The Mandela Effect: Prospecs for peace in Burundi

International Crisis Group

Africa Report No.13

April 18, 2000

Involved in a civil war since the assassination in 1993 of Melchior Ndadaye, the first elected president, Burundi is now at a crossroads. Since 1998 the government of Major Pierre Buyoya (who returned to power in July 1996) has been engaged in a negotiation process with FRODEBU, winner of the 1993 elections, as well as with most of the Burundian political groups. This process, which began under the auspices of Julius Nyerere, has been in the hands of Nelson Mandela since December 1999. It finally seems to be on the point of reaching a peace agreement sponsored by the region and the international community: the most optimistic are talking of the agreement being signed within the next few months.

After three and a half years of isolation for the country as a result of regional sanctions and the suspension of international development co-operation, Mandela has breathed new life into the Arusha process and has put Burundi back on the international agenda. His appointment was a victory for the Burundian government, which has concentrated its diplomatic efforts since Nyerere's death in releasing the negotiation process from the grip of the region, particularly that of Tanzania, which it accuses of bias. The government has criticised the Facilitation team for the methodology applied in the Arusha process, especially its formation of negotiation groups on an ethnic basis, faillure to take internal dialogue efforts into account and, above all, refusal to allow "dissident" armed bands, the Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye branch of the FDD and the Cossan Kabura wing of the FNL, to participate in the negotiations.

Mandela's first priority is to terminate the Arusha process as quickly as possible. In order to do this, he proposes to conclude work in four committees (nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development) and work directly on a draft agreement. By his unaccommodating approach to the conflict and his reminder to the Burundian political class that they must show a sense of responsibility, he has provoked a healthy debate on questions related to an amnesty for those guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the integration of rebel forces into the army, power sharing and the transition. He has also put pressure on the government to dismantle the regroupment camps in rural Bujumbura, and to allow the political parties to become active and permit freedom of the press.

His hope for concluding the Arusha process rapidly is founded on the significant progress made since June 1998. Iiolently rejected by Tutsi public opinion in 1996, the idea of negotiating with the Hutu rebels is now more widely accepted. The great majority of Burundians, tired of the war and of their politicians, do not want to move backwards and lose what has been gained over 22 months of discussion in Arusha. As for the government, it is confronted with huge social and economic difficulties. It is losing more and more credibility and is strongly rejected by both Tutsi and Hutu public opinion. In addition, the work in committees has produced encouraging results. The debate on the stakes of change and the modernisation of the state and of Burundian society has largely taken place. The participants have agreed on the setting up of an international commission of enquiry into the massacres that have taken place since independence, especially those of the Hutu elite in 1972 and of Tutsi in 1993, and a national committee of truth and reconciliation. Agreement has also been reached on the reform of the institutions and the principle that elections will be organised, the reform of the army, a repatriation programme for refugees and economic reconstruction. Finally and above all, Mandela has succeeded in obtaining a promise from the FDD and the FNL that they will participate at the next session of Committee III, planned for the end of April.

Nevertheless, with the tempting prospect of rapidly concluding an agreement, it must not be forgotten that the greatest challenge is not the signing of the document, but its implementation, nor that none of the major political compromises expected is yet on the table. In the first place, despite the agreement in principle of all the rebel factions to participate in the Arusha process, a permanent ceasefire has not been agreed. The rebels' entry into the process at this advanced stage in the negotiations is accompanied by the risk that what has been achieved so far will be thrown back into question and give rise to new divisions or new alliances. In addition, the Burundian conflict cannot be isolated from that of the DRC, which is on an almost continental dimension; nor can the application of the future Arusha accords from that of the Lusaka accords. The tactical alliances between Kabila, the ex-FAR, the Mai-Mai and the FDD on the one hand, and the Burundian Armed Forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Army on the other, as well as Kabila's strategy of bringing the war to the borders of "aggressor" countries, have raised the stakes in the violence on Burundian territory. It is now essential that the Burundian rebels are integrated into a strictly Burundian political process to avoid the risk of their being marginalised definitively by the Lusaka agreement, which already classifies them as "negative forces". And even if a ceasefire is signed between the belligerents, the regional instability leaves open the possibility that the two Burundian parties may challenge the agreement and resort to the war option.

In the second place, acknowledgement of the genocide and the amnesty is an issue that still arouses impassioned reactions as the victims and survivors of 1993 confuse the amnesty with the notion of impunity. As a prerequisite to the signing of an agreement at Arusha, certain Tutsi radicals, who have always been against negotiating with the "genocidaires", want to see the 1993 genocide acknowledged as such. They are even threatening to take up arms if their demand is not taken into account. As regards the Tutsi politicians participating at Arusha - who have recognised the crimes committed on both sides and the necessity of enquiries - they are using the reappearance of the genocide issue at this advanced stage of the process as a tactic to block the negotiations.

Finally, talks about who will lead the transition, and hence the compensation for the other pretenders to power, have not yet taken place. In saying openly that the present regime must consider giving up power, Mandela has launched the debate on the transition and obliged President Buyoya to put aside his reservations and carry out a campaign in the region and among western diplomats to explain the need for a "realistic" solution that would ensure a degree of continuity and stability. It might be assumed that the intransigence shown by some on the genocide issue is in large part related to the debate on the choice of a leader for the transition. As the end approaches, and after much opportunistic positioning dictated by the perception that the next government will be decided in Arusha, the parties are finally grouping into two camps: those for Buyoya and those against.

The stakes in this debate need to be set out clearly. It is undeniable that the ultimate objective of the negotiations is that the present oligarchy cedes power now or later and accepts the principle of an electoral process and a changeover of political power between parties. The real question is to know when and how, for it is absolutely essential to avoid a new wave of violence in the country. Enough blood has already been spilled on both sides and the fears are real. Yet the Burundian political actors still hesitate today between the benefits of violence and those of peace, between the continuity of a system or its rupture, between their individual interests and the interests of society

It is essential that the Arusha process should succeed if the violence is to end and if all Burundians are to be allowed to play an active part in the construction of a new, free and responsible society. Success is also required in order to complete and reinforce the Lusaka agreement and to save the credibility of the idea of negotiations as a mechanism for resolving conflicts in a region in which the logic of weapons and intolerance has dominated for decades.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. To Nelson Mandela, the Net Mediator:

Regarding the Rebels:

A preferential framework for consultations between the rebels and the Facilitation team must be set up in order to guarantee them adequate information on what has been gained by the peace process, and to allow the soldiers and political leaders of the armed movements to express their views on the ceasefire, the reform of the army, their future (as a group and individually) and the transition.
A suspension to hostilities should be negotiated as the first stage of a permanent ceasefire, with the objective of identifying the rebel forces and testing how much control the leaders have over their men.
The FDD and the FNL need to be convinced that they should detach themselves from Kabila's defence force and commit themselves strongly to a strictly Burundian process. They must be made to understand that by continuing to fight on DRC territory they risk being permanently regarded as "negative forces to be disarmed"1 by the negotiators in Arusha and thus losing their status as interlocutors.

Regarding the Transition and the Guarantees for the Agreement:

An agreement should not be concluded unless the negotiations over the transition period and offer sufficient guarantees: �

To protect the interests of societt: The institutions of the transition should be negotiated first, bearing in mind the collective interests to be protected during this period: the end of the war; security for all; the sharing of power and wealth; the implementation of fundamental reforms; and the modernisation of the state.� A formula must be found to reduce presidential powers, which should be decentralised and controlled by the emergence of institutions of transition capable of playing an opposition role. This discussion must be followed through and concluded in Committee II.
To protect indiiidual interests: The interests of some particularly significant players (security, privileges and impunity) must be negotiated next, particularly those of individuals who consider that they have lost out in the negotiations. These discussions could take place within the framework of Committee I. It is essential that they are conducted by Facilitator Nelson Mandela in person.
The regional heads of state and the international players acting as guarantors of the agreement must be encouraged in their role and support must be given to the transition government emerging from the negotiations.

Regarding Fears About and Resistance to the Peace Process:

A visit to Burundi by Nelson Mandela should be organised as soon as possible with the intention of reassuring the Hutu and Tutsi populations about the peace agreement. In particular, he should make an approach to the lobby opposed to the negotiations and convince it of the need for a negotiated settlement to end the war.
The Facilitation team should immediately open an office in Bujumbura to conduct large-scale campaigns aimed at explaining the agreement and leading debates on its contents.

B. To Western Governments and Institutional Donors:

Support should be given for Security Council Resolution 1286 calling for:

a peace process including all factions of the rebellion and an immediate ceasefire;
the resumption of development co-operation. The international community must immediately assist in reviving the economy, firstly in order to demonstrate to the population the advantages to be gained from the negotiations and the normalisation of the political situation, and secondly to create an economic environment allowing a fairer redistribution of the country's wealth.2;
the civilian character of the camps in Tanzania to be maintained

Political, economic and military support should be given to the future transitional government and an active role must be played in ensuring guarantees for the implementation of the agreement.
Funds to finance and implement the agreement must be mobilised rapidly, particularly the setting up of international commissions of enquiry and a national commission for truth and reconciliation, demobilisation and the revival of the economy.
Expert advice should be offered in regard to the different technical recommendations contained in the agreement for: the reform of the army, the development of an electoral system, the reform of the justice system, the management of land and property, and repatriation.

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