

**Immigration and statelessness:
Political Participation of Immigrants and their Descendants in
Catalan and Basque Mobilizations (1959-1978)**

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Immigration and statelessness: Political Participation of Immigrants and their Descendants in Catalan and Basque Mobilizations (1959-1978)

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“In their search for new lives and new nationality, these immigrants have suffered much, and they have been rebuffed and made to feel inferior by the ‘native stock’, commonly being excluded from the better occupations and even from what has bitterly been called ‘first class citizenship’. Insecurity over social status has thus been mixed with insecurity over one’s very identity and sense of belonging. Achieving a better type of job or a better social status and becoming ‘more American’ have become [practically synonymous, and the passions that ordinarily attach to social positions have been vastly heightened by being associated with the need to belong” (Richard Hofstadter).¹

Abstract

Two phenomena have changed the international sociopolitical landscape in recent years. One is the upsurge of ethnonational movements challenging longer established nation-states; the other is the migration of ever larger number of people into these areas. These simultaneous trends have altered previously established concepts of nationhood.

Curiously, studies dealing with these two processes have remained hitherto disjointed and research treating their mutual relationship is still scarce. This paper will compare two areas where the two phenomena merge --and, indeed, reinforce each other. Both cases are situated in Spain’s prosperous periphery: Euskadi (Basque Country) and Catalonia. Large amount of immigrants moved from the country's southern regions to the more economically wealthy and industrialized north. At some stages, mass immigration did contribute to a certain apprehension amongst locals that they might be swamped by new arrivals. At the peak of the migratory movement [1960-75] individuals born outside the host region represented over 30% in both areas. Moreover, these figures refer exclusively to newcomers born outside the two host regions and yet many of those born in either Catalonia or Euskadi were themselves offspring of immigrants. This makes the percentage of indigenous or 'ethnic' Catalans minimal, a minority within the minority. However, in both regions nationalist movements command a large following amongst a majority of the population irrespective of their ‘ethnic’ background, that is, of their native or immigrant origin and even birthplace.

This phenomenon postulates a clarification of the very concepts of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’. If by ‘ethnicity’ we refer to descent, it may be disputable that Basque and Catalan nationalism could be labelled as ‘ethnic’. The huge amount of immigrants did not result in a dwindling of national identity. On the contrary, immigrants provided a catalyst for nationalist regeneration and the reframing of new collective identities. Therefore, traditional views of peripheral nationalisms as ‘ethnic’ would need to be re-framed.

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Immigration studies have hitherto devoted most attention to countries where a dominant ethnic group establishes the patterns of integration and/or assimilation of newcomers. In particular, most studies refer to countries with a single official language and educational system. However, in the last thirty years many

¹ Richard Hofstadter, ‘The pseudo-conservative revolt’, in Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Right. The New American Right. Garden city, NY: Anchor Books, 1963, p. 88.

states have increasingly shifted from official monolingualism to multilingualism -- contrary to the predictions of assimilationist political scientists still in the 1960s: Belgium, Canada, Spain are well-known examples where linguistic homogeneity has been replaced by heterogeneity or multilingualism at the official level. Therefore, a new phenomenon has emerged as the immigrants and their offspring faced a dilemma over norms and values to be adopted in the host society.

There are still relatively few studies dealing with migration into areas specifically characterized by ethnonational conflict. Even less research tries to conceptualize this situation as distinctive one. Ethnonationalism typically involves a conflict between two competing concepts of nationhood. The latter aim at different levels of self-gvt, going from federal arrangements to outright secession. Most so-called nation-states include a plurality of 'national' groups, hence competing concepts and claims of nationhood. Moreover, many ethnonationalist hot-spots are located in economically vibrant regions. During the economic boom of the 1960s, both regions enjoyed the highest per capita income in the Spanish state (Keating 2000, McRoberts 2001, Payne 2000, Zirakzadeh 1991). Indeed, 'internal' mass migration was sternly encouraged under Franco's regime.

This paper contends three related points:

1. Both nationalist movements became *inclusive*, even though the Basque one was not so at its inception.
2. They adapted different *strategies* of immigrants' incorporation which they both defined in terms of '*integration*'.
3. The diverse strategies have been and are related to the strength or weakness of the regional culture, hence to its integrative power.

After briefly describing the impact caused by immigration in Catalan and Basque societies, the paper analyzes its influence upon the two regions' patterns of nationalist mobilization.

Given the gargantuan number of immigrants, the consequence on Catalan and Basque identity was inescapable. Nationalist leaders were compelled to re-elaborate the two regions' identities in order to relate them to the new trends.

By 1980, both the Basque Country and Catalonia were granted Autonomy Statutes recognizing Euskara (Basque) and Catalan respectively as regional languages -- on a co-official level with Castilian (Spanish) (Conversi 2000, Kraus 1996). However, well before these radical changes occurred, immigrants arriving in the two regions encountered two divergent patterns of integration: in one case, Catalan could be learned with relative ease by individuals already speaking Spanish. In contrast, the difficulty of learning Euskara, a non-Indoeuropean language, has beset and baffled most immigrants arriving in the Basque Country.

Moreover, the foregoing historical experiences with migration flows also diverged: Catalan historical records demonstrate long-term and durable integration trends. In contrast, integration has been traditionally strewn with difficulties in the Basque Country. This paper does not focus on the sociolinguistic problems of learning the two languages, but rather on the effect of large-scale immigration on nationalist doctrine and on the different responses it inspired in the two groups of leaders or proto-leaders.

The comparative scholar of immigration will immediately stumble upon an intriguing academic contrast: the different emphasis placed upon immigration studies in the two regions. Catalonia has produced a thriving literature on immigrants and migration issues, whereas the academic output on the subject has been extremely low in Euskadi.²

This contrast can be discerned as the first clue of two contrasting attitudes: in Catalan social sciences the predominant trend has been an optimistic appraisal of the newcomers impact, whereas in Basque scholarship -as in politics- the main issue has remained Euskadi's confrontation with the Spanish state -- relegating immigration to a sub-category of that issue. This difference is encountered in political action: whereas in Catalonia the main concern has been its self-definition as a plural yet integrated society, in Euskadi the problem has traditionally been 'Spain'. Whereas early Basque nationalism aimed at separating Euskadi from the rest of Spain, coeval Catalanist leaders aimed at exerting some kind of influence over the entire Spanish political process, presenting themselves as an alternative model to Castilian hegemony. Finally, a supplementary reason for the scarce treatment of the immigration issue in the Basque Country has been the general low level of development of the social sciences in Spain under the dictatorship. Once democracy emerged, the two regions had different sets of priorities which resulted in distinct specializations and theoretical schools.

What follows is a brief historical sketch of immigration and the different responses it generated in the two regions.

Catalonia's integrative tradition

Catalonia's particular position along the Mediterranean coast and between Castile and France made it a traditional receiving ground for multiple cultural influences and movements of people. The coastal area

² The trend for the study of nationalism in the two regions is just the reverse: The wide range of academic literature existing on Basque nationalism, even in English, has not been matched by similar studies for Catalan nationalism, apart from historical ones (Conversi 1997: Introduction). For a comparative introduction to historical research on regionalism and peripheral nationalism in Spain, see Nuñez Seixas (1999).

was thrown open to commerce through the port of Barcelona. This area's birth-rate and immigration were higher, so population on the coast increased at a much faster rate than most of the interior. Massive immigration also occurred in Valencia (Vilar 1977: 2: 42-94; 1977: 3: map 56). In Catalonia, most immigrants came from culturally alike regions, often from nearby Occitania (Southern France), and hence had no particular difficulties in assimilating.³ This can help explaining why the assimilative traditions of Catalonia are often treated as a primordial given. The past success in integrating Southern French elements provided a stimulus for future optimism.

After a sharp decline in the fifteenth century, the population of Catalonia underwent a spectacular demographic recovery between 1550 and 1620. Part of this increase was due to mass immigration from France. By the end of the sixteenth century, some 20% of the male population was made up of French (Occitan) immigrants (Elliot 1963: 26). Until the XIX century, most immigrants came from the North, especially from this area. Important migratory movements occurred during the Eighteenth Century, when Barcelona recovered part of its economic splendour (see Nadal and Giralt 1960).

By the 1980s, the population of Catalonia-Principat approached six million (Cidc 1987). Before 1700, Catalonia hardly reached half a million inhabitants. Hence, it has increased more than tenfold in two hundreds years. In the Eighteenth century we find a first sharp demographic increase. The population doubled from 407,000 in 1718 to 814,000 in 1787. This was a time of economic development, following the setting up of textile manufacturing, the expansion of commerce and a good period for agricultural output. In the Nineteenth century the population continued to expand. Steady industrial growth allowed the formation of manufacturing cities and the enlargement of Barcelona. In 1887 the population of the Principat reached 1,843,000. The demographic distribution also changed: most of the population moved to the coast or near it, gradually depopulating the agricultural hinterland. By 1900, the birth rate began to decrease, and the decline lasted to the present day. The gap in birth rates between Catalonia and the rest of Spain drastically increased, but Catalonia's population continued to expand due to immigration. Correspondingly, the demographic balance with the rest of the peninsula shifted: Catalonians, who made 10.6% of the Spanish population in 1900, became 15,77% in 1975 (Termes 1984: 132).

Several leading Catalan intellectuals have described Catalonia's historical capacities of assimilation: its position along the Mediterranean coast, between two large countries, France and Spain, the constant flux of different peoples, the alleged cosmopolitan nature of Barcelona, of its port and its commercial activities, Catalonia as a *terra de pas* (literally, country of passage).⁴

³ Here, Occitan (Provençal) was spoken, the nearest language to Catalan in lexicon, grammar, syntax, morphology, and phonetics. Relationships between Catalans and Provençals were mutual and intense. As for cultural matters, many Catalans travelled to Provence in order to attend a poetry context called the *Jocs Florals* (Floral Games).

⁴ This concept has been elaborated in particular by the philosopher Josep Ferrater i Mora (1912-1990). Among other authors who shared a similar vision were Joaquim Maluquer i Sostres and Carles Pi-Sunyer (1888-1971). See Maluquer (1963) and Vicens-Vives (1984).

This vision may be related to other social theories ascribing an integrative and accommodating capacity to seaborne societies. For instance, the concept of a *maritime society* seems to fit the Catalan case (Conversi 1997). One of the characteristics of maritime societies is their apparent greater openness and social mobility, their reliance on free movement of goods and labour endowing them with integrative capacities towards outgroups - at least, so the myth goes.

In 1887, immigrants represented only 1.25% of Catalonia's inhabitants, slowly increasing to 3.33% in 1897, 4.22% in 1900, 5.44% in 1910, up to 14.03% in 1920 (Termes 1984: 129) -- the latter ensuing the industrial boom prompted by Spain's neutrality in World War I. This increase was kept constant until 1930. Rural immigrants from Barcelona's hinterland were now competing with immigrants from outside Catalonia. However, individuals from Catalan speaking areas still represented the majority: they came firstly from Valencia, then from Menorca, Majorca, and some from Southern Arag— n.⁵ Only in 1930, as non-natives became 19.61% of Catalonia's population, did the number of Spanish-speaking immigrants (318.956) approach that of Catalan-speaking immigrants (329.708) in Barcelona's province (Termes 1984: 131).

During Primo de Rivera's dictatorship (1923-1930), many immigrants were attracted by the works for the 1929 Universal Exposition in Barcelona, as well as by the salt potassium mines. But in the 1930s, the economic stalemate produced a decrease in the immigration rate. Finally, the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and its aftermath prompted several thousands to flee hunger from Andalusia into Catalonia, but also a huge political exodus from here. Afterward, immigration halted, a trend reversed only in the 1950s. Between 1951 and 1970, 1.16 million immigrants arrived in Catalonia from other parts of Spain, mainly from Andalusia (Rebagliato 1978: 256). By 1970, 37.69% of Catalonia's inhabitants were born outside the region (Termes 1984: 132), and finally by 1975 the immigrants reached 39% of Barcelona's population (Rebagliato 1978: 260). Not even in countries such as the USA and Argentina at the peak moment of their maximal immigration waves exceeded 30% (Marsal, cited by Termes 1984: 132). Most immigrant families clustered in the newly built *barris* of Barcelona's outskirts: Their highest concentration was to be found in the suburban townships of Cornell^ (78.4 %) and Santa Coloma (78.7 %) (Strubell 1981: 76, 2000). Also crucial was the immigrants' higher birth-rate as compared to the natives'. Already by 1965, immigration accounted for 65% of the total growth of Catalonia, while natural growth represented only 35% (S^ ez 1980: 26). That is, if taken together, the immigrants and their children far outnumbered the natives.

However, this was also a crucial moment for the expansion of nationalism.

⁵ These contacts did not result in major linguistic changes, since "slight dialect differences did not weight on the process and were soon erased" (Badia 1964: 107).

Nationalism attaches a tremendous importance to population figures. The more numerous the population, the more strength the nation has. Demography is therefore a power game. And a declining population is a bad omen for every unfeigned nationalist.⁶ That is why most cases of demographic decline are bound to generate counter-trends in searches for a compensation in political terms. Indeed, migration flows are universally ethno-genetic. Throughout history, nationalist movements exploded at times of massive population upheavals, huge transmigrations or, simply, changes in the demographic balances.⁷

Catalan demographers have traditionally lamented population decline, but the confidence of integrating the immigrants could cajole their separatist components into more moderate stances. Accordingly, integrating non-native population into the regional cultures has been essential to conflict resolution in the region.

Finally, there is a pro-immigrant argument in that this century's only sizable demographic increase in Catalonia was brought about by immigration. The immigration ceased in the 1970s, bringing about a zero-rate growth. Therefore, once the instruments of Catalanisation have been made fully available to the immigrants, some nationalist leaders have even been inclined to encourage further immigration.

Racialist vs. Integrationist approaches in Catalonia

Given Catalonia's traditional capacity to absorb immigrants, Catalans leaders were never particularly interested in drawing up insurmountable barriers between natives and newcomers. Immigrants were not resented as a major threat to Catalan identity, the main menace coming obviously from Madrid. Madrid posed a far greater danger to the survival of the Catalan nation, and its policies were a major source of de-Catalanisation. Moreover, due to the strength of linguistic identity, racialist definitions of the nation never gained currency. There have been attempts in this direction, but what strikes is their overall lack of success. We shall now examine some of these racialist definitions, contrasting them with more integrative ones which won the day.

At the turn of the century, the positivist writer Pompeu Gener (1848-1920) tried to define Catalan identity on the basis of race and descent. The Nordic Gothic character of Catalonia was opposed to the Arab and Berber nature of Castile. Relying on Nietzsche's vitalism, Gener avowed for the creation of a *super-nationalism*. Since 'science' provided an irrefutable instrument of legitimation, it is not surprising

⁶ In considering several nationalist movements world-wide, it is nearly impossible to find a single one of them which encourages birth control. This does not mean that this pattern cannot change in the future

⁷ For instance, the rise of Serbian nationalism, which has led to the present-day war in the Balkans, was inspired by a dramatic shift in the demographic balance of the Kosovo province. This region, which is considered by Serbs as the cradle of their nation, has seen an unprecedented increase in its Albanian component, so that Albanians made up over 90% of its population and the remaining Serbs behaved like a 'besieged' minority. A decrease in birthrate has also fostered radical visions of Quebecois nationalism.

that most European nationalist movements in the last throes of the century developed overt racist rationalizations. Race was considered to be the most reliable and incontestable way of supporting group differentiation. 'Science' provided a kind of esoteric doctrine through which a self-appointed secular clergy tried to impose their vision grounded on pretentiously immovable dogmas. The steadfastness of these dogmas was based precisely on the difficulty of demonstrating them.

I have shown elsewhere that the choice of race was directly related to the absence of other elements of ethnic differentiation⁸. The more the differences between groups are difficult to demonstrate in cultural terms, the more race comes to the fore as the ultimate identity marker. In Catalonia, linguistic consciousness provided an impediment against race-centred ideas. In the end, the racist ideas of Gener and other marginal pundits never acquired legitimacy in Catalonia.

Significantly, racist ideas gained ground under the aegis of late Nineteenth-century Modernism, which strove to open up Catalan culture to wider cosmopolitan influences.⁹ For the Modernists, this was simply a byproduct of their scramble for all things modern, scientific and European. Their use and abuse of 'scientific' terminology was a means of distancing themselves from the Romantics and the preceding Catalan revivalist movement, the *Renaixença*. The stress on race was intended to provide a provisional foundation for an allegedly more 'modern' form of nationalism, against previous nostalgic trends. But Gener's and others' attempts were quickly forgotten. When several decades later a massive influx of immigrants created the conditions for an ethnic backlash, few remembered his name.

A new stream of racial thought appeared in the 1930s.¹⁰ In his pessimistic portrait of Catalonia's 'decadence', the demographer Josep Vandell—s (1899-1950) backed up his anti-Malthusian defence of human natality with a wealth of statistical data.¹¹ Catalonia was 'threatened with extinction' by falling birth-rates. He proposed the diffusion of nationalism as an antidote to what he bemoaned to be racial decadence and generational egotism. In this, Vandell—s (1935) was inspired by both Italian Fascism and German pessimism.¹² Although more influential than Gener, his preoccupations about Catalan 'decadence' as a result of immigration and miscegenation were not seriously taken up by nationalist politicians.

Much more important than them all was the *integrationist* trend, exemplified by several authors

⁸ See Conversi (1990, 1993b, 1994).

⁹ The eclectic Modernist magazine *L'Avenç* hosted the racist writings of Gener: the aim was to differentiate Catalonia from the rest of Spain on what were perceived to be more 'solid' biological grounds. .

¹⁰ As predecessors, Termes (1984: 138-ff) mentions several anti-Malthusian hygienists preoccupied with the declining birth-rate at the turn of the century. Later, the physician Puig i Sais spoke of the fatal dangers of de-Catalanization and the need to increase the number of Catalans of pure stock.

¹¹ Avoiding the concept of 'race', Vandell—s spoke indeed of 'racial qualities' (Hall 1983: 77).

¹² Vandell—s studied with the fascist statistician Corrado Gini and was also influenced by the German philosopher Oswald Spengler (Bilbeny 1988: 156).

scattered in much nationalist literature. However, its importance fully emerged only in the 1960s as a consequence of massive immigration and the competing danger of an anti-immigrant backlash. At this stage, it was imperative to rediscover, and appeal to, a supposedly 'primordial' integrative propensity innate in Catalan society. The works of Vicens Vives, Ferrater i Mora and others served this purpose. But active integration could be more easily achieved in the wake of a common opposition to dictatorship. As in Euskadi, the oppositional character of the nationalist movement helped to mobilise immigrants and natives against a common foe. In this task, the whole opposition remained united. Concerns about the potential for communal strife in Catalan society haunted both left and nationalist politicians.

The two main representatives of this integrative current are the journalist Francis Candel (b. 1925) and the nationalist leader Jordi Pujol (b. 1930). Candel (1964), himself an immigrant, published a best-selling defence of the immigrants' contribution to Catalan society. Significantly, the book was titled *Els altres Catalans* (The other Catalans). However, he did not present an overall solution to the problem of cultural integration, especially in the linguistic aspect. His main merit was to have personified the immigrants' love for the host land and its people. The most relevant thinker in this period was Jordi Pujol, the future President of the Catalan Autonomous Government. His programme consisted in addressing the immigrant issues through linguistic incorporation, seeing Catalan language acquisition as a step 'naturally' ensuing from acceptance in the host country: "Our central problem is immigration and, hence, integration. The basic objective is to build up a community valid for all Catalans. And I care to add that by Catalan I mean everybody who lives and works in Catalonia, and who makes Catalonia his/her own home and country, which he/she incorporates and identifies with" (Pujol 1966). Hence, the stress was put on residence in an attempt to build a non-ethnic sense of citizenship (Woolard 1989). However, within what looks like an unmistakably 'civic' concept of the nation, language (especially language use in the family) remained the real crucible and badge of successful incorporation: "Language is the decisive factor in integration. ... A man who speaks Catalan and who speaks Catalan to his children, is already a Catalan at heart (*de soca i arrel*)" (Pujol 1966: 82-3). Pujol first expressed his vision in the late 1950s in some clandestine pamphlets. Obviously, such literature could not have a large circulation, but was very influential among important circles of intellectuals who can be defined as Catalonia's 'militant minorities' (Terms 1984: 154).

Collective nobility and ethnic chosenness among the Basques

In contrast with Catalonia, the Basque Country did not possess a vibrant tradition of acceptance of newcomers. The concept of universal or collective nobility (*hidalgu' a colectiva*) served a clear isolationist purpose (Conversi 1990, Douglass 2002).¹³ "All those who wish to be considered as inhabitants (*vecinos*)

¹³ See also the more extensive studies by Aranzadi (1981) and Otazu (1973). The concept also provided a myth of ethnic election which portrayed the Basques as a chosen people. On myths of ethnic chosenness, see Smith (1996, 1998) and Psalidas-Perlmutter (2000).

had to, if they were not from the country, prove their nobility. This required a long and costly legal procedure. The applicant had to finance the trip of two persons -a bailiff and an inhabitant of the place - to his birthplace, where he had to prove his nobility and purity of blood with witnesses or a baptism certificate" (Fernandez de Pinedo 1974: 51). Already in the XV century, people who came from outside the two Basque provinces of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa had limited civic rights and duties. With Bizkaia's *Fuero Nuevo*, the permission of the *anteiglesias*,¹⁴ villages and towns was needed in order to acquire stable residence. This implied an investigation into the moral conduct of the applicant, to be carried out in the place where he /she last resided.¹⁵ In 1585, the Junta Provincial of Gipuzkoa forbade the residence to all those who could not prove their collective nobility (Vazquez de Prada 1978: III: 170-2).¹⁶

The abolition of the *fueros* found the local population unprepared for the vast upheavals to come, and unable to counteract them. The rapid industrialization of the Bilbao area after 1876 meant that many people from both the surrounding countryside and other regions of Spain flocked into the city, while the locals could not have a say in these developments. Bilbao more than doubled its population from from 35,505 inhabitants in 1877 to 83,306 in 1900. By 1900 about 80% of the city's population was made up of immigrants, and only 23.4% were born in Bilbao (this figure also includes children of immigrants). Nearly half of the immigrants were non-Basques (Corcuera 1979: 73-5).

The amount of social disruption brought about by these dramatic changes in the human, cultural, social and ecological spheres was an essential catalyst for the birth of Basque nationalism. The massive arrival of dispossessed people who appeared 'impossible to integrate' was at the root of a widespread anti-Spanish resentment which is fully reflected in the words of the founder of Basque nationalism, Sabino Arana y Goiri (1865-1903), who ostensibly used the disparaging term *maketos* to refer to the immigrants:

If an autonomous and Basque-speaking Vizcaya were morally possible, though of *maketo* race, its realization would be the most hateful event in the world, the most creeping and abject aberration for a people, the most iniquitous and wicked political development and the most amazing falsity in history (Arana u.d.: I: 197)

Maketismo or *espa-olismo* creeps into every sphere of Vizcayan society: within the cultural and religious authorities, in the press, in recreational and political groups, in professional and religious organizations (189)

Our race has become despicably dominated by that of its most hard-fought enemy' (326).¹⁷

¹⁴ The *anteiglesias* (literally, before the Church) were administrative units roughly corresponding to municipal districts based on the parishes.

¹⁵ This attitude had been kept in the XVII century, when Bilbao's class structure started to change and expand. The members of the city's Junta periodically affirmed that its inhabitants were of noble lineage and thus they had to admit foreigners only after accurate research on their genealogies (Dominguez Ortiz 1976: 171).

¹⁶ The Basque idea of collective nobility was related to the Spanish concept of purity of blood, or *limpieza de sangre* (Amiel 1983, Douglass 2002). Considerations on the unique blood group of the Basques have recently been corroborated by bio-genetic research, particularly by Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi and Piazza (1991).

¹⁷ Arana also referred to the preferential allocation of administrative posts to the Spanish immigrants as *maketismo* (326). *Vizcaya* (=Bizkaia, in today's standard Basque) was one of the seven Basque provinces and the cradle of both Basque industrialization and nationalism.

In 1895, Arana founded the Basque Nationalist Party (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, PNV) with a program to regenerate morally, culturally and socially the province of Vizcaya (Bizkaia) and, in turn, the other six Basque provinces.¹⁸ Indignation and bitterness for the destruction of Basque traditional society are the main touchstones of Arana's thought. A self-righteous outrage for the decline of Basque civilization, its laws, language and values was at its basis. This wrath was reflected in Arana's manichean typologies of the incompatible human characters of Basques and Spaniards: Spaniards epitomized all negative attitudes and behaviour, all that Basques abhorred. They were painted as lazy, violent, prone to drunkenness.^É By contrast, Basques excelled in all those fields where the Spaniards failed.

As we can see, if by racism we mean a hierarchical evaluation of human groups on an universal scale, Arana can barely be defined as a racist since the target of his contempt were exclusively the Spaniards.¹⁹ His situational 'racism' was driven by hatred for Spanish political oppression.²⁰ And one should not forget that in Arana's time, at the turn of the XIX century, the concept of race was a fashionable one. The concept served to legitimise Basque aspirations to achieve a status on a par to that of other nations dominated by similar ethnically-based principles.

In a sense, race was an even stronger reminder and seal of distinction than language. Racial exclusiveness pre-existed Arana and was a common sentiment among Bilbao's residents in the third quarter of the century. The Castilianized and pro-centralist upper echelons may have been equally -if not more- racist than the Basque-speaking proletariat and petty bourgeoisie. Later on, both nationalists and anti-nationalists resented the *maketos* as invaders. However, only among the nationalists did they become openly identified with the state, since most of them came from Castile, the land of the oppressor.

There is no evidence that Arana had a direct knowledge of the works on racial superiority very popular in Europe at the end of the century, especially in France -- which he visited for brief periods. In his self-taught and disordered syncretism, Arana rarely, if ever, mentioned his sources. Certainly, Arana had a alert and vivacious intellectual curiosity for everything that could reinforce his nationalist creed. Allied with a *fin de siècle* mood of Spanish decadence, European racial thought may have had a strong impact amongst some *Regenerationista* Spanish intellectuals. At the same time, physical anthropologists, both

¹⁸ Basque nationalists define *Euskadi* (the Basque Country) as being composed of seven provinces: in Spain there are Alava (*Araba*), Vizcaya (*Bizkaia*), Guipúzcoa (*Gipuzkoa*), which form the Autonomous Community of Euskadi (established in 1980), and Navarre (*Nafarroa*), which forms a separate autonomous community (*Comunidad Foral de Navarra*); the remaining three provinces are in France: Labourd (*Lapurdi*), Soule (*Zuberoa*) and Basse Navarre (*Baxanabarra* or Low Navarre). Basque nationalists call the former area Euskadi Sur (*Hegoalde*) and the latter Euskadi Norte (*Iparralde*).

¹⁹ Indeed, Arana was also able to express some solidarity for other peoples fighting against Spain or similar Western foes, like the American Indians (1890: 189-90) or the Berbers of Morocco (189-90 and 193-4), who were at that time waging their struggle against the Spanish army.

²⁰ On the different meanings which the concept of *race* assumes relative to prevailing historical conditions and discourses, see Goldberg (1992). On the Spanish case, see Douglass (2002).

foreign and local, were professing theories of Basque racial uniqueness.²¹ Aranism helped only indirectly to popularize these concepts, which became more notorious and prominent after Arana's death. The idea of racial superiority "persisted at the ideological level long after openly racist aspects disappeared from the nationalist programmes" (Corcuera 1979: 386). Many decades later, during the 1960s, this legacy would spawn internal conflicts and fragmentation as most nationalists began to consider how to involve the immigrants and expand their participation in a common struggle.

All nationalist movements require shared values through which to articulate their message of distinctiveness and mobilise large followings. The accompanying quest aspires to re-create the 'essence' of national culture through efforts of syncretism. The compelling term *core value* identifies those symbols of ethnic cohesion which have the capacity of blending, integrating, orchestrating and unifying a rapidly changing culture (Conversi 1990, 1997). Arana's choice of *race* derived from the unavailability of other differentiating elements. He found that race had a stronger mobilising potential precisely because it defined the 'communitarian essence' of the nation, whereas no other element could operate on a similarly shared basis.

The somewhat simplistic contrast between Catalan 'openness' and Basque 'exclusiveness' refers to the initial period of the two nationalist movements. The substance of the original formulations remained basically untouched until the Civil War, as alternative visions could not find the conditions to emerge. In the postwar, Basque attitudes changed dramatically: the reaction to the second massive wave of immigration in the 1960s was to look for, and create, alternative values in order to include the immigrants into the nationalist struggle, rather than rejecting them. But we shall first examine which were the conditions of, and the reactions to, the first great immigration.

Bilbao's working class and the destructive impact of industrialization

At the beginning, industrialization was limited to Vizcaya and concentrated in the mining area around Bilbao. Given the impact of subsequent urbanization and immigration, it was here that nationalism was born and slowly spread.²² We have to consider that, initially, Arana spoke just of a "Vizcayan nation" and only later did he extend his nationalist programme to the other Basque provinces, inventing the term

²¹ Telesforo de Aranzadi and Federico Oloriz published anthropometric works on cephalic indexes, eye colour and various physiognomic peculiarities. Engracio de Aranzadi declared in 1904 that "we Basques constitute the aristocracy of the world, the earth's *noblesse*" (Aranzadi 1931, cited in Corcuera 1979: 386). Here, 'race' embodied more a spirit of caste. But such declarations could not form a cohesive doctrine of racial superiority.

²² Until the late 1950s, Gipuzkoa had relatively little non-Basque immigration and, as a consequence, had a weaker nationalism. Its industrialization was a subsidiary spill-over from Vizcaya, following an eastward trend from the towns at the border between the two provinces towards the French frontier, where it halted. Industrialization in Gipuzkoa consisted mostly of small industrial enterprises. In this environment, *cooperativism* flourished, as exemplified by Mondragon. As industrialization spread to Gipuzkoa's rural hinterland, so did nationalism.

Euskadi. This happened as soon as the effects of industrialization began to sprawl into neighbouring provinces. Immigrants in the Bilbao area were then living in pitiful conditions, as cogently described by the Communist leader Dolores Ibarruri (1895-1988) in her celebrated *They Shall Not Pass* (Conversi 1997)²³

A first natural reaction to the arrival of the immigrants was self-induced isolation. The natives reacted in the typical way of threatened minorities, reinforcing traditional barriers. Efforts in this direction are normally bound to fail if the minority in question does not have the (economic) means to implement its wish of seclusion. In the Basque case, isolationist attempts were encouraged by the natives' economic well-being in comparison to the immigrants. They could afford to display some kind of 'superiority' in regard to the latter, whilst they could hardly do so in respect of the central government.

Again, the population nearly doubled from 1900 to 1930 (Fusi 1984: 15). In the 1930s, religion became increasingly more important than race. The clergy participated massively in the nationalist movement, possibly as a response to the secular threat emanating from the Second Republic. In the Basque Country, religion became an indispensable tool of social cohesion at a time of erstwhile social instability in the rest of Spain. At the popular level, this new religious awareness was expressed by visionary events, religious apparitions and performances of miracles (Christian 1987). But the cataclysm of the Civil War irreparably broke this traditional balance (Aguilar Fernández 1998). The Catholic field was split along ideological and geographical lines; the two Basque provinces of Navarre (*Nafarroa*) and Alava (*Araba*) -or at least part of the latter- sided with the troops of General Francisco Franco (1892-1975) against the Basque nationalists. As is known, Franco's troops won the war establishing a nationalist dictatorship in Spain which lasted until the death of the dictator in 1975. In the dark night of oblivion which followed, an underground movement slowly emerged challenging what had been an hitherto static nationalist ideology. We shall now see how this ideology focused first on language, and subsequently on voluntary action, as an unitary platform and source of cohesion.

In the 1960s, the Basque economy underwent a massive process of expansion. Immigration had been constant since the 1890s, but the record figures of the 1960s led to inevitable strains on Basque culture and society. The fracture between immigrants and natives was in part healed through attempts to create a new sense of Basque identity carried out by some educators and nationalists. This effort to achieve 'national' unity is epitomized by the role of the *andere- os* (Basque teachers) as agents of the Basque cultural revival. They insisted on creating common schools where immigrant children could learn Basque side by side with native ones. But their first attempts failed on several occasions, not because of opposition from the immigrants, but, on the contrary, because many villagers were firmly opposed to their children being

²³ On the conditions of the working class from 1880 to 1914, see Castells (1990).

sent into mixed classes. Only a nationalist explanation -namely the sincere desire and right of the immigrants to become Basques -succeeded in convincing the reluctant parents about the viability of such schools, chasing away deeply-rooted prejudices. The source of the problem was the different view the teachers and the rest of the inhabitants had of Basque culture. The *andere- os* had a highly positive view of it, the villagers traditionally did not. In true Aranist spirit, their main concern was to be kept safe from 'negative foreign' influences, more than maintaining Basque culture. In the early phase of the cultural revival, positive national self-appraisal was still skin-deep.

The perception of their culture as a badge of inferiority is common to many minorities. In particular, social mobility in industrialized societies demands the mastery of a standard language as a vehicle of a homogeneous high culture (Gellner 1983). Hence, the retention of un-standardized varieties is seen as an hindrance to social mobility, as well as an emblem of cultural backwardness. This did not necessarily mean that the Basques themselves despised their culture. Quite the contrary, they often loved it, but, having continually to confront the impact of the dominant one, they did not have the means - political power - nor the knowledge - political skills - to promote Basque culture at a higher level. Centuries of diglossic inertia prevented them from even considering the possibility of transforming Euskara into a vehicle of high culture.

Eventually, the old ideology of racial superiority - which *de facto* downgraded Basque culture - waned with the spread of a neo-nationalist ideology which, in contrast, tried to promote Basque cultural manifestations. In 1971, a special issue of *Alderdi*, the underground newsletter of the PNV, was entitled "43 words for you, immigrant in Euskadi".²⁴ Its leading article called those who "came from other landsÉ to assume fully the duties which the impending crucial situation demands from us all". The call opened with a "welcome to our landÉ this is your land, you are BasqueÉ we [the natives] are not better or worse than any others". A vigorous rebuke of the centralizing dictatorship concealed a plea for the respect of all non-Spanish cultures. The immigrants were asked first to respect Basque culture and then to join the struggle for freedom. They were finally given the possibility of 'becoming Basques'. The only condition was to accept the Basques and their desire for independence and democracy. Hence, the stress was primarily on participation in the struggle for freedom and collective rights. *Faute de mieux*, it is a call to respect at least Basque culture and the Basques' efforts to preserve it. Hence, the next section will analyze the emergence of this voluntary conception of the nation.

State repression and the immigrants' nationalist socialization

By the 1960s the previous ascriptive requirements for membership in the Basque nation were being

²⁴ *Alderdi*, n¼ 270, December 1971.

replaced by a kind of voluntary association centered on personal involvement in the political struggle. Albeit remaining in the background as a symbol of Basque identity, language was continuously overshadowed by political action.

A militant nationalist movement, ETA (*Euskadi 'ta Askatasuna*, Basque Land and Freedom), was founded in 1959 by a group of students and mid-professionals who included assimilated natives and a few immigrants. It slowly became the second most effective 'liberation army' in Europe after the IRA (Irvin 1999). However, at the beginning it was basically a non-violent organization where Ghandi's and Fanon's followers joined side by side in an underground attempt to revive the persecuted Basque language. Language and the study of Basque history were the key ingredients of the new liberation movement in its embryonic stage. But as soon as the movement endeavored to spread from its original inner basis of university students, rural middle-classes and urban professionals, it encountered enormous difficulties. It was a time of rapid economic transformation and mass urbanization. People were abandoning the countryside and flocking into large urban centers. Bilbao, already assimilated into the dominant Spanish culture, became further and utterly un-Basque. Frustration built in both the crowded urban centers and in the emptying countryside. All over Spain, the working class movement was becoming the pillar and sinews of the anti-regime opposition, due in particular to the efficient organization of the underground Communist party and Communist-affiliated labour unions. In order to expand the national liberation struggle, the nationalists had to co-opt, or at least familiarize with, working class issues.

When ETA turned to armed struggle in the late 1960s, more and more immigrants joined the organization. Clark (1984: 147-9) gives interesting figures about ETA's non-native membership.²⁵ Many activists were offspring of immigrants, of mixed parents, or even immigrants themselves. Many of ETA's martyrs were immigrants as well, such as Juan Paredes Manot, who shouted "Long live free Euskadi" in front of the firing squads before being executed. Even the most traditionalist Aranists were deeply impressed by similar acts of ultimate generosity and their beliefs in Basque purity were deeply shattered. *Action* became far more important than race and, generally, it was also more important than language as a marker of Basqueness. One of the main reasons for this choice was precisely that immigrants, as well as assimilated Basques, could not be mobilised through the old primordial tools of race, religion, and language revivalism.

This new way of conceiving Basque membership through active participation draws from a pre-existing autochthonous value, *ekintza* (action).²⁶ Its inner meaning is a "commitment as far as possible to

²⁵ According to the surnames of ETA members, 40.1% of them came from mixed ancestry, that is, either the mother or the father had a non-Basque surname. Furthermore, 16.6% came from purely non-Basque ancestry, that is, both surnames were Spanish. In the whole, 56.7% of the *etarras* were not of purely Basque origin (Clark 1984: 147). The Basques follow the Iberian tradition of using both maternal and paternal surnames.

²⁶ Zulaika (1988: 36-56) links the revival of this concept to the influence in Euskadi of the pro-regime ecclesiastical movement, *Acci— n Cat— lica* (Catholic Action). According to the group's representatives, the notion of *militancy* had to be the central vocation

implement in secular life what the religious belief dictated to be true" (Zulaika 1988: 39). In other words, the Basque defines herself/himself as a person by 'doing' (Del Valle 1989: 127). The nationalists felt that a Basque is one who, "loving his nation, fights for its liberation"É Hence, "a true Basque can only be a Basque nationalist" (Heiberg 1979: 187). This conception was also present in Arana's stress on patriotism as a 'moral obligation'. Also, a true Basque is one who actively (and politically) defends the symbols of Basque cohesion and differentiation (Heiberg 1979: 195). Activism is especially a duty for the youth and every youth has a particular responsibility to be an *ekintzaile* (activist). The concept contains in it a sense of mission and a striving to 'convert' other people to act likewise (Zulaika 1988: 39). The new post-1960s Basque nationalism extended this sense of mission to the immigrants, where it achieved a new class-oriented meaning. The choice of Marxism as a central ideological tenet was directly linked to this drive at immigrants' mobilisation. The root of the concept of *ekintza* is contained in the name of the organization and journal *Ekin*, the predecessor of ETA. *Ekin* means 'to do' and its young founders conceived it as in opposition to the static, out-dated and passive attitude of the old *peneuvista* generation.

The relationship between this concept of self-fulfilling action and violence is clear. *Ekintza* is enhanced whenever the activity involves some kind of risk. Thus, "the requirement of underground secrecy for the more political type of *ekintza* was a proof of its importance. The high risk involved in following the dictates of one's conscience exposed the intrinsically evil nature of the existing political establishment and gave a moral, almost sacred imperative to the *ekintza*" (Zulaika 1988: 44). All participants in the struggle were not simply Basque citizens, but also Basque nationalists and part of the corresponding 'moral community', irrespective of where they were born. The 'targets' of these mobilisation tactics were both Spanish-speaking Basques and the immigrant population. Hence, the peculiar conditions of secrecy under the dictatorship, transformed each *ekintza* into a daring act and favoured the metamorphosis from simple action and militancy into violence. The choice of a voluntarist definition of the nation brought about the subsequent fall into a mounting spiral of violent actions and reactions.

Political participation and integration in the Basque Country

There are different means of measuring political integration and participation. If we take into account voting patterns, the high percentage of votes for the pro-independence coalition *Herri Batasuna* in areas where immigrants are a majority can testify to the immigrants' involvement in nationalist politics. In Renteria, an industrial town of Gipuzkoa, only 19% of the population was native-born, yet the overall nationalist vote was 48.65% in 1979 (Llera Ramo 1985: 405, SIADECO 1981) and achieved 62.7% in the 1987 municipal elections (Anuario El Pais 1988, Silver 1988: 124).²⁷ The greatest gain was recorded by

of any Christian (ibid: 40).

²⁷ The total vote for the nationalist parties (62.77%) was distributed as follows: HB 28.13%, EA 15.92 %, EE 13.05 % and PNV

radical parties: HB (from 19.97 % in 1979 to 28.11 % in 1987 and 24% in the 1989 legislative elections) and EE (from 12.62 % to 13.1%).²⁸ Before the Civil War, when immigrants were a small minority in Renteria, the overall nationalist vote was a mere 36.1%. Moreover, this was exclusively directed at the conservative PNV. In 1979, the PNV's percentage declined to 16.9%, while the radical parties achieved top positions. The conclusion put forward by Silver (1988) is that when immigrants vote for nationalist parties, they tend to vote for radical nationalists.

Such changes occurred on the background of a dramatic demographic shift. The population of Renteria increased from 3,062 inhabitants in 1877 to 45,789 in 1981. That is, it multiplied over fourteen fold in little more than a hundred years (Goicoechea 1991: 20). Immigration also caused a change in the age structure and there is a higher percentage of youth than in other cities (21). This is a further variable that may be taken into account in order to explain radical nationalism's strength. Indeed, the peculiar appeal which nationalism exerts over the youth has been highlighted by research in many other nationalist movements (Conversi 1997). Most immigrants were non-Basque: in 1975, 40.1% of the inhabitants of Renteria were born outside Euskadi (Goicoechea 1991: 21-2). Of course, this percentage did not include their Basque-born offspring, who were considered as natives, so that, if taken together, the immigrants and their children formed the overwhelming majority of the population. The average of immigrants in the *comarca* (36.3 %) was much greater than in Gipuzkoa as a whole (27.77 %) or Euskadi as a whole (30 %, including Navarre). As in most other Basque towns, the support for HB in Renteria has increased at every election. After a brief decrease to 16.59 (general election of 1982), HB support increased to 24.65 (municipal election of 1983), 25.71 (legislative election of 1986), 25.44 (regional election of 1986), and 28.13 (municipal election of 1988). HB has to compete with the PSOE (Socialists), the only relevant Spanish-based party, for the immigrants' vote.²⁹ Since Renteria has been a special target for repression by the para-military *Guardia Civil*, the city is a good ground for testing a correlation between nationalism, immigration, lack of common culture and state violence.

This propensity towards immigrant radicalization is confirmed by other more general data. Those living in the Basque Country can identify themselves as either Basque or Spaniard. Thus, many immigrants identify themselves as Basques. In Juan Linz's (1986: 40) sample, 8.4% of immigrants identify themselves

5.67 %. The PSOE remained the first party with 31.93 %. The positive result for the Basque Left indicates that the choice of class-related politics by Basque nationalists started to yield results, vindicating their initial choices.

²⁸ See *Anuario Estadístico Vasco 1985*. Bilbao: Gobierno Vasco/Eusko Jauriaritza, 1986; and *Anuario Estadístico Vasco 1988*. Bilbao: Gobierno Vasco/Eusko Jauriaritza, 1989. For the data up to 1980, see SIADECO (1981) *Análisis Descriptivo de la Comarca Rentería a Pasajes*. Donostia: Caja Laboral Popular, pp. 132-151. For a detailed analysis of the 1977 and 1977 elections in the four Basque provinces, see Llera Ramo (1985).

²⁹ Given its steady but slow growth, HB also appeared to be the most stable party in the region (Ramirez Goicoechea 1988: 407).

as 'more Basque than Spaniard'. Among them, 36% want independence for Euskadi, compared with 24% among those natives [that is, with both Basque parents] who identify themselves as 'more Basque than Spaniard' (not all natives identified themselves as such). Assuming that desire for independence is a reliable indicator of nationalism, we can see that nationalism is stronger among those immigrants who feel Basque, even stronger than among the natives in general (whether they feel Basques or Spaniards). When the immigrants 'felt' Basque, they are less prone to compromise over independence and other issues. The oppositional mechanism of nationalist mobilisation has resulted in the direct incorporation of many immigrants into the 'moral community'. The hot ground became the contested control of the nationalist discourse (Douglass 2000). The crucible for nationalist militancy is hence a shared Basque identity, rather than origin or race. Furthermore, paradoxically, the percentage of people opposed to independence is higher among 'pure Basques' than among all the other groups of immigrant or mixed origin.³⁰ Linz concludes that "when immigrants are forced to choose between a primordial and a territorial definition, they naturally incline towards the latter".^É That is why "the most extreme nationalism in the Basque Country seems to be associated with a *territorial*, rather than a *primordial*, conception of the nation" (Linz 1985: 206).³¹ This seems to contrast with Clark's finding on the positive correlation between language maintenance and nationalist voting, but Clark refers mainly to the native population, rather than to the immigrants (Clark 1984, 1987).

Also, among those who favour a centralized Spanish state, the definition of who is Basque tends to focus on birth and descent: this stress on putative origin or race is adopted by 80.3% of the pro-centralists. That is, the *espa-olistas* are unable to conceive an integrative dimension in Basqueness. In parallel, people who define Basqueness on the basis of race or descent are 'only' 45.5% of those favouring independence (1985: 215). Thus, a racially exclusive conception of the nation is more widespread among the centralists than among the nationalists.

Catalonia: Mass migration and the limits of cultural integration

The regime's propaganda deliberately falsified the causes of migratory movements: they were explained away in terms of the "attraction exerted on the simple peasant mentality by the city, with its theatres, avenues and elegant women" (Hall 1983: 74-5). Minimizing the seriousness of the social problems caused by its policies, the regime's cop-out was to say that "these are problems common to all developed countries" (cited by Hall 1983: 75). As we have seen, the most crucial period of massive immigration

³⁰ Rejection is obviously strongest of all among those who feel themselves to be purely Spaniards: 75% of these firmly reject independence, a far higher percentage than any of the other groups.

³¹ Among the 'primordial' traits, Linz includes language, which can obviously be acquired. This is perhaps on the ground that the sociolinguistic nature of Euskera (its scarce diffusion, low prestige and difficult learning) makes it more 'primordial' than Catalan.

occurred at a time when Catalan was still rigorously forbidden in all public spheres and its use was liable to prosecution. The immigrants did not stand a chance to learn it formally. At the same time, Catalan remained *de facto* the habitual language among Catalans 'by birth'. Francoist prohibition therefore rendered impossible the immigrants' cultural integration at the very moment in which a massive effort in this direction was most needed. On the other hand, many scholars were optimistic about the immigrants' gradual assimilation into Catalan culture. For instance, Maluquer (1963: 62-ff.) found that in the Pyrenean industrial town of Campdev^ nol all the immigrants' offspring spoke Catalan and behaved as Catalans. He explained this success as a result of the children's parents' desire for social mobility and the prestige they associated with the natives as a reference group: "Their situation of socio-professional inferiority explains the efforts of the immigrants to be similar to the autochthons". While the natives labelled the immigrants as *xarnegos* (literally, half-breed, half-caste, or hybrid), the most relevant finding was that "such form of verbal discrimination was employed against the newcomers, not only by the Catalans, but also by older immigrants, who tried thus to elevate themselves by stressing a social distance" (63). This, Maluquer concluded, was a clear proof of successful integration into Catalan culture and society. From this, he extrapolated optimistic conclusions for the Catalanization of future generations: "Despite the fact that the teaching was carried out only in Spanish, the school children spoke Catalan among themselves and called *xarnegos* those who did not master the language yet. É This [attitude] encourages assimilation" (63). By defining anyone who did not speak Catalan as *xarnego*, hence member of an outgroup, the children also testified to the central importance of language in the definition of their identity. These attitudes highlighted prevailing integrative trends, since the immigrants were no longer considered *xarnegos* as soon as their language proficiency was clearly established.

We have seen that these assimilatory trends have ancient roots dating back to Catalonia's centenary concept of *terra de pas* (Vicens Vives 1984). Not only philosophy and philology, but also archeology was harnessed to this end (D' az-Andreu 1997). In the recent past, this process has led to optimistic attitudes on the Catalan side. Thus, in 1965 the linguist Antoni M. Badia i Margarit claimed: "the possibility that the immigrants would escape assimilation is simply nil" (cited by Vallverde 1980). Again, still in 1978, the anthropologist Claudi Esteva i Fabregat assumed that the autochthonous culture was still dominant and a new 'ethnic group' was emerging in the form of 'hybridization' (*mestissatge*): "in Barcelona, the Castilian-speaking population (that is to say, the monolingual one, my addition) is losing about 17% of its components by the second generation" (Esteva 1978).

Catalan culture started to show signs of renewed vitality once the trauma of dictatorship was overcome. However, things did not go as well as many expected. Pi i Sunyer (1971: 119) warned that "the argument that this minority within a minority can, given the right conditions, be assimilated with few problems smacks of wishful thinking and is not borne out by similar historical cases". According to Hall (1983: 74),

since reliable data on immigration was still scarcely available in the 1970s, the gravity of the situation was hidden to many Catalans. The number of monolingual Castilian-speakers was the highest ever recorded in Catalan history. In such circumstances, daily use of Catalan was unlikely even for people who did master the language.

However, assimilation was not the issue. On the contrary, the issue was the diffusion of bilingualism, which does not imply the loss of the immigrants' culture (Sanz 2000). Indeed, the very term *Castilian-speakers* normally refers to the monolingual population (i.e, unable to speak Catalan), whilst *Catalan-speakers* are always bilingual individuals who normally use Catalan.³² I use the concept of two groups, Catalan- and Castilian-speakers, only for heuristic purposes. This will prevent us from reifying the two communities in sharp terms, since there are both Catalanized immigrants (or immigrants who are undergoing a process of Catalanization), and Castilianized natives (even though they are a minority, mostly from higher echelons). Linguistic competences form a continuum shading from pure monolingualism to 'perfect' bilingualism and the preferred use of Catalan as daily language.

To a lesser extent, the same notion of a continuum can be applied to the Basque case, where most of the literature emphasizes a gap between autochthonous inhabitants and immigrants. In Euskadi we also find a continuum of identities and behavioural patterns, rather than a sharp opposition between two groups, although cultural integration is less likely. Several studies tend to reify the immigrants as a tightly bound and easily identifiable community, over-emphasizing the fracture between them and the host society. This may occur both in nationalist and more balanced analysis.³³

Moreover, as the big wave of immigration ended in the late 1970s, the very term *immigrant* can no longer imply territorial displacement from one region to another.³⁴ The largest part of those who migrated in the last twenty years are well-established and intend to remain in the 'host' country. This is especially true for the second generations who have virtually no desire to return to their parents' land (SolŽ 1981: 18-24 and 344-53). Certainly, many immigrants mythologise their land of origin surrounding it with a halo of nostalgia. But the myth falls apart as soon as they have a chance to return to their *pueblos*. Here, often unrecognized as members of their own kin by the local population, they are called, ironically, *los catalanes* (the Catalans) (SolŽ 1986). After such disappointing experiences, they frequently feel the

³² In a classic case of language loyalty, Catalans tend to use their code daily in most in-group interactions. Language erosion only occurs among very limited sectors of the native population. In fact, most children with two Catalan parents have daily occasion to use Catalan within the family (Strubell 1981: 151-ff). However, the natives' competence in Catalan is often far superior to their competence in Castilian.

³³ Some studies of Basque society (Escudero 1978, Heiberg 1979) speak plainly of 'two communities'. For the case of Catalonia, see, for example, Pi i Sunyer (1971) and Di Giacomo (1984).

³⁴ Pascual and Cardeloes (1987: 332) note that the fact of being born outside Catalonia does not justify the definition of a person as an 'immigrant', since he or she could have been residing in Catalonia for at least 20 years.

impossibility of being re-integrated in their former 'homeland'. The ensuing identity conflict sometimes results in a desire to acquire a stronger Catalan identity. As older immigrants find it difficult to make this step, they are nonetheless anxious that their offspring be fully integrated into Catalan society and culture. This desire is shown by several surveys mentioned in the next section, which show a clear wish for future generations to have full access to Catalan.

Catalan language as a vehicle of integration

The percentage of those able to understand Catalan grew spectacularly by over 10% in a five-year period, from 79.8% in 1981 to 90.3% in 1986 (data from the municipal census of April 1986). In the Basque Country the increase has been just 3% over the same period -- an increase, nevertheless.³⁵

Distinct explanations have been adduced to explain the diffusion of Catalan among immigrants. A variety of 'relative deprivation theory' suggests that, since the autochthonous group is economically better off, for many immigrants it represents a "reference group", embodying a pattern of behaviour which many migrants aspire to emulate. The reference group's language is part of the apprehended norms of behaviour that people wishing to become its members may seek to adopt. In sociolinguistics, the phenomenon is known as *linguistic prestige* (Weinreich 1956) or *status* (Ryan 1979). Thus, language "is generally inseparable from the prestige of those who speak it" (Woolard 1989: 93). Many authors tend to see class and ethnicity in Catalonia as overlapping, as the Catalans are concentrated in the middle- or upper-class echelons, while immigrants allegedly represent the working class (Woolard 1989, Di Giacomo 1984). Indeed, most immigrants initially fell into semiskilled and unskilled labour pools (Pinilla de las Heras 1973: 105).³⁶ However, this is only a rough generalization and we cannot speak of class as coterminous with ethnicity, particularly in more recent years. In fact, some Catalans are likely to be found at the bottom of the social ladder too. On the other side, there are immigrants who have succeeded in reaching the highest ranks of class stratification, thanks to a relatively diffuse social mobility.³⁷

Numerous sociolinguistic studies have confirmed the immigrants' highly positive attitudes towards Catalan language.³⁸ Much of the data refers to the respondents' opinions about the introduction of Catalan in the school curricula. This have been reinforced by recent linguistic findings pointing that bilingual education enhances third language acquisition (Sanz 2000). The proliferation of such surveys is in itself a

³⁵ However, actual linguistic uses are much more resilient to change. Furthermore, they are difficult to assess statistically: census' forms only contained items on language proficiency, not language use.

³⁶ For a comprehensive account of the Labour movement among the immigrants in postwar Barcelona, see Balfour (1989).

³⁷ On social mobility among the immigrants in the 1960s and the first 1970s, see the classical sociological investigation by Pinilla de las Heras (1973). See also Miguelez (1987).

³⁸ For an exhaustive review of these studies, see Torres (1988).

signal that the Catalanists were very concerned about the possible impact of forthcoming linguistic normalization on immigrants' attitudes. Investigations preceded, or followed swiftly, democratic changes in the local education system. A survey by Badia i Margarit (1969) was the first to unveil a genuine desire to learn Catalan among the general population. A first comprehensive quantitative work (FOESSA 1970) came to more reliable conclusions: in a sample of housewives, 97% of the interviewees favoured the introduction of Catalan in the school system (33% of the respondent women were immigrants themselves, while 50% had at least one parent born outside Catalonia). Other surveys were specifically concerned with the attitudes of the overall immigrant population. In the prevalently rural *comarca* of Osona, 94% of the immigrants, all born outside Catalonia and in Castilian-speaking areas, expressed the wish that their offspring learn Catalan (Reixach 1975). But the same trend was observable where there was a high concentration of immigrants: In the satellite city of Cornellà de Llobregat, which had -and has- the highest percentage of monolingual Castilian speakers in all Catalonia (CIDC 1987), 97% of the parents were favorable to increasing the teaching of Catalan (cited by Torres 1988). According to another study, 90% of an interviewed sample of both native Catalans and immigrants expressed a preference that the teaching of Catalan be extended to the overall territory, while about 80% held as necessary the introduction of Catalan as a compulsory subject in all school curricula (Bibiloni and Junyent, cited by Torres 1988). Paradoxically, the zone which showed the strongest support for the teaching of (and in) Catalan were the suburbs of Barcelona, that is to say, the place of maximum immigration and of minimum knowledge of the language (Torres 1988: 53). This evidence has been backed by more recent data on the pressing request for 'immersion schools' in the metropolitan periphery on the part of immigrant fathers on behalf of their children (Conversi 1987).³⁹ The fact that almost all the immigrants expressed a desire to learn Catalan is a measure of its perceived utility. In fact, this desire seems to be stronger in those areas which are less knowledgeable of Catalan and, therefore, have a greater need to acquire basic rudiments of the language. However, this pragmatic demand does not guarantee an increasing use of Catalan, nor does it necessarily reflect a positive attitude towards the language.

Some authors indicate a further factor of integration in the solidarity between the immigrant workers and, generally, the Catalans experienced during Francoism, a solidarity found in the wake of the common experience of oppression by the centralist state.⁴⁰ With its double crusade against 'separatists' and 'reds' alike, Falangist rhetoric reinforced such situational alliance. After years of unceasing propaganda against the *rojoseparatistas*, even ordinary people came to perceive some sort of identity among the two

³⁹ For an overview of changes in the Catalan education system in the early 1980s, including the implementation of 'immersion' classes adapted to Catalonia on the Canadian model, see Conversi (1987).

⁴⁰ This may seem part of nationalist or leftist mythology, but similar examples are given by numerous authors. On immigrant-Catalan solidarity during later Francoism, see Candel (1964, 1985).

dimensions. The experience of the Spanish Republic was still fresh in popular memory, when the Catalan nationalists and the Left were allied against the centralist right. However, probably the most important factor of integration was that the working class leaders were themselves raised in Catalanist milieux, or directly involved in Catalanist politics. Due to the common struggle for democracy and against a common foe, a solidarity bond was created amongst leftist and nationalist leaders. This brings to the fore once more the role of the political intelligentsia as the moulder of a new social identity. Sometime, nationalist, communist or socialist leaders were members of the same families.

In this section we have demonstrated that the immigrants perceived a strong need to be integrated and that learning Catalan facilitated this process. In the next section, we shall explore the dynamics of Catalan identity.

Shifting parameters of Catalan identity.

The concept of identity is among the most elusive and difficult to define both in general terms and in terms of any specific identity associated with a given ethnic group. Most anthropologists agree that the creation of a group's identity derives from a group's interactions with outgroups (Conversi 1995). Also, the intensity with which group members stress their ethnicity increases when there is intense spatial-geographical contact between groups (Manzo 1997). The most isolated ethnic groups are probably the least self-defined in ethnic terms. Thus, it is more likely that the Catalans and the Basques who underwent massive immigration and overall acculturation, would become more consciously 'national' than their Galician counterparts, inasmuch as the Galicians did not experience anything like the same amount of cultural interference. Immigration is particularly important in this respect, because, thanks to the massive arrival of people belonging to a different culture, the average person becomes conscious of cultural differences on a daily basis. As the immigrants' all-pervasive presence can no longer be ignored, cultural conflict becomes part of every person's everyday life. In particular, wherever immigration occurs on a great scale, it is inevitably perceived as a form of aggression. Traditional ethnic borders are attacked daily and plunged into deep crisis. These borders might either be utterly reinforced by this crisis, as in the early Basque case, or prone to be more pliable, adapting to new trends, as in the Catalan case. The natives adopt different strategies in order to defend their identity. In both cases, national identity is a concentric process, but the hierarchy of values is clearer in Catalonia.

The Catalan leaders' attempt to define a specific sense of Catalan identity have tended to underline territoriality and residentiality, rather than descent ("A Catalan is whoever lives and works in Catalonia").⁴¹ On a second and more inward level, there is the linguistic aspect ("A Catalan is he/she who

⁴¹ The territoriality and cultural dimension of nationhood was also stressed in the works of the first Catalanists: Antoni Rovira i Virgili (1882-1949), Francesc Pi i Margall (1824-1901), Enric Prat de la Riba (1870-1917), and Vincent Almirall (1841-1904). Among the works which are specifically dedicated to immigration, those of Jordi Pujol (b. 1930) lay the foundation for a non

speaks Catalan"), which is not automatic, but can be acquired. With the stress on either residentiality or language, ascriptive and hereditary criteria of national membership have been cast aside ("A Catalan person is a child or descendant of Catalans"). Hence, present-day definitions of who is a Catalan include individuals coming from other regions, provided they remain resident in the Catalan Countries. Furthermore, this is also part of the immigrants' self-conception, insofar as 'second-generation immigrants' (that is, the immigrants' children who were born in Catalonia) usually define themselves as Catalans, independently of their knowledge or use of the Catalan language (SolŽ 1981, 1982). On the part of the nationalist leaders, this integrative definition is certainly linked to political -not merely electoral- goals of nation-building. However the factor 'residence' is often played down in everyday life, until it becomes almost epiphenomenal. Language gradually emerged as the core value of the Catalan nation (Conversi 1990, Cramer 2000a, 2000c, McRoberts 2001, Strubell 2000, Wright 1998, 1999), a process which has been known and diffused amongst other European stateless nations (Cormack 2000). As shown before, many immigrants themselves see in it a crucible of Catalanness. The fact that language tends to be accepted as such by many immigrants as well is a measure of its integrative strength, although this does not imply that immigrants will renounce to their regional identity.

Hence, we are faced with a series of concentric circles or progressively integrating concepts, as with an onion's layers. First, there stands a civic territorial definition of nationhood based on the *jus soli*. This definition is prevailing at least in political rhetoric. Then, there comes an acquirable and deserved membership in the nation through voluntary efforts, symbolized by the mastering of the language. The idea of 'nation of will' has to be actively demonstrated through a 'will of the nation', a longing to be part of the nation. Here, we can find some parallel in the French concept of citizenship. Finally, mostly limited to small town strongholds, stands a declining stress on origin and descent, usually to be proved by a person's double Catalan surname. The three above mentioned concepts of Catalan identity are often situational.

Language is however not the only hallmark of integration. Immigrants often find an easier way into Catalan identity by participating in folksy events of popular culture, such as popular dances, *colles de castellers* (human towers), Orfeon choirs, trekking excursions, etc. -- although folklore certainly played a more conspicuous role in Basque nationalism (Martinez Montoya 1999, Watson 1996). In the crucial years of resistance and transition, these activities provided a relatively painless means of integration, in which not much personal reputation or sacrifice was at stake. Sport has also provided a crucial means of integration in Catalonia (Hargreaves 2000). A particular symbolic integrative element has been provided by the Catalan national dance, the *sardana*. This dance was created during the *Renaixença* by the Andalusian immigrant Pep Ventura (1817-1875) on the basis of a folk tradition which allegedly dates back

to the 16th century. It was 'launched' in 1859 at the Liceu Theatre and, since then, it acquired increasing popularity (Barrera 1985: 300-8). A typically invented tradition, the sardana can be seen as a symbol of the inclusive nature of Catalan culture: "By stressing the inclusion of everyone who learns the rules, the dance is a microcosmic reflection of the general Catalan belief in ethnicity as an achieved status. However, the sardana also excludes those who neither know nor follow the detailed rules of the dance" (Brandes 1990).

Children's entertainments and shows were also aimed at the immigrants' offspring. As an example, in several Barcelona's suburbs the *Roda d'Espectacles Infantils* (Children Shows Group) organised shows based on the study of Catalan traditions and the revival of lost celebrations. The *Roda* was founded in 1977 by the initiative of neighbourhood associations and recreation groups, at a time when it was still imperative to revive customs and traditions which had been suffocated by years of clandestine existence.⁴²

A comparative assessment

Several factors can be singled out as determining the more or less successful extent of the immigrants' cultural integration in Catalonia and Euskadi:

1. The region of origin is an important factor in the capacity or will to acquire the regional culture. According to a survey conducted in the Catalan town of Mataró, the most adaptable of the immigrants came from Andalusia and Catalonia's nearby regions; the more refractory came from the Castilian centre (Duocastella, cited by Maluquer 1963: 59).⁴³ In Euskadi, Castilian immigrants outnumber those from all other regions and are said to be more resistant to assimilation (Blanco 1990).

2. The structural quality of the two languages is even more crucial. The facility of learning Catalan cannot be matched by the difficulty of learning Basque, which is completely unrelated to Castilian.

3. The prestige associated with language is also determinant. Catalan enjoys a high prestige, not only in cultural terms, but also because it is associated with a dynamic entrepreneurial part of society. No such prestige has hitherto been accorded to Basque.

4. Its worth in the labour market may make the language a valuable means of economic integration. What we defined as 'instrumental' motivations for language learning are nearly all-pervasive in an environment where Catalan is used in virtually every sector of the economy. In contrast, notable attempts to introduce Euskara in the public administration have not been matched by equally successful efforts to introduce it into the private sector. Consequently, economic integration in the Basque Country can bypass cultural integration.

⁴² *Lluisa Celades: la integraci— dels fills dels immigrants mitjan ant la cultura*, *Avui*, 4 June 1986. On the role of neighborhood associations and other citizens' movements in Euskadi, see AndrŽ s and Maisuetxe (1980).

⁴³ The survey simply asked the interviewees if they understood Catalan.

5. The reception of the local population to the immigrants' efforts to assimilate is also crucial. In contrast with Catalonia, the initial Basque isolationism implied that the locals were not particularly interested in promoting the knowledge of their language. This may have influenced the respective success of the two countries' integrative efforts.

6. The nationalist leaders' different interpretations of national identity may finally have influenced both the attitudes of the natives towards the immigrants and the immigrants' confidence of being accepted in the host society, so that their efforts of assimilation will be rewarded. In the Basque Country and Catalonia, we encounter two original concepts of nationhood and potential citizenship. Perhaps the distinction runs parallel to the one between the allegedly German *ius sanguinis* and French *ius soli*.

Probably other factors can be added to the above. For instance, before venturing into learning a new language, an immigrant may ponder what its intrinsic worth is, what has this language to offer *per se*. Again, Catalan was greatly advantaged by its rich and ancient literature.

Apart from some general similarities, the two regions faced different immigration patterns, with different timing and forms of adaptation for the immigrants. Finally, we have seen how the two nationalist movements have tackled the issue of immigration in contrasting ways.

Concluding remarks

There is an increasing number of recent studies comparing the distinctive developments of nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia (Payne 2000, Guerin and Pelletier 2000, Mar-Molinero 2000) or the different nations within Spain (Heywood 1996, Keating 2000, Lecours 2001), as well as international comparisons focusing on Spain's nationalities (Giordano and Roller 2001, Guibernau 1999, Mansvelt Beck 2001). One of the questions which inevitably emerges is why the two nations have spawned so hugely different modes of mobilizations, in other words, 'why terrorism?' (Moxon-Browne 1999). But no study has yet systematically compared the relationship between nationalism and its efforts to integrate immigrants into the nationalist platforms of the two countries, relating it to different forms of nationalism - although the relationship between immigration and nationalism has been analysed through a broad comparative lens (Shafir 1995). Basque radicals and Catalan intellectuals engaged in two contrasting processes of 'nation-building' and partial processes of de-ethnicization. In both countries the issue of how to integrate the immigrants became the crucible.

Catalan intellectuals disentangled the problem by envisaging nationhood in terms of mixed breeding, where culture, rather than descent, was the key to membership in the moral community. In contrast, Basque nationalists avoided touching directly upon the topic. The issue of how to integrate the 'working class' - most of which was made of immigrants - was resolved with political, rather than cultural, means.

Although there were competing visions of Basque identity, the stress was increasingly put on 'action', rather than engaging in any attempt to essentialize a coherent image of Basqueness. The leaders' strategy was to mobilize the entire population. In the Basque Country this was achieved by radical confrontation with a repressive, hence de-legitimate, state. Indeed, violent action filled the cultural gap between immigrants and natives, compensating for the initial lack of a common culture and shared values -- a goal towards which most nationalists strive. To put it bluntly, violence replaced culture.

Immigration can play a central role in the formation and evolution of nationalism. In the two cases examined, immigrants have also been active participants in the respective nationalist movements. This was bound to occur as the latter promoted a new inclusive vision of national identity, non-ascriptive and not based on putative descent. In order to integrate newcomers, both nationalist movements had to concentrate on inclusive myths, symbols and core values -- which were not always available.

Yet, there has been a sharp opposition in the way the two movements have mobilized immigrants' political participation. Catalan identity was originally conceived as integrative, while Basque identity had an exclusivist bent (Conversi 1997, Guerin and Pelletier 2000, Mar-Molinero 2000, Payne 2000).

In Catalonia, racist or segregationist approaches were never openly adopted by the intelligentsia or the professional classes -- only by marginal intellectuals. Whenever they emerged, similar trends were quickly superseded by the nationalist leaders' integrative stance. Barcelona had been a destination point for immigrants for over a century (Jofre 1978). However, the steadiest migration wave in modern Catalan history occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s, coinciding with the final phase of Franco's dictatorship. In a few years, nearly a million immigrants, mostly from Andalusia, settled in the newly-built unwholesome, noxious outskirts of Barcelona's "industrial belt" and in other cities, such as Tarragona.⁴⁴ Catalan culture was to prove its slow but relentless attraction and integrative strength. Since 1980, the process of Catalanization has deepened with successive laws of linguistic 'normalization' (Roller 2001)

In the Basque case, an oppositional ideology bypassed the cultural dimension. Many immigrants were captivated by nationalist politics in the presence of a high polarization between the nationalist movement and the state as the latter's legitimacy was declining.⁴⁵ This is part of a pattern commonly experienced in conflictive situations (Kriesberg 1998) where the overwhelming power of the state and its relentless oppression of minorities and individuals does in the long run result in its overall fall of legitimacy. Contrary to Catalonia, the Basque provinces had never experienced massive population income prior to

⁴⁴ *Desarrollismo* (fast and savage industrial and urban development) is the nick-name for the last economic phase of Francoism, when the regime devoted itself to unbridled technocratic development as a panacea for all sorts of social and political problems, including the economic gap between North and South. The government's "remedy" to this economic imbalance was initially to encourage inter-regional migrations (Barbancho 1974).

⁴⁵ On the lack of legitimacy of the Spanish state in the Basque Country, see Perez-Agote (1982).

the industrial revolution. Correspondingly, the nationalists had little preparation for, and faith in, integration. Pre-modern local charters or *fueros* deterred non-Basques from settling in the land (Conversi 1997). According to Arana, the immigrants were *maketos* from despised *Maketania* (Spain), that is, fifth columns of the abhorred enemy. For many Catalanists, the immigrants were instead uneducated people who needed human care and full integration into the more European and modern Catalan 'civilization'. Catalonia turned this sense of confidence into a pillar upon which to found its successful drive to turn the immigrants into 'new Catalans'. Arana himself recognized this when he opposed his solipsist philosophy to the Catalan aims (see Conversi 1990, 1997).

From Arana's virulent statements, one is tempted to infer that ethnic conflict between immigrants and natives would be much more acute in the Basque Country. But it was not exactly so. On the contrary, Catalonia has a tormented history of strife between natives and immigrants. This tension reached its peak in 1909 with the anti-Catalan revolt of Alejandro Lerroux (1864-1949). It is important to consider that such anti-Catalan feelings barely depended on the language gap. Periods of great expansion of the Catalan language at the official level were not characterized by particular inter-ethnic strife. The main cause of these strifes consisted in the identification of Catalanism as a pure bourgeoisie product. An often inflexible Catalan bourgeoisie was unable to meet the workers' demands. In contrast, Arana's anti-capitalist emphasis and his stress on social Christianity made him less a target of class hatred than people like the Catalanist millionaire Francesc Camb— (1876-1947). In a period of impetuous social conflicts throughout Europe, Arana's racist statements passed relatively unnoticed in comparison to his visceral anti-capitalist sermons. Moreover, Lerroux's mobs saw the Catalanists as representatives of a surreptitious hidden power, the power of economy and industry, which had few equivalents in Basque nationalism. In the latter case, moderate small bourgeois nationalists were always contrasted by more radical separatists inclined to join common cause with the working class.⁴⁶

Only after World War II was race banished altogether from the nationalist vocabulary. In the aftermath of the Nazi concentration camps, appeals to race became universally discredited and Basque nationalists had to face a most serious challenge in the search for new core values to adopt in its place. From the late 1950s both countries experienced suburban segregation. And both nationalist movements resisted these trends. However, although the aim became the same (the immigrants' incorporation), the tactics were different. Catalan nationalism tried to *attract* the newcomers through the mobilisation of cultural symbols, presenting the language as the final prize of a successful incorporation. Postwar Basque nationalism tried instead to *penetrate* immigrants milieux by voicing their class concern through direct mobilisation of workers and the experimentation of new forms of solidarity. The nationalist struggle with its distant goal

⁴⁶ For instance, Espinosa (1993) claims that the radical nationalist Eli Gallastegi's (1892-1974) identified profoundly with the plight of exploited workers -both immigrants and Basques.

of independence, rather than culture, was proffered as the final prize of successful incorporation.

In Catalonia, attempts at stigmatising and segregating the immigrants were pushed aside by several factors: Firstly, the natives' traditional predisposition to redefine their "ethnic borders" in flexible terms helped to limit ideological segregationism. This implies a remarkable capacity to absorb external cultural elements. Secondly, as working class' leaders and nationalists formed a common front of resistance against Francoism, Catalanism was assumed by relevant fringes of the immigrant proletariat. Thirdly, Catalonia's economic vitality made its original inhabitants into a reference group for the newcomers. Fourthly, the Catalan Autonomous Government (*Generalitat*) more recently took over the main instruments of secondary socialization, particularly education. Since Catalonia has been granted autonomy, Catalan has knocked down most of the remaining resistance to be accepted as a vehicle of high culture (McRoberts 2001). The generalized process of regionalization of the nation-state (Loughlin 2000) has taken on very specific features in Spain, where a centralist apparatus has been dismantled in a relatively short time while saving the country's unity.

Of course, this does not mean that the unchecked power of the state has diminished anywhere. The state is always able to recycle itself in endless ways and impose its arbitrary rules on the acquiescent masses in the name of 'democracy', 'civic society', national security and the like (Pollock 2001). This the state can easily do by continuously inventing and identifying new enemies which justify an increasing concentration of powers in its hands via a constant erosion of individual freedoms. Democracy is never granted -- indeed, for many it remains a chimera. Perhaps the power of the state to suppress any form of dissent has nowadays increased to unprecedented levels, particularly in the fields of culture, media and social control. As argued by *Le Monde Diplomatique's* editor, Ignacio Ramonet, the state is now able to practice, "an affable and gentle but at the same time terrible oppression which makes each of us convince ourselves that the system is right" (cited in Pollock 2001).

But in area where thriving minorities cultures are able to constantly organize public resistance against the inevitable daily abuses of the state, the likelihood of these abuses to spread to all aspects of our lives is certainly minor. In this way a thriving regional culture where immigrants are fully participant may constitute the bedrock for an healthy democracy. In Catalonia and Euskadi, the regional cultures' surviving power, despite centuries of oppression, attests and proves the fraudulent character of the modern nation-state and the ultimate futility of state repression.

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