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Israeli General Derides Findings on Iraq
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By Peter Enav
The Associated Press
December 4, 2003
JERUSALEM - A former Israeli intelligence officer charged
Thursday that Israeli agencies produced a flawed picture of Iraqi weapons
capabilities and substantially contributed to mistakes made in U.S. and
British pre-war assessments on Iraq.
The comments of reserve Brig. Gen. Shlomo Brom represented
an unusual criticism of the Israeli intelligence community, long regarded
as one of the world's best. Prior to his retirement in 1998, Brom served
in Israeli military intelligence for 25 years, and acted as the deputy
chief of planning for the Israeli army.
Career officers in Israel traditionally maintain close ties
with military colleagues even after retirement. Brom's research was
conducted under the aegis of Israel's leading strategic affairs think
tank, Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center.
Brom said he was directing his remarks at Military
Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, and the Mossad intelligence agency.
The army declined to comment. The Mossad did not
immediately return a message.
Brom first raised his concerns in a report, "The War
in Iraq: An Intelligence Failure?" The article was published this
week in "Strategic Assessment," the quarterly bulletin the
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, where he works as a researcher.
American and British leaders used the purported existence
of the weapons, including chemical and biological agents, as one of the
main justifications for going to war with Iraq earlier this year.
Stuart A. Cohen, the vice chairman of the National
Intelligence Council, wrote last month that with all the evidence the U.S.
government possessed, "no reasonable person could have ... reached
any conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different from
those that we reached."
Cohen was the acting chairman of the council when he
oversaw the production of a National Intelligence Estimate summarizing
U.S. evidence on Iraq's alleged weapons programs, concluding that Iraq
possessed prohibited biological and chemical weapons and missiles and was
producing more.
Since ousting Saddam Hussein, the U.S.-led coalition's
technical experts have continued a futile search for Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction.
"Israeli intelligence was a full partner with the U.S.
and Britain in developing a false picture of Saddam Hussein's weapons of
mass destruction capability," Brom said. "It badly overestimated
the Iraqi threat to Israel and reinforced the American and British belief
that the weapons existed."
Brom said a lack of professionalism and poor supervision
were major reasons for the Israeli intelligence failure.
"Even if Iraq had any Scud missiles left, I can't
understand how Israeli intelligence officers came to believe they
threatened Israel, particularly when they hadn't been used in more than 10
years," Brom said. "It's a clear example of how an inability to
think clearly is undermining the Israeli intelligence community."
Israeli leaders said on the eve of the Iraq war there was
an outside chance that Saddam Hussein might arm Scud missiles with
chemical or biological agents and attack the country. Partially based on
the precedent of the 39 Iraqi Scuds that hit Israel during the 1991 Gulf
War, the warning resulted in the expenditure of tens of millions of
dollars and disrupted daily life.
Brom also cited the bitter memories of the 1973 Middle East
War, when Israeli intelligence failed to anticipate an attack by Egypt and
Syria, and the country suffered thousands of casualties.
"Israeli intelligence agencies have tended to
overstate the threat the country faces ever since 1973," he said.
Following the publication of Brom's article, opposition
lawmaker Yossi Sarid called for a parliamentary inquiry on the performance
of Israeli intelligence services.
Sarid told Israel Radio the article proved that Israeli intelligence
assessments on Iraq caused Israel considerable damage by compelling it to
prepare for "threats that did not exist."
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