a focus of scholarly debate. It has been widely discussed how well the notion of party identification is applicable in countries outside the United States and what survey questions should be used to obtain comparable measures of party identification for cross-national analyses. Both experimental and comparative studies emphasize that the best estimates are acquired when respondents are given a clear opportunity to register a “non-identity” (see, for instance, Sanders et al. 2002; Blais et al. 2001). Such filter question is available in the CSES survey data. Respondents were first given a screening question: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?” Following Holmberg (2003), I used this question as a basis for constructing a four-category party identification variable. Individuals who said “Yes” to the first question were given a follow up question: “Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?” Individuals who answered “Very close” were classified as strong party identifiers; and those who gave any response other than “Very close” were classified as weak party identifiers.

Respondents who answered “No” or “Don’t know” to the initial question, were presented with a follow-up question: “Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?” Respondents who answered: “Yes” to this second question were classified as without party identification but with a party preference. Respondents who answered “No” or “Don’t know” to both the first and second question were classified as having no party identification. The resulting four-category partisanship measure ranges from 0 that denotes non-identifiers to 3 marking individuals with strong party identification. It accounts not only for the presence or absence of party identification but also for its strength. What is more, the measure is applicable not only in two-party systems, as in the U.S., but also in multi-party systems and is valid across many countries (Holmberg 1994, 2003, Budge et al. 1976).

## Party Position Toward the Political System

Recall that party positions toward the political system are my primary suspect in explaining the variations in satisfaction with democracy and political efficacy across supporters of different parties. To measure party views, I use the MRG data collected prior to the CSES survey for each country in my sample. I employ two MRG items: first, ‘Constitutionalism: positive’, which represents the extent to which a party expresses support for specific aspects of the constitution, and uses constitutionalism as an argument for policy as well as general approval of the constitutional way of doing things; second, ‘Constitutionalism: negative’, which reflects the opposite from what defines ‘Constitution: positive’.<sup>3</sup>

These items serve as a good proxy for the purpose of my analysis because they reflect party evaluation of the fundamental rules for governing the country. Criticizing existing constitutional order suggests party dissatisfaction with the political system. Conversely, expressing support for the constitutional structure demonstrates a desire to maintain the status quo of the system. The MRG documents show that statements coded under the ‘Constitutionalism’ items often include party proposals for institutional changes, such as creating a Presidency with substantial powers (the Australian Labor Party 1996 manifesto), or resisting any changes in the existing constitutional order because it is “the product of hundred of years of knowledge, experience and history” (the UK Conservative Party 1997 manifesto).<sup>4</sup>

The MRG data also show that many parties often do both: they express support for certain aspects of the constitutional order and at the same time criticize other of its features. I therefore created a combined variable, a Constitutionalism Index, that reflects overall party position towards the political regime by subtracting the percentage of ‘Constitutionalism:

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<sup>3</sup> In the original MRG coding scheme, ‘Constitutional: positive’ statements are given a code of 203, and ‘Constitutionalism: negative’ statements a code of 204.

<sup>4</sup> The author is grateful to Paul Pennings and Andrea Volkens for making the original coded party manifestos available.

negative' statements from the percentage of 'Constitutionalism: positive' statements. Higher values of this variable thus indicate more positive party outlook towards the political regime.

Unfortunately, the MRG data provide measures only for political parties that won 2 or more seats in national elections. This means that smaller political parties that did not succeed to secure seats in national legislatures were not coded in this data set. To keep respondents that identify with parties not in the MRG data set in my analyses, I assigned these individuals a value of zero on the Constitutionalism Index variable. Parties that did not succeed in winning any legislative seats are more likely to be dissatisfied with the political system than parties in parliament. Thus coding them as neutral on the Constitutionalism Index offers a conservative test of my hypotheses because it should make it more difficult for us to find party persuasion effects.

### **Control Variables**

Recall that the first stage of the model is designed to predict party positions towards the political system. I therefore included a number of variables tapping various party characteristics that could be associated with party satisfaction with the political regime. Ideological extremity usually generates lower levels of system support because radical views denote more dissatisfaction with the status quo and a willingness to mobilize for change (Riker 1982). We therefore should see a negative relationship between party ideological extremity and party support for the political system. Party ideological extremity is measured by absolute distance between party position and the median voter on the Left-Right scale. Party Left-Right position is taken from the MRG project data. The median voter is calculated using Kim and Fording (1998) formula applied to party position data and party vote percentage data (see appendix for a more detailed description). In addition, because the extremity measure is based on the left-right scale, I also control for left-right party positions

to ensure that the effects of extremity are not driven by the average left-right party position in a country.

Further, parties in government can be expected to express more positive views towards the political system because they enjoy office benefits and have a better chance to implement their policy preferences than other parties. To determine which parties were in government at the time of survey in each country of my sample, I relied on special issues of the *European Journal of Political Research*. Finally, the first stage of the model also includes a set of party family variables. Using the MRG data categorization of political parties, I created dummy variables for Green, Communist, Social Democratic Christian Democratic, Liberal, Conservative, National, Agrarian, and Ethnic parties.

In the second stage of the model, I control for various individual-level characteristics that have been found to operate on system support in previous research. Specifically, I control for whether an individual is winner or loser in the last election. Existing research shows that citizens who identify with parties in office are more satisfied with their political system than other citizens (Anderson et al. 2005, Anderson and Guillory 1997, Anderson and LoTempio 2002, Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978, Nadeau and Blais 1993, Norris 1999, 220). Using information about which parties were in government at the time of the survey, I created a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates that an individual identified with a party in government and 0—otherwise.

Further, I controlled for respondent's distance from country median on the Left-Right self-placement scale as well as his or her Left-Right position. Individuals closer to the median should be more satisfied with their political system than individuals with extreme ideological positions. On average, policy preferences close to the median voter get better represented by parties in government than extreme ideological positions. Furthermore, I controlled for

whether a respondent voted in the last election because having expressed their preferences in democratic elections voters are more likely to see the system as their own.

Existing research also shows that, generally speaking, those who have a greater stake in the maintenance of the political system tend to express higher levels support for it. At the level of individual citizens, having a stake in the system has been measured with the help of variables such as income and education, as well as age, gender, and race as proxies for an individual's socio-economic status or political resources (Almond and Verba 1963, Finkel 1985, Anderson and Guillory 1997, Anderson et al. 2005, 20).<sup>5</sup> I therefore included measures of the respondent's age, gender, employment, education, marital status, income, as well as economic performance evaluations. Finally, I include a vector of country dummies to capture cross-national differences in citizen attitudes towards their political system.

## **Analysis and Results**

Partisan distribution in Table 2a and Table 2b reveals that in the mid- late-1990s new democracies still had much lower levels of partisanship than established democracies. Around 42% of respondents in new democracies have no party identification compared to only 28 % in long-term democracies. Interestingly, the percentage of strong identifiers in both established and developing democracies is almost the same – around 9%. However, as expected, most partisans in post-soviet societies are concentrated among supporters of the former Communist parties: more than a third of strong identifiers and a quarter of weak identifiers are partisans of communist successor parties. No other party group has such a pronounced base of partisans in new democracies of East Central Europe. Liberal parties come the closest to communist parties in this respect. As with communist parties, around a

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<sup>5</sup> More recent research, however, shows that the relationship between education and system support is not straightforward: a new politics approach is that high levels of education can lead to critical attitudes and political dissatisfaction (Dalton 2004).

quarter of all weak partisans are liberals. However, only a quarter of all strong partisans are attached to liberal parties compared to a third of all strong partisans reporting attachment to communist parties. These numbers are particularly interesting given that at the time of the CSES survey communist parties did not have much legislative representation across new democracies of East Central Europe. On average, communist parties had only 15.2 % of parliamentary seats across post-communist societies in our sample, ranging from no seats in Hungary to 27% in Ukraine. Party identification with communist parties in East Central Europe indeed is a feature inherited from the previous regime and it seems to be relatively independent from the vote choice of many citizens.

[Table 2a and Table 2b about Here]

Figure 1a and Figure 1b presents average values of satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy variables across countries in our sample. There is a marked difference between established and new democracies with respect to citizen satisfaction with democracy: with an exception of Portugal, all long-term democracies have higher democracy satisfaction than new democracies of East Central Europe. This difference is less apparent with respect to external efficacy: for instance, Romanian and Ukrainian citizens have much more positive views about the efficacy of their system than Americans, British, or Germans! This optimistic outlook of many East Europeans might be due to the fact that their standard of comparison is the previous regime that was completely unresponsive to citizen preferences or demands and e citizen enthusiasm with political reforms in their new democracies. Norway has the highest levels of both satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy. Portugal occupies the last place among established democracies with respect to both variables. Among new democracies of East Central Europe, Ukrainians are the least satisfied with the way democracy works in

their country, whereas Lithuanians are the most pessimistic about the efficacy of their political system.

[Figure 1 about Here]

Figure 2a and Figure 2b present average values for both dependent variables across partisans of different parties. They show that in all established democracies partisans have higher levels of democracy satisfaction and external efficacy than unaligned voters. Although party identifiers are also more externally efficacious in new democracies of East Central Europe, the relationship between party attachment and satisfaction with democracy is less clear. In the Czech Republic and Romania independent voters are more satisfied with democracy than party identifiers. The opposite is true for Hungary, Ukraine, and Lithuania.

[Figure 2a and Figure 2b about Here]

The figures also reveal that there is a lot of variation in the attitudes towards the system across citizens attached to different political parties. In fact, it is not uncommon for partisans of certain political parties to express more cynical attitudes about their political regime compared to non-partisan voters. For example, in Norway average democracy satisfaction among identifiers with Progress Party (FrP), Centre Party (SP), Liberal Party (V), and Red Electoral Alliance (RV) is lower than among non-partisans. Similarly, in the Netherlands, external efficacy is lower among citizens attached to Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Political Reformed Party (SGP), Reformational Political Federation (RPF), Socialist Party (SP), and Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) than among un-aligned voters. This initial investigation suggests that partisanship does not always lead to positive attitudes towards democratic governance. What is more, high levels of variation in system support across citizens identifying with different parties signal that our models of system

legitimacy could be significantly improved if we can identify and incorporate systematic forces operating across political parties. I suggest that this could be done by accounting for party views towards the system in multivariate analyses.

I model citizen's satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy as a simultaneous non-recursive process. A two-stage least squares model is necessary to separate persuasion effects from the strategic position taking by political parties. The first stage of the model is designed to predict party positions using a number of independent variables except public opinion. In the second stage, these predicted party positions, purged of the component that could be caused by electorate opinion, serve as an independent variable in the analysis of citizens' views towards the system.<sup>6</sup> The multivariate results are presented in Table 3. As expected, we find a positive relationship between party positions on the Constitutionalism Index and partisan attitudes towards the political system. The relationship is statistically significant in both established and new democracies. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients is higher in post-communist societies supporting our expectations that party persuasion is stronger in new democracies.

[Table 3 about Here]

The results also show that having accounted for party positions towards the political regime, partisanship continues to operate as an independent force on system support in the electorate. Its effect is statistically significant in all our models; however, the direction of the relationship is not the same for established and newer democracies. In older democracies, party identification translates into more satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy

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<sup>6</sup> Ideally, I would use panel data if it were available cross-nationally because a two-stage least squares model does not eliminate a possibility that citizens might develop party identification on the basis of party views towards the system. However, I believe there is a very small chance of this because party cynicism or endorsement of the status quo of a political system does not seem to be a constant feature of political parties: the MRG data shows that most political parties change their positions towards the political system from one election to the next.

supporting the contagion thesis in the existing research (e.g. Dalton 1999, Holmberg 2003). However, psychological attachment to a party does not automatically lead to more system support among citizens in newer democracies. The coefficient is negative in the satisfaction with democracy model, reflecting the fact that in the mid-1990s partisanship is still a feature of people supporting Communist successor parties. Since the democratic transition in East Central Europe is associated with the loss of power for Communist parties, partisanship has a negative effect on citizen satisfaction with democracy in their country.

A more surprising result is that partisanship has a positive and highly statistically significant effect on citizen external efficacy in new democracies. Recall that external efficacy is an additive index of two items: a belief that political parties care what people think and that politicians know what people think. In answering these questions, partisans may have used their own party as a reference. This could explain why all partisans, including communist loyalists, expressed more positive attitudes about the efficacy of their political system.

With respect to control variables, I find that winner status clearly increases individuals' satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy. Not surprisingly, this effect is stronger in newer democracies, especially in the external efficacy model. In transitional societies where political sophistication is low, uncertainty is high, and it is almost impossible to assess the accuracy of policy representation, winning or losing offers the best available criteria for many citizens to evaluate system responsiveness to their demands. Distance from the median, or ideological extremism, is statistically significant only in established democracies in the satisfaction with democracy model. Citizens whose preferences are further removed from the mainstream do not feel that their preferences are unknown to political actors. Positive Left-Right coefficient suggests that being on the right of the ideological continuum leads to more optimism about the political system. The results also show that voters and those who have positively evaluate the economy support democratic governance more. Among demographic

characteristics, age has a non-linear effect in all models of system support: middle-age people emerge as a group that is more dissatisfied with the political system than young or very old. Gender, education, marital status, and unemployment have no consistent effect, however, income produces a positive effect on system legitimacy but its coefficient is statistically significant only in established democracies.

To get a better sense of the estimated effects, I also calculated the substantive impact of party persuasion on my dependent variables for established and new democracies. These calculations (effects and 95% confidence intervals) are displayed graphically in Figure 3a and Figure 3b. In the sample of established democracies the effects are estimated for a German who strongly identifies with Social Democratic Party (SDP), that is, the party that was in government at the time of the survey. The individual is assumed to be typical with respect to other micro-level characteristics: he voted in the last election, is located at the country left-right median, has completed secondary education, is employed, married, earns middle-level income, and believes that the economy stayed the same over the last twelve months. Predicted effects in new democracies are estimated for a Lithuanian male citizen who also strongly identifies with the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Conservatives – the major party in government at the time of the survey, and has the same other characteristics as our hypothetical German individual.

Figure 3a shows predicted effects of party persuasion on citizen satisfaction with democracy in established and new democracies. The graphs indicate that moving from the most negative (-4.5) to the most positive party position with respect to political system in our sample (4.5) will raise partisan satisfaction with democratic process approximately half way between two response categories in both established and new democracies, with an effect being slightly stronger in new democracies. Specifically, satisfaction with democracy will increase by .39 units (from 1.61 to 2.00 on range from 0 to 3) in established democracies, and

48 units (from .99 to 1.47) in new democracies. This difference would make our hypothetical German citizen change his opinion from being uncertain whether he is not very satisfied (1) or fairly satisfied (2) with the democratic process to giving a confident response that he is fairly satisfied (2). For our hypothetical Lithuanian citizen the difference would imply changing his opinion from being clearly not very satisfied to being uncertain whether he is not very satisfied or fairly satisfied with the system. Put differently, one unit change on satisfaction with democracy variable, that is, for example, changing one's response from being not very satisfied to fairly satisfied with democratic process in one's country, will require 23% of party programmatic statements in support of the system in established democracies and 18% in new democracies.

Figure 3b illustrates estimated substantive effects of party evaluations of political system on citizen external efficacy. The figure indicates that party persuasion effects here are more pronounced in new democracies than they are in established ones. Moving from the most negative to the most positive party positions, partisan external efficacy increases by .78 units (from 3.59 to 4.37 on a range from 0 to 8) in established democracies, and by 1.10 units (from 2.91 to 4.01) in new democracies. This means that increasing citizen external efficacy by one unit will require 12% of positive party statements about the system in established democracies, and 8% in new ones.

[Figure 3a and Figure 3b. about Here]

### **Concluding Remarks**

This paper shows that partisanship plays an important role for system legitimacy, and it does so in both established and new democracies. I hypothesized that partisanship operates on system legitimacy in two important ways: directly, by stimulating a psychological

attachment to the political system, and indirectly, that is, by providing a link by which political parties communicate their views about the political system to their partisans. My empirical evidence confirms these expectations. Partisanship indeed has a direct effect on system legitimacy: party attachment translates into system attachment in established democracies, confirming the contagion thesis in the existing literature (Dalton 1999, Holmberg 2003). In new democracies of East Central Europe partisanship has a negative effect on satisfaction with democracy because in the early stages of democratization partisanship is concentrated among supporters of former Communist parties that are highly dissatisfied with the political reforms. As citizens develop partisan attachment to new political parties, the effect of partisanship on system legitimacy should change from negative to positive across new democracies of East Central Europe.

Furthermore, the results demonstrate that partisanship operates on system support also as a medium that allows parties to communicate their views about the system to their supporters more effectively. Given the complexity and remoteness of political sphere from the immediate concerns of most ordinary citizens, it should not be surprising that most partisans rely on their political parties as a readily available and a trustworthy source of information. The results of a non-recursive two-stage least squares model that control for strategic party position taking, demonstrate that positive party views towards the political system indeed foster optimism among party identifiers. Conversely, negative party statements about the constitutional order generate more cynical evaluations also among their partisans. The effect is particularly strong in new democracies, where citizens lack political sophistication and in the environment of high uncertainty are especially susceptible to party opinions.

In short, my findings confirm the traditional finding that having party identification is generally better for system support than not having one. However, they also tell a new story because the positive role of partisanship for system support is not merely a function of

spillover or an extension of party affect to the political system. Partisanship acts also as an important linkage mechanism or a source of cues for party supporters in evaluating their political regime. Thus, my findings support Dalton's (1999) concerns that a loosening of the connection between political parties and citizens observed in established democracies may undermine mass support for the democratic governance. However, this is likely to happen not only because eroding partisanship may weaken citizen attachment to democratic governance but also because citizens less likely to listen to the political elites. This is because from the existing literature we know that political elites tend to be more supportive of democratic principles than are ordinary citizens in both established (Sullivan et al. 1993, Converse and Pierce 1986) and new democracies (Miller, Erb, Reisinger, Hesli 2000). Recent studies showing rapid rise in partisanship across post-Soviet societies (Miller and Klobucar 2000), however, offer optimism about the growth of democratic legitimacy across East Central Europe. Given the power of persuasion that parties in enjoy in new democracies, this study suggests that political parties can play an important role in speeding up this process.

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## Appendix

### Measures and Coding

*Democracy Satisfaction.* “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (country)?” Not at all satisfied (0), very satisfied (3).

*External Efficacy.* Additive index of responses to two CSES survey questions: 1) Political parties in [country] care what people think (4); don’t care what people think (0). 2) Members of [Congress/Parliament] know what ordinary people think (4); don’t know what ordinary people think (0). The index ranges from 0 (=low efficacy) to 8 (=high efficacy).

*Party Identification.* Following Holmberg (2003), I constructed a four-category variable that accounts not only for the presence or absence of party identification but also for the strength of party identification. Specifically, I first used the CSES survey question: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” Respondents who said “Yes” to this question then were given a follow up question: “Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?” Those who answered “Very close” were classified as strong party identifiers; and those who answered with any response other than “Very close” were classified as weak party identifiers. Respondents who answered “No” or “Don’t know” to the first question, were presented with a follow-up question: “Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?” Respondents who answered: “Yes” to this second question were classified as without party identification but with a party preference. Respondents who answered “No” or “Don’t know” to both the first and second question were classified as having no party identification. The resulting measure has the following four categories 0 (=no identification), 1(=preference only), 2(=weak identifiers), and 3(=strong identifiers).

*Constitutionalism Index.* Based on two items from the Comparative Manifestos Project data. 1) item 203 – “Constitutionalism: Positive”, defined in coding instructions as “support for specific aspects of the constitution; use of constitutionalism as an argument for policy as well as general approval of the constitutional way of doing things”. 2) item 204 – “Constitutionalism: Negative,” defined as “opposition to the constitution in general or to specific aspects; otherwise as “Constitutionalism: Positive”, but negative.” The Constitutionalism Index was calculated by subtracting the percentage of ‘Constitutionalism: negative’ statements from the percentage of ‘Constitutionalism: positive’ statements. Higher values of the measure indicate more positive outlook towards the political system by political parties.

*Party in Government.* Based on the CSES survey question “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” If “Yes,” “What party is that?” If party choice matched with a governing party at the time of the survey, respondents were assigned a value of 1 on this variable, otherwise 0.

*Left-Right Party Position.* This measure was taken from the Comparative Manifestos Research Group data.

*Left-Right Party Extremity.* Squared absolute distance between party left-right position and the median voter. Party left-right position is taken from the Comparative Manifestos Research Group data. The median voter is calculated using Kim and Fording (1998) formula applied to party position data and party vote percentage data:

$$M = L + \{(50 - C)/F\} * W.$$

Where

M - median voter position

L – the lower end (left-right score) of the interval containing the median  
C – the cumulative vote share up to but not including the interval containing the median  
F – the vote share in the interval containing the median  
W – the width of the interval containing the median – i.e., the range of midpoints between the party of the median voter and adjacent parties to its left and right.

*Party Family Variables.* *Green, Communist, Social Democratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic, Conservative, National, Agrarian, Ethnic.* Dummy variables based on the Manifestos Research Group (MRG) indicator.

*Voter.* Based on the CSES survey question on whether respondent cast a ballot. Cast a ballot (1), did not cast a ballot (0).

*Left-Right Self-placement.* Based on the CSES survey question: “Where would you place yourself on this scale?” Left (0), right (10).

*Distance from the Median.* Absolute distance of respondent from country median on the Left-Right self-placement scale. Calculated using Left-Right self-placement item in the CSES survey.

*Age.* Actual age of respondent in years.

*Male.* Male (1), female (0).

*Married.* Married or living together as married (1), otherwise (0).

*Income.* Household income: lowest income quintile (1), highest income quintile (5).

*Education.* The highest level of education attained. Respondents were coded on a 1 to 8 scale, where 8 denotes the highest level of education.

*Unemployed.* Unemployed (1), otherwise (0).

*Economic Performance Evaluations.* Based on the CSES survey question: “Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in (country) has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?” Gotten worse (0), gotten better (2).

**Table 1. Summary Statistics.**

Variables	Established Democracies				New Democracies			
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Individual-level Variables</i>								
Democracy Satisfaction	1.854	.722	0	3	1.271	.870	0	3
External Efficacy	3.842	1.845	0	8	3.706	2.220	0	8
Party Identification	1.229	.965	0	3	1.066	1.038	0	3
Voter	.761	.427	0	1	.773	.419	0	1
Left Right Self-Placement	5.024	2.222	0	10	5.395	2.693	0	10
Distance from the Median	1.631	1.471	0	6	2.036	1.736	0	6
Economic Evaluations	1.167	.702	0	2	.809	.738	0	2
Age	46.335	16.971	17	98	45.954	16.951	15	91
Education	4.728	1.717	1	8	4.681	1.699	1	8
Male	.474	.499	0	1	.455	.498	0	1
Unemployed	.040	.196	0	1	.068	.252	0	1
Married	.609	.488	0	1	.660	.474	0	1
Income	2.915	1.376	0	5	2.962	1.395	1	5
<i>Party-level Variables</i>								
Constitutionalism Index	.250	.647	-2.532	3.229	.163	1.031	-4.549	4.598
Party in Government	.219	.413	0	1	.163	.370	0	1
Left-Right Party Extremity	4.897	9.595	0	55.92	2.854	5.351	0	25.23
Left Right Party Position	.85	11.77	33.47	54.08	.23	8.33	-28.77	25.49
<i>Party Family</i>								
Green	.007	.810	0	1	.013	.111	0	1
Communist Party	.020	.139	0	1	.118	.323	0	1
Social Democratic	.204	.403	0	1	.041	.199	0	1
Liberal	.029	.167	0	1	.117	.322	0	1
Christian Democratic	.045	.208	0	1	.017	.131	0	1
Conservative	.078	.268	0	1	.032	.177	0	1
National	.001	.030	0	1	.013	.113	0	1
Agrarian	.015	.121	0	1	.017	.128	0	1
Ethnic	.011	.106	0	1	.003	.053	0	1



**Table 2a. Percentage of Respondents with Party Identification in Established Democracies.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>No Party Identification</b>	<b>Party Preference Only</b>	<b>Weak Party Identification</b>	<b>Strong Party Identification</b>
Germany	38.34	28.08	27.44	6.14
The Netherlands	27.89	44.26	24.32	3.52
Norway	16.16	31.05	46.33	6.47
Portugal	36.45	19.19	35.15	9.21
Spain	35.89	23.10	28.38	12.62
Switzerland	34.23	31.01	27.49	7.28
UK	22.99	29.48	33.34	14.19
US	22.43	20.86	41.00	15.71
<b>Average</b>	<b>28.43</b>	<b>29.49</b>	<b>32.81</b>	<b>9.26</b>



**Table 2b. Percentage of Respondents with Party Identification in New Democracies.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>No Party Identification</b>	<b>Party Preference Only</b>	<b>Weak Party Identification</b>	<b>Strong Party Identification</b>
Czech Republic	20.91	34.83	33.44	10.82
Hungary	45.38	27.08	18.43	9.11
Lithuania	56.49	14.17	25.07	4.26
Romania	50.81	8.51	30.98	9.70
Ukraine	36.32	8.10	44.51	11.06
<b>Average</b>	<b>41.62</b>	<b>19.34</b>	<b>29.90</b>	<b>9.14</b>



**Figure1. Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy and External Efficacy in Established and New Democracies.**





**Figure 2a: Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy and External Efficacy by Party Identifiers and Country in Established Democracies.**




CDU – Christian Democratic Union  
 CSU – Christian Social Union  
 SPD – Social Democratic Party  
 FDP – Free Democratic Party  
 PDS – Party of Democratic Socialism





PvdA – Labor Party  
 CDA – Christian Democratic Appeal  
 VVD – People's Party for Freedom and Democracy  
 D'66 – Democrats 66  
 SGP – Political Reformed Party  
 GPV – Reformed Political Union  
 RPF – Reformational Political Federation  
 SP – Socialist Party  
 SDAP – Social Democratic Workers' Party





RV – Red Electoral Alliance  
 SV – Socialist Left Party  
 DNA – Labor Party  
 V – Liberal Party  
 KrF – Christian People's Party  
 SP – Center Party  
 H – Conservative Party  
 FrP – Progress Party





PSD – Social Democratic Party  
 PSP – Socialist Party  
 PP – Popular Party  
 CDU – Unified Democratic Coalition  
 PCP – Communist Party




PP – Popular Party  
 PSOE – Socialist Workers' Party  
 IU – United Left  
 CiU – Convergence and Union  
 PNV/EAJ – Basque Nationalist Party  
 ERC – Catalan Republican Left  
 HB – United People (Herri Batasuna)  
 BNG – Galician Nationalist Bloc





FDP/PRD – Radical Democratic Party  
 CVP/PDC – Christian Democratic People's Party  
 SPS/PSS – Social Democratic Party  
 SVP/UDC – Swiss People's Party  
 LPS – Liberal Party  
 EVP/PEP – Evangelical People's Party  
 PdA – Swiss Labor Party  
 FDU – Federal Democratic Union




SNP – Scottish Nationalist Party  
 LDP – Liberal Democratic Party







**Figure 2b: Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy and External Efficacy by Party Identifiers and Country in New Democracies.**





CSSD – Social Democratic Party  
 KDU-CSL – Christian Democratic Union – Czech People’s Party  
 KSBM – Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia  
 ODA – Civic Democratic Alliance  
 ODS – Civic Democratic Party  
 SPR-RSC – Association for the Republic – Czech Republican Party  
 SD-LNSS – Free Democrats – Liberal National Social Party





FiDeSz – Federation of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Party  
 Smallholders – Independent Smallholders’ Party  
 MDF – Hungarian Democratic Forum  
 MIEP – Hungarian Justice and Life Party  
 MSzP – Socialist Party  
 MMP – Hungarian Workers’ Party  
 KDNP – Christian Democratic People’s Party



LCS – Center Union  
 LKDP – Christian Democratic Party  
 LDDP – Democratic Labor Party  
 LNP-JL – National Party – Young Lithuania  
 LSDP – Social Democratic Party  
 TS-LK – Homeland Union – Lithuanian Conservatives  
 LLS – Polish Union  
 LMP – Women’s Party



PD-NSF – Democratic Party – National Salvation Front  
 PDSR – Social Democracy Party  
 PNL – National Liberal Party  
 PNTCD – Christian and Democratic National Peasants' Party  
 PUNR – National Unity Party  
 UDMR – Hungarian Democratic Union  
 PRM – Greater Romania Party  
 PSM – Socialist Labor Party  
 PSR – Romanian Socialist Party  
 CDR – Democratic Convention of Romania  
 USD – Social Democratic Union



APU – Agrarian Party of Ukraine  
 PZU – Green Party of Ukraine  
 KPU – Communist Party of Ukraine  
 NDPU – People's Democratic Party of Ukraine  
 SPU – Socialist Party of Ukraine  
 SDPU – Social Democratic Party of Ukraine  
 PSPU – Progressive Socialist Party

**Table 3. Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimates Predicting Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy and External Efficacy with Party Statements about the System, Party Characteristics, National Context, and Individual Level Controls in Established and New Democracies.**

Independent Variables	Established Democracies		New Democracies	
	Democracy Satisfaction	External Efficacy	Democracy Satisfaction	External Efficacy
<b>First Stage: Predicting party statements about the system</b>				
Party in Government	.231*** (.018)	.229*** (.018)	.187* (.079)	.228** (.080)
Left-Right Party Extremity	.007*** (.001)	.007*** (.001)	-.048*** (.004)	-.052*** (.004)
Left-Right Party Position	.003*** (.001)	.003*** (.001)	.008*** (.002)	.008*** (.002)
Party Family <sup>a</sup>				
Green	.107* (.049)	.112* (.050)	.530*** (.132)	.616*** (.129)
Communist	.212*** (.033)	.223*** (.034)	1.282*** (.049)	1.301*** (.049)
Social Democratic	.097*** (.024)	.100*** (.024)	1.174*** (.065)	1.214*** (.064)
Liberal	-.085** (.029)	-.081** (.029)	1.566*** (.092)	1.576*** (.093)
Christian Democratic	.541*** (.026)	.544*** (.026)	.724*** (.113)	.718*** (.112)
Conservative	1.652*** (.023)	1.650*** (.024)	.817*** (.088)	.826*** (.088)
National	-.284* (.122)	-.293* (.122)	1.807*** (.094)	1.817*** (.094)
Agrarian	-.113*** (.034)	-.105** (.034)	-3.554*** (.123)	-3.694*** (.124)
Ethnic	.099* (.044)	.100* (.044)	2.552*** (.244)	2.575*** (.110)
Constant	.012 (.040)	.010 (.040)	-.321** (.111)	-.284** (.110)
N	11.291	11158	3930	3954
R <sup>2</sup>	.626	.628	.570	.578

*Table 3 (Continued)*



Independent Variables	Established Democracies		New Democracies	
	Democracy Satisfaction	External Efficacy	Democracy Satisfaction	External Efficacy
<b>Second Stage: predicting citizen views about the system</b>				
Constitutionalism Index	.043** (.016)	.087* (.042)	.053*** (.014)	.123** (.046)
Party Identification	.042*** (.010)	.193*** (.026)	-.031* (.014)	.207*** (.040)
Party in Government	.024 (.018)	.129** (.046)	.069* (.035)	.378*** (.098)
Distance from the Median	-.020*** (.005)	.020 (.013)	-.003 (.007)	.034 (.021)
Voter	.079*** (.018)	.229*** (.046)	.127*** (.033)	.363*** (.095)
Left-Right Self-placement	.008** (.003)	-.004 (.009)	.018*** (.005)	.036* (.015)
Economic Evaluations	.153*** (.011)	.368*** (.026)	.332*** (.017)	.526*** (.046)
Age	-.007** (.002)	-.023*** (.006)	-.015*** (.005)	-.031* (.012)
Age <sup>2</sup>	.000*** (.000)	.000** (.000)	.000** (.000)	.000* (.000)
Education	.001 (.004)	.064*** (.011)	.008 (.008)	-.013 (.022)
Male	.024 (.013)	.011 (.032)	-.017 (.024)	-.079 (.066)
Unemployed	-.169*** (.037)	-.057 (.093)	-.107 (.059)	-.254 (.152)
Married	.005 (.015)	-.067 (.038)	.002 (.028)	.025 (.078)
Income	.029*** (.006)	.064*** (.015)	.030 (.042)	.032 (.027)
Constant	1.733*** (.065)	2.990*** (.163)	1.269*** (.116)	3.937*** (.307)
N	11 291	11 158	3930	3954
R <sup>2</sup>	.130	.096	.239	.128

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate robust standard errors: \*p<.5, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

The models include country dummy variables (not reported)

<sup>a</sup> Reference category for party families is other parties and non-identifiers.

**Figure 3a. Substantive Effects (with 95% Confidence Intervals) of Party Persuasion on Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy in Established and New Democracies.**



**Figure 3b. Substantive Effects (with 95% Confidence Intervals) of Party Persuasion on Citizen External Efficacy in Established and New Democracies.**

